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L'INFINITO  
 
Sempre caro mi fu quest'ermo colle, 
E questa siepe, che da tanta parte 
 Dell'ultimo orizzonte il guardo esclude. 
Ma sedendo e mirando, interminati 
Spazi di là da quella, e sovrumani 
Silenzi, e profondissima quiete 
Io nel pensier mi fingo; ove per poco 
Il cor non si spaura. E come il vento 
Odo stormir tra queste piante, io quello 
Infinito silenzio a questa voce 
 Vo comparando: e mi sovvien l'eterno, 
E le morte stagioni, e la presente 
E viva, e il suon di lei. Così tra questa 
Immensità s'annega il pensier mio: 
E il naufragar m'è dolce in questo mare.  
 
Giacomo Leopardi, Canti, XII 
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To my family 
 
 
  v 
  
  vi 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between culture and development as reflected in 
the current international debate on human and sustainable development through the 
lens of the EU’s external policy practice. For long time culture has been kept aside 
from the international debate around development, yet, during the last twenty years, 
culture become considered a relevant vehicle to promote human sustainable 
development and nowadays many voices at local and global stages argue for 
recognizing culture as the fourth pillar of sustainable development and call for a 
greater integration of culture into developmental policies. Although culture as a driver 
and enabler of sustainable development is rather peacefully accepted, mainstreaming 
culture within developmental policies is a considerably challenging task. This often 
implies confronting contradictions and tensions, arising, in particular, when culture 
interacts with trade and other aspects of today’s global economy. The debate around 
the need to promote culture as a vehicle for development highlights the need to 
intensify cultural flows at the global level. On the other hand, the unbalanced access 
to global trade and the unfair relationship between developed and developing 
countries raise issues concerning the protection and promotion of less economically 
important cultures. A balance between the interest to foster cultural exchanges and to 
protect cultural diversity needs to be found. The European Union, as a major 
international actor on the international scene, is taking part to the global debate about 
mainstreaming culture in developmental policies. In particular, the Union’s external 
initiatives concerning the role of culture in contributing to sustainable development 
has gained strength since the EU’s ratification of the UNESCO Convention for the 
Protection and Promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions (2008). This thesis 
develops around the following questions: is the EU – as a global actor – carrying out a 
coherent policy when mainstreaming culture as a vector of development in its external 
action? If not, how can the Union improve the mainstreaming of culture as a vector of 
development in order to pursue a more coherent approach? The analysis carried out in 
this research tries to answer this main question by analysing the EU’s action in three 
specific cases dealing with the interaction of culture with development, namely the 
free circulation of cultural goods and services, the mobility of artists and cultural 
professionals, and the protection of traditional knowledge related to the use of genetic 
resources. The thesis demonstrates that, although the inner institutional and 
constitutional features of the EU often hamper the achievement of an overall coherent 
EU policy, the Union is certainly contributing to the shaping of a global governance 
for “culture and development”. The thesis also argues that the overall action of the 
Union could gain added value from a better use of the principle of integration and, 
more broadly, the principles of sustainable development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. BACKGROUND: CULTURE, DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
DEBATE 
 
In a continuously changing world, where the predominant models of 
development are constantly challenged by the limits of nature and global threats like 
famine, poverty and wars, culture is being increasingly recognised as a potential 
vector for a different developmental paradigm, likely to ensure fairness and equity 
and to boost more economically, environmentally, socially and culturally sustainable 
lifestyles. Indeed, since the beginning of civilization, culture has played an important 
role in shaping and influencing the social development of societies. Nevertheless, it is 
only in the last twenty years that the recognition of culture as a positive element for 
development is gaining its place on the global scene. For a long time, culture has been 
kept aside from the international debate around development. If we look at the 
framework of international meetings, conventions and declarations dealing with 
developmental issues, from the 1972 Stockholm Declaration to the 2002 
Johannesburg Summit, they barely mention culture or cultural concerns. On the one 
hand, at the roots of such a gap there is probably the negative perception of the 
relationship between culture and development; that has been largely predominant 
among major economists and policy thinkers. According to this view, culture is 
understood as a set of old beliefs and prejudices, which remain immutable throughout 
time and are the primary causes of underdevelopment and inequalities.1 On the other 
hand, the notion of sustainable development under international law has evolved 
through a sectoral approach, leading to a fragmented set of treaties mainly focusing 
on environmental protection and addressing the relationship between environment and 
the economy The Rio+5 Summit in 1997 enriched the definition of sustainable 
development with the social component, giving form to the well-known three pillar 
structure of development: economy, environment and social development. If a place 
for culture had to be found within the sustainable development model, it could only be 
on the social pillar, since culture is often associated with the elements of the social 
sphere. 
                                                
1 L E Harrison and S P Huntington, (eds), Culture matters: How values shape human progress, (New 
York: Basic Books, 2000). 
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In the last two decades something has changed. The strengthened focus on the 
human dimension of development and the centrality of human rights for improving 
the condition of human beings has paved the way for a greater acknowledgement of 
culture as a vector of development. Within the new broader paradigm known as 
sustainable human development, development is mostly seen as the enhancement of 
human freedoms in a broader sense. The enjoyment of cultural freedoms is, then, 
essential both to ensure and to assess development.2 Further, the contribution of 
culture to development is not only seen in terms of human cultural rights: through the 
lenses of a holistic approach, its multiple interaction with the economic, 
environmental and social pillar of development has been more and more 
acknowledged. Indeed, through the creative and cultural industries, culture promotes 
economic growth and offers opportunities for employment; traditional knowledge, 
which is part of the intangible cultural heritage of local rural communities or 
traditional handicraft, often constitutes environmentally friendly practices for the 
management of lands and natural resources and strengthens the linkages with the 
territory; artistic and creative forms of expression – including cultural goods and live 
performances – spread values that can foster social cohesion and contribute to 
enhance respect of diversities and fundamental rights. 
Within this new trend, several voices among States, scholars and stakeholders 
were raised to claim that culture should be recognised as the fourth pillar of the 
sustainable development paradigm. Such a formal recognition has not yet happened, 
as the most recent declaration “The Future We Want”, issued at the end of the UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development / Rio+20 Summit held in June 2012, shows 
by renewing the global “commitment to sustainable development and to ensuring the 
promotion of an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable future for our 
planet and for present and future generations” (emphasis added).3 Nevertheless, 
several efforts to include cultural concerns into developmental policies have been 
made. If the three pillars definition of sustainable development has not yet changed, 
the growing awareness towards the positive effects of culture on development has 
slowly started to be integrated into international agreements dealing with 
environmental and developmental issues, such as the Convention on Biological 
                                                
2 A Sen, Culture and Development, (World Bank Tokyo meeting, 13 Dec 2001), electronic version 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/6699222/Culture-Development-by-Amartya-Sen. 
3 A/CONF.216/L.1, Point 1.  
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Diversity. Ad hoc initiatives have also been undertaken, such as the UN Resolution on 
Culture and Development adopted in 2011,4 or the creation of specific network for 
civil society and stakeholders like the Agenda 21 for Culture.5 Certainly, among these 
initiatives, the most relevant are those carried out by UNESCO, the UN organisation 
devoted to science, culture, and education. Under the aegis of the UN Decade for 
Culture and Development, in 2001 the UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity 
was adopted, which, for the first time, clearly established a direct connection between 
culture and sustainable development. This first attempt to create a legal framework for 
the integration of culture into developmental policies and strategies was followed by 
the adoption, in 2005, of the UNESCO Convention for the Protection and Promotion 
of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. The 2005 UNESCO Convention is the first 
legally binding instrument that consecrates the link between culture and sustainable 
development in terms of principles and compulsory obligations. Although it addresses 
in a more direct sense the relationship between culture and the economic pillar of 
sustainable development, the 2005 UNESCO Convention requires all Parties to 
further integrate culture in all developmental policies at the international, regional, 
national and local level. In the international framework of global commitments, 
culture no longer seems to be the forgotten dimension of development.  
In spite of all these valuable efforts, the transposition of the concept ‘culture 
for development’ into legal terms and concrete actions is not an easy task. When 
implementing the obligations under the UNESCO Convention a chain of challenges 
and inner contradictions is unveiled. First of all, the 2005 UNESCO Convention 
recognises the need to foster cultural exchanges in order to promote economic growth, 
social and cultural values and contribute to all aspects of human wellbeing. This 
means opening national and regional markets to cultural goods and services, granting 
conditions for developing countries in order to ensure them a fair and equitable access 
to such markets. It also means facilitating the temporary circulation of artists and 
cultural workers, especially those coming from disadvantaged contexts. This 
constitutes a countertrend in the global scenario, where phenomena like cultural 
homogenisation, loss of local cultures and increased migration flows are among the 
                                                
4 UNGA Res 65/166 “Culture and Development”, (28 February 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/166. 
5 Agenda 21 for Culture, www.agenda21culture.net. 
5 United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), Culture: Fourth Pillar of Sustainable Development, 
Policy Statement adopted on 17th November 2010 at the World Summit of Local and Regional Leaders 
– 3rd World Congress of UCLG, held in Mexico (made available at: www.cities-localgovernments.org). 
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major concerns in today’s national agendas. In addition, globalisation has contributed 
to exacerbate the effects of existing asymmetries in international trade and 
inequalities around the world, therefore becoming a threat rather than a chance for 
enhancing cultural exchanges. In practice, this signifies that the unbalanced access to 
global trade and the unfair relationship between developed and developing countries 
raise issues concerning the protection and promotion of less economically important 
cultures. Further, when intensifying cultural flows requires the facilitation of mobility 
of persons, like artists and cultural professionals, the contrast between the different 
interests at stake is even stronger. Fostering the circulation of artists and cultural 
workers from developing countries entails, indeed, entails the opening national 
borders and dealing with migration-related matters. Other issues concern certain 
forms of cultural expressions, such as traditional knowledge, that promote sustainable 
lifestyles and represent cultural identities of local communities in many developing 
countries. They are often also a valuable source of revenues for developed countries’ 
actors. The accent on their economic relevance led to their being protected mainly 
through market-based measures, like patents under IP law, which reflects a Western 
approach and does not take into account the impacts on local models of development. 
Considering the whole landscape, two main opposite trends emerge when 
implementing culture as a vector of development: on the one hand, the need to foster 
mobility of cultural goods, services and persons as well as to further integrate cultural 
aspects into trade agreements and developmental strategies; on the other hand, the 
necessity to limit the effects of free trade on local and national cultures in order to 
preserve diversity and avoid the risk of making culture a mere commodity. In other 
words, the integration of culture into developmental policies encroaches on inner 
tensions belonging to the eternal dilemma between free flows and protectionism. 
In today’s globalised world, the facilitated circulation of people, goods and 
services, the massive migration flows, the technological revolution of means of 
communication have result in increased cultural exchanges. This situation has 
generated uncontrolled and accelerated interactions between culture and other 
policies, such as trade, migration or IP law. Globalisation has demonstrated both the 
synergies and tensions of these interactions, like the advantages for creative industries 
and the risk of homogenisation of cultures, as well as the claim for cultural identity 
within our multiethnic societies.  
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The idea of preventing and mitigating cultural homogenisation without 
hindering cultural exchanges6 is strictly connected to the current debate on the 
promotion of sustainable development. Culture has always been considered as energy, 
inspiration and empowerment for groups and individuals and profoundly contributed 
to their social development7. A balance between the interest in fostering cultural 
exchanges and protecting cultural diversity as well as the specificity of culture needs 
to be found. At different times and levels, a possible solution has been envisaged by 
establishing a special legal treatment for cultural goods and services under 
international trade law, mostly known as the cultural exception clause. However, if 
cultural exceptionalism certainly shows a certain understanding of the special nature 
of cultural goods and services, it does not provide an adequate solution to address and 
reconcile the complex set of challenges and concerns relating to the relationship 
between culture and development.  
 
2. THE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
In the last few years the EU has enormous gained attention on the international 
scene, becoming a major international actor, capable of having a major influence on 
global processes as well as developmental models in third countries. Within the 
framework of its external action, culture has usually played a marginal role. Under 
Article 167(4) TFEU the Union and its Member States committed to “foster 
cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the 
sphere of culture”. However, no explicit connection between culture and 
developmental objectives is made under such a provision. Further, the Treaty of 
Lisbon clearly reiterates that the promotion of a sustainable economic, social and 
environmental development is among the priorities of the Union’s external action 
(Article 21 TUE), but it does not make any reference to the cultural dimension of 
development.  
Despite this lack of reference, the EU’s awareness concerning the role of 
culture in contributing to achieve sustainable development was already nuanced in its 
                                                
6 This concept was also expressed in the UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/26 on the 
“Promotion of the enjoyment of the cultural rights of everyone and respect for different cultural 
identities”.  
7 Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development Our Creative Diversity, UNESCO 
publishing, Paris, 1995  at 11, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001055/105586e.pdf 
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conventions concerning developmental cooperation, and has sensibly grown in the 
last decades. The Cotonou agreement, adopted in 2000, stated that “development 
policy in the area of culture shall aim at integrating the cultural dimension at all levels 
of development policy; at recognising, preserving and promoting cultural values, 
heritage and identities to enable inter-cultural dialogue; at supporting the development 
capacity in this sector, developing cultural industries and enhancing market access 
opportunities for cultural goods and services” (Article 27). Most recently, the EU’s 
ratification in 2008 of the UNESCO Convention for the Protection and Promotion of 
the diversity of cultural expressions marked a significant step for the integration of 
cultural aspects within the Union’s external (and internal) developmental policy. 
Since its entry into force, the Union is committed, on the one hand, to promote 
cultural exchanges as a means to foster development, on the other hand, to ensure the 
protection of cultural diversities in a globalised world.  Following the spirit of the 
UNESCO Convention, the 2007 European Agenda for Culture on a Globalizing 
World places culture at the heart of development and calls for respect of cultural 
diversity. More recently (June 2014), the European Commission published the report  
“Preparatory Action Culture in EU External Relations”, which is the outcome of a 
sixteen-month inquiry that has been the centrepiece of the Preparatory Action 
“Culture in EU External Relations”. It is quite significant that this document opens 
with the following statement: “Strong awareness of the need for a strategy for culture 
in external relations has emerged in Europe over the last few years. The adoption in 
2005 of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions, to which both the EU and its individual Member 
States are Parties, underscored the importance of strengthening Europe’s 
relationships with other regions, notably in the developing world. It also underlined 
the need to enhance the autonomy of the cultural sector and of the cultural and 
creative industries everywhere.”8   
The EU has, then, to face this new global challenge: to foster and facilitate 
cultural exchanges with third countries, and, at the same time, to ensure the protection 
of cultural diversity. If we consider that “development” itself can be considered a 
cultural model, the challenge seems to be doubled: integrating cultural elements 
                                                
8  “Preparatory Action Culture in EU External Relations”, Report prepared for the European 
Commission, published in June 2014. 
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within trade and development policies ought not to turn into the imposition of 
European values and models of development in third countries.  
 
3. SCOPE, METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE THESIS  
 
This thesis develops around the following questions: is the EU – as a global 
actor – carrying out a coherent policy when mainstreaming culture as a vector of 
development in its external action? If not, how can the Union improve the 
mainstreaming of culture as a vector of development in order to pursue a more 
coherent approach? The analysis carried out in this research tries to answer this main 
question. This thesis focuses on the intrinsic tensions and ambiguities that arise when 
mainstreaming culture into developmental policies by analysing the integration of 
culture within the Union’s external action. The choice to select the EU as the case 
study of this research is mainly based on two reasons (besides my personal interest in 
this very peculiar regional organisation with a strong international vocation). First, I 
wanted to understand in more depth what is concretely meant when we try to 
implement the principles and identify the content of “culture as a vector for 
development”: in this sense, the EU offers a very interesting frame for a case study 
thanks to its broad and varied external relations with third countries and international 
organisations. Second, as the EU is among the major international actors today, taking 
part in almost every kind of international processes, and since it is a model of regional 
economic integration for a great number of third countries, the potential level of 
influence that the EU can exercise when implementing the idea of culture as a vector 
for development deserves to be explored. Third, the EU itself needed to grapple with 
the problems of culture and free movement, having undertaken a considerable number 
of commitments in terms of fostering liberalisation and protecting diversity – both by 
being a WTO member and having ratified the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural 
Diversity. Further, the EU is constantly engaged in the international law-making 
process dealing with sustainable development issues, and it is a party to other 
international agreements – such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and its 
Protocol of Nagoya, as we will see later on – which contains relevant provisions 
addressing specific issues of the “culture and development” relationship. 
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While most of the existing literature and research focuses on the growing 
integration of cultural interests within the internal and external EU law and policies or 
on the potential expansion of EU competence in the cultural field, my research 
addresses directly addresses the implementation challenges stemming from the 
integration of culture within the EU’s external action, with a special focus on 
developmental issues. This work looks at the EU’s policy and legal initiatives in the 
cultural sector from a different angle: assuming that the Union is today a recognised 
actor that mainstreams culture in its external relations, my analysis does not question 
whether the Union is more or less competent to act in the cultural sector, rather it 
wants to explore in which terms and to what extent the Union is developing a 
coherent frame of action that mainstreams culture as a means of development. In 
order to do so, the analysis focuses on three specific issues belonging to the “culture 
and development” debate, in which the EU has undertaken initiatives, and that 
interact with other relevant EU policies: 1) fostering the mobility of cultural goods 
and services, which falls under the frame of the Common Commercial Policy 
(Chapter 3); 2) fostering mobility of artists and cultural workers, overlapping both 
with the CCP and migration policy (Chapter 4); 3) ensuring the protection of 
traditional knowledge in vulnerable contexts, falling under the frame of both the 
environmental and the intellectual property external actions (Chapter 5). Although 
these three chapters may appear to concern three single and separated issues, they are 
pieces of the same puzzle and offer a more comprehensive vision of the concrete 
problems at stake. Indeed, one of the greatest challenges of writing this thesis has 
been to draw a connecting line between these three chapters to ensure a coherent and 
comprehensive analysis for the readers. They must be read bearing in mind the 
multidimensional interaction of culture with the three pillars of sustainable 
development (which will be fully discussed in Chapter 1). Indeed, the chapter dealing 
with the circulation of cultural goods and services looks at synergies and tensions 
emerging from the interaction between culture and trade: more circulation of creative 
industries’ products can contribute to economic growth, but also entail the risk of 
increased cultural homogenisation. In the chapter on mobility of artists and cultural 
workers, these last are taken into account in their function of promoters of social 
cohesion and mutual understanding: as we will see, the obstacles deriving from 
migration law and policy often have a negative impact on the potential social effects 
of culture. Finally, the chapter addressing the protection of traditional knowledge 
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acknowledges that certain traditional practices, in particular those belonging to Local 
and Indigenous Communities, are not only central to the survival of cultural diversity, 
but they play a core role in preserving biological diversity and environmental 
integrity. Today, most traditional knowledge is at risk of disappearing. This is also 
due to the increasingly inadequate access to such knowledge, especially those relating 
to the use of genetic resources, demanded by western users and regulated mostly by 
Intellectual Property rules. A fair and equitable access to traditional knowledge and 
the benefits deriving from its use is today urgently needed.  
Focusing on the implementation challenges of the concept “culture for 
development”, the analysis mainly looks at the instruments adopted by the EU in the 
bilateral and multilateral framework. For the bilateral level, particular attention is 
given to the new Economic Partnership Agreements and most recent Free Trade 
Agreements; for the multilateral level, the EU’s position within relevant frames of 
negotiations, such as WTO and WIPO, is taken into account. Each of the three 
chapters is complemented with an in-depth analysis of the international legal and 
policy framework to contextualise the questions at stake and the EU’s position. 
The underlying thesis of this work challenges the idea that trade-based 
instruments can ensure an appropriate path to mainstream culture as a vector of 
development. It also questions the validity of the “cultural exceptionalism” approach, 
while proposing to focus on solutions that can correct the existing asymmetries and 
disparities between developing and developed countries. Finally, the thesis argues that 
to mainstream the integration of cultural elements that will lead to sustainable human 
development, culture cannot be considered predominately as a commodity. When 
looking at the interaction of culture with the economic, environmental, and social 
pillars, it would be important to address them through the lens of a truly integrated 
and systemic approach, which also contemplates the enforcement of human cultural 
rights. The instruments-based analysis of the EU’s external action will demonstrate 
that the European Union’s position in the bilateral and multilateral frame of 
negotiations is often different. In this sense, it is difficult to assert whether the EU is 
implementing a coherent strategy to mainstream culture as a vector of development. 
Nevertheless, such diversity also shows a different understanding of the issues at 
stake at different levels, as well as that the EU is often more willing to dare on the 
bilateral than the multilateral level. 
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In particular, concerning the free flow of cultural goods and services, it will be 
shown that the idea of a cultural exception clause, used within the WTO to exclude 
this sector from opening to further liberalisation, has been almost abandoned at the 
bilateral level in favour of the establishment of ad hoc protocols that facilitate cultural 
movements. The idea of a “special” frame for cultural goods and services remains, as 
if to confirm the recognition of their peculiar nature, but at the same time, the 
necessity to grant better access to developing countries to the international cultural 
market is addressed. However, the analysis will show that the most valuable 
initiatives addressing culture and development often take place under the umbrella of 
trade. The mismatch between the results achieved in external trade and those that 
have failed under other relevant frames, such as the external action concerning 
migration, reveals that ensuring coherence is often critical when the domains fall 
within the competence sphere of the Member States. Constraints on the external 
action of the EU derive from internal limits that characterise the EU’s architecture. 
The bilateral trade frame often offers a chance for a broader margin of action for the 
EU. However, using trade as the most relevant path to promote culture for 
development raises doubts about what kind of approach to sustainable development 
the EU is promoting worldwide.  
After outlining the overall scope and the methodology adopted for this thesis, 
it is equally important to acknowledge some shortcomings affecting this research. 
This work does not cover all the possible fields presenting legal and policy 
challenges. For instance, it does not deal with challenges resulting from the increased 
digitalisation of cultural contents, or the issue of bringing unlawfully exported 
cultural goods back to the country of origin. Nor does the thesis address in depth the 
controversial relationship between human rights, culture, and development. On this 
point, it is important to specify that Chapter 1 takes human rights into account when 
exploring the human development concept, namely to explain the human rights-based 
approach to development. Chapter 1 also briefly explores the role of human cultural 
rights as potential instruments to protect and promote cultural diversity, giving a hint 
of the underlying debate concerning the opposition between cultural relativism and 
the universality of human rights. Unfortunately, there was not enough room and time 
in this thesis to fully address this topic and the brief mention included serves the 
reader to have a broader vision of the whole possible paths that are being discussed to 
ensure an adequate integration of culture within the development discourse. This and 
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other subjects – such as the ones just above mentioned – might fall within those 
controversial and debated aspects concerning the use of culture as a factor of 
development. I am aware that the absence of the analysis of these issues does not 
allow us to reach a fully comprehensive vision of the entire culture and development 
debate. Unfortunately, a thesis’ timeframe does not provide enough space to cover all 
the complex discussions surrounding the culture and development debate. Further, a 
research project is a constant work in progress, and along the way one realises how 
many other different perspectives and paths the research could take. Yet, a choice, in 
terms of time, space and coherence, had to be made and this choice has been based on 
a careful selection of the most relevant case studies both from the angle of the 
“culture and development relationship” and the European Union, as just explained. 
4. THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
The thesis is structured in 6 Chapters: the first two introduce the contents of 
the analysis and outline the major issues and questions at stake; the three central 
chapters explore three specific challenges concerning the implementation of culture 
for sustainable development; the sixth chapter draws together the outcomes of the 
critical analysis carried out and tries to make an overall assessment of the Union’s 
initiative, as well as to propose possible solutions wherever appropriate. 
Chapter 1 outlines the debate about culture and development, clarifies basic 
notions, such as “culture” and “sustainable development”, and breaks down the 
binomial “culture for development” into concrete issues. The chapter gives an 
appraisal of the two major views of  “culture and development”: a negative vision, 
that sees culture as an element hindering development, and a positive one, that looks 
at culture as a factor enhancing development. The chapter also traces the difference 
between the two theoretical concepts of “cultural development” and “culture for 
development”. Indeed, while “cultural development” can be seen as one of the 
outcomes of developmental strategies,  “culture for development” mainly refers to the 
manifold ways in which culture can contribute to economic, environmental, social and 
cultural development. This distinction sheds light on the current debate discussing the 
need to ascertain culture as the fourth pillar of the sustainable development paradigm. 
Finally, the interaction of culture with economic, environmental, and social aspects is 
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analysed through legal and policy lenses, which underline what major tensions arise 
when mainstreaming culture within developmental policy.  
Chapter 2 looks at the EU as a relevant international actor within the “culture 
and development” debate by assessing the existence of the EU’s external competences 
in this area. It tries to shape, then, the notion of sustainable development and the 
notion of culture adopted and/or promoted by the EU, both within the Treaties and 
other secondary legislation or policy documents. Finally, it explores whether 
synergies or tensions between the EU culture and development policy, as well as 
other EU policies – namely trade, migration and intellectual property law – are 
acknowledged by the Union’s institutions.  
Chapter 3 deals with one aspect concerning cultural flows: the free circulation 
of cultural goods and services. The chapter focuses on the debate within the WTO and 
explores the tensions between the need to achieve further liberalisation to promote the 
circulation of cultural goods and services, and the opposite: exempting cultural goods 
and services from the implementation of free trade rules. It looks at the adoption of 
the UNESCO Convention on the diversity of cultural expressions as a possible tool to 
counterbalance the effects of WTO rules. It focuses, then, on the bilateral level, in 
particular the recent EPAs and FTAs. The adoption of a specific protocol on cultural 
cooperation constitutes an innovative action within the bilateral trade relations of the 
EU with third countries. 
In Chapter 4 fostering cultural flows is explored through the perspective of the 
mobility of artists and cultural professionals. This issue touches upon the sensitive 
policy area of migration. The difficulties encountered by artists and cultural 
professionals in crossing frontiers can be compared to those faced by most economic 
migrants. The chapter proposes an analysis of the mobility of artists and cultural 
workers through the lenses of the migration and development nexus. It looks at the 
practical initiatives enacted by the Union under both trade and migration policies. 
Once more, trade instruments seem to be more efficient, while the human and cultural 
dimensions of the whole subject seem to be overlooked. 
Chapter 5 addresses the relationship between traditional knowledge and 
development and the complications deriving from adopting intellectual property 
measures to protect traditional knowledge. Although the protection of traditional 
knowledge is not an important issue within the European context, at the international 
level this subject is today highly debated, at least as far as it concerns the protection of 
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traditional knowledge connected to the use of natural and genetic resources. The EU 
is involved in this worldwide discussion, both under the WIPO and WTO umbrella. 
The analysis looks at the EU position within the multilateral framework, as well as at 
the actions undertaken under the bilateral frame.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: OUTLINING THE DEBATE 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1) Culture and development: a theoretical framework 
 
The first part of this chapter will provide a picture of the theoretical debate 
underlying the shift from a negative to a positive vision of the interplay between 
culture and development. Since these two approaches are strictly connected with the 
understanding of what “development” and “culture” mean, it will be necessary to 
trace the evolution of these two concepts and to clarify which basic notions are 
adopted for the purposes of this analysis. I will attempt to outline the distinction 
between the concepts of “culture and development” and “cultural development”, 
which are often conflated. This thesis focuses on “culture and development”: to make 
clear the distinction between the two concepts our analysis will begin by addressing 
the opportunities and tensions stemming from the use of culture as a vector of 
development. The second part of the chapter will look at the interaction between 
culture and development from a legal and policy perspective. The analysis will focus 
on three specific case studies and in turn the relevant international legal contexts will 
be taken into consideration.  
 
1.1) From a negative to a positive vision of the role of culture: a theoretical 
framework 
 
Until only recently the scientific, political, and academic debates around 
developmental issues had dedicated little attention to culture and its relationship to 
development. In general, development has been mainly conceived of as a matter of 
“numbers” or “modernism”, and thus a prerogative for economists, scientists and 
technologists. Policy makers – in particular, economists and lawyers – and major 
actors engaged in debates over development have greatly overlooked the possibility to 
consider culture as a positive factor to boost development. When attention has been 
granted to the connections between culture and development, it has tended to stress 
the negative impact of culture for developmental process. Over the last few decades 
this trend has declined and a growing interest towards the “culture and development” 
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dynamic has arisen. Culture is no longer considered a field of study exclusively for 
artists, sociologists or anthropologists: today economists, politicians, and most of the 
actors involved in developmental thinking recognise the need for a more 
interdisciplinary approach to take better account of cultural factors in policies and 
programmes.  
 
1.1.1) The negative vision  
“Some may find it incongruous that two economists  
who work for the World Bank are editing a book  
about culture. It reflects an increasing recognition of  
the centrality of cultural process to the reproduction of  
inequality and human ill-being among  
development policy makers and economists.” 
V. Rao and M. Walton, Culture and Public Action, (2004) 
 
 
With this provocative statement two famous economists – Rao and Walton – 
sum up the negative approach towards cultural interactions with development1 that 
prevailed for most of the past century. As recalled above, economists and policy-
makers have mainly inspected the influence of culture on development from a rather 
sceptical standpoint. Such a diffident approach never denied the existence of potential 
connections between culture and economic performances; after all, Max Weber was 
among the first influential scholars and economists to recognise that “culture 
matters”.2 Nevertheless, culture – mostly perceived as a set of inner values and 
attitudes traditionally guiding populations – was perceived as an element hindering 
the realisation of economic, political and social changes. Since the Industrial 
Revolution, the Western idea of “development” put economic, institutional, and social 
reforms at the heart of the path towards development. To put it another way: 
development could only be achieved through a process of “modernisation” involving 
                                                
1 V Rao and M Walton (eds), Culture and Public Action, (Stanford University Press, 2004). 
2 Max Weber put cultural values and ethics (typical of Protestantism) at the heart of his economic 
analysis. The Weberian analysis of the role of values in the emergence of capitalism is still of 
considerable interest for the contemporary world. For a commentary on this: D Landes, ‘Culture Makes 
Almost All the Difference’, in L E Harrison and S P Huntington, (eds), Culture matters: How values 
shape human progress, (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 2-13. 
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institutions, the economy and society; therefore calling for cultural changes as well. 
Culture, understood by economists and other social scientists as a static set of 
traditions and beliefs, immutable throughout time, represents the old heritage of the 
past that constitutes an obstacle for progress and “modernisation”. To use Davis 
Landes’ words: “culture frightens scholars”.3 
This negative approach towards the interaction between culture and 
development has been mainly built upon the evidence that certain traditional cultural 
rules induce social and gender inequalities, like the subjugation of women or the 
differentiation of enjoyable rights according to ethnic background, others justify the 
use of violent practices and body mutilations on human beings, which deny human 
dignity and all respect of human rights. In these cases, cultural values and beliefs 
certainly hamper the promotion of social, political and institutional reforms and are a 
threat to democracy and social justice. It is well known that in countries where the 
cultural context favours anti-democratic regimes or allows racial and gender 
discrimination, challenges like poverty, inequality, or the violations of fundamental 
freedoms remain unresolved. Culture can also negatively affect the maintenance of 
peace and security: recent centuries have witnessed the rise of intercultural and 
multiethnic conflicts in the name of cultural diversity. According to some, the 
struggle for the affirmation of ethnic, religious and cultural identity is the major cause 
of wars, national instability, and difficult international relations in our times.4  
Obviously culture, and cultural issues, can impinge in different ways on 
developmental patterns, which may lead to negative or positive effects.5 Yet, to assert 
that culture can, for the most part, be an adverse factor for developmental mechanisms 
is overly reductive. Indeed, such an analysis has two major shortcomings: it relies on 
a narrow notion of “culture” and an outdated understanding of “development”.  
As for the notion of “culture”, this negative approach looks at culture solely in 
terms of values, beliefs and ethical behaviours, which remain immutable throughout 
time and incapable of inspiring new processes. Instead, the notion of culture is a much 
                                                
3 D Landes (n 2), 2. 
4 S P Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Free Press, 1996). 
5 For a collection of case studies on negative and positive examples: Harrison L E and Berger P L 
(eds), Developing Cultures: Case Studies, (Routledge, 2006); and L E Harrison and S P Huntington, 
(eds), Culture matters, (n  2). On the interactions between culture and development and the ambiguity 
of the role of culture in societies, see also: I Vitanyi, “Development and Culture: the New Concepts”, 
3-17 and E Laszlo “The Role of Culture in Development”, 19-32, both in E Laszlo and I Vitanyi (eds.), 
European Culture and World Development, (Pergamon Press, 1985). 
  18 
broader concept, including both material and immaterial components, whose 
capability to change and evolve according to times and place makes it a very fluid 
concept. The complexity of the notion of culture will be explored further in the 
following paragraph, yet it is important to underline here that this intrinsic complexity 
is reflected in a great variety of different interconnections with social, political and 
economic aspects of people’s lives. The great economist Amartya Sen is among the 
most authoritative voices to acknowledge that achieving an adequate understanding of 
cultural interconnections is an inescapably complex endeavour, nonetheless he 
recognises the importance of examining these diverse interrelations by “paying 
attention to their disparate nature and  relevance” in order to understand the multiple 
ways in which culture can be considered a means for development. 6 We may assert, 
then, that the branch of economic analysis investigating the influences of cultural 
values on behaviour, and their contribution to the process of  economic and social 
development – also known as “behavioural studies” – is only one of the various ways 
through which the interrelations between culture and development can be explored.  
As for the notion of “development”, the tendency to see culture as a hindrance 
for development appears to be largely based on the traditional understanding of 
development as primarily involving economic growth. Social, cultural, and political 
issues of societies, although important, are treated separately at different stages:  
either as instrumental for achieving economic progress, or as externalities to take into 
account when implementing economic policies. According to this view, development 
is achieved through specific economic programmes and concrete actions such as 
building roads, schools, or telecommunications systems.7  Within this traditional 
vision there is little room for considering culture as a vector of development, except in 
the form of education –building schools and helping to reform educational systems in 
order to fight illiteracy. 
 
1.1.2) Moving towards a positive vision 
 
                                                
6 A Sen, Culture and Development, (World Bank Tokyo meeting, 13 Dec 2001), electronic version 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/6699222/Culture-Development-by-Amartya-Sen. 
7 D D Bradlow, ‘Differing conceptions of development and the content of International Development 
Law’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 47, 53. 
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In recent decades the predominant trend to see culture as hindering 
development has much changed: nowadays, there is a growing interest towards 
exploring the positive influence culture may have on developmental dynamics. This 
shift is connected to the considerable evolution of the concept of development that has 
gradually occurred (as it will be further discussed in the following paragraph 1.3). The 
traditional understanding of development has been strongly questioned since the 
1980s, when political scientists and anthropologists started to deconstruct the 
development discourse while criticising the “aid to development” strategy put in place 
by Western governments and Institutions in developing countries.8 In his major work 
The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development”, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic 
Power in Lesotho, the anthropologist James Ferguson challenges the concept of 
“development” as a universal one and argues that, like the word “civilization” in the 
19th century, “development” is used as an interpretive prism to identify Southern 
Countries. 9  While recalling that ‘different people mean different things by 
“development”’, Ferguson acknowledges that the “development discourse” is often 
defined as “problematic” but never really questioned. When it is challenged, it is 
mostly in the name of real development, as if to confirm that “development” is an 
unquestionable truth and a value shared by all. His social analysis of developmental 
projects in Lesotho demonstrates that the “development discourse does operate within 
a familiar broad contemporary configuration of Western knowledge […] [a]nd it is 
easy to trace the lineage of many of its characteristic lines of thought – from 
modernization theory, for instance, or neo-classical economics”.10 In this sense, the 
idea of “development” is very much outlined as a dominant cultural model that aims 
at perpetuating Western forms of colonisation, rather than empowering people.11 
According to Ferguson’s deconstructionist analysis, “development” is a cultural 
model to engage with important issues like poverty, hunger, and rights-deprived 
                                                
8 The emphasis on the word “deconstruct” is to refer to the form of philosophical and literary analysis 
known as deconstruction, whose major father is the philosopher Jacques Derrida. This approach is used 
to assert that words and metaphysical concepts do not have just one meaning and that their meaning 
depends on ultimately arbitrary signifiers. In the 1980s, this method of critical analysis gained ground 
in diverse areas of humanities and social sciences, including law, anthropology, linguistics, and 
political studies. It was also used to criticise the idea of development.  
9 J Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine. “Development”, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in 
Lesotho, (University of Minnesota Press, 1994). 
10 Ibidem, 67. 
11 James Ferguson audaciously asserts that governments and governmental agencies do not really wish 
to enable and foster the process of popular empowerment, which may lead to political and social 
transformation. 
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people in the Third World, but it is far from being the only possible answer. In the 
same vein, Arturo Escobar, who sees “development” as a cultural invention used as 
“mechanism of control” to maintain the unbalanced relationship between North and 
South, calls for the identification of alternatives for a post-development era.12 While 
he provocatively asserts that “to think about alternatives in the manner of sustainable 
development, for instance, is to remain within the same model of thought that 
produced development and kept it in place”,13 Escobar stresses the importance of 
focusing on cultural differences as a key element for discerning alternatives to 
capitalism and modernity in their hegemonic form. Escobar sees in the resistance of 
certain minority cultural situations the possibility for “other ways of building 
economies, of dealing with basic needs, of coming together into social groups”.14  
Although highly philosophical, and perhaps somewhat unrealistic, the merit of 
this deconstructive critique of the development discourse is that it interprets the 
relationship between culture and development through a different lens. First, it makes 
clear that the traditional idea of “development” – mainly corresponding to the 
Western neo-liberal model – is itself a cultural prototype, which may or may not work 
when applied to different (cultural) contexts. For this reason it is necessary to take 
local and cultural differences into account when building developmental strategies. 
These cultural differences, not intended as static but as transformed and 
transformative forces, can contribute to shape different meanings of development able 
to better address local needs and give value to different social and economic 
opportunities. 
On a less theoretical level, the quest for alternative models of development has 
been also raised within international institutional fora. The failure of the neo-liberalist 
models, the unsuccessful global fight to eradicate poverty and inequality, and the 
environmental emergency have shown the interconnection of the economic system 
with the environmental, social and cultural spheres. Since the 1992 UN Conference 
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, a less econometric and more 
holistic concept of development has started to become popular. A new definition of 
development was proposed in Rio: the idea of a “sustainable development”, which 
could work in harmony with the ecosystem and enable future generations to satisfy 
                                                
12 A Escobar, Encountering Development: the making and unmaking of the third world, (Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
13 Ibidem, 232. 
14 Ibidem, 225. 
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their needs.15 In the following years, many major scholars, under the aegis of the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), have forged the concept of “human sustainable 
development”. Based on the assertion that development requires more than economic 
growth alone, the adjective human switches the focus to the human dimension of this 
process, which is concerned with aspects of human life, such as access to education, 
healthcare, and the enjoyment of social and cultural rights.16  
Although culture mainly sits on the sidelines, these ways of re-thinking 
development open the door for the recognition of its positive contribution. Most 
International Organisations and NGOs dealing with developmental policies now 
acknowledge that culture has always played a fundamental role in human 
development and the evolution of societies: contributing to shape minds, behaviours, 
and creativity. In particular, during the 1970s and 1980s, UNESCO, the UN agency 
devoted to education, science and culture, promoted a series of intergovernmental 
Conferences on Cultural Policies, which emphasised the role of culture as an integral 
part of world development and invited States to engage in adopting long-term policies 
to foster cultural development in all related fields (such as education, communication, 
art, heritage, environment, democracy, participation of civil society, etc.).17 The 
second World Conference, held in Mexico in 1982 and known as MONDIALCULT, 
adopted a declaration (the Mexico City Declaration) stressing the need to ensure 
cultural pluralism as a means of enrichment18 and launched the UN Decade for 
Cultural Development, whose aim was to ascertain the cultural dimension of 
development and the connections between culture, development and democracy. 19 In 
the report Our Creative World, released in 1995 within the framework of the Decade 
by the World Commission on Culture and Development, culture is defined as energy, 
inspiration, and empowerment for individuals, groups and societies, and looks at 
                                                
15 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, UN Report A/CONF.151/26. 
16  S Fukuda-Parr, and AK Shiva Kumar (eds.), Handbook of Human Development: Concepts, 
Measures, and Policies, (Oxford University Press, 2009). Both the notion of “sustainable 
development” and “human development” will be treated further in the following paragraphs.  
17 The first of the World Conferences on Cultural Policies was held in Venice in 1970. It was followed 
by a cycle of regional conferences (Europe, 1972; Asia 1973; Africa, 1975; Latin America 1978), 
which ended up to the second World Conference in Mexico in 1982, known as MONDIALCULT. For 
more details on this: K Stenou (ed.), UNESCO and the Issue of Cultural Diversity-Review and Strategy 
1946-2004, (UNESCO Division of Cultural Policies and Intercultural Dialogue, Paris, 2004). 
18 Mexico City Declaration, UNESCO Doc. CLT/MD/1, 1982, World Conference on Cultural Policies 
(MONDIACULT) in Mexico City, Mexico.  
19 Proclamation of the World Decade for Cultural Development (1988-1997), UNGA Res 41/187 (8 
December 1986). 
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cultural diversity as an inherent element of sustainable development.20 In 2005, 
UNESCO adopted the Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions, which is based on a broad concept of development and 
establishes a clear duty for the Parties to include culture in all developmental 
policies.21 Similarly, other agencies and international organisations working in fields 
related to development have started to adopt a broader vision of development and to 
advocate for the beneficial effect of culture to achieve a more qualitative 
development.22 Yet, it was only in 2011 that the UN General Assembly adopted a 
specific Resolution on “Culture and Development”, which recognises that “culture is 
an essential component of human development, represents a source of identity, 
innovation and creativity” and “is an important factor in the fight against poverty, 
providing for economic growth and ownership of development processes”.23 Today, 
some argue that culture should be considered the fourth pillar of the sustainable 
development paradigm.24 This theory will be explored further at a later stage in this 
chapter, yet it is worth mentioning here to show that the vision of culture as a positive 
vector of development has gained enormous ground. 
As discussed above, this acknowledgment has not always been easily 
accepted. Besides the reasons described, the fact that both the notion of “culture” and 
“development” are rather difficult and often contested has certainly contributed. Thus, 
the next step of my analysis will be to clarify the notions of “culture” and 
“development”.  
 
 
                                                
20 Our Creative World, Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, CLT-96/WS-6 
(1996). 
21 Art. 13 of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, adopted by the 33rd Session of the General Conference of UNESCO, Paris 20 Oct 2005. 
The 2005 UNESCO Convention will be further discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
22 For example, similarly to Our creative world, the UNDP 2004 Human Development Report 
Freedom in a Diverse World, focused on culture and cultural diversity and stated that development is 
not only about economic wealth, but is also about the possibility for all people to have a satisfying and 
valuable life.  
23 UNGA Res 65/166 “Culture and Development”, (28 February 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/166. 
24 Among the others, see: J Hawkes, The fourth pillar of sustainability: culture’s essential role in 
public planning, (Common Ground Publishing Pty Ltd in association with the Cultural Development 
Network (Vic), 2001). 
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1.2 The notion of culture  
1.2.1) Culture as heritage, creativity and way of life 
 
“The notion of culture is everywhere invoked  
and virtually nowhere explained”25 
 
Providing a precise and univocal definition of “culture” is no easy task and no 
agreements under international law contain a universal definition. This is due to the 
fact that “culture” is per se a dynamic process, which continuously changes and does 
not have precise boundaries. Furthermore, as “culture” is a cross-cutting subject that 
interacts with a wide range of different disciplines, such as law, economics, and 
sociology, its meaning is often drafted according to the relevant purpose of the 
context. There is also a great degree of ambiguity in understanding when culture 
refers to the means or to the end: for instance, culture is both the source of education 
and the product of the educational process. Because of the manifold ways in which 
culture manifests itself and is understood, to give a unified definition of the word 
“culture” would not only be difficult, but also rather inappropriate.26 
An historical excursus dealing with the origin of the word “culture” and the 
evolution of the concept over time may help to advance a comprehensive 
understanding of the notion. Etymologically, the Latin word cultura derives from the 
agricultural context and referred to the action of cultivating the land, in order to make 
it fertile and grow plants.27 The word was used metaphorically by Latin authors, such 
as Horace and Cicero, to refer to the development and exercise of the intellectual 
capabilities of human beings. Conversely, the analogous Greek word had a broader 
meaning and referred to both intellectual and physical exercise, as well as to 
education. Over the centuries, the extensive Greek notion of “culture” was dismissed 
and the classic notion mainly came to refer to the “highest intellectual achievements 
of human beings”.28 Indeed, this is the traditional understanding of culture and, in 
                                                
25 N Mezey “Law as Culture”, in A Sarat and J Simon. (eds.), Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies and 
the Law: moving beyond legal realism, (Duke University Press, 2003), 37. 
26 The concept of culture is still a widely discussed and contested topic in social and legal sciences. 
See: P Rossi. (ed.), Il Concetto di cultura, (Einaudi, 1970). 
27  Fratelli Fabbri (ed.), Nuova Enciclopedia Universale, Vol. V,(F.lli Fabbri, 1984), 2611.  
28 Ibidem, p. 2611. See also: L V Prott “Cultural Rights as Peoples Rights in International Law”, in J 
Crawford (ed.), The Rights of Peoples, (Clarendon Press, 1998), 94. 
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modern times, it refers to literacy and artistic productions, including fine arts, 
literature, music, and all those works inspired and produced by creative activities.  
This humanistic sense of culture implies at least two other declinations of the 
word: “culture as heritage” and “culture as creativity”. The first declination indicates 
the entirety of historical monuments, works of art and traditional handicrafts that 
embed cultural values and contribute to shape the identity of nations and people, also 
known under International Law as the “cultural heritage of humankind”.29 The second 
declination – “culture as creativity” – refers to the process of artistic creation and 
intellectual production. Creativity usually translates as artistic performances and 
output, such as dancing, theatre, music, literature, etc., which are identified as cultural 
goods and services. Today, thanks to the introduction of new technologies in the field 
of arts and creativity, the category “cultural goods and services” also encompasses 
new products of creative industries, such as film, television, and radio broadcasting.30 
In both cases the material element of culture is key, in other words, the focus 
is on the externalisation (or the objectification) of cultural manifestations. Although, it 
is undeniable that we cherish these cultural objects for the values, ideas and history 
they embed. The material side of culture is, then, strictly connected to its intangible 
component. Over the last century, under the influence of social sciences – in 
particular ethnology and anthropology – the notion of culture evolved significantly in 
order to reconcile the material and immaterial dimensions. During the nineteenth 
century, anthropologists focused their research on primitive societies and their habits, 
techniques of exchange and traditional customs, with the aim of reaching a unitary 
concept of culture. According to anthropologists, “culture” means the sum of all 
material and spiritual activities and products of a given society, all the beliefs, 
knowledge, rites, customs, laws and arts that distinguish one social group from other 
                                                
29 The concept of the “cultural heritage of mankind” first appeared in the 1954 Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. Nowadays the notion has expanded 
and also encompasses natural elements (such as landscapes and seas), see the 1972 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Some authors have pointed 
out that a universal definition of “cultural heritage” is nowhere written, but each Convention (or other 
legal instrument) dealing with it has a definition drafted for the purpose of that instrument alone. See: 
V L Prott and P J O’Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, Vol I, (Professional Book, 1984), 8. On the 
difficulty to define “cultural heritage” under International Law: J Blake, “On Defining the Cultural 
Heritage”, (2000) 49 International And Comparative Law Quarterly, 61. 
30 In Western countries, debates over this broad understanding of cultural goods and services led to a 
distinction between “high” and “low” culture: the latter refers to popular culture as the results of 
modern cultural industries (pop-music, pop-stars, etc.); the first refers to “culture d’élite”. See: R 
Stavenhagen, “Cultural Rights: a Social Science Perspective”, in Institute for Art and Law (ed.) 
Cultural Rights and Wrongs, (UNESCO Publishing, 1998,), 5. 
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similar groups.31 In other words, “culture” is a  “total way of life”. This broader 
understanding of culture, which relies on the social role of culture as a symbolic 
element of continuity for communities, contributed to re-shape the concept of “culture 
as heritage”. 32 Indeed, it introduced the idea of “living culture” as a comprehensive 
notion of all those traditions, values, religions, symbols and practices that contribute 
to express and manifest the identity of a society. Today, cultural heritage 
encompasses the material dimension of culture (cultural goods and services), as well 
as the intangible dimension (traditional knowledge, customs, popular cultural 
manifestations, folk music and dances, traditional agricultural ways, languages, 
religion, etc.).33   
As summarised above, culture can be identified with a great variety of ideas, 
depending upon the lenses through which we look at the concept (e.g.: culture as 
values, culture as education, culture as religion, etc.). Heritage, creativity, and way of 
life are the relevant working definitions for the purpose of this analysis.  
 
1.2.2) Culture, cultural diversity and identity in a globalised world 
 
Culture also means identity, a subject that is directly connected to the notion 
of cultural diversity. In recent years much attention has been given to the need to 
preserve and protect diversity for healthy and balanced societies.  
The influence of the anthropologists’ analysis brought about a shift from a 
rather elitist concept of culture to a more pluralist idea, which takes into account the 
individual and collective dimension of culture, as well as the subjective dimension 
given by feelings, behaviours and ways of thinking.34 This broad knowledge of culture 
                                                
31 Among the rich variety of authors on this concept, see: E B Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches in 
the Development of Mithology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art and Custom, (London, 1920); C 
Lévi-Strauss, La pensée sauvage, (Paris, 1962). 
32 F Francioni, “Culture, Heritage and Human Rights: An Introduction”, in F Francioni and M Scheinin 
(eds.), Cultural Human Rights, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 14. 
33 For a legal definition of intangible heritage, see Art. 2 of the 2003 UNESCO Convention on the 
Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, partially quoted here: “For the purposes of this 
Convention, 1. The ‘intangible cultural heritage’ means the practices, representations, expressions, 
knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated 
therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural 
heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly 
recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature 
and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for 
cultural diversity and human creativity.” 
34 R O’Keefe,“The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life under Article 15 of the ICESCR”, (1998) 47 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 905, 913. 
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raised awareness about the fact that there is not one culture but many. According to 
Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism, this plurality of cultures is the way through which social 
groups and communities evolve and develop: it is a natural phenomenon deriving 
from the direct or indirect interactions between societies.35 This concept implies the 
idea of cultural change as an endemic element of societies: culture is not static, it is a 
dynamic process intimately linked to the social space in which social actors interact. 
This interaction causes cultures to exist, adapt, change, or disappear in the course of 
time. To return to the theoretical debate that opened this chapter, it is this capability of 
continuously adapting that makes culture a potential positive factor for development: 
culture becomes, indeed, a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, useful to 
achieve social and economic improvements. 
The modern “what is culture?” debate no longer aims at achieving a 
homogenous idea of culture, rather it recognises that culture is a complex and 
constantly evolving process which results in a plurality of cultures, or cultural 
diversity. Under the current landscape of international conventions, UNESCO defines 
cultural diversity as the “the manifold ways in which the cultures of groups and 
societies find expression” which “is made manifest […] through […] diverse modes 
of artistic creation, production, dissemination, distribution and enjoyment, whatever 
the means and technologies used”.36 Further, the UNESCO Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity, adopted in 2001, by affirming that this cultural diversity is part of the 
richness of our humanity, widens the range of everyone’s options, and “is as 
necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature”,37 acknowledges the link 
between culture and development. It is interesting to note that UNESCO, while 
defining cultural diversity as “one of the roots of development” points out that 
development is “understood not simply in terms of economic growth, but also a 
                                                
35 Discussing about the concepts of race and civilization, Claude Lévi-Strauss writes: “[…] la vie de 
l’humanité […] ne se développe pas sous le régime d’une uniforme monotonie, mais à travers des 
mode extraordinairement diversifiés de sociétés et de civilizations; cette diversité intellectuelle, 
esthétique, sociologique, n’est unie par aucune relation de cause à effet à celle qui existe sur le plan 
biologique […] elle lui est seulement parallèle sur un autre terrain”, C Lévi-Strauss, Race et Histoire, 
(Edition Gonthier, 1961).at 11. 
36 Art. 4 of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, references above (n 21). 
37 Art. 1 of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted by the 31st Session of 
the General Conference of UNESCO, Paris 2 Nov 2001. 
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means to achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual 
existence”.38 
In our globalised ever-changing world where societies become increasingly 
multicultural, cultural diversity is under several threats. On the one hand, 
globalisation and digitalisation have generated uncontrolled and accelerated 
interactions between culture and other sectors, such as trade and law, which are 
leading to a sort of global cultural homogenisation. On the other hand, the difficulty 
of accommodating diversity in our societies creates social tensions and hostilities. In 
both cases, there is an increasing claim for preserving cultural diversity as a means to 
protect cultural identity. As we will see in the course of this analysis, these tensions 
are at the heart of the culture and development dichotomy. 
 
1.3) The notion of development 
 
            1.3.1) From economic growth to sustainable development 
 
As previously stated, institutions and governments have traditionally 
understood development as economic growth, to be achieved through increasing 
production and trade activity. Great attention was given to the relationship between 
human beings and economic growth: poverty could be overcome through growth, and 
this would be the key for humanity’s wellbeing.39 In general, the Western neo-liberal 
developmental model assumed that if the economy grows, eventually all would 
benefit.40 As we have seen above, since the 1980s this traditional understanding has 
been strongly attacked. Evidence that there are still well-developed and non-
developed regions in the world, the negative impact of industrialisation for the 
environment, and the acknowledgment that economic growth does not always trigger 
the respect of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental freedoms, calls for alternative 
and more holistic models of development.  
Starting again from the etymology of the word, “development” literally means 
a progressive process towards improvements or change. Improvement is not only a 
                                                
38 Art. 3 of the Declaration.  
39 B Hopwood, M Mellor and G O’Brien, “Sustainable Development: Mapping Different Approaches”, 
(2005) 13 Sustainable Development, 38. 
40 D Dollar and A Kraay Growth is Good for the Poor, (World Bank, 2000). 
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matter of quantity, but also – if not mainly – a question of quality. Therefore, a 
progressive process towards improvements cannot only be about economic growth as 
quantitative results, but implies also qualitative goals.41 Further, every progressive 
process does not stand alone, but depends upon the interaction of several elements 
that are not disconnected from the rest of the world and generate externalities likely to 
affect other lives (or systems).  
The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development defines development as “a 
comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the 
constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals 
on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in 
the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom”.42 In spite of this all-embracing 
definition, for a long time development was not considered a complex process 
connected to other dimensions: indeed, the interdependence of economic growth and 
the environment and its consequences on ecosystems, as well as with the social and 
cultural sphere, have been mostly ignored. In the 1970s, under the influence of the 
ecologist and environmentalist conservation movements, awareness was raised about 
the fact that growth is not unlimited and is very much dependent on natural resources 
– which are finite and in great demand by human beings.43 The recognition from the 
scientific community that irresponsible industrialisation has negative impacts on the 
environment and heavily affects climate change also contributed to stir the global 
audience and in 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) was created.44 The WCED released the document Our Common Future, 45 
also known as the Brundtland Report, which introduced the idea of a sustainable 
development, subsequently reaffirmed at the UN Conference on Environment and 
                                                
41 H Daly, “Sustainable growth: an impossibility theorem”, in H Daly and K Townsend (eds), Valuing 
the Earth: Economics, Ecology Ethics, (MIT Press,1993). 
42 Preamble of the Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA resolution 41/128 (4 December 
1986). 
43 This strong concern about environmental issues gained international attention with the 1972 United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), held in Stockholm, which ended with the 
“Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment”. The Declaration is a statement of principles, 
among which principle 14 recognises the need to reconcile the conflicts between the needs of 
development and the need to protect and improve the environment. See: Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on Human Environment, UNGA A/CONF.151/26  
44 The WCED was a mixed international group made up by experts on environment, development, 
politicians and civil servants, whose mandate was to propose long-term environmental strategies for 
achieving sustainable development. UNGA 38/161 Res (1983).  
45 Our Common Future, UNGA Res 42/187. 
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Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.46 According to the Brundtland Report, 
sustainable development “meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. This definition recognises the 
dependency of humans on natural resources to satisfy their needs – giving priority to 
the needs of the poor – and understands wellbeing in a much wider sense than merely 
economic. The Brundtland Report points out the interconnections of human activities 
with the environment and the fact that actions and impacts are not only local, but 
regional and global: environmental problems threaten people’s health and livelihoods, 
hinder access to food, can cause instability and wars and compromise future 
generations’ lives. Therefore, sustainable development should be built on the more 
responsible action of human beings towards the entire planet, which requires 
increased participation of civilians and local stakeholders and the assessment of 
environmental and social impacts of human activities. Business and governmental 
actors should also be socially responsible when taking initiatives that can have 
externalities on the environment, ensure equity in benefit sharing, and a fair access to 
resources. Based on three components – economic, environmental, and social – the 
model of development proposed by the Brundtland Report focuses on qualitative and 
responsible growth, rather than quantitative growth. This has been codified under 
international environmental law through new principles and obligations, such as the 
integration of environmental protection in development policies, the precautionary 
principle, the sustainable use of natural resources, conservation strategies, etc.47 
Further, the principle of equal access to benefit-sharing, “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” for developed and developing countries, inter-generational and intra-
generational equity, and social accountability of private and public actors recall the 
social component of this new developmental paradigm. 
Although this paradigm certainly represents a more holistic way of thinking 
about development, several critics have pointed out that the accent is still on growth – 
namely understood as economic growth.48 Qualitative aspects seem to be reduced to 
the possibility of being able to achieve economic growth in the future, whereas 
                                                
46 Rio Declaration, cit (n 15). 
47 See the 27 principles of the Rio Declaration (n 15). For a history of the birth and evolution of 
sustainable development under international law: N Schrijver, The Evolution of Sustainable 
Development in International Law: Inception, Meaning and Status, (Martinus Nijhoff Publisher 2008). 
48 See, for instance, Serge Latouche, who argues that societies of growth are not sustainable and 
advocates for a downscaling of production and consumption: S Latouhce, Le pari de la décroissance, 
(Librairie Arthème Fayard/Pluriel, 2010). See also Arturo Escobar, above quoted (n 12). 
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“sustainability” – the key word of this new paradigm – should mainly mean 
ecological sustainability, referring to a “harmonious relationship between humans 
and nature, enabling life on the planet and supporting human development”.49 Others 
argue that the social components of the sustainable paradigm are mostly instrumental 
to achieve economic development, and social and cultural rights mainly stay on the 
sidelines.50   
From these critical perspectives, as far as the final goal is still to ensure 
economic growth, sustainable development does not represent a truly different model 
of development,51 nor does it seem to endorse fully the etymological definition of 
development as a process towards improvement. Nonetheless, the emphasis on the 
environmental dimension of development – highlighted from the Rio declaration 
onwards – passed into a proliferation of soft and hard law instruments focusing on 
environmental protection. Although the effectiveness of international environmental 
law can be questioned,52 it can be noticed that the same attention has not been granted 
to culture as a dimension of the sustainable paradigm. It is unsurprising, therefore, 
that the implementation of multilateral action plans does not systematically include 
the cultural dimension. Let us consider, for instance, that the Millennium 
Development Goals – adopted in 2000 – left out culture entirely.53 Within the 
sustainable development paradigm, the cultural component is generally associated 
with the social pillar, which mainly refers to culture as education or more broadly 
with regard to human rights. 
 
1.3.2) A rights-based approach: the human development paradigm 
 
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the international debate on sustainable 
development turned into a reconceptualisation of a broader definition of development: 
the “human development” paradigm. In 1990, the United Nations Development 
                                                
49 M Montini, “Revising International Environmental Law Through the Paradigm of Ecological 
Sustainability” (2013) EUI Working Papers AEL 2013/05, at 5. See also: K Bosselman, The principle 
of sustainability: transforming law and governance, (Ashgate, 2008). 
50 MC Cordonier Segger and A Khalfan, Sustainable development law: principles, practices and 
prospects, (Oxford University Press, 2004), at 29.  
51 See again A Escobar on this, above (n 12), at 232. See also: H Bartoli, Rethinking Development. 
Putting an end to poverty, Ed. UNESCO, Paris, 2000, 31-60. 
52 On this: D Bodansky, The art and craft of international environmental law (Harvard University 
Press, 2010); or also M Montini, above (n 49). 
53 Millennium Declaration, UNGA Res A/RES/55/2.  
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Programme launched the Human Development Report, which, under the influence of 
Amartya Sen’s work,54 defined human development as the process of enlarging 
people’s choices. The main difference between the idea of “development as economic 
growth” and “human development” is that the first one focuses exclusively on the 
expansion of one kind of choice (namely increasing incomes), whereas the second one 
encompasses the enlargement of all human choices (economic, social, cultural or 
political).55 This idea moves from the understanding that the expansion of income 
does not necessarily contribute to enlarge all other choices, especially when the access 
to resources and income are not fairly and equally distributed within a society.56 The 
human development theory questions the prevailing approaches to development: the 
accent is on the human being as a complex system of different needs and abilities and 
development is about empowering people to enhance their capability (rather than on 
the expansion of the capability of the economic system). As Amartya Sen explains, a 
human life may be seen as a set of interrelated “functionings”, a set of beings and 
doings contributing to her/his personal welfare: being well-nourished, being 
respected, avoiding escapable disease, and participating in political decisions are 
among such beings or doings. “Capabilities” are the various combinations of 
functionings a person can undertake, when exercising his/her freedom to choose a 
lifestyle. Development becomes the process of providing new functionings and 
enlarging the capabilities of people.57 Sen also argues that choices are the condition 
and the realm of freedom: the fulfilment of human rights plays a core role in 
extending people’s choices and, therefore, securing human beings’ freedom and 
development.  
Among the diverse critics of sustainable development, there is also the 
acceptation of the legal status of sustainable development under international law, 
which remains highly contested. Such incertitude weakens the concept and 
undermines its effective implementation. 58  A human rights-based approach to 
                                                
54 A Sen, Development as Freedom, (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
55 M Ul Haq, The Human Development Paradigm, in S Fukuda-Parr and A K Shiva Kumar (eds.), 
Handbook of Human Development: Concepts, Measures, and Policies, (Oxford University Press, 
2009,),17. 
56 A Sen, cit. (n 54). 
57 A Sen, Development as capability expansion, in S Fukuda-Parr and AK Shiva Kumar (eds.), 
Handbook of Human Development: Concepts, Measures, and Policies, (Oxford University Press, 
2009), 3. 
58 On the debate over the legal status of sustainable development, see: V Lowe, “Sustainable 
development and unsustainable arguments”, in A Boyle and D Freestone (eds), International law and 
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development may help to overcome this problem. As argued in the 2000 Human 
Development Report, grounding the human development paradigm on human rights 
has a double advantage. First, human rights grant a more specific and compulsory 
dimension to development by giving a legal status to the claim of individuals and 
communities and indicating duty and responsibility of institutions and other actors to 
enforce them. For instance, to assert a human right to free elementary education is to 
claim more than saying that it would be a good thing for everyone to have a basic 
education: the rights dimension entitles everybody to have access to and enjoy free 
elementary education, and to raise such a claim before national (and, if necessary, 
international) courts when not enforced. Second, embedding the human rights 
thinking within the human development logic can help to make human rights’ 
contents more concrete – whose realisation is often hindered by problems related to 
their interpretation and enforcement.59  
The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development states that “the right to 
development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person 
and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, 
social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realized.”60  Such a definition embeds the principles and 
contents of the human development paradigm and goes beyond the sustainable 
development definition of the Brundtland Report. Focusing on the human rights-based 
approach directs the attention to the ends that make development important, rather 
than to some of the means that make it possible. GDP growth or rise in personal 
income can be among these useful means, but they are not the ends of development.61 
The primary end of development is freedom, which can be reached through the 
enjoyment of economic, social, cultural, and political rights. This broader and more 
inclusive perspective of development re-interprets the role of markets as instrumental 
to other goals: economic improvements can bring economic freedom, which can lead 
to social and political freedom and extend human freedoms.62    
                                                                                                                                      
sustainable development: past achievements and future challenges, (Oxford University Press, 1999); 
see also N Schrijver, cit. (n 47), and Cordonier Segger and Khalfan, cit. (n 50), at 45. 
59UNDP, Human Rights and Human Development, Human Development Report 2000, at 21. 
60 Art. 1, Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA resolution 41/128 (4 December 1986).  
61 A Sen, (n 54), at 3. 
62 Ibidem, 6. 
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Within the human development paradigm a greater recognition of the role of 
culture as a means of development can be discerned.63 Culture is, in primis, taken into 
account in terms of cultural rights, whose fulfilment contributes to enhance freedom 
and to have good, equal, and balanced societies, but also the constructive role of 
culture in the genesis of values and priorities is endorsed. 64  Indeed, while 
acknowledging that certain traditions and values may hinder personal freedoms, Sen 
refuses all generalisations or universalist presumptions about cultural values, and 
recalls that also in the same region there may be much diversity and argues that it is 
now time to understand cross-cultural influences. Cultural interchange can extend our 
basic capability to enjoy products of other cultures and other lands, and, by doing so, 
strengthen the opportunity to understand one another.65 Finally, culture contributes to 
enhance people’s ownership of developmental processes by strengthening their 
participation and sense of self-determination. 
Sustainability and human development have today merged: when UN 
agencies, institutions, and States talk about development to the global audience, they 
commonly refer to a “sustainable human development” model, which brings together 
environmental concerns and economic, social, and cultural aspects. To sum up, the 
adjectives “sustainable” and “human” have given development a different face and 
put the accent on the qualitative aspect of development, rather than quantitative. This 
integrated approach reflects a more holistic vision of development and asks for the 
integration of human rights, social, cultural, economic and environmental objectives 
at all policy and governance level.66 This holistic and comprehensive understanding 
of development is the one adopted for the purpose of my analysis.  
2) “Culture and development” or “Cultural development”: what is it 
all about? 
 
                                                
63 Culture is, at the same time, a structural element of the human development paradigm and the result 
to be achieved through human development policies, see: C Welzel, R Inglehart and H C Klingemann. 
“The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis”, Paper for the Center for the Study 
of Democracy, University of California of Irvine, 2002, available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/02-
01. 
64 Ib., 233, 246. 
65 Ib, 242, 244.   
66 This approach is reflected in the principle of integration and interrelations of human rights and 
social, economic and cultural objectives (Principle 7) of the ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles 
of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, ILA Resolution 3/2002 (70th Conference of 
the International Law Association, held in New Delhi, India, 2–6 April 2002), also published in (2002) 
2 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 211-216. 
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2.1) “Culture and development” vs. “Cultural development” 
 
Does “culture and development” refer to something different to “cultural 
development”? When talking about “culture and development” (or “culture for 
development”), many people will immediately think about “cultural development”. 
This mismatch is quite common and perhaps inevitable, considering that the two 
processes are strictly connected and interdependent. Nonetheless, they define two 
different concepts and pursue different outcomes and objectives.  
The “culture and development” dichotomy, similarly to “culture for 
development”, refers to the role of culture in achieving development. In these terms, 
culture is instrumental to the economic, social, and environmental pillars of 
development. Culture is taken into account as a vector for economic growth and 
eradicating poverty, enhancing human rights, gender equality, health and 
environmental concerns, but also as a broader resource to improve quality of life and 
intensify participation.67 In other words, “culture and/for development” is about the 
relationship of culture with very pragmatic and concrete situations of human life and 
the way through which culture can interact, influence and contribute to the 
improvement of the human condition. Indeed, the final objective of “culture and 
development” is development and not – or at least, not only – the development of 
culture itself.68  
Conversely, “cultural development” deals with the promotion of cultural 
growth as an aspect of development: culture is here considered as a sociological 
dynamic in which society grows by taking part in cultural life, education, arts and 
creative processes. When referring to “cultural development”, the focus is on culture 
per se and the overall goal is the development of cultural involvement, intellectual 
and cultural capabilities.69 Cultural development is, then, one possible outcome of 
developmental policies, and in particular of those policies that use mainstream culture 
as a lever for development.  
                                                
67 R Cherneva, B Danailov, R Arkova and T Petrova, “Culture and Sustainable Development”, in K 
Epskam, H Gould, DA Jelincic (eds.), Culture and Development vs. Cultural Development, 
(Culturelink Special Issue, 2000), 125. 
68 M Claxton, Culture and Development Revisited, (1998) paper delivered at the UNESCO World 
Conference on Cultural Policies for Development, also published in K Epskam, H Gould, DA Jelincic 
(eds.), Culture and Development vs. Cultural Development, (Culturelink Special Issue, 2000), 23. 
69 K Epskam and H Gould, “Introduction: outlining the debate”, in K Epskam, H Gould, DA Jelincic 
(eds.), (n 67), 6, 8. 
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“Cultural development” is mainly a matter of cultural policy addressing artists, 
cultural professionals and citizens, whereas the dichotomy “culture and development” 
needs to be implemented by governments, institutions, and developmental specialists 
through typical developmental channels such as trade agreements, cooperation, aid 
programmes, and human rights instruments. In the last case, practical aspects 
concerning artistic and cultural activities, the protection of cultural heritage and 
diversity should be taken into account within developmental frames. This distinction 
is not always clear to governments and policy makers, who frequently switch between 
the two concepts, stressing the cultural component as a goal rather than a means when 
integrating culture into developmental policies. On one hand, this is explained by the 
difficulty in describing and measuring the interactions between culture and 
development through wealth measures and indicators.70 On the other hand, culture is 
both the means and the end of development and it is not always easy to establish if 
culture acts as a catalyst for development or whether it is a product of development. 
In the past fifty years, international conferences addressing the interaction 
between culture and development have contributed to create even more confusion, 
often making no distinction between culture and development, cultural development, 
and cultural policies for development.71 In particular, governments usually focus on 
the promotion of cultural policies as art promotion and art policy, forgetting the other 
dimension of development. To draw a clear-cut distinction between these two 
binomials might clarify the existing confusion, but it could also prevent us from 
noticing the synergies between them. Indeed, the two concepts not only coexist, but 
they are often closely entwined. Let us consider, for instance, the promotion of artistic 
events, which at first glance falls within the activities pursuing cultural development, 
but, in some ways, also has a social vocation and stimulates dialogue and participation 
within societies (therefore contributing to build a more democratic community life 
and addressing social problems). Cultural and artistic activities promoting “cultural 
development” – such as entertainment, cultural tourism, or education – do not 
                                                
70 On the need to develop a set of new and comprehensive cultural indicators see: P Schafer, “Diversity 
and Sustainable Development. Contemporary Concerns or Permanent Realities?”, in (Special Issue 
2002/2003) Cultural diversity and Sustainable Development Culturelink Review, 5, 16. On this issue, 
see also the UNESCO’s initiative “Culture for Development Indicator Suite”, a research project that 
aims to establish a set of indicators highlighting how culture contributes to development at the national 
level fostering economic growth, and helping individuals and communities to expand their life choices 
and adapt to change (http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/cultural-diversity/diversity-of-
cultural-expressions/programmes/culture-for-development-indicators/more-information/). 
71 For some examples see para. 1.1.2 of this chapter. 
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explicitly focus on development, however they have indirect positive spill-over 
effects for it.  
While from a theoretical point of view a rigid separation between “cultural 
development” and “culture and development” might not be necessary, from a 
practical perspective a distinction between the two is relevant, particularly in terms of 
the opportunities and tensions that may arise. Indeed, cultural development is not a 
controversial theme, whereas using culture as a means to achieve development (in its 
broader sense) may give rise to unexpected tensions, in primis the preservation and 
conservation of culture and cultural diversity. In fact, if it is true that culture can 
positively or negatively impinge upon development, it is also true that development 
can have a positive or negative impact on culture. The accelerated and ongoing 
process of globalisation contributes to point out the contradictions arising from the 
encroachment of culture by other policies.72 In particular, this thesis focuses on the 
tensions that may arise from the interplay of culture with trade, migration, and 
intellectual property policies. After describing how culture can positively contribute 
to the economic, social, and environmental pillars of sustainable development, I will 
provide a frame depicting what tensions may arise when different interests are at 
stake. This analysis will be explored further through the lenses of international law in 
chapter 3.  
2.2) “Culture and development”: contributions to economic development, social 
inclusion and environmental sustainability 
2.2.1) Heritage and creativity as a lever of economic growth  
 
There are several declinations of the “culture for development” dichotomy: 
beliefs, traditions, ways of living, cultural expressions and creativity can 
simultaneously play different roles for societies’ development. Starting from the 
economic dimension, it is acknowledged today that culture as heritage and creativity 
contributes to boost economic growth.73 In particular, we can consider the role of 
                                                
72 As Rosemary Coombe notices, nowadays cultural preoccupations seem to be more relevant for 
sociologists, economists and lawyers than for anthropologists: R J Coombe.“Legal claims to Culture in 
and Against the Market: Neoliberalism and the Global Proliferation of Meaningful Difference”, 
(2005), 1 Law, Culture and the Humanities, 35. 
73 For a comprehensive discussion on how and to what extent culture contributes to economic growth, 
see: P E Petrakis, Culture, Growth and Economic Policy, (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014). 
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cultural and creative industries74 – such as film and music, broadcasting, fashion, 
design, cultural tourism – in increasing national GDP, creating employment and 
generating incomes. When the production of a movie begins – or the restoration of an 
ancient monument, the preparation of music festivals, and other similar initiatives – it 
is not only the cultural sector that is likely to benefit but all the economic activities, 
provisions of services and business around it. For instance, in the case of film 
production, investments dedicated to this realisation will bring opportunities for new 
jobs in the area where the film is set and produced. Thus it is not only the producers, 
distributors and creatives involved in the cultural production, but also the local 
economic actors around it – from people working in the hospitality sector and 
restaurateurs to providers of services such as cameraman, hairdressers, music 
technicians, etc. – that can take advantage of this situation, both in terms of increased 
incomes and new creation of job opportunities. 
Trend studies affirm that the creative industries have been one of the most 
dynamic sectors of the world economy throughout the past decade.75 Because of a 
lack of evidence, long-term statistical data on cultural industries and underdeveloped 
methods of measurement of economic analysis that could be applied to the cultural 
sector, until the 1960s cultural industries as an economic phenomenon have been 
underestimated. Between the mid-1960s and 1980s, methodological and analytical 
research improvements in this field produced research that demonstrated that cultural 
and creative industries can generate a high growth rate of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) or Gross Value Added (GVA) and employment.76 From the point of view of 
                                                
74 UNESCO broadly defines cultural industries as the ‘printing, publishing and multimedia, audio-
visual, phonographic and cinematographic productions, crafts and design, architecture, visual and 
performance arts, sports, manufacturing of musical instruments, advertising and cultural tourism’. See: 
UNESCO, Culture, Trade and Globalization: Questions and Answers (2000). The expression ‘creative 
industries’ is synonymous with cultural industries. Hereinafter, I will use both terms to refer to the 
same concept. For further details on the evolution of the concept of cultural industries see: Rostam J. 
Neuwirth, The Cultural Industries in International Trade Law. Insights from the NAFTA, the WTO and 
the EU, (Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2006), 30. 
75 UNCTAD Creative Economy Report 2010, (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2010/3), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/publications/Creative-Economy-Report-(Series).aspx (last access on the 12th 
May 2014).  
76 A history of the evolution of economic analytical approaches to cultural industries can be found in 
Measuring the economic contribution of cultural industries A review and assessment of current 
methodological approaches 2009 Framework for Cultural Statistics Handbook No. 1 (published by 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012) available at http://www.uis.unesco.org. The report clarifies that 
“the history of economic research of culture is connected with the publication of Baumol and Bowen’s 
paper “On Performing Arts: Anatomy of their Economic Problems” in 1965, and later in 1966, with the 
book entitled Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma, where the authors analysed the economic 
position of performing arts in the United States”. Such contributions gave fresh inputs into the 
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economists, cultural and creative industries can generate growth of the overall 
economy: some of their sectors (e.g. tourism, design and film production) can provide 
spill-over effects for the economy; they attract a high-quality workforce, business and 
investment, and spur creativity and innovation across other sectors of the economy.77 
This last element is particularly relevant if we consider that under the new 
understanding of growth and development, the main factors of economic and social 
growth are knowledge, creativity, originality and skills. This so called “knowledge-
based economy” finds its economic support in creativity, talent and the exchange of 
ideas; therefore, cultural industries play a significant role as growth generators.78 
Further, in time of crises, figures show that the creative sectors are responding better 
than other industries: in 2008, despite the 12 per cent decline in global trade, world 
trade of creative goods and services continued to expand, reaching $592 billion and 
reflecting an annual growth rate of 14 per cent during the 2002-2008 period.79 The 
UN Conference on Trade and Development recognises that “creative economy sectors 
can contribute a lot to growth and prosperity, especially for developing countries 
seeking to diversify their economies and build resilience to future economic crisis”.80 
Cultural goods and services can, then, play a crucial role in fighting poverty, creating 
employment and enhancing national economies – even in developing countries. 
Several initiatives undertaken by several governments in the Eastern and Southern 
regions of the world, especially in the frame of institutional regional cooperation, 
seem to show that developing countries have cottoned on to the economic potential of 
the cultural sector. For instance, in 2006, the BIMSTEC ministerial meeting launched 
the Paro Initiative recognising that “Cultural industries have the capacity to 
                                                                                                                                      
reconsideration of the role of cultural industries in economics. Major studies were developed between 
1980 and 1990 on this subject (at 9).  
77 More information concerning relevant authors and research carried out by economists in this field are 
available in the 2009 UNESCO Handbook No 1, (ibidem). 
78  Unfortunately, at the time of writing, updated and comprehensive statistics concerning the 
contribution of the cultural and creative industries that could offer more precise data in support of this 
statement are still missing. The scarcity of data and comprehensive analytical frameworks measuring 
both the qualitative and quantitative contributions of culture to the economic sectors is a major 
challenge for analysts in this sector. Several ongoing initiatives are attempting to fill this gap. For 
instance, the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS), based in Canada, is now implementing a new 
global survey on Cultural Employment, to be launched in July 2015 (first results are expected by 
2016). Further, the UIS is currently developing a new analytical report and a new data set, which will 
also include the international trade of cultural goods and services, based on the 2009 UNESCO 
Framework for Cultural Statistics: outcomes are expected by Mid-2015. (Source: courtesy of the Head 
of the Cultural Statistics Unit, José Pessoa, of the UIS, interviewed via e-mail in June 2014). 
79 Data extrapolated from the 2010 UNCTAD Report, at 22. 
80 Ibidem, at XV.  
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contribute to poverty reduction and have proven to be a powerful instrument for 
social reorganisation and the vitalization of local communities, especially among the 
poorer groups of society, both in rural communities and in the urban slums.”81 
Similarly, in 2008 the Ministers of Culture of the African Union, who had gathered 
together in Algiers, adopted the Nairobi Plan of Action on the Cultural and Creative 
Industries in Africa. 82  These initiatives aim at improving living and working 
conditions of local artists and creators in endogenous cultural development, as well as 
to support improvements of local cultural industries. In particular, the Nairobi Plan of 
Action, by establishing specific objectives, such as facilitating the “safeguard, 
organisation, production, marketing, distribution, exhibition and preservation of 
African cultural and creative industries”, and making them key to African 
development, highlights the contribution of cultural activities, thereby enabling 
culture to become a significant element of future development strategies. 
Finally, we should recall the economic contributions deriving from Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR), namely copyright, licenses, and other related author’s rights. 
First of all, such rights entitle creators and owners of intellectual work to exercise 
certain economic rights, which allow them to derive financial reward from the use of 
their work by others. Yet, IPRs are not exclusively beneficial for authors and creators, 
they are also considered an engine for the development of cultural and creative 
industries as they attract and foster investments, promote research development (RD) 
and technological advancement. As a confirmation of the acknowledgement of this 
contribution, between 2004 and 2012, Developmental Agendas of WIPO, the UN 
organisation concerning culture, cultural trade and intellectual property rights, made 
quite significant efforts through different proposal for actions – such as, normative 
and policy regulation, technology transfer, capacity building – to strengthen the value 
of the economic dimension of intellectual property assets.83  
                                                
81 BIMSTEC countries (2006). “Paro Initiative and Plan of Actions”. First BISMTEC on Cultural 
Cooperation, Paro, Bhutan, May 2006, (source: http://www.bimstec.org/). 
82 The Nairobi Action Plan was produced at the First Session of Conference of African Union Ministers 
of Culture (African Union, 2005) and adopted at the Second Session of Conference of African Union 
Ministers of Culture in Algiers (African Union, 2008).  
83 It is also worth mentioning that in 2003 WIPO published the Guide on Surveying the Economic 
Contribution of the Copyright-Based Industries, a practical tool for measuring the economic 
contribution of a nation’s creative and information sector: available at 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/publications/pdf/copyright_pub_893.pdf. 
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2.2.2) Arts and culture as a lever of social inclusion and mutual understanding 
The cultural sector generates two types of impact: non-economic and 
economic. This double effect comes from cultural goods and services’ dual nature: 
indeed, cultural goods and services are both trade goods and vehicles of cultural 
contents, ideas and national identities.84 Consequently, while circulating, they not 
only contribute to increase economies, but also have a social function. They spread 
knowledge, foster creativity, build social capital, and can raise awareness about key 
issues such as civil and political rights, gender equality, or environmental concerns. 
The arts and artistic creations are also valuable tools to support a community’s 
participation in cultural life, as well as pluralism and democratic processes. Indirectly, 
by diffusing access to knowledge, they contribute to foster dialogue among peoples 
and nations and play a role in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. 
Overall, cultural exchanges contribute to build more balanced and peaceful societies. 
Several cases demonstrate that where, for instance, the commercial music industry or 
the handicrafts industry are prospering (and are owned by the local community), 
money goes directly to the grassroots and will support further development of cultural 
products, contributing to create community participation in building development and 
social cohesion.85 
Enhancing the circulation of cultural products into and from developing 
countries thus seems to be a core priority in order to allow cultural industries to play a 
part in building sustainable development in the least developed and developing 
countries.86 Circulation of cultural goods, services and artists is an essential element 
to foster cultural exchanges, which can deploy both economic and social benefits. 
Cultural exchanges have been taking place for centuries, spurring cultural 
contamination across the globe. It is from such contamination that many cultural 
products and artistic creations, highly valued today for being at the same time forms 
of arts and sources of important income, originated and created bridges between 
                                                
84 Art. 1 (g) and art 4 of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, above (n 21). 
85 Several examples of these experiences in African, Caribbean, and Asian Countries are quoted in the 
UNESCO/UNDP Creative Economy Report 2013 Special Edition: widening local development 
pathways, available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/pdf/creative-economy-report- 2013.pdf and 
http://academy.ssc.undp.org/creative-economy-report-2013. For other examples, see also the Kuna 
Mola Handicraft Project in Panama supported by WIPO and the Inter-American Development Bank, 
dealing with the safeguard of traditional handicrafts through a sui generis IP law and the empowerment 
of women belonging to a discriminated ethnic group in Panama: WIPO Magazine, Issue 6/2005 (Nov-
Dec), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2005/06/. 
86 UNCTAD, Audiovisual Services: Improving Participation of Developing Countries - Note by the 
UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/B/COM.1/EM.20/2 (30 September 2002), point II.C, at 9. 
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peoples and populations. To offer only a few emblematic samples, we might consider 
the significant influence of African music on the American continent, which gave 
birth to some remarkable music genres like Jazz and Blues in the US, or the 
combination of music and dancing such as Capoeira in Brazil. It is worth highlighting 
how such forms of cultural expressions, which were firstly tools to manifest the 
identity of certain socio-cultural contexts, have today become forms of arts and 
leisure that are appreciated worldwide and are capable of gaining an important space 
in national and international trade. We can also recall that cultural projects – such as 
the recovery and reconstruction of historical buildings or art works – are today a tool 
for building reconciliation in post-conflicts contexts.87 When culture moves, acting as 
a vector of development, social and economic benefits for the whole society seem to 
come together.  
 
2.2.3) Traditional knowledge as a lever of environmental sustainability 
 
Regarding the relationship between culture and environmental sustainability, it is well 
known today that culture as intangible heritage and ways of life can have positive 
impacts on environment and biodiversity.88 Although the development of any culture 
                                                
87 Several examples can be found among cooperation projects under the aegis of the UN (and in 
particular of UNESCO). The EU is also among the greatest promoters and financial supporters of this 
kind of initiative. The example of the Sarajevo Festival, quoted by Stefano Manservisi – former 
Director General for Development of the European Commission – from an interview for the 
website Culture and creativity, vectors for development in 2009 - clarifies the role of culture in post-
conflict situations:  “Culture also plays an important role in conflict and postconflict zones, for inter-
cultural dialogue is a key element in brining about peace and reconciliation between communities. For 
instance, in recent years, the Sarajevo Film Festival, which held its first edition in 1995 in a climate of 
smoking guns and dire inter-cultural hatred, has been working hard to bring people in the Balkans 
together, encouraging co-productions of young directors from the different Balkan regions and 
promoting, quite successfully, an atmosphere of understanding, tolerance, and exchange of ideas and 
experiences”. (Source:  http://www.culture-dev.eu/pages/en/en_introduction_part1.html) 
88  See, for instance, the Belém Declaration, adopted by the First International Congress of 
Ethnobiology in Belém (Brazil), July 1988, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, and the 2003 
UNESCO Convention on the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. Furthermore, in recent 
decades several studies were promoted to assess the links between culture, environment and 
development. Among others, see: UNESCO and UNEP, Cultural Diversity and Biodiversity for 
Sustainable Development, report from the World Summit Sustainable Development held in 
Johannesburg on 3rd September 2002, available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001322/132262e.pdf; A Persic and G Martin (ed), Links 
between biological and cultural diversity-concepts, methods and experiences, Report of an 
International Workshop, (UNESCO, Paris 2008). It is also worth mentioning the Joint Programme 
Between UNESCO and the SCBD on the links between Biological and Cultural Diversity, launching 
the International Conference on Biological and Cultural Diversity, held in Montreal, Canada in 2010 to 
implement the provisions of the CBD and UNESCO culture related Conventions in a mutually 
reinforcing and coordinated manner. The Joint Programme was endorsed by UNESCO’s constituencies 
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is highly influenced by the constant interaction between the environment and human 
needs, the role of cultural diversity to counteract environmental challenges, such as 
the erosion of biodiversity and climate change resilience has been often 
underestimated. States and the international community have mostly privileged 
technical and scientific responses to ecological issues. Yet, there is “increasing 
recognition that cultural practices are intimately linked to environmental integrity”.89 
This is particularly true in the case of traditional knowledge and practices related to 
natural resources management and land planning, which entail endogenous 
connections between culture and nature. We can think, for instance, about traditional 
agricultural systems or traditional handicrafts linked to the use of local raw materials 
that have been practised for centuries in rural European villages. Such knowledge – 
acquired, shared, and refined throughout time and generations – has constituted the 
basis of communities’ local development for a long time. Traditional agriculture’s 
interactions with nature contributed to shape the European landscape, which is today 
considered an important element of bio-cultural identity and diversity as well as of 
economic return.90 Traditional knowledge’s contribution to sustainable development 
is particularly relevant in developing countries, where Indigenous and local 
communities primarily thriving on traditional agriculture, hunting, fisheries or the 
managing of forests still exist. Such traditional practices often constitute 
environmentally-friendly management of natural resources and contribute to preserve 
ecological assets and biodiversity. At the same time, traditional knowledge is part of 
indigenous or local communities’ cultural identity and societal structure: its safeguard 
is necessary to ensure the sustainable economic, social, and cultural survival of such 
communities. 91  On a global scale, protecting these local cultural practices can 
contribute to bring environmental benefits and influence decision-makers to adopt 
more harmonious measures – striking a better balance between ecosystem and human 
                                                                                                                                      
and welcomed by the 10th meeting of the Parties to the CBD (CBD COP 10) held in October 2010 in 
Nagoya, Japan (Decision X/20).  
89  UNESCO World Report, Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue, (2009, 
UNESCO Publishing), at 203. 
90 Art. 1 of the European Landscape Convention, adopted by the Council of Europe on 20 October 
2000 in Florence and entered into force on 1st March 2004, defines landscape as “living cultural and 
natural heritage”. The ELC recognises the positive role of landscape for environmental sustainability 
and economics. 
91 Bates, P., Chiba M., Kube S. and Nakashima D. (Eds.), Learning and Knowing in Indigenous 
Societies Today, UNESCO, Paris 2009, pp. 128. See also the Preamble of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, adopted on 5 June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro and entered into force on 29 December 1993. 
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needs.92 
2.2.4) The role of artists and cultural workers in societies and their contribution 
to human sustainable development 
When exploring synergies between culture and development, it must be 
recognised that artists and cultural professionals play a major role not only in 
contributing to the socio-cultural development of societies, but also to their economic 
growth.93 Further, they contribute to raise awareness and build a civic conscience 
towards environmental issues.  
Beginning with the economic pillar, producers of cultural goods and services, 
artists, and cultural operators make a significant contribution to local and global 
economies. As pointed out above, artistic and cultural productions and all related 
activities in the sector – such as technical support for film production, exhibitions, 
live-performances, etc. – are an important source of employment opportunities, and 
thus are important for a country’s economic development. To continue with the social 
pillar, it can be observed that artists have always been the first actors in promoting 
cultural development by generating creative and innovative works that nourish human 
souls and enrich life – both through education and leisure opportunities. Artists are 
also the guardians and ambassadors of national traditional heritage, ancient 
knowledge, and local cultures: therefore, they play an important role in preserving 
and promoting intangible heritage. By so doing, they strengthen human cultural 
rights’ contents, such as preserving and promoting national identities and diversities, 
freedom of expression, and access to and participation in cultural life. Performing 
artists, writers, intellectuals and cultural operators also play a core role in building 
mutual understanding between people: they are extraordinary actors in fostering 
intercultural dialogue in our globalised world by facilitating encounters with ideas and 
concepts that might seem unusual and create fears and prejudice. We can think, for 
example, of the role of “migrant writers” in exile: their works tell us about unknown 
countries and societies oppressed by political or religious dictatorship in order to both 
                                                
92 This, of course, would require a greater involvement of local and indigenous communities in the 
international processes and community’s decision making concerning global and local environmental 
agendas. 
93Article 7(2) of the UNESCO Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions expressly recognises this role and invites its parties to do the same: “Parties shall also 
endeavor to recognize the important contribution of artists, others involved in the creative process, 
cultural communities, and organizations that support their work, and their central role in nurturing the 
diversity of cultural expressions.” 
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promote a better understanding of those countries and to denounce the violations of 
fundamental rights. Finally, artists sometimes use their works and performances to 
advocate global causes, like raising awareness for environmental concerns. Several 
artists are involved in projects dealing with the rescuing and reintroduction of ancient 
local traditions, with the aim of improving ecological standards and, at the same time, 
creating opportunities for locals to restore elements of traditional identities.  
 
2.3) “Culture and development”: threats and challenges in an increasingly 
globalised world 
 
Although, as shown above, there are manifold ways through which culture can 
contribute to development, it should not be assumed that everything is rosy in the 
garden. On the contrary, mainstreaming culture as a vector of development is no easy 
task and it entails several threats and challenges. As stated above, in this thesis I will 
focus on three challenging cases dealing with the interplay between culture and other 
policies related to development, namely ‘trade’, ‘migration’ and ‘intellectual property 
rights’. More precisely, I will look at the threats and challenges stemming from the 
demand for fostering the circulation of cultural goods and services, artists and cultural 
workers, and the protection of traditional knowledge related to Genetic Resources. 
The choice of these three specific cases, rather than the return of illegally exported 
cultural works, access to education, or other issues, is mainly based on the following 
reasoning.94  Since the adoption of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural 
Diversity (introduced earlier – this will be explored further in Chapter 3), the accent 
on the economic returns of the cultural and creative industries has been stressed. This 
accentuation advocates the enhancement of the circulation of cultural goods and 
services, which also entails greater circulation of cultural workers and artists. Yet, 
fostering cultural exchanges in our globalising world is a double challenge: first, 
international trade rules marginalise developing countries’ cultural industries, which 
                                                
94 Naturally I am aware that these three specific cases do not cover the entire range of possibilities in 
which culture can interact with development. Nonetheless, in my opinion they are particularly 
interesting because of the endogenous legal and policy issues they entail. At the same time, they offer a 
fascinating playground to analyse the action of the Union in its external relations. Other topics, such as 
cultural tourism related issues, access to education, or the return of illegally exported cultural goods, 
are also strongly intertwined with the “culture and development” discourse. Unfortunately, there is not 
enough room here to deal with all these issues and the selection for this thesis has been made for the 
practical reasons discussed. 
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already suffer from their fragmented structure and weak technological innovation;95 
second, enhancing and facilitating the mobility of artists and cultural workers is a 
subject that becomes highly controversial when it involves artists from developing 
countries or vulnerable contexts because of its connection with migration issues.  
Further, the focus on the economic dimension of culture risks diverting 
attention away from social and environmental benefits, leading to an increased 
commodification of culture. This mainly brings mainstream culture into development 
strategies through trade-based tools. In the case of the protection of traditional 
knowledge, especially that related to the use of genetic resources, this turns into the 
increased implementation of intellectual property rights in local and indigenous 
contexts in developing countries, where such property rights clash against very 
diverse existing social and economic structures and hinder their development as well 
as the protection of local identities.  
The line connecting these three specific cases is the predominance of the 
trade-approach in mainstreaming culture as a vector of development. I will now frame 
the issues at stake in these three cases, while I will describe the international law 
framework within which such challenges take place in chapter 3.   
2.3.1) Circulation of cultural goods and services in our globalising world 
 
In today’s globalising world, thanks to the liberalisation of markets, the 
circulation of cultural goods and services, artists and cultural professionals has 
increased enormously. Advanced technology and globalisation also improved 
conditions for access to means of communication, by spreading knowledge and 
information. On the one hand, this is beneficial for global economic, social, and 
cultural development. On the other hand, globalisation and the increased liberalisation 
of markets has multiplied threats and challenges for the cultural sector and underlined 
discrepancies and differences among rich and poor countries. First of all, the unequal 
distribution of resources and means of development makes participation in the 
globalisation process very different for developed and developing countries. Wealthy 
and developed countries are major actors in this process and can take advantages of 
this situation, whereas developing and low-income countries have a very limited 
access to the world market and the processes underpinning current global policies. 
                                                
95 2010 UNCTAD Report, at 41. 
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Such imbalances determine, to some extent, the cultural superiority of developed 
countries over poor countries.96 The dominance of Hollywood productions in most of 
the world’s film markets is one example of this Western predominance. As a 
consequence, we assist in a “westernization” of most countries in terms of culture, the 
homogenisation of artistic creativity according to the market’s standards97 and loss of 
cultural models and identities.  
From a very liberalist perspective, the loss of cultural diversity should not be 
perceived as a problem if the rejection of a particular cultural model is the result of 
free and informed choice. Rather, it should be considered as the consequence of a 
selective process that determines a natural evolution from one cultural model to 
another. Yet, free choice in today’s world barely exists: the economic and 
technological superiority of rich countries highly influences and determines the 
cultural shifts that occur in less developed countries. Developing countries simply 
cannot compete on the international market in terms of the production and circulation 
of cultural goods and services. Moreover, they are not in the position to stop the 
introduction of foreign (cultural or otherwise) goods and services to their internal 
markets: doing so, in a way, would have negative impacts on their attempts to achieve 
economic development and would hinder their relationships with developed countries 
(which are often also donors). From a legal perspective, it should be acknowledged 
that current international trade rules and the lack of global governance for cultural 
goods and services are conducive to the affirmation of the cultural superiority of 
Western countries, while contributing to influence local habits and cultural 
preferences in developing countries. Unfortunately, these conditions do not favour 
mutual cultural influences or fair exchange of knowledge that could lead to positive 
effects, such as economic returns, better-informed societies, and increased reciprocal 
understanding. In the light of these considerations, the liberalist approach to the loss 
of cultural diversity is rather hard to support.  
                                                
96 N Obuljen, From Our Creative Diversity to the Convention on Cultural Diversity: Introduction to 
the debate, in UNESCO’s Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions: making it work, (Institute for International Relations, 2006), at 19, 20. 
97 For example, the fact that almost 80% of the recorded music is distributed by only fours giant 
companies – Sony Music Entertainment (USA), Universal Music Group (France), Warner Music 
Group (USA) and EMI (UK) – is highly influencing the genre and the quality of the music listened to 
by people all over the world. In this situation, there is very little room for non-commercial music 
creations, experimentation and traditional songs, which, in a more optimistic view, are destined to a 
niche market.  
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Further, cultural homogenisation is not only a concern for developing 
countries, but also for some developed countries that fear the predominance of the US 
cultural model in the world. The widespread use of English as the main language of 
global communication, advanced higher technologies and massive investments in the 
US audiovisual industry are the main factors limiting the worldwide distribution of 
audio-visual products in other languages and determining the dominant presence of 
American productions on the global market.98 So far, the priority of global trade has 
been to reach the highest level of profit, without paying much attention to the 
potential consequences of this profit-oriented approach to culture. If the situation 
remains unchanged, bigger and stronger companies will quickly replace many local 
cultural industries, with the subsequent loss of several cultural specificities and 
further cultural homogenisation.  
2.3.2) Mobility of artists and cultural workers in a globalising world 
Freedom of mobility seems to be an essential condition for the work of artists 
and cultural professionals, as well as for allowing them to accomplish the socio-
cultural tasks mentioned above. From a broader perspective, the mobility of workers 
and professionals is nowadays perceived as a crucial factor to promote innovation, 
and creativity and to increase employment opportunities. It should be noted here that 
freedom of mobility of workers has been at the heart of the European Union since its 
formation and that the Community Lisbon Programme listed the removal of obstacles 
to physical, labour, and academic mobility among the number of key actions for 
growth and employment.99 For the arts and culture sector, mobility plays an even 
more crucial role: considering that culture and artistic productions are continuously 
evolving, freedom of movement is important for nourishing artistic inspiration and the 
cross-fertilisation of ideas.100 Transnational movement contributes to provide artists 
with a deeper understanding of reality, fresh inspiration, and new artistic languages. 
                                                
98 At the end of the 1990s, some 80% of films distributed in Europe had been made in the US (data 
available at: http://lumiere.obs.coe.int/web/sources/analyse.html). 
99 ‘Common Actions for Growth and Employment: the Community Lisbon Programme’, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2005) 330 
final, 4. 
100 M Blakemore, R Polacek, J Staines: Information systems to support the mobility of artists and other 
professionals in the culture field: a feasibility study. Final Report, (March 2009), Study commissioned 
by the DG Education and Culture of the European Commission, 1.  
  48 
Artists affirm that such mobility is often necessary for the process of creative 
production and allows them to operate as ‘sensors’ of peoples, times and societies.101  
When asking whether artists and cultural operators are fully able to enjoy their 
personal freedom of movement, we find out that they often encounter different kinds 
of obstacles when crossing transnational borders. Major hindrances to their mobility 
are of regulative and administrative nature, like the recognition of qualifications, 
diverse and atypical social security regulations,102 or different uses of intellectual 
property rights under national law. Other problems derive from the lack of funds and 
financial assistance for cultural programmes supporting and promoting cultural 
exchanges, like labour or study exchange grants. However, the biggest obstacle is 
presented by visa and work permits regulations, which are interconnected with 
national migration law and policy.103 A considerable number of surveys and field 
studies show that concerts and festival organisers, cultural agents and organisations, 
as well as performing artists (musicians, singers, actors, etc.) increasingly face 
problems with visa applications, such as non-transparent, time consuming and costly 
application procedures. 104  These practical problems are often the outcomes of 
restrictive national migration policies. In addition, given that artists performing during 
a tour may need to move (with their troupe) back and forth between many countries, 
they often request multiple entrance permits. Because of a lack of administrative 
harmonisation, as well as scarce bureaucratic coordination, multiple entry visas often 
fail (especially at the country of transit’s borders), obliging the whole group of 
performers to re-enter their country of origin. By consequence, a great number of live 
performances, shows, festivals – and even academic lectures – are cancelled, often 
resulting in a loss of money for both the performers and the organisers of the host 
country, and a missed opportunity to enrich the cultural offer.  
The overall question of mobility is strictly connected to migration policy and 
regulation. Once again, freedom of movement is more difficult for artists and cultural 
                                                
101 J Neisse (ed), Made in Méditerranée. Les défies des échanges artistiques en Méditerranée, Fonds 
Roberto Cimetta, (2008), available at http://www.cimettafund.org/documents/FR/FRC-F-.pdf. 
102As mentioned, artists and cultural professionals are often atypical workers. In particular, artists 
easily switch from self-employed status to that of employed, whereas cultural professionals are usually 
employed with temporary contracts. This cause problems in order to individualise the social or 
economic treatment to be applied, and stops them from moving. 
103 O Reitov and H Hjorth, Visas / the discordant note. A White Paper on visa issues, Europe & artists’ 
mobility, 2008, published by Freemuse, ELMF and ECA, also available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/documents/visa_white_paper.pdf.  
104 As an example of such studies see O Reitov and H Hjorth (ibidem) and J Neisse (ed), Made in 
Méditerranée. Les défies des échanges artistiques en Méditerranée (n 101).  
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workers from the developing and least-developed countries – as well as from certain 
critical areas such as the Middle-East and Mediterranean areas. Indeed, artists and 
cultural professionals from disadvantaged contexts are often assimilated to all other 
migrant workers from developing or least-developed countries: host countries, relying 
on biased assumptions, deem that arts and culture are just a special channel to grant 
people coming from third countries a preferential treatment to cross national borders. 
Once they have entered the country, they are alleged to stay longer and reside in the 
country illegally, thus contributing to increase irregular immigration.105 Because of 
such prejudices, artists and cultural professionals from developing countries 
experience discriminatory treatment when applying for visas and entry permits, 
compared to their more famous colleagues from other privileged contexts.  
Besides this discrimination, it should be recalled that the existing disparity of 
economic, social, and cultural conditions between the North and the South already 
heavily affects the possibility for artists and professionals from the South to travel for 
work purposes. Most of them can only move thanks to bilateral agreements and 
cultural cooperation programmes.106Frequently, the nature of these exchanges shows 
the inequality between the Southern and Northern positions: as the North provides 
funds and tools enabling artists and cultural workers to move from the South, the 
latter does not have enough power in order to decide contents, rules and conditions of 
the agreements. Still, the objectives of these exchanges are perceived differently: 
whereas the Northern countries emphasise the solidarity aim, the Southern countries 
see them as a possibility for a preferential corridor toward developed countries, which 
might contribute to improve their working conditions (but not meaning that they will 
stay illegally in the receiving country).107 These different expectations lead Northern 
countries to raise barriers in order to stop the free movement of Southern artists and 
cultural workers, which could allegedly turn into an uncontrolled flow of migrants. 
By consequence, artists and cultural workers have to deal with national migration 
rules and increasingly restrictive policy. In the last decade, most States (including EU 
Member States) have adopted rigid immigration policy and introduced more stringent 
control on visa applications, in order to counteract irregular immigration and 
                                                
105 In the report Visas/The discordant note, a respondent reflecting on the behaviour of embassy’s 
officers, says that “Visa application procedures have huge human costs. Artists are subject to pointless 
queuing, often in disgraceful conditions and subject to disrespectful treatment by embassy staff”, supra 
(n 103) at 12.  
106 J Neisse, supra (n 101), at 24. 
107Ibidem, at 24. 
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international terrorism. An example of this is the UK Home Office’s decision, 
adopted in 2008, to introduce a new points-based system and visa restrictions for non-
EU artists and academics wishing to come to the UK for talks, exhibitions, concerts or 
residencies. According to these new rules, all non-EU visitors must now apply for a 
visa in person, and supply biometric data, electronic fingerprint scans and a digital 
photograph. New controls over visitors’ day-to-day activity have also been 
previewed: visitors must show that they have at least £800 pounds of personal 
savings, which have been held for at least three months prior to the date of their 
application; the host organisation must keep copies of the visitor’s passport and their 
UK Biometric Card, and a history of their contact details; and if the visitor does not 
turn up to their studio or place of work, or their whereabouts is unknown, the 
organisation is legally obliged to inform the UK Border Agency. 108 Like the UK, 
several other States have adopted similarly restrictive measures that, although not 
directly addressing artists and cultural workers, are likely to create obstacles to their 
entrance.109 It is quite clear that these kinds of restrictions hamper the realisation of 
equal opportunities for the artists of developing countries to gain their place on the 
global stage. 
 
2.3.3) Protecting Traditional Knowledge related to genetic resources in a 
globalising world 
 
When exploring the dynamics between culture and development, one of the 
most fascinating and controversial relationships stems from the interaction between 
certain manifestations of intangible cultural heritage, such as traditional knowledge, 
and intellectual property law. In the last few decades, the debate on the social, 
environmental, and economic returns from the use of certain forms of traditional 
knowledge has focused on the need to protect such forms of intangible cultural 
heritage both from the risk of disappearing and from the risk of misappropriation. In 
particular, the protection of indigenous and traditional local knowledge related to the 
use of genetic resources is a major challenge. It is increasingly recognising the 
                                                
108 Source and info available at: www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk and 
www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2009/feb/22/9. 
109 For example: Ireland, Austria, Italy, the US and Canada. In spite of the well-known support that 
France has always given to artists coming from third countries, especially from Africa, they also face 
several problems regarding French policies on visa and work permits.   
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enormous benefits to national economies that can derive from traditional knowledge 
connected to the use of genetic resources, like plants, seeds, etc. Biotechnological 
agriculture, pharmaceutical experimentation, and the chemical and food industries 
largely thrive on the use of such biogenetic resources and access to related traditional 
knowledge. Once again, developing countries – in particular those that are also 
custodians of a rich and wild biodiversity like several African or Latin American 
countries – are a valuable source of income for these industries, mainly based in 
Western countries or financed by Western corporations. For these companies access 
to traditional knowledge connected to the use of genetic resources is a necessary step 
in order to acquire that knowledge, which will be the basis for further experimentation 
and innovation in the laboratory. Once finalised, the outcomes of such research will 
turn into new productions to be commercialised – such as GMO products, medicines, 
cosmetics, etc. – with great economic benefits to Western companies and societies, 
but little (or no) benefits for local and indigenous communities in developing 
countries. Developing countries’ governments are usually very keen on providing 
access to local traditional knowledge for the economic benefits that can derive from 
such disclosure, even when it may entail access to intangible cultural heritage of 
indigenous and local communities. This situation opens the door to a chain of serious 
consequences threatening the survival of indigenous and local communities. At the 
base of this chain are two major causes originating in the implementation of current 
international Intellectual Property (IP) law: first, the possibility granted under 
international law to patent biogenetic resources; secondly the inadequacy of IP law to 
adequately protect TK holders – in particular from serious risks of misappropriation 
or biopiracy – and ensure a fair distribution of benefits. 
It appears crucial to ensure adequate protection to indigenous knowledge for 
those local and indigenous communities, which primarily thrive on traditional 
agriculture, fisheries, cattle raising and other essential activities like traditional 
medicine. While preserving TK in Western societies is mainly a matter of folklore, in 
such contexts it is essential for ensuring both the community’s development and the 
survival of their cultural identity. So far, most of the debate around this focuses on 
finding solutions within the frame of Intellectual Property (IP) law. Yet, several 
scholars and experts are discussing the inadequacy of the solutions offered by current 
intellectual property law and question the compatibility of the IP law regime with the 
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respect and full realisation of fundamental rights.110 Further, intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) – as currently applied, and implemented worldwide – may hinder the 
possibility to achieve the development of developing and least-developed countries. 
More precisely, the legal and economic implications of current IP law can be an 
obstacle for local and indigenous communities seeking to maintain their own 
traditional model of development and can heavily influence the economic and social 
models of developing countries’ societies. As Margaret Chon highlights, the debate 
around IP law and development reveals a divide: not only a divide between developed 
and developing countries according to their material well-being, but also a divide in 
understanding development as growth and development as freedom.111 Within a 
model of development mainly based on economic growth, IPRs are often supposed to 
play a crucial role as an engine of growth and innovation in a country as well as a 
conduit for foreign investment and technology transfer. Many suggest IP protection as 
an essential driver or even pre-condition of economic growth and development. 
Nevertheless, economic studies have produced ambivalent results about these 
connections, and this is also due to the difficulty to separate out the impact of IP on 
the socio-cultural sphere from other intertwined factors relating to an economy. 
Today, it is recognised that similar levels of IP protection do not necessarily lead to 
the same socio-economic impact: on the contrary, they can result in different socio-
economic impacts depending on the stage of development and cultural contexts of 
countries.112  
In Chapter 3 I will further explore the complex relationship between TK, IPR 
and development through the narrative of biotechnological agriculture. For now, it is 
sufficient to point out that globalisation and the predominance of market economy are 
threatening the existence of such traditional knowledge in the most vulnerable 
countries and the safeguarding of such pieces of intangible heritage is a key issue not 
only to preserve cultural and biological diversity, but also the existence of indigenous 
and local communities. 
                                                
110 See: Sub-Commission on Human Rights, ‘Intellectual property and human rights’, Resolution 
2000/7 and resolution 2001/21; High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Impact of the Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights’, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13. See also for a broader view on this topic: Wong, T. ‘Intellectual Property 
through the lens of human development’, in Wong, T. & Dutfield, G. Intellectual Property and Human 
Development. Current Trends and Future Scenarios, 2001, Cambridge University Press. 
111 M Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 Cardozo L. Rev., 2005-2006, 2823. 
112 See the examples and data quoted in the UNDP Human Development Report 2001, Making new 
technologies work for human development, Oxford University Press (for UNDP). 
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3) Mainstreaming culture as a vector of development: major tensions and 
issues to tackle  
3.1) The protection of cultural diversity as a global concern 
 
Although very different in nature and content, the three challenging situations 
just presented seem to share one major issue: the protection and promotion of cultural 
diversity. In the case of the circulation of cultural goods, services and artists, the 
protection of cultural diversity emerges as an issue from the encounter of two 
different interests: on the one hand the need to foster cultural exchanges, and on the 
other the need to stop cultural homogenisation. Under the current conditions of neo-
liberalism, international trade rules do not seem appropriate to strike the right balance 
between fostering the circulation of cultural goods and services and preventing the 
loss of cultural diversity.113 Preventing and mitigating cultural homogenisation in the 
context of globalisation is nowadays a legal claim advocated both at the national and 
international level.114 Thus, one of the major challenges is the identification of a more 
appropriate system of rules and policy that could conciliate the need to promote the 
movement of cultural goods and services to contribute to development and the need to 
preserve cultural diversity. In other words, the challenge is to find the threshold 
between more liberalisation of trade in culture and protectionist measures. When it 
comes to the freedom of movement of artists and cultural workers, striking a balance 
between the different interests at stake – notably to foster cultural mobility to preserve 
cultural diversity’s potential and the migration and security issues – is even more 
challenging. In the case of the relationship between TK and IPRs, threats to the 
protection of cultural diversity stem from the encroachment of two different models 
and understandings of development: the predominant neo-liberal one, of which IPRs 
can be considered an expression, and local and indigenous models of development in 
certain vulnerable contexts, which are very much related to the safeguarding of local 
cultural identities. This interaction also raises issues concerning the self-determination 
of peoples to choose and decide their own model of development, as well as to 
                                                
113 The international legal framework will be analysed in chapter 3. 
114 R J Coombe, Legal Claims to Culture in and Against the Market: Neoliberalism and the Global 
Proliferation of Meaningful Difference, 1 Law, Culture and the Humanities (2005), 35-52, at 36. See 
also the Preamble of the UN Res 2005/20 on the “Promotion of the enjoyment of the cultural rights of 
everyone and respect for different cultural identities”, (14 Apr 2005), UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.10. 
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preserve their cultural integrity.  
Cultural diversity, like biological diversity, is considered a public good: cultural 
products, intangible heritage, and creativity accomplish a public function that needs to 
be conserved and promoted for the common good.115 Just like biological diversity, 
whose preservation is considered essential for the wellness of the global ecosystem, 
cultural diversity is seen as the common heritage of humanity and necessary for 
humankind’s richness.116 Therefore, preserving cultural diversity it is in the interest of 
humankind. As Francesco Francioni differentiates them, biological and cultural 
diversity present different features: the first being more permanent and less mutable, 
varying throughout millennia according to the law of evolution (and increased human 
impacts); the second being more adaptable and constantly changing throughout 
generations. Yet, the fact that culture is continuously changing and adapting should 
not be considered a reason not to grant legal recognition of cultural diversity as a 
value per se.117 To the contrary, it is this ability to adapt and express diverse cultural 
contents and identities that creates fruitful exchanges and makes human life rich.118 It 
is this ability and the potential of preserving cultural diversity that must be protected 
in the interest of current and future generations.  
 
3.2) Towards the commodification of culture? 
 
Mainstreaming culture in developmental strategies also entails the risk of 
commodifying values and heritage. Roughly speaking, commodification refers to the 
attribution of economic value to all kinds of goods and services, in order to put them 
on the marketplace. 119 As known, for a long time developmental thinking has 
prioritised poverty as an issue, therefore the “culture and development” discourse is 
                                                
115 Many argue that cultural products should also be considered public goods: I Serageldin, ‘Cultural 
Heritage as Public Good: Economic Analysis Applied to Historic Cities’ in I Kaul, I Grunberg, and M 
Stern (eds), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (1999), 240, 241, 244. 
In the same book, see also the chapter “Defining Global Public Goods”, 2.5. 
116 Art. 1, 2001 UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity (n 37); see also the Preamble of the 2005 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Diversity. 
117 F Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared Interest of 
Humanity; 25 Michigan Journal of International Law, (2003-2004), 1209-1228, at 1221. 
118 Ecology and biology show that specialisation, in specific sectors, can help to improve performance 
but weakens the overall strength and resistance of the system, whereas diversity increases this 
resistance and facilitates adaptation. The same reasoning can be applied to culture and cultural 
diversity: cultural diversity can contribute highly to enrich our lives and provide new solutions to face 
and adapt to the new millennium challenges. 
119 A Appadurai “Commodity and the politics of value” in A Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of 
Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, (1988). 
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highly tied to the same critical agendas.120 Yet, culture and cultural activities can 
enrich human lives in many ways that cannot be quantitatively measured. The focus 
on the economic returns that can derive from culture, as governments and 
developmental thinkers have tended to do, mainly sees culture as instrumentally 
useful to economic growth and overlooks the value of culture as itself and as 
constitutive of a more qualitative development. This is a further challenge of the 
“culture and development” interplay: to go beyond the instrumental vision and assign 
to culture a constructive and creative role that can contribute to reconcile the purely 
economic opportunities with values, including non-use values.  
 
 
4) Culture and development: possible paths (for a difficult love) 
4.1 Calling for Culture as the Forth Pillar of development (or towards a broader 
implementation of the principle of integration) 
 
Globalisation is stressing endogenous tensions of the interplay between culture 
and development. Beyond the specificities of each single case, the emergence of 
possible clashes is favoured by the fact that, globally speaking, there is not a 
consistent and comprehensive set of principles and rules creating a global cultural 
governance. So far, legally binding and soft law instruments addressing cultural issues 
adopted within international and regional frameworks do not always refer to each 
other and are not applied according to a systemic interpretation. This results in a 
fragmentation of international cultural law, which undermines its effectiveness.121 
Further, synergies among culture-related legal and policy tools and other international 
instruments regulating relevant areas for the culture and development binomial – such 
as trade or migration – are not adequately envisaged. Therefore, efforts and 
achievements made within the frame of a specific cultural convention or programme 
are often dispersed or weakened by the counteraction of other instruments.122 Better 
coordination and more awareness of the need for a systemic implementation and 
                                                
120 Y R Isar, “Cultural Policies for Development: Tilting Against Windmills?”, in K Epskam, H Gould, 
D A Jelincic (eds.), (n 67), 15, 16. 
121 On risks and challenges posed by the fragmentation of International Law, see the Report of the 
Study Group of the International Commission finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of 
International Law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of International Law, 
A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) 
122 This happened, for instance, in the case of the 2005 UNESCO Convention interacting with WTO 
regimes or with national migration regimes; or in the case of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and the TRIPS Agreement. These examples will be presented in chapter 3. 
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interpretation of international law is needed in order to protect and promote cultural 
diversity within development strategies.  
It is upon this need to include culture in developmental strategies through a 
more systematic and integrated approach,123 that the emergent discussion to re-
formulate the sustainable development paradigm in four pillars, where culture would 
be the fourth cross-cutting pillar, seems to be based. In recent years, both at the local 
and global stage, several voices have called for an official recognition of culture as 
the Fourth Pillar of sustainable development. Jon Hawkes was among the first 
thinkers to have written about this, gaining the attention of the international 
audience.124 Starting from acknowledging the difficulty to define culture and the 
different usage of this word, Hawkes affirms that government and local 
administrations often have an overly reductive understanding of this term and do not 
see the practical applications and implications of culture in everyday life. Therefore, 
they have largely ignored the potential of culture in the attempt to re-configure 
development. Hawkes recognises that the failure of the market-economy model of 
development is pushing the world to look for alternative models and asserts that 
culture can be an invaluable tool to re-shape winning developmental strategies.125 
Adopting a definition of culture that includes culture as values, tangible and 
intangible heritage, and creativity, Hawkes demonstrates through several examples 
how culture is essential for achieving sustainability and wellbeing. He shows that a 
sustainable society depends upon a sustainable culture, which embraces sustainability 
as a core value and promotes participation, engagement, and active citizenship. He 
acknowledges that creativity brings innovation and progress; and that arts and 
heritage contribute to create a sense of belonging and maintain society’s vitality. For 
all these reasons, Hawkes argues that culture should be an integral part of public 
planning and the developmental paradigm on three dimensions should include a 
fourth one, namely the cultural pillar.126 Culture must be granted a separate and 
                                                
123 Among others, Amartya Sen is a supporter of this integrated and systemic approach, see: A. Sen, 
Culture and Development, (n 6). 
124 J Hawkes, The fourth pillar of sustainability: culture’s essential role in public planning, (Common 
Ground Publishing Pty Ltd in association with the Cultural Development Network (Victoria), 2001).  
125 Introduction, Ibidem, at 1. 
126 To be more precise, Hawkes defines the fourth pillar as ‘cultural vitality’, which encompasses 
wellbeing, creativity, diversity and innovation. It is interesting to notice that Jon Hawkes also renames 
the other three pillars, in order to stress on some specific components of their contents: the social pillar 
is called ‘social equity’ (stressing on justice, engagement, and cohesion), the environmental one is 
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distinct place within the development paradigm, in order to gain its place among 
governments and administrations’ decisions and plans. This position is also shared by 
others, and, in particular, is strongly supported by civil society, local associations, and 
NGOs – in primis Agenda 21 for Culture, which is currently promoting a global 
campaign for culture to be included in the post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals.127 
Some may argue that there is no need to add a new pillar for culture, since 
cultural concerns are encompassed within the social pillar (e.g., through the 
enforcement of cultural and social rights). Yet, the social pillar only takes into 
account certain aspects of the interaction of culture with development, whereas it fails 
to consider the cultural environment and cultural factors as elements influencing and 
contributing to development. Supporters of the Four Pillars structure would answer 
that including culture within the social component of the three pillars structure of 
sustainable development is not fully appropriate to advocate the central role of culture 
in developmental policies. Further, the three pillars formula does not reflect the 
complexity of current societies, in “which culture ultimately shapes what we mean by 
development.” 128  Instead, the four pillars approach allows us to address the 
relationship between culture and sustainable development from a dual perspective: 
first, it looks at the development of the cultural sector itself (i.e. heritage, cultural 
industries, creativity, cultural tourism) as an independent component of development; 
second, it establishes that culture has its rightful place (similarly to the environment) 
at all levels and in all public policies (particularly those related to the economy, 
education, science, environment, social cohesion, communication and international 
cooperation).129 
Without dwelling too much on the desirability of re-formulating the sustainable 
development paradigm into four pillars, it must be recognised that doing so would 
                                                                                                                                      
renamed ‘environmental responsibility’ (to say that it should aim at ecological sustainability and 
balance), the economic one is named ‘economic viability’. Ibidem, at 25. 
127 Agenda 21 for Culture, together with other NGOs and cultural organisations, is supporting the 
campaign. See the manifesto “The future we want includes culture: Declaration On The Inclusion Of 
Culture In The Sustainable Development Goals” at http://www.culture2015goal.net/. See also: 
www.agenda21culture.net; K. Nurse, ‘Culture as the Fourth Pillar of Sustainable Development’, 
prepared for Commonwealth Secretariat, (London, June 2006); I Ruigrok, The missing dimensions of 
the Millennium Development Goals: culture and local governments, “Culture, local governments and 
Millennium Development Goals”, Agenda 21 for Culture-United cities and local government, (2009). 
128 United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), Culture: Fourth Pillar of Sustainable Development, 
Policy Statement adopted on 17th November 2010 at the World Summit of Local and Regional Leaders 
– 3rd World Congress of UCLG, held in Mexico (made available at: www.cities-localgovernments.org). 
129 Ibidem. 
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help draw attention towards cultural concerns at the global level and could contribute 
to designing a global cultural governance. In legal terms, this approach seems to rely 
on (and call for) a stronger and systemic application of the principle of integration. 
The principle of integration came to the fore in the 1970s, with the emergence of 
environmental awareness, calling for the integration of environmental concerns into 
development policy.130 It was codified under these terms in the 1992 Rio Declaration 
(principle 4). With the widening of the notion of sustainable development, the 
principle of integration was further extended to social and human rights’ concerns. 
Principle 7 of the ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law 
Relating to Sustainable Development defines it as the “principle of integration and 
interrelations, in particular in relation to human rights and social, economic and 
environmental objectives” and states that “the principle of integration reflects the 
interdependence of social, economic, financial, environmental and human rights 
aspects of principles and rules of international law relating to sustainable 
development as well as of the needs of current and future generations of humankind. 
All levels of governance – global, regional, national, sub-national and local – and all 
sectors of society should implement the integration principle, which is essential to the 
achievement of sustainable development.” 131 Thus, the principle of integration calls 
for a better integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development and 
requires States to make all efforts in resolving “conflicts between competing 
economic, financial, social and environmental considerations”.  
The principle of integration is probably among the most important principles 
of sustainable development. As Duncan French points out, sustainable development 
can only be truly achieved when the principle of integration is “properly and fully 
implemented”.132 The official recognition and formalisation of culture as the fourth 
pillar of sustainable development would open the door for both vertical and horizontal 
integration of cultural concerns in developmental policies. A correct and full 
implantation of the principle of integration would, then, require States and local 
                                                
130 Principle 13 of the Stockholm Declaration (n 43). For a history of the evolution of the principle of 
integration: P Sands, “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging Legal 
Principles”, in Graham and Trotman (eds), Sustainable Development and International Law, 
(International Environmental Law and Policy Series, Martinus Nijhof, 1995), at 61. 
131 ILA Resolution 3/2002, above (n 66). 
132 D French, “Sustainable Development”, in M Fitzmaurice, D M Ong and P Merkouris (eds), 
Research Handbook on International Environmental Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010), at 
59. 
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governments to identify the synergies or virtuous circles mainstreaming culture within 
the international, regional, national and local action and at all policy levels.  
Some initiatives, under different arenas, seem to be moving in this direction. 
In the previous part of this chapter, I recalled the 2011 UN Resolution on “Culture 
and Development”, which expressly acknowledges culture an essential component of 
human development and a significant source to fight poverty, provide for economic 
growth and ownership of development processes.133 Stakeholders and NGOs are 
lobbying for the integration of culture as a formal goal within the post-2015 
millennium agenda. 134  Such a possibility is also contemplated within the UN 
Resolution “Keeping the promise: united to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals”.135 In 2013, stakeholders, NGOs, and other members of the civil society 
gathered together under the UNESCO aegis on the occasion of an international 
congress on culture and development, adopted “The Hangzhou Declaration: placing 
culture at the heart of sustainable development policies” and committed to integrate 
culture within all development policies and programmes.136 
In spite of these valuable efforts, the codification of culture as the fourth pillar 
of sustainable development seems a long way off. Major global and regional 
strategies rarely quote culture within their action plans.137 The outcome of the 
RIO+20 Summit in 2012, the most recent global event discussing achievements and 
new strategies for sustainable development, makes little reference to culture and 
cultural diversity within the document “The Future We Want”.138 The document 
reiterates the idea of a tri-dimensional development, in which economy (although 
                                                
133 2011 UNGA Resolution on “Culture and Development” (n 23).  
134 See Agenda 21 for Culture’s initiative, above (n 127). 
135 UNGA Res “Keeping the promise: united to achieve the Millennium Development Goals”, adopted 
by the UN General Assembly on 19 Oct 2010, A/RES/65/1.  
136 “The Hangzhou Declaration Placing Culture at the Heart of Sustainable Development Policies”, 
adopted in Hangzhou, People’s Republic of China, on 17 May 2013 on the occasion of the 
International Congress “Culture: Key to Sustainable Development” (15-17 May 2013), CLT-
2013/WS/14,(source: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/culture-and-
development/hangzhou-congress/). 
137 For example, at the regional level, the Mediterranean Strategy on Sustainable Development (MSSD) 
adopted in 2005 within the framework of the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea 
Against Pollution (the Barcelona Convention, adopted on 16 February 1976) does not take culture into 
account. Yet, its ongoing revision seems to be making some improvements towards the integration of 
cultural concerns (at least at the consultation stage, see UNEP/MAP “Review of the Mediterranean 
Strategy for Sustainable Development. Consultation Document” (April 2014), available at the 
UNEP/MAP website. 
138 Points 41, 58(j), 130, 131, 134, 197 of “The Future We Want”, outcome of the Rio+20 UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro 20-22 June 2012, A/Conf.216/L.1 
(reissued for technical reasons on 22 June 2012). 
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“green”) remains the major component. As some have highlighted, the Rio+20 
Conference could have been a suitable occasion to expand the development paradigm 
to culture: yet, it seems that States are still wary of formalising this.139 A reason for 
this reluctance may be the difficulty to establish thresholds that would help 
understand to what extent the cultural pillar has to be taken into account. In 
mainstreaming culture within development, States prefer to remain on the soft level, 
using soft-law instruments and language. In terms of legally binding obligations, the 
only compulsory commitment is established under article 13 of the 2005 UNESCO 
Conventions on Cultural Diversity which expressly requires the Parties “to integrate 
culture in their development policies at all levels for the creation of conditions 
conducive to sustainable development and, within this framework, foster aspects 
relating to the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions”.140Certainly, if we compare the integration of cultural concerns with the 
integration of environmental concerns within the development discourse, it is evident 
that culture has a long way to go before gaining its official place among the pillars of 
sustainable development. Environment has been part of the construction of the 
sustainable development paradigm on three pillars since the world conferences of 
Stockholm (1972) and Rio (1992). Until now, international law has produced a rich 
series of binding legal instruments aiming at ensuring the protection of environment 
(although their real effectiveness may be challenged and criticised) that are 
contributing to design a global environmental governance. Nonetheless, culture and 
development share several similarities: like the environment, culture is a limited 
resource if its capability to regenerate and reproduce (cultural diversity) is not 
preserved. Therefore, while a global governance for culture is still being born, it 
seems reasonable to apply to culture the same principles of sustainable development 
that are applied to the relationship between environment and development. 
 
4.2) Applying the principles of sustainable development to preserve culture as 
“capital”  
When culture acts as a constitutive element and instrument of development, it 
should be considered as a “capital”: as such, culture needs to be protected, maintained 
                                                
139 On this point: V Guévremont, "Le développement durable: ce gène méconnu du droit international 
de la culture", (2012) 116:4  Revue Général e de Droit International Public, 832. 
140 Article 13 “Integration of culture in sustainable development”, 2005 UNESCO Convention (n 21). 
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and nurtured in order not to erode and destroy it. As Throsby put it: “just as the 
maintenance of natural capital is seen as essential to the achievement of economic 
and social objectives in a resource-using world, so also might the maintenance and 
accumulation of cultural capital be seen as critical to the same objectives, with the 
added dimension that cultural capital is also valued for its own intrinsic worth”.141 
Throsby addresses the “culture and development” debate by applying some typical 
principles of sustainability, such as inter-generational and intra-generational equity. 
He affirms that fairness in the distribution of resources and opportunities between 
generations is crucial for ensuring the sustainability of cultural capital, considered in 
terms of its links with other elements of the economic and social system. 142 
Paraphrasing Throsby’s analysis of the dialectic “culture and development”, culture 
can be seen as a complex asset of values, knowledge, goods, and creativity that 
constitute the human capital of people to be invested in, in order to produce 
development. Like natural capital, cultural capital is made of renewable and non-
renewable resources. Therefore, it is important to put in place developmental 
strategies that, when using cultural resources, ensure their durability, as well as equal 
and fair access to them. This is necessary in order to preserve the diversity of culture 
and to ensure that less rich and developed countries also enjoy the benefits deriving 
from culture as capital. As we will see, equal and fair access is particularly important 
in the case of cultural industries. 
The durability of cultural resources can be ensured through the principle of 
conservation of tangible and intangible cultural heritage, which we find expressed in 
several cultural-matter conventions, in particular those adopted under UNESCO’s 
aegis.143 The conservation and safeguard of tangible and intangible heritage is also 
related to its sustainable use, which is mainly put in practice through measures of 
preservation (lists of sites, inventories, but also financial interventions, etc.). Yet, the 
                                                
141 D Throsby, “Sustainability and Culture: Some Theoretical Issues”, (1997) 4 International Journal of 
Cultural Policy, 7, 16. 
142 Throsby argues that, in terms of immediate policy decisions and investment analysis, cultural capital 
– both tangible and intangible – should be maintained through time and this maintenance could be 
interpreted as an investment process committing current resources in anticipation of future benefits. 
Ibidem, 17. 
143 E.g.: the Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972); the 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001); the Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003) and 2005 UNESCO Convention for the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. But also: the Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague Convention) and its 
Protocol (1954); the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (1995). 
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sustainable use of culture is, in some aspects, different than the sustainable use of 
environmental resources. Indeed, cultural resources are “living” resources and need to 
be valued and used, not only safeguarded as immutable, in order to maintain the 
ability to re-generate.144 This is particularly true in the case of traditional knowledge, 
which is considered an expression of  “living” cultures, but also relevant in the case of 
cultural goods and creativity, which necessitate the continuous flowering of contents 
and ideas. Sustainable use is, then, connected to ensuring sustainable and responsible 
access to cultural goods: as Rosemary J. Coombe indicates, this “involves a complex 
balance between openness and discretion”.145 In other words, cultural policies should 
aim at ensuring a balance between the protection and preservation of cultural 
expressions – traditional or otherwise – and the free exchange of cultural experiences.  
Among the principles of sustainable development, precaution and prevention 
may also be applied to culture. This means that States should take preventive action 
and/or adopt a precautionary approach in situations where the survival of cultural 
identities and cultural diversity is at risk. Two examples of a practical implementation 
of these principles are inscribed within the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage 
Convention and the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity. In the first 
case, art. 11(4) foresees a specific section to inscribe material cultural heritage under 
risk within the world heritage list;146 in the second case, art. 8 establishes that States 
may determine the existence of special situations where cultural expressions on its 
territory are at risk of extinction, under serious threat, or otherwise in need of urgent 
safeguarding.147 
Finally, the principle of public participation and a community-based approach to 
decision-making processes seem to be fundamental to empower local cultural 
communities. If culture is something “living” and continuously evolving, local 
peoples, ethnic and minority groups are the best custodians and spokesmen of cultural 
interests and concerns. Yet, empowering peoples through a participatory approach, 
especially in the case of minority groups or indigenous peoples, is always a 
                                                
144 V Guévremont, (n 139), 820, 821. 
145 R J Coombe, “Fear, Hope, and Longing for the Future of Authorship and a Revitalized Public 
Domain in Global Regimes of Intellectual Property” (2003) DePaul Law Review 52, 1171. 
146 Article 11, 1972 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage. The 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage is 
constructed on a similar approach. 
147 Article 8 “Measures to protect cultural expressions”, 2005 UNESCO Convention for the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 
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controversial issue within the States’ practice.  
4.3) Contributions from human cultural rights  
Within the culture and development debate, besides the use of sustainable 
development principles, a contribution to the protection and promotion of cultural 
diversity can certainly derive from human rights, in particular cultural rights. Just as 
culture is instrumental to strengthen awareness and respect of fundamental freedoms 
and rights, human rights can be useful tools to strike a balance between culture and 
trade issues by rescuing the human dimension of development. This is clearly 
established by article 4, which celebrates cultural rights as a guarantee of cultural 
diversity, and article 5 of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, which 
recalls the role of cultural rights as enablers for cultural diversity.148 In particular, art. 
5 recognises that “the flourishing of creative diversity requires the full 
implementation of cultural rights as defined in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and in Articles 13 and 15 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” Of course, the reference to these human rights 
provisions should not be considered exhaustive. The whole range of cultural rights 
existing in the various human rights conventions should be considered instrumental to 
the survival and flourishing of cultural diversity. Namely, these cultural rights 
encompass individual rights and freedoms, such as the right to freedom of expression, 
the right to participate in cultural life, free access to cultural and artistic goods, the 
right to education, freedom of religion, and respect of cultural identities; and 
collective rights, such as minority groups’ rights, linguistic diversity, right to freedom 
of association or other relevant rights, like the right to land and cultural self-
determination in the case of indigenous peoples.149  
Under the human sustainable paradigm, human rights play a central role and 
no development strategy can be considered successful if it does not integrate the 
promotion of human rights’ fulfilment.150 Yet, except for the right to education, 
cultural rights have not been granted the same attention within the development 
discourse as other civil and political human rights. Broadly speaking, cultural rights 
                                                
148 Article 4 “Human rights as guarantees of cultural diversity”; article 5 “Cultural rights as an enabling 
environment for cultural diversity”, 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration (n 37). 
149 On the special relationship between land rights, cultural heritage and the right to development in 
indigenous peoples’ contexts see: K Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, 
Culture, Strategy, (Duke University Press, 2010), 142. 
150 See above par. 1.3.2. 
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have not been equally developed as the other human rights’ categories.151 As some 
have pointed out, the underdevelopment of cultural rights is probably a consequence 
of the difficulty to define culture universally: indeed, the different meanings of culture 
can diversely shape the content of cultural rights.152 This consideration is the basis of 
cultural relativism, a theory challenging the universal character of human rights by 
highlighting that not all human beings share the same values.153  According to 
relativist thinking, all values are conventional and people accept certain values 
depending on the context in which they were born, on the political, cultural, 
economic, and religious influences surrounding them, as well as on their genetic 
inheritance and experiences154. Thus, there would be no universally accepted values 
that justify the universality and indivisibility of human rights. The relativism 
argument has been used by most Eastern and Arab States o argue that the rights 
contained in the international legal instruments are a product of a Western European 
and American culture, and that they do not match the concept and contents of human 
rights as shaped in their own countries.155 As a consequence, the effort to integrate 
human rights (together with principles of democracy and rule of law) is often 
perceived as an attempt to export and impose the Western model of development and 
society. From a relativistic perspective, there would be an inherent contradiction in 
asserting that the promotion of human and cultural rights must be integrated within 
regional and international development cooperation programmes in order to lower the 
risks of cultural homogenisation and promote diversity.  
From a genuine anthropological and sociological perspective, the cultural 
relativism argument may be supported in as far as it moves from the assumption that 
all cultures have the same dignity even if they do not all share the same values or 
cherish the same principles. In any case, the equality of all cultures is generally 
                                                
151 Y Donders, “Do cultural diversity and human rights make a good match?”, in UNESCO 2010 
(Blackwell Publishing Ltd , 2010), 15.  
152 Y Donders, ibidem, 15, 16; D McGoldrick “Culture, Cultures, and Cultural Rights”, in M A Baderin 
and R McCorquodale. (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action, (Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 448; L.V Prott supra at (n 28), 94. 
153 Since the 1960s, the universality of human rights has been greatly discussed by human rights 
theorists and lawyers. Besides the critics from the communist approach to human rights and the debate 
arguing that social rights rely upon the recognition of different categories of groups and individuals, the 
theory of the universalism of human rights has mainly been challenged by cultural relativism and the 
pluralism of values. For more on this: M Iovane, “The Universality of Human Rights and the 
International Protection of Cultural Diversity: Some Theoretical and Practical Considerations”, 14 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 2007, 231. 
154 J Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism, Princeton University Press, 1993, 8. 
155 This criticism is known as the debate on ‘Asian Values’, on this topic see, among others: A. Sen, 
Development as Freedom, (n 54);  
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accepted and encompassed in human rights’ instruments. As Yvonne Donders has 
noted: “equality and non-discrimination [are] key principles of human rights [and] 
also entail the recognition of diversity and the right to be different”.156  Under human 
rights law, it is possible to distinguish between unequal and diverse situations, taking 
into account national and religious specificities, as well as historical, cultural, and 
religious backgrounds.157 Universality and indivisibility of human rights do not entail 
the denial of different values: the universal character of human rights norms refers to 
the fact that they apply to everyone on the basis of human dignity, whereas the 
implementation of these rights can vary according to specific contexts and 
circumstances. From this perspective, it can be argued that integrating human rights, 
and in particular cultural rights, within developmental strategies is not about imposing 
universal human rights’ contents and values, but promoting respect for human dignity, 
which should be equally recognised everywhere. Concerning this last observation, it 
must be acknowledged that the traditional practices and values typical of certain 
cultures which undermine respect of human dignity, such as female genital mutilation, 
forced marriages, and other discriminatory practices, mainly affect women. In such 
contexts, the discrimination and violations of physical integrity and human dignity are 
not considered as such by most of the people belonging to those societies, if not by 
the victims themselves, because of their cultural background. A rigid interpretation of 
the relativistic argument risks justifying and supporting the perpetration of such 
practices.158 This is the point at which cultural relativism can no longer be accepted: 
all persons are equal and culture cannot be used as an argument to violate human 
dignity and other related fundamental rights.  
Once the limits of cultural relativism, and the sense in which cultural rights 
should be considered universal, are clarified, efforts should be made by States and IOs 
to strengthen the respect and enforcement of cultural rights. Their role in promoting 
inclusive social development and cultural diversity seems to be mostly accepted by 
civil society. The Hangzhou Declaration, quoted above, places the guaranteeing of 
cultural rights, such as access to cultural goods and services, free participation in 
cultural life, freedom of artistic expression, among the central elements of a new 
                                                
156 Y Donders, above (n 151), 16. 
157 Para 5, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights 
1993, (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 1661. 
158 There are still societies that allow traditional practices hindering physical integrity and violating 
human dignity, such as genital mutilation, or that apply discriminatory treatment to women, minorities, 
or other groups on the basis of the local culture or the culture of the majority.  
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development governance that would include culture. The Declaration asks States to 
adopt “a rights-based approach to culture and respect for cultural and linguistic 
diversity […] within national and regional policies and legal frameworks, including 
consideration for minorities, gender balance, and youth and specific indigenous 
peoples’ concerns.” The enforcement and the respect of cultural rights are perceived 
as beneficial for democracy, freedom of expression, gender equality, reducing 
discrimination, and other positive values that contribute to the overall wellbeing and 
development of societies. 
 
5) Concluding remarks 
 
The scope of this chapter was to present a comprehensive frame of the 
theoretical debate underlying the integration of culture within development policy. I 
have tried to show how the perception of the relationship between culture and 
development has shifted from a negative to a positive approach – from an 
anthropological, sociological, economic, and legal perspective. This shift is mostly 
due to the evolution of both the notions of culture and development. Within this new 
and broader understanding of these terms, culture in its manifold declinations can act 
as a lever for a more inclusive and sustainable model of development. Yet, in spite of 
the growing international, regional, and local recognition of the benefits that culture 
can bring to development, international texts still do not include culture within the 
development paradigm. A considerable step forward has been taken with the adoption 
of the 2005 UNESCO Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions, which expressly requires its Parties to integrate culture in all 
developmental policies (article 13). Nonetheless, the integration of culture within 
development strategies seems to be quite a challenge. Indeed, culture’s interaction 
with different policies entails the overlapping of diverse and contrasting interests, 
which call for a careful assessment and balance. Further, the accent on the linkages 
between culture and economics can lead culture to be treated as a mere commodity. 
These controversial issues have been analysed within the frame of three concrete 
cases, namely: the circulation of cultural goods and services, the mobility of artists 
and cultural workers, and the protection of traditional knowledge in vulnerable 
contexts. In these cases, two opposite interests are at stake: on the one hand, the need 
to foster circulation of cultural goods, services and artists and guaranteeing access to 
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cultural knowledge, on the other hand the need to preserve cultural diversity and local 
identities. In other words, the challenge seems to be between more mobility and 
openness versus more protectionism and conservationism. How can a balance 
between these different interests be reached? 
If we compare the integration of environmental and cultural concerns within 
development policies, we can notice that mainstreaming culture as a vector of 
development shares several commonalities with the protection of the environment. 
Just like environment, culture is a capital that needs to be preserved and protected 
through sustainable use. An adapted use of the principles of sustainability to culture 
can help find a path towards a better management of cultural resources. Yet, it must 
be acknowledged that the integration of cultural concerns in all policies and at all 
levels is not systemic and is still rather weak. Therefore, several voices at different 
stages call for a re-shaping of the sustainable development paradigm in a way that 
would include culture as the fourth pillar of sustainable development. Such 
recognition would facilitate the systemic implementation of the principle of 
integration, which is considered a cornerstone principle for a governance of 
sustainability. In the next chapter I will focus on the European Union’s approach to 
culture and development, in order to see what role culture has played within the 
external relations of the EU.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE EU, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN EXTERNAL 
RELATIONS 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“ La dimension culturelle est une composante essentielle 
 de la construction européenne et une condition de sa réussite […]. 
 La culture européenne, c'est la diversité 
 - une diversité  qui constitue notre richesse et qui doit être préservée.”1 
 
 
 
 
1) The European Union as a global actor: an introduction 
 
The role of the European Union as an increasingly influent actor on the global 
scene is nowadays well established and acknowledged. Born as an organisation of six 
European States for strengthening regional economic integration, the Union’s project 
already embedded more ambitious vocations. While the EU’s integration process 
grew, adding a rich range of internal competence areas to attain the goal of internal 
market integration, in parallel the external action of the EU has expanded and 
proliferated. The EU is currently part of innumerable multilateral agreements and 
conventions, not only covering trade-related topics, but also new challenges, such as 
climate change, environmental protection, human rights, social issues and many more. 
The EU is also increasingly engaging in bilateral economic and trade related relations, 
strategic partnerships, development cooperation initiatives and is constantly 
developing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Since the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon adopted in 2009, the Union has even provided itself with 
a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, assisted by a European 
External Action Service (EEAS), who should represent the Union in foreign affairs.2 
                                                
1 Extrapolated from the speech by José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, 
concluding the meeting of the Member States’ Ministers of Culture in Paris “Rencontres pour l'Europe 
de la Culture”, held in Paris on the 2nd and 3rd of May 2005. Source: 
http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/actualites/index-rec11.html. 
2 Articles 18 and 27 of the Consolidated version of Treaty on the European Union, OJ 2010/C 83/01 
(from now on, simply Treaty on the European Union or TEU). For a clearer understanding of the 
complex system of the EU representation in world relations, see: Chapter 2 International 
Representation of the EU, in The Law of EU External Relations Cases, Materials, and Commentary on 
the EU as an International Legal Actor, (Oxford University Press, 2013).  
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The relationships with its neighbouring countries became a well-established policy, 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the EU is even engaging in 
managing migration issues. Being a recognised international actor with legal 
personality,3 the European Union is a member of several International Organisations 
and is contributing to the practice and evolution of international relations and law.4  
As a consequence of such expansion, the EU could not avoid the debate 
around culture and development and is increasingly engaging in initiatives aiming at 
discussing and integrating the role of culture in development policies. Although it did 
not have a central role in the founding treaties, culture is certainly a core element of 
the EU construction. As far as it concerns the external dimension of the EU action, 
culture has always played a role – albeit one often limited to cultural cooperation. 
Since the EU ratified the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity in 2006, its 
commitment to integrate culture in all developmental strategies and at all levels 
became an international binding obligation. Considering that “the more the EU 
matures, the more it acts as a global power, the more fundamental issues concerning 
its position in international law will be raised”,5 it is not absurd to explore in what 
terms and to what extent the EU contributes to the international “culture and 
development” discussion. 
1.1) The EU as a sui generis actor of international law with global ambitions 
The new Article 3(5) of the Treaty on the European Union, as now 
consolidated under the Treaty of Lisbon, recites as follows: “In its relations with the 
wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and 
contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the 
sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, 
free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in 
particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the 
development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter”. Article 3(5) grounds the basis for a very rich and aspiring external 
agenda of the Union. According to this wording, the Union’s external action should 
pursue not only its interests and spread the values embedded in the Lisbon Treaty, but 
                                                
3 Article 47, Treaty on the European Union.  
4 F Hoffmeister, “The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law”, in M Cremona (ed), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 37. 
5 J Klabbers, “The EU and International Law” (From IVR Encyclopedie, electronic source). 
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should also aim at contributing to achieve global goals and interests, such as peace, 
sustainable development, poverty eradication and enhance the respect for human 
rights, rule of law and principles of democracy. These goals, and other challenging 
tasks such as the promotion of an international system based on stronger multilateral 
cooperation and good global governance, are repeated under Article 21(2) TEU, 
dealing with the general provisions on the Union’s external action.6 It may be noted 
that Article 3(5) and Article 21(2) TEU have the semblance of a political agenda of 
national ministers for foreign affairs. 
Although the founding treaties focused on reaching regional market 
integration, the EU vocation to become a more ambitious world actor was already 
hinted at in the Schuman declaration. It is in Schuman’s sentences such as “[t]he 
world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts”, “the 
contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is 
indispensable”, “this production will be offered to the world as a whole without 
distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and 
to promoting peaceful achievements”, and “[…] Europe will be able to pursue the 
achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African 
continent”7 that the European vocation to contribute to the world’s order and peace 
can be foreseen. Grounding its basis on very concrete issues and goals, such as 
ensuring peace by fostering economic growth and creating an area of free trade, the 
European project also embedded a political dimension since its establishment in the 
                                                
6 Article 21(2) TEU: “The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work 
for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: 
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; 
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of 
international law; 
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final 
Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders; 
(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, 
with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; 
(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; 
(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment 
and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable 
development; 
(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and 
(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global 
governance.” 
7 The Schuman Declaration, presented by the French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950, 
proposed the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community (full text available at 
www.europa.eu/abouteu/basic-information). 
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aftermath of the Second World War.8 The ultimate goal seems to be the European 
contribution to world peace, security, and development.9 The international ambitions 
of the European project were inscribed within the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community 10  – firstly through the creation of a common external 
convention assigning an external dimension to the internal goal of creating a 
European market (also known as the single or internal market) and secondly by 
attributing to the European Community (EC) external powers in specific sectors, such 
as trade policy (art. 131 TEC), development cooperation (art. 177), economic, 
financial and technical aid to developing countries (art. 181), and environment (art. 
174(4)). As we will see later in this chapter, the European Community was also 
attributed a certain degree of external competence in the field of culture (art. 151(3)). 
Further, the EC was given the power to negotiate and conclude international 
agreements (art. 300, art. 310 and art. 133(3)). In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht 
created the European Union11 and provided this new treaty’s creature with a set of 
objectives, among which arose the will to represent itself as a unity and identity on 
the international scene (ex art. 2 TEU). Inter alia, this goal also had to be pursued 
through the means of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, established under Title 
V TEU and which formed the second pillar of the previous three-pillar structure of the 
EU. Considering that the third pillar, known as the Justice and Home Affairs (JAI) 
under Title VI, involved cross-borders police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, the TEU had further expanded the EU’s external fields of action.12 It is 
interesting to notice here that both the second and third pillars were conceptualised 
and structured in a way that recalls more traditional inter-governmental cooperation 
practice, whereas the relationship between the Community and its Member States 
following under the first pillar were defined in terms of “concession of power” from 
national authorities to a supranational one. Considering this peculiarity alone, the EU 
can be identified as an atypical kind of international organisation. 
                                                
8 G Tesauro, Diritto dell’Unione Europea, VII ed., (CEDAM, 2012), 10. 
9 The focus on the African continent can be attributed to the historical relationship between France and 
its former colonies.  
10 Treaty founding the European Economic Community (EEC), signed in Rome on 25 March 1957, 
entered into force on 1 January 1958. From now ECT or Treaty on the European Community. The 
consolidated version under the Lisbon Treaty is called the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). 
11 Treaty founding the European Union, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, entered into force on 
1 November 1993. 
12 Among the novelties brought by the Treaty of Lisbon is the abolishment of the three pillars structure. 
The JAI has been renamed as Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters. 
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The Maastricht Treaty stressed the importance for the European Union to 
speak with one voice, in order to achieve more credibility as an actor on the global 
stage. This priority was also enshrined in the objective to ensure overall consistency 
in the external action of the EU (art. 3 TEU) and to preserve and maintain the 
integrity of the acquis communautaire (art. 2 TEU). Preserving the integrity of 
Community law has also been among the priorities of the European Court of Justice. 
It is known that the ECJ has played a significant and exceptional role in contributing 
to the constitutional development of the European construction. Since the historical 
early decisions Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. Enel, the Court stated that the EC 
Treaty had created a new and distinct legal order: by so doing, the Court affirmed 
both the supranational nature of EC law on its Member States’ constitutional orders 
and its distinctiveness from other international organisations.13 In several following 
cases, the ECJ reiterated the distinctiveness of the European legal order: among 
others, we can recall the Commission v. Ireland decision (also known as the MOX 
Plant case), 14 in which the Court ruled that an international agreement cannot 
jeopardiSe the system of competences nor the unity of the legal order established by 
the Treaties;15 and the more recent Kadi case, in which the Court’s statement about 
the autonomy of the EU legal order raised a lot of criticism due to the delicate issues 
involved.16  
Through its judicial interpretations, the European Court of Justice further 
expanded the external competence of the EU. According to the principal of conferral, 
a cornerstone constitutional principle ruling the functioning of the EU legal order, the 
European Union can act only in those areas expressly attributed to its competence by 
the Treaty.17 Yet, in the ERTA case, another keystone decision concerning the power 
of the Community to conclude an international agreement on transports (namely the 
                                                
13 On this last point, see the view of B de Witte, “The European Union as an international legal 
experiment”, in G De Búrca and J H H Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 38. 
14 Commission v. Ireland, C-459/03, para 123. 
15 For a critical comment on aspects related to international law fragmentation that the MOX Plant 
decision raises, see, among the others: Lavranos, “Concurrence of Jurisdiction between the ECJ and 
other International Tribunals”, (2005) 14 European Environmental Law Review, 213.  
16 Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P. For a broader view on 
the discussion around this decision: G de Búrca, “The European Court of Justice and the International 
Legal Order After Kadi”, (2010) 51:1 Harvard International Law Journal, 1; also: J Kokott and C 
Sobotta, “The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and International Law – Finding the Balance?”, 
(2012), 23:4 European Journal of International Law, 1015. 
17 Article 5 TEU (ex art. 5 ECT). For a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional principles of the 
EU external action: G de Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations, (Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
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European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA), the Court ruled that a Community 
power to conclude an international agreement may arise not only from “[…] an 
express conferment by the Treaty, […] but may equally flow from other provisions of 
the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by 
the Community Institutions”. 18 For the first time, the Court recognised implied 
external competences of the EC: an interpretation that greatly contributed to expand 
the treaty-making competence of the Community whenever internal EU law 
implementation is at stake. Indeed, by upholding that the conclusion of such an 
international agreement by one or even all of the Member States would affect or alter 
internal legislation,19 the Court stated that “[e]ach time the community, with a view to 
implementing a common policy envisaged by the treaty, adopts provisions laying 
down common rules, whatever form they may take, the member states no longer have 
the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third 
countries which affect those rules or alter their scope.”20 The so-called ERTA rule 
recognises, then, the existence of implied exclusive external competences when prior 
internal legislation has already been adopted and Member States are pre-empted from 
engaging in negotiations of subject-matter conventions which may interfere with the 
existing internal asset. The Union becomes the only subject entitled to undertake 
international obligations21 whenever the conclusion of an international agreement is 
necessary in order to achieve Treaty objectives that cannot be attained by the adoption 
of autonomous rules.22 Further, by stating that “with regard to the implementation of 
the provisions of the treaty, the system of internal community measures may not be 
separated from that of external relations”, 23  the Court highlighted the intrinsic 
parallels between the internal and the external dimensions of EU law. 
Since the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community in 1952,24 the 
European process of integration has witnessed a tremendous evolution. The Treaty 
establishing the European Community and the following constitutional and 
                                                
18 Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities, Case 22/70 
ERTA, para 16. 
19 ERTA case, para 22. 
20 ERTA case, para 17. 
21 ERTA case, para 18. 
22 See also: Opinion 2/92 (Competence of the Community or one of its institutions to participate in the 
Third Revised Decision of the OECD on national treatment), para 32. 
23 ERTA case, para 19. 
24 Treaty founding the European Community of Coal and Steel, signed in Paris 18 April 1951 by 
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and entered into force in 1952.  
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institutional modifications that have been taking place since the Treaty of Maastricht 
until the Treaty of Lisbon, created a very special creature under international law. The 
Treaty of Lisbon, which codifies under the TEU, the TEC and the Nice Charter under 
one single legislative tool, merged the European Community and the European Union 
into one entity (the European Union or the Union),25 formally certifies its legal 
personality,26 and further extended the fields of external competence of the EU.27 
Because of the unprecedented and peculiar mix of supranational and inter-
governmental features which rule its construction and functioning (briefly outlined 
above),28 the Union is often defined as a sui generis organisation among the actors on 
the international landscape. Differently from other existing international and regional 
organisations, the EU has expanded its substantive mandate and institutional initiative 
to unequalled levels. The unusual mixture of supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism, the attribution of explicit and implied competence to the EU, 
the constitutional relationship between Member States and the Union similar to a 
federal order, (but in which, at the same time, the Member State remains as 
international legal subjects acting alongside the EU) and the constitutive role played 
by the European Court of Justice makes the EU a very exceptional experiment of 
Member States’ cooperation and international organisation’s development. 
Considering that the Union is acting in an increasingly globalising world, where 
different areas and issues are interconnecting and interrelating, the increased external 
power of the Union also raises challenges concerning its legitimacy to act and the 
boundaries between the Union and Member States’ competences.  
1.2) The role(s) of the EU in the world  
 
The discussion around the nature of the EU under international law and the 
related constitutional issues is extremely interesting, although there is not enough 
room in the frame of this thesis to go through the extensive literature and different 
scholarly opinions on this subject. Besides the fascinating institutional and 
constitutional challenges that have attracted the attention of important scholars and 
researchers, from a more political perspective it can be affirmed that the EU has 
                                                
25 Article 1 TEU.  
26 Art. 47 TEU. The former version did not embed a specific provision on the legal personality of the 
European Union. 
27 E.g.: Article 214 TFEU concerning humanitarian aid. 
28 For an interesting view and analysis of the exceptional nature of the EU under international law: B 
de Witte, “The European Union as an international legal experiment”, above (n 13). 
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become a very influential political actor that the rest of the world is watching. This 
brief excursion on the evolution of the external competences of the Union has aimed 
at clarifying under which terms the EU is defined as a sui generis legal actor. Yet, 
what is most important for the purposes of this thesis is to assess the weight gained by 
the EU on the international stage. Its constant process of evolution has made it a 
growing actor, both on multilateral, bilateral and interregional frameworks. Indeed, 
the EU is party to a wide range of multilateral agreements and is increasingly 
engaging in inter-regional trade relations29 and strategic bilateral partnerships. What, 
then, are the consequences of this increased visibility and presence of the Union in 
world relations? The abundance of academic literature on EU external relations and 
the EU’s “actorness” reveal an undeniable interest in this topic.30 Here, I will try to 
briefly present the major roles that the Union plays on the international stage. 
First of all, it may be highlighted that through its growing net of multilateral, 
bilateral and regional relations, the Union is creating a great number of expectations 
among third parties engaging in contractual relations with the EU, as well as among a 
broader global audience.31 Such expectations are also fed by Article 21(1), which 
states that “the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles that have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and 
which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for 
human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles 
of the United Nations Charter and international law”. The accent on EU values, as 
stressed by Article 3 TEU, suggest that the EU has given itself the status of a 
community of values: values which led to European progress and development and 
that should be globally promoted by the EU in order to contribute to global prosperity. 
Certainly this strengthened accent on values under the Lisbon Treaty raises not only 
expectations, but also criticism. Looking at it from a cultural relativist perspective as 
                                                
29 S Santander, “The European Partnership with Mercosur: a Relationship Based on Strategic and Neo-
liberal Principles, The EU as a Global Player”, in F Soderbaum and L Van Langehnove, The EU as a 
Global Player The politics of Interregionalism, 37. 
30 To quote only a few: M Cremona ad B de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law Constitutional 
Fundamentals, (Hart Publishing, 2008); M Teló and F Ponjaert (eds), The EU’s Foreign Policy What 
Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action?, (Ashgate 2013); P J Cardwell (ed), EU External Relations Law 
and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (Springer, 2012); P J Kuijper, J Wouters, F Hoffmeisters, G De 
Baere and T Ramopoulos, The Law of External Relations Cases Materials, and Commentary on the EU 
as an International Legal Actor, (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
31 G Grevi, “The EU Strategic Partnerships: Process and Purposes”, in M Teló and F Ponjaert (eds), 
above (n 30). 
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presented in the first chapter of this thesis, one may question “which and whose 
values” the EU is alleged to export? The wording of both Articles 21 and 3 TEU seem 
to be referring uniquely to European values, but what exactly are these European 
values? Leaving aside neo-liberalist values, Article 21 focuses on universally 
accepted principles such as democracy, the indivisibility of human rights, equality and 
so forth. Perhaps the more relevant question is: how is the Union supposed to spread 
these values and achieve its ambitious goals in a way that would comply with the 
expectations raised? The second part of Article 21(1) seems to be suggesting that this 
should be achieved by enhancing bilateral and multilateral relations and building 
partnerships with third countries and international organisations sharing similar 
principles. This entails that the Union has to integrate the promotion of these values in 
the framework of bilateral and multilateral agreements with the rest of the World, and 
to strengthen its participation in appropriate global multilateral fora, such as the UN. 
This export of values, although it may be perceived as a superimposition of the EU 
model of democracy, can also be seen as a positive element. Indeed, as Marise 
Cremona suggests, when the EU acts as a promoter of values such as democracy, the 
rule of law, and fundamental freedoms, it moves as a force for stabilisation 
worldwide.32 
Besides seeing the EU as a “stabiliser”, Cremona identifies four further roles 
undertaken by the Union as a global actor, namely: the Union as a model of regional 
integration, as a player on the global market, as a rule generator, and as an attractor 
for neighbours.33 As for the Union as an inspiring model of integration, the results 
achieved in terms of development, wealth, and peace in Europe over the past 60 years 
present the European model for regional integration as a successful one. Despite the 
unceasing Euro-crisis and the increased wave of Euro-scepticism (also confirmed in 
the results of the European elections held in May 2014), the workable institutional 
structure and degree of regional market integration created by the Union can still be 
considered a model for regional integration by the rest of the world. Indeed, no other 
regional integration arrangement in the world (e.g.: MERCOSUR, ASEAN, NAFTA) 
has achieved equal or comparable results. Further, Cremona argues that the EU can be 
seen as a laboratory for testing deeper forms of integration in fields other than trade, 
                                                
32 M Cremona, “The Union as a global actor: roles, models and identity”, (2004), 41 Common Market 
Law Review, 558.  
33 M Cremona, ibidem, 553. 
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such as immigration policy, monetary policy, security and defence policy. It is 
undeniable, however, that the Union’s overall architecture today is in need of a 
process of revision and rethinking, in order to overcome the current crisis.34 This 
should not be so surprising: as De Witte points out, the Union is a legal experiment35 
and, as such, improvements and changes are embedded in its nature.  
Further, the EU is acting as a player on the global market, and is therefore 
contributing to promote more liberalisation. Certainly, as an importer, the EU is 
protecting its own internal market and reinforcing its position on the global market 
through the adoption of various measures, such as anti-dumping measures or other 
protectionist-oriented strategies. Nonetheless, the EU is a member of the WTO, and 
therefore committed to achieving further liberalisation worldwide, and it is 
increasingly concluding strategic partnerships and bilateral trade agreements on the 
basis of reciprocity. This element also confirms the importance of access to the EU 
market.36  
A fourth role of the Union would be to act as a normative power. Through its 
varied typology of agreements – association, cooperation, and partnership agreements 
– the Union export parts of its regulatory norms to third parties. This happens when 
the opening of the internal market is conditioned upon the adoption of certain legal 
standards – for instance, environmental standards or intellectual property protection. 
Further, being a member of several international organisations, like the WTO, or 
having a recognised special status under other fora that allows the EU to take part in 
international organisation, the Union is contributing to creating multilateral rules and 
global governance.37  
Finally, another role that can be attributed to the EU as a global actor is that of 
exercising a magnetic effect on its neighbours, who increasingly apply for 
membership, and of playing an active role as a neighbour. The Union, indeed, is using 
                                                
34 A Gamble, “The EU and the Evolving Shift of Power in Global Governance”, in M Teló and F 
Ponjaert (eds), The EU’s Foreign Policy What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action?, (Ashgate 2013), 
at 16. 
35 B de Witte, above (n 13). 
36 M Cremona, above (n 32), 556. 
37 On this point, Cremona observes that “the most distinctive contribution made by the EU is likely to 
be not so much in formulating substantive rules as in promoting “‘just’ processes of governance at all 
levels”, processes which are informed by the principles of inclusiveness, transparency and 
participation”. Ibidem, at 557. 
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its neighbouring policy (ENP) as an “instrument for foreign policy” and to realise 
stabilisation and unification within Europe.38 
In particular, for the purpose of this thesis, I will mainly look at the role of the 
EU as a model and laboratory of integration and a rule generator. It is the action of the 
EU as a model capable of inspiring other global actors’ initiatives and to influence 
global governance processes concerning the relationship between culture and 
development that will be the subject of this analysis. The first step of this analysis will 
be to clarify the EU’s understanding of “culture” and “development”, as well as their 
place in the EU’s external relations. Yet, before moving to the next section, it is 
necessary to understand the relevance of ensuring coherence and consistency to the 
EU external action. 
1.3) The EU external action: issues of coherence and consistency 
 
Ensuring coherence and consistency of the Union’s external relations is a 
recurrent theme within EU treaty-law and policy documents. Indeed, already under 
the Maastricht Treaty, the EU was required to ensure the “consistency of its external 
activities as a whole”.39 Currently, under the frame of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 7 
TFEU talks about ensuring consistency between the EU’s policies and activities, 
taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of 
conferral of powers; while Article 7 TEU foresees that the Union’s institutional 
framework shall aim to “ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its 
policies and actions”. Article 21(3) TEU states that “[t]he Union shall ensure 
consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and 
its other policies.” As major actors in representing the Union in external relations, the 
Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, are called to ensure such consistency and 
cooperate for this purpose (second statement of art. 21(3)). In the Commission’s 
Communication in 2006 on Europe’s place in the World, ensuring more coherence to 
the whole European external action emerges as a priority in order to face new and 
complex global challenges, as well as to strengthen the international accountability 
and visibility of the EU.40 In sum, in order for the Union to be a reliable actor and 
                                                
38 M Cremona, ibidem, at 558. 
39 Art. 3 TEU, see discussion above in paragraph 1.2. 
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006, “Europe in the World 
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boost the effectiveness of its external action, ensuring coherence between its internal 
and external dimensions and all the EU policies is crucial. 
But what do “coherence” and “consistency” mean and refer to in the 
framework of EU law? To answer this question, a first step is to clarify the use of 
these two words, which may be different in the 28 official languages of the Union. 
Various commentators have drawn attention to the linguistic divergence concerning 
the use of these terms in the different national versions of the Treaties.41 More 
specifically, where the English version of the Lisbon Treaty uses “consistency”, the 
Italian, French, and other versions use “coherence” instead. In English, the word 
“consistency” means conformity, uniformity, and the absence of contradictions, 
which can be translated into the Italian “coerenza” or French “cohérence”. 
Conversely, the English word “coherence” covers a wider concept, by referring both 
to cohesion, positive connectedness, and a logical, comprehensive and consistent 
interaction of parts as a whole. Under EU Treaty law, interpreting the word 
“consistency” as merely the absence of contradiction may be reductive.42 Taking into 
account that the Treaty provisions demand the assurance of consistency between the 
internal and external dimension and all EU policies as a whole, it is more reasonable 
to think that the term under EU Treaty law refers to a broader concept like coherence. 
To confirm this assumption, we can note that the Commission Communication 
“Europe in the World” exclusively refers to coherence, without mentioning 
consistency. 
What, then, is the level of coherence that the Union is required to pursue? 
Although some distinguish up to five different degrees of coherence,43 the most 
relevant distinction appears to be between horizontal and vertical coherence. 
Horizontal coherence refers to synergy, complementarity, and consistency between 
                                                                                                                                      
— Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility”, COM (2006) 278 
final. 
41 M Cremona, “Coherence and EU external environmental policy”, in M Morgera (ed), The External 
Environmental Policy of the European Union EU and International Law Perspectives, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), at 33; P Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional 
Law, (Hart Publishing, 2001), at 39. 
42 C Hillion, “Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External Relations of the European 
Union”, in Developments in EU External Relations Law, above (n 4) at 14. 
43  Hartmut Mayer identifies vertical, horizontal, inter-pillar, rhetorical, strategic, and external 
engagement coherence. Taking into account that the Lisbon Treaty eliminated the division into pillars 
of the EU constitutional structure, the inter-pillar coherence can be included under the horizontal one. 
See: H Mayer, “The Challenge of Coherence and Consistency in EU Foreign Policy”, in M Teló and F 
Ponjaert (eds), The EU’s Foreign Policy What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action?, (Ashgate, 
2013), at 105. 
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the entire range of EU policies and activities; vertical coherence is coherence between 
Union and Member States’ actions. In particular, the pursuit of vertical coherence 
entails coordination and the respect of the principle of loyal cooperation (art. 10 TEU) 
between the EU institutions and Member States, whereas horizontal coherence relies 
on internal coordination among the EU institutions. A fully coherent external action 
would imply complementarity and uniformity in terms of foreign policy objectives 
and strategies, harmony between the internal and external initiatives, transparent and 
tension-free interactions between EU institutions, and EU institutions and the Member 
States.44 Further, there should be a concrete correspondence between statements and 
actions: in other words, what the Union “says” should match what the Union “does”.  
In the field of “culture and development”, the focus of my analysis will be on 
horizontal coherence. Nevertheless, considering that culture is not an exclusive 
competence of the Union, nor a shared one, but falls within the new Lisbon category 
of competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the 
actions of the Member States (art. 6 TFEU), issues of vertical coherence cannot be 
completely ignored. Because of the overlapping of culture with other policy areas, 
such as trade, IP protection, or migration, this analysis will require a careful 
assessment of what EU competences are at stake. It is now important to clarify which 
principles and mechanism exist under EU law to ensure coherence.  
 
1.3.1) The allocation of powers between the Union and Member States: a pre-
condition for external coherence 
 
It is clear that the success of the EU in pursuing coherence is intimately 
connected to preserving the integrity and primacy of the acquis communautaire, 
which can be guaranteed through the full respect of internal constitutional 
principles, 45  in particular the principle of conferral (art. 5 TEU) and duty of 
cooperation (art. 4(3) TEU). As mentioned, the principle of conferral allocates 
competences and powers between the EU and the Member States. Under the current 
Lisbon Treaty framework, we can distinguish three categories of competences as 
listed under art. 2 TFEU: exclusive, shared, and supporting. When the Treaty 
allocates an area within the exclusive competence of the EU, the latter is the only one 
                                                
44 H Mayer, ibidem, at 107. 
45 Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg, para 60. 
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empowered to take internal and external legislative and policy initiative. Article 3 
TFEU includes a full list of such areas.46 Under Article 4(2) TFEU, the Treaty lists 
the areas of shared competence, in which both Member States and the Union are 
entitled to act.47 This list is not exhaustive, given that, in principle, powers in all areas 
not listed under Article 3 TFEU are shared between the Union and Member States 
(art. 4(1) TFEU). Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon introduces a third sector of areas that 
remain in the sphere of national competences, but for which the Union is allowed to 
exercise complementary, supportive or supplementing actions (art. 2(5) TFEU). A list 
of these areas is included in Article 6 TFEU.48 The Treaty is not clear in defining this 
kind of competence, which, as some commentators point out, seems to embed three 
different competences in one.49 This group of competences may be re-conduced to the 
pre-Lisbon category of complementary competences that could be employed by the 
EU to reach minimum levels of harmonisation and that need to be complemented by 
higher national standards. Yet, some argue that these newly defined complementary 
competences are restricted to the adoption of incentive measures or legal measures as 
far as they do not lead to forms of harmonisation.50    
The principle of subsidiarity is meant to shape the boundaries between the 
Union and Member State’s power: in fields falling under shared competences, the 
Union shall intervene only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States (art. 5(3) TEU). Under these 
terms, the Union competence in shared areas appears to be a residual one. Yet, 
drawing the boundaries between Union and Member States competences is not always 
                                                
46 Article 3 TFEU: “The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: (a) customs 
union; (b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market; 
(c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro; (d) the conservation of marine 
biological resources under the common fisheries policy; (e) common commercial policy.” 
47 Article 4(2) TFEU:  “Shared competence between the Union and the Member States applies in the 
following principal areas: (a) internal market; (b) social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty; 
(c) economic, social and territorial cohesion; (d) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation 
of marine biological resources; (e) environment; (f) consumer protection; (g) transport; (h) trans-
European networks; (i) energy; (j) area of freedom, security and justice; (k) common safety concerns in 
public health matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty.” 
48 Article 6 TFEU: “The Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the Member States. The areas of such action shall, at European level, be: (a) 
protection and improvement of human health; (b) industry; (c) culture; (d) tourism; (e) education, 
vocational training, youth and sport; (f) civil protection; (g) administrative cooperation.” 
49 R Schütze “Lisbon and the Federal Order of Competences: a Prospective Analysis”, (2008), 33:5 
European Law Review, at 715. 
50 R Schütze, ibidem, at 714. This interpretation is based on the Final Report of Working Group V 
CONV 375/1/02 Rev 1 and the position of the Convention Presidium expressed in CONV 724/03, 
Annex 2, at 81.  
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easy. First, the Court of Justice of the European Union contributed to expand the areas 
of exclusive competences of the EU through its jurisprudence. As we saw in the 
previous paragraph, the Union is entitled to act in areas not expressly attributed to its 
exclusive competence any time that Member States’ international initiatives are likely 
to affect existing common rules.51 Further, the Court’s jurisprudence holds that this 
principle also applies when EU secondary legislation does not yet exist, but the EU 
international action is necessary to adopt common rules for the attainment of a 
specific objective of the Treaty,52 when secondary legislation is about to be adopted, 
or the EU has already taken steps that envisage its future initiative in that area.53 
Secondly, in our globalising world, where areas and issues are more and more 
connected and interrelating (as in the case of environment and development, or 
culture and trade), competences may overlap and identifying the correct legal basis to 
empower either the Union or the Member States, or both of them, to act on the 
international ground represents a real challenge. On the other hand, it is fundamental 
to avoid that Members States and the EU engage in legal initiatives likely to be in 
contrast and affect the image and effectiveness of the Union’s external action, in order 
to pursue coherence and consistency. In sectors falling outside the exclusive 
competence of the Union, this becomes a crucial issue today and a careful assessment 
of the interests at stake is often demanded. The Court of Justice played a relevant role 
in shaping criteria that could be helpful to trace thresholds;54 nonetheless this balance 
of powers still depends upon a case-by-case assessment. Further, the Court recognised 
that the Treaty’s division of powers itself is not enough of a guarantee to ensure 
coherence, especially when the implementation of an agreement involves the shared 
competence and joint action of the EU and its Member States.55 
                                                
51 ERTA case, above (n 18). 
52 Opinion 1/76 European Laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels, para 4. 
53 Opinion 1/03 Lugano Convention, para 126. It is worth noting that in this material case, the Court 
was asked to express its opinion on shared competence. For a comment on this: M Klamert and N 
Maydell, “Lost in Exclusivity: Implied Non-Exclusive External Competences in Community Law”, 
(2008) 13 European Foreign Affairs Review, at 502. 
54 The engagement of the EU in international negotiations concerning areas that do not fall under its 
exclusive competence is conditioned upon certain specific conditions as elaborated in the ECJ case 
law. 
55 Opinion 1/94 WTO, para 107. In this opinion, concerning the existence of an exclusive competence 
of the Community to conclude the WTO agreement, including GATS and the TRIPS agreement, the 
Court does not apply an extensive interpretation of the common commercial policy. Not recognising an 
exclusive competence of the Community to sign the WTO agreements, engages in a highly 
fragmentary repartition of competences between Member States and the Community. For further 
comments on this: A Mignolli, L’azione esterna dell’Unione Europea e il principio della coerenza, 
(Jovene editore, 2009), 76-88. 
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To conclude briefly, external coherence depends upon the functioning of 
internal principles and mechanisms of the EU’s architecture. The good 
implementation of the principle of conferral is a necessary precondition to ensure 
coherence, but in case of shared and overlapping fields of competences it is not a 
sufficient tool. 
 
1.3.1) The duty of cooperation to preserve common interests 
 
When the Treaty’s allocation of competence is not enough to preserve the 
unity of the whole EU legal order on the external dimension, so as to ensure 
coherence, the duty of cooperation may come to help. Art. 4(3) TEU states that 
“[p]ursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from 
the Treaties.” The Lisbon Treaty talks again about sincere cooperation in art. 13 TEU, 
when it requires the whole set of EU institutions to practice mutual sincere 
cooperation. Loyalty and mutual support are also recalled under the special 
provisions concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy.56 The principle of 
cooperation applies, therefore, to the relationship between the Union and its 
Members, as well as the interactions between the EU institutions. The statement under 
Article 4(3) TEU seems quite clear: Member States and the EU institutions shall take 
all appropriate measures in order to cooperate for the achievement of the Treaty’s 
scopes. This plays a central role in contributing to the action of the Union as a 
“unity”, especially when applied in conformity with the principle of primacy of EU 
law.57 
The duty of cooperation has been developed as a constitutional principle 
fixing issues of procedural compliance in the context of mixed agreements,58 but the 
                                                
56 Article 24(3) TEU: “The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy 
actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s 
action in this area”; Article 25(c): “The Union shall conduct CFSP by strengthening systematic 
cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.” 
57 M Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and Compliance”, in M 
Cremona ad B de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law Constitutional Fundamentals, (Hart 
Publishing, 2008), 126. 
58 Mixed agreements are agreements on topics entailing shared competences and, therefore, negotiated 
jointly by the Member States and the Union. It should be noted that there is no obligation to proceed 
with the mixed agreement procedure every time that shared competences are involved (though, this has 
become a constant practice in the EU’s functioning). Mixed agreements are mandatory when an 
  84 
Court of Justice provided for interpretations to articulate its content and widen the 
scope of its application. In particular, the Court interpreted former Article 10 TEC in 
a way that strengthened the power of the EU in external action and limited the scope 
of action of the Member States. In the decision Commission v. Luxembourg, the Court 
specifies that the duty of cooperation is of general application and does not depend on 
whether the Community competence concerned is exclusive or not, nor on the 
existing right of a Member State to enter into obligations with third countries.59 
Therefore Member States have to comply with this duty even when they act in fields 
falling under their faculty. When a Member State has the competence to conclude an 
international agreement on a specific subject, but the Union has taken the first steps 
towards a common action on that subject, it is obliged to consult the EU institutions 
first, in order to reach an agreement with them before contracting any obligation.60 
Further, before engaging in unilateral initiatives, Member States shall inform and 
consult the EU institutions.61 In this way, the duty of cooperation becomes a valuable 
instrument to limit the competence and fields of action of its Member States. In the 
field of mixed agreement, infringement of Article 10 can also be used as a deterrent 
for the Member State initiative to select an eligible dispute settlement forum. An 
example of this effect can be found in the MOX Plant case, in which Ireland was 
alleged to have failed to fulfil its obligation laid down in Article 10 TEC (and Article 
292 TEC)62 because it had initiated a proceeding against the UK under the dispute 
settlement system of the UNCLOS.63 Ireland argued that the claims raised before the 
ITLOS (the Arbitral Tribunal under the UNCLOS) concerned areas falling within its 
competence, (notably environmental protection). Yet, the Court, mostly adhering to 
the opinion of the Advocate General, affirmed that the provisions of a convention also 
                                                                                                                                      
agreement can be divided in two parts, with one falling under the exclusive competence of the Union, 
and the other falling under the competence of the Member States. Mixed agreements are an option 
when an international agreement affects exclusive and non-exclusive competences of the Union. 
Further: A Rosas, “The European Union and Mixed Agreements”, in A Dashwood and C Hillion (eds), 
The General Law of the EC External Relations (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), 203. 
59 C-266/03, para 58. 
60 Ibidem, also C-433/03 Commission v. Germany. 
61 MOX Plant case, above (n 14), para 179-180. 
62 Within the Lisbon version, Article 292 has become Article 344 “Member States undertake not to 
submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of 
settlement other than those provided for therein.” 
63 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, singed in Montego Bay on 10 Dec 1982. Both the 
EU and Ireland are party to this Convention.  
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ratified by the Community64 “form an integral part of the Community legal order”, 
therefore determining the existence of the EU competence. But, more interestingly, 
the Court held that initiating a proceeding before an international arbitral tribunal 
entails a manifest risk of violation of the system of competence set up by the Treaty 
and a threat for the autonomy of the EU legal order.65 By condemning Ireland for the 
infringement of the duty of loyal cooperation, the Court restricts the faculty of the 
Member States to select a dispute settlement system of their choice, even when they 
are party to a mixed agreement, in order to preserve the unity and integrity of the EU 
legal order. Although the Irish claims against the UK could fall under the scope and 
competence of EU law,66 Ireland – as a sovereign national order engaged in other 
international commitments – was exercising its right to submit a dispute concerning 
breach of a sectoral agreement to the specialised tribunal foreseen by the agreement in 
question. The Court seems not to have taken this into consideration at all, by 
considering the EU legal order almost as a self-contained regime in the international 
framework and placing the protection of its unity and autonomy among the common 
interests of the EU.67 
Although the power of action of EU member States appears to be considerably 
reduced, the Court’s extensive interpretation of the principle of cooperation should 
not merely be seen as an attempt to erode national competences. The rationale behind 
this is the effective protection of the common interest, which “is not simply an 
expression of the collective interest of the Member States but represents an aspect of 
the autonomy of the [Union] system”.68 Indeed, in exercising their concurrent power, 
Member States are alleged to pursue the satisfaction of their own interests in external 
relations at the risk of compromising the effective defence of the common interests of 
the Union. Member States may adopt positions which differ from those that the 
                                                
64 At the time of the MOX Plant decision the division between the Community and EU was still in 
place. Of course, the reasoning applies today to the EU.  
65 MOX plant case, para 154. 
66  AG Poiares Maduro broadly demonstrated the existence of the Community’s environmental 
competence on the basis of secondary legislation in the environmental field. Further, he asserted that 
by ratifying the UNCLOS Convention, the Community had also exercised its non-exclusive 
competence in the field of environment (which normally falls under shared competence), and therefore 
issues in this field fall within the scope of Community law. See Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, para 
33. 
67 This aspect of the MOX Plant decision has been harshly criticised by international lawyers and 
scholars, see in particular: Lavranos, “Protecting its Exclusive Jurisdiction: the MOX Plant-Judgment 
of the ECJ”, (2006), 5 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 479. 
68 M Cremona, (n 57) at 127. 
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Community intends to adopt, and would thereby distort the institutional framework.69 
The principle of cooperation, together with the primacy of EU law, aims at avoiding 
this risk. This interpretation of the principle of cooperation is confirmed by the 
Court’s decision Commission v. Sweden, in which Sweden was found to be in breach 
of its duty of loyal cooperation because it had proposed, within the framework of the 
Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants (POPs)70 – to which the Union 
is also a party – to add a new group of POPs (perfluoroctane sulfonates, PFOS) to 
those already covered by the Convention.71 At the moment of the Swedish proposal 
the EU’s environmental regulatory framework did not cover PFOS and – according to 
Sweden – no common position on the issue had been formalised by the Council.  
Recalling that the environmental competence is a shared one, that Member States are 
a priori allowed to adopt higher environmental standards, and that no EU legislation 
or position existed at that time, it may be logical to think that Sweden could propose 
unilaterally to add the dangerous group of substances (PFOS) to the list. Yet, the 
Court, referring to the Environmental Council Conclusions of March 2005 preparing 
the first COP and considering it to be connected to the broader strategy of the Union 
within the Stockholm Convention, retained that a common position existed. 72 
Therefore, according to the reasoning of the Court, by proposing to add a new 
substance Sweden had dissociated itself from the common strategy and compromised 
the unity in the international representation of the Union and its Member States”, 
weakening their negotiating power with regard to the other parties to the Convention. 
The Court thus found Sweden in breach of the duty of loyal cooperation. As Marise 
Cremona points out “[t]he key is the fact that the Stockholm Convention is a mixed 
agreement: Sweden was acting as a party, but the Union is also a party. Sweden’ s 
act therefore had potential consequences for the Union both internally and externally 
in a way which would not have been the case had the Union not been bound by the 
Convention”.73 The exercise of shared competence on the external level may, then, be 
limited (or substantially reduced) when it can affect the Union’s decisions on the 
internal and external level. In the specific case of environment, Member State may 
decide to give priority to environmental policy over other considerations internally, 
                                                
69 Opinion 1/75.  
70 Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants entered into force on 17 May 2004. 
71 Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) 
of 20 April 2010. 
72 Ibidem, paras 89–91. For further comments on the possibility to consider non binding acts  
73 M Cremona, C-246/07 CASE LAW, (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review, at 1663. 
  87 
but externally – at least in this context of a mixed agreement – the reconciliation of 
objectives necessary to policy coherence must be worked out by Union and Member 
States together.74 After all, adapting Dashwood’s words to the post-Lisbon scenario, 
the objectives of the Treaty have to be attained jointly through the action of the EU 
and the Member States.75 
1.4) Some interim remarks 
 
The Union has become an increasingly visible and active international actor. It 
plays several roles and raises expectations among its partners and, more broadly, the 
international community. The success of the external Union performances depends 
upon several factors intimately connected to its internal dimension. In order for the 
EU to be a reliable and trustworthy actor, it is necessary to purse coherence between 
the internal and external dimension of the EU. This requires coordination and 
consistency between the different goals and objectives of all the EU policies, as well 
as between the EU and its Member States. The achievement of such coherence 
becomes a real challenge when different policy areas encroach, implying the exercise 
of different kinds of competence. EU constitutional principles, such as the principle of 
conferral and the duty of cooperation, make a crucial contribution to achieving 
coherence and preserving the unity of the EU as an autonomous legal order. 
Nonetheless, in our globalising world, this contribution may not be satisfactory 
enough. As we will see in the field of culture and development, different issues and 
areas overlap and finding the appropriate legal basis entitling the Union action to take 
initiative demands a careful assessment, which may lead to tensions between the 
Union and its Member States.  
 
2) The European Union and culture 
 
Is there a place for culture within the Union’s external action? And can culture 
be considered as something falling under the common interest of the Union? As we 
saw, the allocation of competences is a central element in the functioning of the EU 
legal order. In order to understand what role the EU assigns to culture when behaving 
as a global actor, it is necessary to assess first whether an EU competence in the 
                                                
74 M Cremona, ibidem, at 1662. 
75 A Dashwood, “The Limits of European Community Powers, (1996), 21 European Law Review, at 
113. 
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cultural sector exists. Secondly, a look at the relevant EU Treaties’ provisions and 
major policy documents will help us to understand what notion of culture the EU 
seems to be endorsing, and whether any acknowledgements of the relationship 
between culture and development emerge. 
 
2.1) Assessing the EU cultural competence under Treaty Law 
2.1.1) The evolution of the cultural competence from the origins of the 
Community to the Maastricht Treaty 
 
The Schuman Declaration opened with the following sentences: “World peace 
cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts […]. The contribution 
which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the 
maintenance of peaceful relations.” These words, and the frequent references to 
solidarity as a core value for a united Europe encompassed in the text of the 
Declaration, show that culture had, since the very beginning, a role to play in the 
building of Europe. Schuman called for creative efforts, efforts of imagination and 
intellect, to conceive of a new Europe, without borders and conflicts, and placed 
shared values, such as solidarity and the maintenance of peace, at the heart of Europe. 
The birth of the European project was also a cultural project.  
Despite the relevance of culture in the original idea of the European project of 
integration, the founding Treaties did not establish a specific cultural competence for 
the Communities, nor grant any special recognition to culture. It was only in 1992, 
with the amendments brought by the Treaty of Maastricht, that a specific cultural 
competence was introduced within the EU legal order, namely Article 151 TEC. 
Nonetheless, even if the Community before the Maastricht Treaty did not have any 
conferred power on culture, it found itself dealing with cultural issues while 
implementing the rules concerning the realisation of the internal market. Under the 
original version of the Treaty on the European Community (EEC), the only provision 
contemplating cultural aspects was embedded in Article 30, which allowed 
restrictions of the free movement of goods on the grounds of their artistic, historic and 
archaeological value.76 Such a provision hints at a certain awareness about the 
                                                
76 Former Article 30 ECT is now Article 36 TFEU: “The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not 
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of 
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preservation of national cultural heritage already at the initial stage of the European 
market integration, or at least among the drafters of the Treaty founding the European 
Community.77 Yet, it also shows that cultural goods were considered trade goods like 
all others for which the rules on free circulation had to apply: if otherwise, it would 
not have been necessary to include such an explicit exclusion.78 It could be stated that 
the Community, by applying the rules on free circulation to cultural goods, has acted 
as a promoter of cultural exchange and, therefore, contributed to enrich cultural 
diversity in its Member States. Yet, as in any free trade regime, risks of loss of 
national cultural specificities came to the fore and the protection of cultural heritage 
and diversity has mainly been a concern for Member States rather than a specific goal 
for Community level action. During the initial phases of integration, Community and 
Member States’ interests in culture have mostly been in conflict: whereas the 
preservation of historical and artistic heritage has always been a central concern for 
most of the Member States due to the intimate relationship with their need to preserve 
cultural identity and sovereignty,79 the Community demonstrated that it saw such 
interest towards cultural concerns as likely to jeopardise the internal market’s 
integration process. In one of the first cases decided by the ECJ concerning the 
imposition of an export tax on cultural goods, the Court – although it recognised the 
special nature of cultural goods – rejected the idea of a general cultural exemption 
because it was likely to hamper the realisation of the internal free market and clearly 
affirmed that the free movement rules apply to works of art as objects of commercial 
transactions.80 The position of the Court at that time is not surprising: it is well known 
that the ECJ, through its decisions and judicial interpretation, highly contributed to 
the increased abolishment of trade barriers in order to achieve negative integration.81 
                                                                                                                                      
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or 
plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the 
protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States.” 
77 Some scholars speak of an existing hidden cultural agenda under the EC Treaty. See: Craufurd Smith 
R., “Community Intervention in the Cultural Field: Continuity or Change?”, in Craufurd Smith R. (ed), 
Culture and European Union Law, Oxford University Press, 2004, 28-49. 
78 E Psychogiopoulou, The Integration of Cultural Considerations in EU law and Policies, (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 19. 
79  E Steyger, National Traditions and European Community Law: Margarine and Marriage, 
(Dartmouth, 1997), 69-72. 
80 Case Commission v. Italy (Italian Arts Treasures), C 7/68, ECR 423, at 428. 
81  The market integration process had to be realised through negative integration and positive 
integration. Negative integration refers to the gradual removal of all trade barriers, a set of mandatory 
bans for Member States and careful and limited list of exceptions to free trade rules; positive 
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With market integration as the priority, national claims to apply exemptions to the 
free circulation of cultural goods or to certain productions connected to national 
cultural traditions, like in cases concerning culinary traditions and local food, have 
mostly been denied by the Court.82 In balancing commercial and cultural interests, the 
ECJ often gave priority to the freedom of circulation and condemned national cultural 
arguments as forms of hidden protectionism.  
Tensions between the internal market regime and Member States’ interests 
also arose under EC completion law. Frictions between Member States and the 
Commission were particularly frequent in the audiovisual media sector: most of the 
European countries – France in primis – have always had a long tradition of state 
intervention, regulating practices and subsidising cultural industries. State aid is often 
the only means to ensure the survival of small cultural industries, yet this can often be 
in conflict with the EC competition law and the ban on State Aid as envisaged by the 
former Article 87 ECT.83 Under the frame of the common market’s rules, Member 
States started to claim for a “cultural exception” to exempt cultural productions from 
the full application of EC competition rules in order to preserve their cultural 
identities.84  
Over the years, the Court has not always demonstrated a lack of sensitiveness 
towards national cultural claims. Through an extensive interpretation of the doctrine 
of mandatory requirements, as elaborated in the famous Dassonville and Cassis de 
Dijon decisions,85  the Court provided a frame for some protection of national 
measures dealing with cultural matters. More precisely, measures coping with the 
protection of national cultural heritage,86 or other cultural characteristics can be 
                                                                                                                                      
integration is realised through the adoption of EC policy and legal measures, such as harmonisation 
measures. F Tesauro, Diritto dell’Unione Europea, VII ed., (CEDAM, 2012), 365 and ff. 
82 The Court has often adopted a very restrictive approach on cultural issues. See, for instance, 
Commission v. Germany, C 178/84, 1987, ECR 1227; Drei Glocken v. USL Centro-Sud, C 407/85, 
1998, ECR 4233. See, for other interrelations between culture and free trade: Leclerc v. Au Blé Vert, C 
229/83, 1985, ECR 1. In this case, concerning national measures on book-price-fixing adopted to 
protect cultural diversity and creativity at the national level, the Court held that they could not fall 
under the exception by Art. 30 because they were not mentioned among the allowed exemptions. The 
Court privileged a narrow interpretation of Article 30, considered as an exception to the general rule on 
free circulation, whereas, the protection of creativity and diversity proved to be better pursued through 
other provisions, namely those concerning copyright and IP related rights. 
83 Now Article 107 TFEU. 
84 S Foa and W Santagata,“Eccezione culturale e diversità culturale. Il potere culturale delle 
organizzazioni centralizzate e decentralizzate”, (2004), 2 Aedon, 4-7. 
85  Case 8/74, Dassonville [1974] ECR 837; Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral-AG v 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Brandwein (Cassis de Dijon), ECR 649. 
86 Case C-180/89, Commission v Italy. 
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justified as far as they pursue the public interest and would match with the parameters 
of the mandatory requirements.87 The Court – elaborating on the “rule of reason” – 
started to accept trade restrictions or state aid policy justified on cultural arguments, if 
and when they were proportionate with the scope.88 The ECJ, however, did not 
develop a homogenous and consistent doctrine on “culture and trade” issues, but 
proceeded on a case-by-case approach. This cautious attitude of the Court may be 
attributed to suspicions about the genuine intentions of the States, often alleged to use 
the “cultural excuse” to justify their breach of the EU/EC law and protect their 
domestic market. At the same time, the approach of the Court acknowledges that the 
Member States have diverse national values, which may justify the recourse to 
restrictive measures: because values and culture vary from one State to another, this 
diversity needs to be assessed in each case.89  
The more the integration of the internal market is realized, the more cultural 
and trade interests encroach. The growing intervention of the Court of Justice on 
cultural matters showed that there was a need to have a legal basis to start addressing 
the relationship between culture and trade. On a parallel level, the Commission had 
also moved towards the acknowledgement that a cultural competence was necessary: 
culture, indeed, could be an obstacle for the internal market, but also a valuable 
opportunity for economic growth, in particular through cultural industries and 
increased circulation of cultural goods and services, as well as a soft power to boost 
the sense of belonging to Europe and foster the European integration process. We 
should not forget, in fact, that in the 1970s and 1980s Europe started to suffer from 
the first symptoms of a spreading Euro-scepticism. In 1986, the Single European Act 
(SEA) was adopted to give new powers to the integration process. Among the other 
structural changes, the SEA introduced new areas of competence under the sphere of 
power of the Community, such as environment, although it did not grant any express 
power in the cultural field to the Community.90 A year later, the Commission released 
                                                
87 On this, see: E Psychogiopoulou, above (n 78), 140 and ff. 
88 To quote a few: Cinéthèque v. Fédération National des Cinéma Français, Joined Cased 60-61/84, 
1985, ECR 2605; Groener v. Minister for Education, C 379/87, 1989, ECR 3967; Commission v. 
Netherlands, C 353/89, 1991, ECR I 4069; Echirolles Distribution SA v. Association du Dauphiné and 
others, C 9/99, 2000, ECR I 8207. For a broader view on these and other similar cases: R Craufurd 
Smith, supra at (n 77), 19-78. 
89 C 38/02, Omega v. Bonn, par. 31.  
90 The Single European Act (SEA) entered into force on 1 July 1987 and was adopted to revise the 
Treaties of Rome in order to add new inputs to European integration and to complete the internal 
market. It amends the rules concerning the European institutions and expands Community powers, 
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the Communication “A fresh boost for culture in the European Community”, 
supporting the idea that an increased Community cultural power was both “a political 
and economic necessity given the twins goals of completing the internal market by 
1992 and progressing from a people’s Europe to European Union”.91 The document 
of the Commission reconnects with the initial logic of the Schuman Declaration: the 
text, indeed, by making reference again to solidarity as a central element to underpin 
integration and improve living conditions, asserts that a sense of belonging to a 
European culture is a fundamental prerequisite to realise such solidarity. The 
Commission Communication seems to be reconnecting both the political and 
economic dimensions of the European integration process through the basis of 
culture. Looking closely, the Commission goes even further by admitting that the 
main means to keep Europe united are through its regional and national cultural 
diversity.92  
Member States looked at this growing Community cultural interest as a 
dangerous impingement on their national cultural policies. Fearing an attack on their 
power in an area that has traditionally belonged to State’s sovereignty, Member States 
argued that the attribution of cultural competence had to be limited to supporting 
activities valorising cultural differences and diversity.93 Member States have always 
been afraid of European cultural homogenisation under the European integration 
process.94 Therefore, if a cultural competence was to be attributed to the European 
Union, it should only be formulated in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity 
and not with the aim of creating a uniform common culture. In this context, a cultural 
competence was introduced in 1992 with the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht, 
which created the European Union and aimed at strengthening the political dimension 
of the European integration. Overall, the Maastricht Treaty gave more visibility to the 
relevance of culture within the European Union, especially as an element of the 
“European identity” that the Treaty aimed at building. For instance, the preamble of 
                                                                                                                                      
notably in the fields of research and development, the environment, and common foreign policy. As far 
as it concerns the environmental competence, the SEA specifies that the Community can only intervene 
in environmental matters when this action can be attained better at Community level than at the level of 
the individual Member States (subsidiarity). 
91 European Commission, “Communication on a fresh boost for culture in the European Community”, 
COM (1987) 603, 1. 
92 Ibidem, at 3. 
93 R Corbett, The Treaty of Maastricht: From Conception to Ratification: A Comprehensive Reference 
Guide (Longman Group UK, 1993), at 51; E Psychogiopoulou (n 78), at 15. 
94 I Katsirea, Cultural Diversity and European Integration in Conflict and in Harmony, (Ant. N. 
Sakkoulas Publishers, Athens, 2001), 31-49 
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the Treaty on the European Union emphasised the role of values in the European 
construction and the respect of Member States’ history, culture and traditions. Under 
Article 6(3) TEU, it was established that the Union shall respect the national identities 
of its Member States.  
The Treaty on the European Union introduced Article 151 in the ECT, 
conferring a complementary competence to the Community in the cultural area, in 
order to contribute to the “flowering of the cultures of its Member States, while 
respecting their national and regional diversity, and at the same time bringing the 
common cultural heritage to the fore”. Under (then) Article 151(2) ECT the 
Community “shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between the Member States 
and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in order to improve the 
knowledge and dissemination of culture, safeguard cultural heritage, and promote 
non-commercial cultural exchanges and literary and artistic creation, including in the 
audiovisual sector”. No power of harmonisation in the cultural sector was given to the 
Community: a clear ban in this sense was established under Article 151(5). The 
Council could only adopt incentive initiatives through the co-decision procedure, and 
recommendations, with the unanimity vote.95 It is striking that for the adoption of 
recommendations, which are soft-law instruments within the European Union, 
unanimity was required. It is also peculiar that for the adoption of incentive measures, 
not only did the Parliament have to be involved, as required by the reference to the 
co-decision procedure (former art. 251 ECT), but the Committee of Regions also had 
to be consulted and decisions taken with unanimity. In the pre-Lisbon system the 
ordinary legislative procedure did not foresee the participation of the European 
Parliament: the Parliament’s involvement was envisaged only in the case of the co-
decision.96 For culture, this was expressly envisaged in order to address Member 
States’ anxiety towards the attribution of a cultural competence outside their national 
powers. The Parliament was perceived as a better custodian for the promotion of 
culture and cultural diversity than other EU institutions. Indeed, within the context of 
                                                
95 Article 151(5): “In order to contribute to the achievement of the objective referred to in this article, 
the Council  
- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Committee 
of Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations of 
the Member States. The Council shall act unanimously throughout the procedures referred to in Article 
251; 
- acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.” 
96 After Lisbon, co-decision is now the ordinary legislative procedure. 
  94 
the discussion surrounding the introduction of a cultural competence in the Treaty, the 
Parliament’s position stressed that any involvement in the cultural field had “[to 
make] the most of all aspects of the [European] diversity, thereby turning European 
culture into a culture of cultures by creating the most fertile environment possible”.97  
The use of the words “cultures” and “diversity” in Article 151 shows the 
attention of the EU towards culture as a plurality of cultural identities and 
manifestations.98. Moreover, the exclusion of any power of harmonisation seems to be 
the expression of a will to preserve this plurality of cultures, as something strongly 
desired by the Member States. This is also recalled under paragraph 4, which 
acknowledges the cross-sectional function of culture by stating that “[t]he Community 
shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this 
Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.” 
Finally, under paragraph 3, the Community was attributed a complementary power 
also on the external dimension, by fostering, together with the Member States, 
cooperation with third countries and international organisations active in the cultural 
sphere (in particular with the Council of Europe). 
2.1.2) Cultural competence after the Lisbon Treaty reform: art. 167 TFEU 
 
The reform carried out by the Lisbon Treaty did not change the asset of the 
cultural competence of the Union. Under Article 167 TFEU (current Article 151 
ECT), culture remains a supportive competence, as also recalled under Article 6 
TFEU, which lists culture among the sectors likely to be included in the 
complementary competences. Most of wording of Article 167 TFEU remains 
unchanged: under paragraphs 1 and 2, the Union shall contribute to the flowering of 
the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional 
diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore; 
encouraging cooperation between the Member States and, if necessary, supporting 
and supplementing their activity’ in order to improve the knowledge and 
dissemination of the culture and history of European peoples; the conservation and 
safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance; non-commercial cultural 
                                                
97 Resolution of the European Parliament of 17 February 1989 on a fresh boost for Community action 
in the cultural sector, point E. 
98 B De Witte, “The Value of Cultural Diversity in European Union Law”, in H Schneider and Van 
Den Bossche (eds.), Protection of Cultural Diversity from an International and European Perspective, 
(2008), 219-220; D Ferri, La costituzione culturale dell’Unione Europea, (CEDAM, 2008) 31-42.  
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exchanges; and artistic and literary creation in various sectors, including the 
audiovisual sector. In terms of external powers, the Union’s major power remains in 
the form of cultural cooperation, which has to be undertaken together with the 
Member States (paragraph 3). Only one major change can be found in paragraph 5: 
whereas the ban of adopting any measures likely to entail harmonisation in the 
cultural sector continues to exist (directives and regulations therefore remaining 
excluded from the range of legal initiatives of the Union), the Council can now adopt 
recommendations through the qualified majority vote procedure. With the Treaty of 
Lisbon, Member States overcame their antipathy for the qualified majority vote in 
cultural matters and reaching an agreement towards the adoption of cultural measure 
should become less difficult.99  
 
2.1.3) The external cultural competence of the Union 
 
Regarding the external competence of the Union in the cultural sector, cultural 
cooperation continues to be the external playground of the EU. The Union has, then, 
the power to promote and support projects concerning the protection of cultural 
heritage, cultural exchanges, and similar activities falling under the umbrella of 
cultural cooperation. The Union also has the power to conclude international 
agreements dealing with cultural cooperation.  
But what does it mean that the external action of the Union is limited to 
“cultural cooperation”? The wording of Article 167(3) is not very precise in this sense 
and the effective external power may remain vague. Although “cultural cooperation” 
may appear at first glance as a restricted field of action, to understand better the 
boundaries of the external cultural power of the Union we should not forget that 
culture is a cross-cutting area that encroaches and intertwines with others. Further, 
other policy of the EU may deploy impacts on culture and raise issues concerning the 
protection of cultural diversity. The Union and its Member States seem to have a clear 
understanding of the cross-cutting nature of culture: indeed, Article 167(4) expressly 
requires the Union “to take cultural aspects into account in its action under other 
provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the 
                                                
99 In the past, it has proved to be very difficult to reach an agreement that could be accepted with 
unanimity by the Members of the Council. For this reason, the possibility to switch to the qualified 
majority vote was already discussed at the time of the Nice Treaty negotiations. However, the Nice 
Treaty did not achieve any result in this sense. Further on this: E Psychogiopoulou, (n 78), at 38. 
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diversity of its cultures”.  
Cultural cooperation may, then, be a wide field of action for the Union, given 
that opportunities for cultural cooperation may have a place within multilateral and 
bilateral agreements, and under different fora. Since 1992, indeed, the efforts of the 
European Union to integrate culture in external relations have expanded 
tremendously.100 For instance, culture has been integrated within the framework of the 
trade and development policy: the Lomé and Cotonou agreements between the EU 
and the ACP envisage financial and technical assistance for actions in the cultural 
sphere, mainly in the area of the preservation of tangible cultural heritage, as well as 
the exchange of best practices, teaching, dissemination of information.101 Provisions 
concerning cultural cooperation also exist under the frame of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership.102 More recently, the increased engagement in the field of culture carried 
the EU to become a party to the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: the first 
UNESCO Convention concluded and ratified by the EU.103 
Member States have always looked at the growing initiatives of the EU in the 
field of culture through critical eyes, fearing an extension of the Union competences 
and interferences in their national cultural policies. Therefore, they have tried to avoid 
this possibility through mechanisms and procedure, such as the need for unanimity 
voting first, or the joint participation in international agreements (mixed agreements), 
or by challenging the external power of the EU before the Court of Justice.  
Safeguard mechanisms are envisaged in the case of culture and trade in services. 
Indeed, while external trade falls under the exclusive competence of the Union (art. 
207 TFEU), Member States’ concerns regarding cultural services and intellectual 
                                                
100  See: Commission Communication COM (92) 149, “New Prospects for Community Cultural 
Actions”. Also: J A McMahon, “Preserving and Promoting Differences? The External Dimension of 
Cultural Cooperation”, in R Craufurd Smith (ed.), Culture and European Union Law, (Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 327. 
101 E.g.: Article 139 of the 1989 Lomé Convention (Fourth Lomé Convention) aimed at fostering 
dialogue and better understanding through cultural exchanges between the ACP governments and 
peoples on the one side, and the Community on the other (Article 139 of the ACP-EEC Convention, 
signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989); following this, the Cotonou Agreement included Article 27, 
which became a cornerstone for a strong cultural development policy. (Partnership Agreement between 
the members of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) on the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, on the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000). 
Further in paragraph 4.2.1 of this chapter.  
102 E.g.: Article 46 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the 
European Communities and its Member States 
103 Contents and impacts of the 2005 UNESCO Convention will be further analysed in Chapter 3, 
whereas constitutional aspects of the EU ratification of the Convention and its implications for the 
Union will be object of analysis in chapter 4.  
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property matters are expressed through the retention of unanimous voting in these 
fields. Article 207 states that for all decisions concerning the “negotiation and 
conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects 
of intellectual property, the Council shall act unanimously where such agreements 
include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules”. 
Further, “the Council shall also act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these 
agreements risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural and linguistic diversity; and in the 
field of trade in social, education and health services, where these agreements risk 
seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the 
responsibility of Member States to deliver them”. As the preservation of cultural 
identities and national cultural competences is a major concern for the Member States, 
the unanimity vote requirement for all Council decisions concerning cultural and 
audiovisual services should serve as a safeguard clause.104  
In addition, paragraph 6 confirms that the exercise of the competences conferred 
by Article 207 in the field of the common commercial policy “shall not affect the 
delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States, and shall not 
lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States in 
so far as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation”. This provision seems to be there 
to recall that the equilibrium between the cultural competence of the Member States 
and the complementary cultural competence of the Union should not be altered in the 
external level by the exercise of the trade competence. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union never interpreted the limits of 
Article 167(3) and did not clarify what falls under “cultural cooperation”. On their 
side, Member States often challenged the exercise of the cultural external competence 
of the EU – especially in areas requiring joint action by the Community and its 
partners – mainly relying on the subsidiarity nature of the EU cultural competence.105 
In Portugal v. Council106, the first case in which the Court was called upon to give 
                                                
104 A Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and Objectives of the Common 
Commercial Policy’ (2010) 15 European Foreign Affairs Review, at 159; M Krajewski, ‘The Reform 
of the Common Commercial Policy’ in A Biondi and P Eeckhout (eds) EU Law After Lisbon, (OUP 
2011), at 307. For an interesting view on this issue in the pre-Lisbon system:  M Cremona, “A policy of 
bits and pieces? The Common Commercial Policy After Nice”, in A Dashwood, et al, Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies (Hart Publishing, 2001), at 74. 
105 E Psychogiopoulou, (n 78), at 109. 
106 Portugal v. Council, C-268/94. 
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judgment on the provisions referring to development cooperation, the ECJ recognised 
the possibility to include culture in development cooperation on the grounds of the 
complementary development competence established under Article 177 ECT (now 
replaced by Article 208 TFEU).107 Nonetheless, the Court missed the opportunity to 
express itself on Article 151(3) (now 167(3) TFEU). In this case, Portugal applied for 
annulment of Decision 94/578/EC, concerning the conclusion of a cooperation 
agreement on partnership and development between the EC and India,108 foreseeing 
action in the cultural domain. Under Article 15 of the agreement, in fact, the 
contracting parties should cooperate in the fields of information and culture in order 
to promote mutual understanding and foster cultural ties. Mostly, the activities 
contemplated were cultural information sharing, heritage preservation, media and 
audiovisual documentation and the organisation of cultural events. The Agreement 
included inter alia the enhancement of the protection of IP and related rights under 
Article 10. Portugal contested that the Council had adopted the Decision on the basis 
of former Article 133 and Article 181 ECT (now 207 and 211 respectively under the 
TFEU) 109  by qualified majority vote, arguing that Article 151 ECT is about 
coordinating cultural policies defined by each Member State within the sphere of its 
own competences, but does not confer any external cultural competence to the 
                                                
107 Article 177 ECT: “1. Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be 
complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster: 
- the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly 
the most disadvantaged among them, 
- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy,  
- the campaign against poverty in the developing countries. 
2. Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
3. The Community and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the 
objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent international 
organisations. 
This Article has been replaced in the Lisbon Treaty by Article 208: “1. Union policy in the field of 
development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of 
the Union’s external action. The Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the Member 
States complement and reinforce each other. Union development cooperation policy shall have as its 
primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take 
account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely 
to affect developing countries. 2. The Union and the Member States shall comply with the 
commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United 
Nations and other competent international organisations.” 
108Council Decision 94/578/EC of 18 July 1994 concerning the conclusion of the Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on Partnership and 
Development. 
109 Article 211 “Within their respective spheres of competence, the Union and the Member States shall 
cooperate with third countries and with the competent international organisations.” 
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Community. Therefore, according to Portugal’s interpretation, the Community has no 
power to conclude agreements dealing with cultural matters.110 Where the Court 
should recognise such competence to the Community on the base of Article 308 TEC, 
the Council would be entitled to take measures only by acting unanimously and 
following the co-decision procedure. 111  Moreover, addressing the fact that the 
Community had acted alone in concluding the agreement with India, Portugal 
estimated that this was a violation of the rules on shared and complementary 
competences and that all Member States should have participated in the conclusion of 
the agreement.112   
The Court avoided interpreting Article 151(3) by asserting that the objectives of 
the Community development policy set out in Article 177(1) were very broad 
objectives and that the measures required for their pursuit might deal with a variety of 
specific matters, including culture. The Court held that, in order to qualify an 
agreement as a development cooperation agreement, this should pursue the objectives 
of Article 177 TEC and its content and nature must de determined as “having regard 
to its essential object and not in terms of individual clauses”.113 Therefore, the fact 
that it includes cultural aspects does not imply that it is not a development 
cooperation agreement. Instead, the cultural clause embedded in the agreement 
classifies culture as a sector of development cooperation.114 That being so, the Court 
found that “to require a development cooperation agreement concluded between the 
Community and a non-member country to be based on another provision as well as 
on Article [181] and, possibly, also to be concluded by the Member States whenever it 
touches on a specific matter would in practice amount to rendering devoid of 
substance the competence and procedure prescribed in Article [180]”.115 Therefore 
the Court did not deem the joint participation of the Member States and the 
Community as being necessary for the contested agreement.116 
In terms of reallocation of competence, the Court stated that those cultural 
provisions did not impose obligations going beyond the objectives of cooperation 
                                                
110 Supra at 71, para. 51. 
111 Article 352(1) TFEU (former Article 308 ECT). 
112 Portugal v. Council, above (n 106), para 36. 
113 Ibidem, para 37 and 39. 
114 Ibidem, para 45 and 54. The Court applied the same reasoning to the clauses concerning intellectual 
property, still considered as accessorising with the overall scope of the Treaty by “smoothly and 
gradually integrating the developing countries into the world economy”. See para 73-77. 
115 Ibidem, para 38. 
116 On mixity, see discussion above. 
  100 
development, nor  established the concrete ways to implement such cooperation. 
Therefore, they did not transfer any wider cultural competence to the Community and 
did not open the road to future reallocation of subjects between the EC and Member 
States. Nonetheless, it indirectly recognises the possibility for the European Union to 
act as a stand-alone actor, and not always together with the Member States, when 
culture is instrumental to the achievement of other objectives, such as development 
cooperation.  
From a broader perspective, in affirming that culture can fall within the sphere 
of development cooperation competence, the Court indirectly opened up the external 
cultural power of the Community to new horizons. Still indirectly, it also ascertained 
the intertwining between the cultural competence and the development one. Recalling 
that Article 177(1), in particular, refers to sustainable economic and social 
development, including cultural actions in this sphere of actions can be considered as 
a step forward for the recognition of the value of culture for development. 
 
2.2) The EU’s understanding of “culture”  
2.2.1) The notion of culture under EU law: culture as goods, creativity, values 
and heritage 
 
The EU Treaties do not provide a definition of “culture”, nor have the Court of 
Justice or the other EU institutions supplied an interpretation of such a notion. This is 
not surprising, given the difficulty ascertained in the first chapter of this work to 
provide a uniform definition of culture. The above-made analytical excursus on the 
evolution of the EU cultural competence and a look at the secondary legislation and 
cultural policy developed by the EU should be useful to single out which notion(s) of 
culture are relevant for the Union. In other words, how does the Union understand 
culture?  
 It has been ascertained that culture was not among the priorities inscribed in 
the founding Treaties, nonetheless cultural concerns came to encroach on the 
realisation of the internal market since its origins. The initial decisions of the Court of 
Justice in disputes concerning culture and the internal market rules show a trend 
towards a negative approach in the understanding of the relationship between culture 
and economics. The Member States’ claims for special consideration of cultural 
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concerns and exemptions of cultural goods from free market rules were mostly seen 
by the Court as likely to hinder the realisation of the single market, and therefore as 
an obstacle for further European integration.117 Initially, the Commission also sensed 
this threat and adopted several measures impinging on national cultural policies with 
the aim to ensure the full functioning and achievement of the internal market. For 
instance, the Sixth Value Added Tax (VAT) Directive and the following Directive 
92/77/EEC on approximation of VAT’s rates allowed for preferential tax treatment of 
certain cultural goods and services, in order to facilitate the flow of such goods and 
services.118 Furthermore, despite the ban of harmonisation established by Article 151 
ECT (now 167 TFEU), in the early 1990s the Commission started a series of 
initiatives in the field of culture, which have led to some level of harmonisation in 
specific cultural sectors. In particular, secondary law instruments were adopted to 
regulate the audiovisual sector, such as the Television without frontiers directive.119 
The final scope of this directive was to create a European broadcasting space, 
undermining national monopolies in the sector. Such regulations, of course, affected 
national public broadcasting policy, yet were also meant to contribute to the diffusion 
of knowledge, cross-cultural exchange, and creative development.120 This last point is 
particularly interesting for the current analysis because it shows a certain degree of 
awareness towards the double nature of culture goods and services. Indeed, if culture 
is mainly taken into account by Treaty law as cultural goods and services,121 their 
double nature consisting in embedding both economic and cultural values is not 
ignored. The special nature of cultural goods was also recognised by the Court in the 
Italian Arts Treasures case, and a shift towards a more sensitive approach to the 
protection of cultural values can be discerned on a case-by-case analysis of the 
Court’s jurisprudence.122  
                                                
117 Cases above quoted, see ff. (n 80 and n 82). 
118 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to turnover taxes; Council Directive 92/77/EEC of 19 October 1992 
supplementing the common system of value added tax and amending Directive 77/388/EEC. 
119 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television 
broadcasting activities, (amended by Directive 97/36/EC). 
120 M De Cock Buning, “Cultural Diversity in Mass Media Regulation”, in H Schneider and Van Den 
Bossche (eds.), Protection of Cultural Diversity from an International and European Perspective, 
2008, at 249. 
121 See for instance commentator on the exception under former Article 30 ECT, above (n 78). 
122 For some examples see f. (n 88). See also: D Ferri, above (n 98). 
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Whereas at the beginning the encroaching of culture on the economic 
development of the EU mainly came to the fore in terms of opposition, the 
Commission had sensed the potential of culture as a driver of economic growth and 
creativity since its 1987 Communication “on a fresh boost for culture”.123 Aware of 
the close interrelation between cultural industries and economic development, the 
Commission promoted programmes to incentivise (through financial assistance) the 
creative industry sector, the mobility of artists, and access to culture. A first example 
of this kind of initiative is the Council Decision 90/685/EEC concerning the 
implementation of an action programme to promote the development of the European 
audiovisual industry, also known as the MEDIA programme.124 Other programmes 
aimed at encouraging cultural cooperation in the arts and literature.125 Most of the EU 
efforts were focused on the audiovisual sector and creative industries, however 
initiatives dealing with the protection of more traditional forms of cultural heritage 
were also enacted, such as the Raphael Programme.126 This programme aimed at 
raising awareness about issues concerning cultural heritage protection, collecting best 
practices in conservation, and sharing information. Under this frame, several projects 
concerning the restoration and conservation of heritage received financial support. In 
2000, the Commission adopted the Culture Programme: a single programming and 
financing instrument for measures in the field of culture.127 Besides collecting the 
different previous cultural initiatives supported by the EU under one single frame 
(therefore simplifying the basis for actions), the Culture Programme 2000 aimed at 
creating a common cultural area for the creation and dissemination of culture, 
supporting the mobility of artists and their work, promoting cultural dialogue and 
transnational cooperation projects and the European cultural heritage.128 The Culture 
                                                
123 Above quoted, (n 91).  
124 Council Decision 90/685/EEC of 21 December 1990 concerning the implementation of an action 
programme to promote the development of the European audiovisual industry.  
125 Namely, the Kaleidoscope programme and Ariane programme. Respectively adopted with Decision 
719/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 March 1996 establishing a programme 
to support artistic and cultural activities with a European dimension (Kaleidoscope); and Decision 
2085/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 establishing a 
programme of support, including translation, in the field of books and reading (Ariane). 
126 Decision 2228/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1997 
establishing a Community action programme in the field of cultural heritage (Rapahel). The 
programme lasted from 1997 to 2000. 
127 Decision 508/2000/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 February 2000 
establishing the Culture 2000 Programme. The programme lasted from 2000 until 2006. 
128 Article 1 of Decision 508/2000/EC. 
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Programme 2000 can be considered the beginning of a European cultural policy 
adopted on the basis of Article 167 TFEU (still Article 151 ECT at that time).  
It is interesting to see that Decision 508/2000/EC defines culture as both an 
economic factor and a factor in social integration and citizenship, an important 
intrinsic value to all people in Europe, and a vehicle of socioeconomic 
development. 129  The Culture Programme 2000 can be considered an official 
recognition of the multifunctional dimensions of culture and its positive role for 
development within the EU. Further, Article 6 of Decision 508/2000/EC requires the 
Commission and the Member States to ensure the overall consistency and 
complementarity with relevant EU policies and actions. This seems to be reproducing 
the formula under current Article 167(4) TFEU. The integration of culture and 
cultural concerns into other EU policies is also recalled under Article 13 TFEU, 
which established that “in formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, 
fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and 
space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient 
beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the 
legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in 
particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage” (emphasis 
added).  In spite of the lack of a formal definition of culture, the Union seems to have 
developed a broad understanding of culture, which takes into account its tangible and 
intangible dimensions, as well as its cross-cutting and multifunctional nature. 
2.2.2) Culture as a cross-cutting instrument for regional and local development 
 
The integration of cultural elements in the framework of regional development 
policy and other EU policies, such as environment, shows that the Union is aware that 
culture is a transversal tool which may support local development, environmental 
benefits, strengthen social cohesion and economic wealth. The recognition of the 
positive interaction of culture with development, and in particular local development, 
can be detected in the 1999 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, which 
introduced the idea that the market and the income support activities ought to be 
complemented by rural development initiatives. In this context, more attention was 
given to encouraging farmers to use agricultural practices safeguarding the cultural 
                                                
129 See point 1 and 2 of the Preamble and Article 1(e) of Decision 508/2000/EC. 
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and natural heritage of the countryside. Financial aid was also given to support 
measures for the renovation and development of rural villages, the conservation of 
rural heritage, tourist and craft activities, and protection of the environment in 
connection with landscape conservation. In 2005, the Council Regulation 1698/2005 
on the financing of the CAP 130  set up the future strategy of the Community 
agricultural policy and enhanced the integration of cultural considerations with a view 
to promoting sustainable rural development. This sustainable rural model was also 
promoted under the Structural Funds programmes in the framework of regional 
development policy. A wide range of funded projects was set up, such as INTERREG 
III, URBAN, EQUAL and LEADER+:  these programmes still mainly focused on the 
conservation and management of natural and rural heritage, yet they have been 
conceived as important tools for a local sustainable economic development. Some of 
them have focused on conservation and better management of tangible and intangible 
heritage, others on the creation of spaces for cultural enjoyment. In any case, by 
directing resources to projects with a cultural dimension, the Structural Funds restore 
less-developed and underperforming local economies and contribute to the 
development of the endogenous cultural potential of EU regions, transforming them 
into spaces where culture is more accessible. There is, then, an attempt to promote an 
integrated approach for a bottom-up development strategy, based on the creation of 
partnerships involving local subjects and taking into account indigenous traditions 
and the cultural elements of rural communities. 
 
2.2.3) Cultural diversity as a European common interest  
 
Article 167 TFEU grants constitutional recognition to the protection of 
cultural diversity.131 In particular, the Union has to protect and promote European 
cultural diversity. What strikes the attention of the reader is that the Treaty never 
speaks of one single European culture; rather, cultural diversity is the European 
culture. As a regional integration organisation of 28 member states, the diversity of 
languages, traditions, and cultural backgrounds is overspread among the European 
                                                
130 Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by 
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). 
131 B De Witte, “Trade in Culture: International Legal Regimes and EU Constitutional Values”, in The 
EU and the WTO Legal and Constitutional Issues at 252 
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countries. Cultural diversity is also present in Europe in the form of political and legal 
diversity: a wide range of different constitutional regimes coexists in the Union.132 
Throughout the years the concept of a European culture made of a plurality of 
cultures emerged as a complementary element of the EU citizenship and a central 
element for further improvements for the integration.133 Cultural diversity has become 
the essence of the European cultural identity. This was firstly outlined in 1973 in a 
document on the European Identity published by the Nine Foreign Ministers on 14 
December 1973, which defined the European identity as the “diversity of cultures 
within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common 
values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of 
having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the 
construction of a United Europe”.134 This identity is what makes the originality and 
the dynamism of Europe, as was also highlighted by the European Parliament in its 
1989 Resolution on a fresh boost for Community action in the cultural sector.135 
Today the slogan “United in Diversity” is quite notorious, and having first appeared 
in 2000 it has since become a symbol of the European Union.136 
The promotion and preservation of cultural diversity is among the Union’s 
constitutional values. Article 3(3) TEU “shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic 
diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and 
enhanced”. The protection of cultural diversity should, therefore, be considered 
among the priorities of the Union – or, in other words, as being among the common 
interests of the Union. In a relatively recent case decided by the Court of Justice, the 
protection of cultural diversity gained some judicial strength. In the UTECA decision, 
the Court was asked to decide about the conformity of a restrictive Spanish measure 
affecting the broadcasting discipline of the Television without Frontiers Directive. 
The Spanish measure requires the television operator to allocate 5% of their operating 
revenues for the pre-funding of European films, and to allocate 60% of that 5% for 
the production of films in one of the official languages of Spain, in order to preserve 
                                                
132 The recent failure of the adoption of the project of a Constitutional Treaty for the European Union is 
also evidence of the strong will of the Member States to maintain this constitutional pluralism, in order 
to preserve their national political identities. 
133 M Ross, “Cultural Protection: a Matter of Union Citizenship or Human Rights?”, in N A Neuwahl 
and A Rosas (eds.), The European Union and Human Rights, Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 1995, 247. 
134 “Declaration on European Identity”, Bulletin of the European Communities, December 1973, N 12, 
(Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities), 118-122. 
135 See above (n 97).  
136 Europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/motto/index_en.html 
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Spanish multilingualism. This last aspect is particularly interesting for the scope of 
this thesis. Indeed, although the Spanish measures are likely to reduce the mobility of 
workers, as well as the free movement of capital and establishment and may appear to 
be in conflict with the internal market rules, the Court found that the Spanish 
measures pursued the promotion and protection of multilingualism, which is a 
component of cultural diversity, and were compatible with the Treaty rules on 
competition.137 Following the address of the AG Kokott, to define multilingualism as 
a component of cultural diversity, the Court made express reference to the UNESCO 
Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 
ratified by the EU in 2006.138 In her opinion, AG Kokott recalled that, according to 
the UNESCO Convention “cultural diversity forms part of the common heritage of 
humanity” and, therefore, it needs to be protected.139 In a way, it seems that the 
protection of cultural diversity could gain further strength from the entry into force of 
the UNESCO Convention within the EU. It also seems that the protection of cultural 
diversity by the EU has to be ensured to pursue a common interest that goes beyond 
the Union’s interests, but rather as an overriding reason of general interest (also 
identified as the common interest of humankind).  
 
3) The European Union and development 
 
Development policy is one of the most significant and developed policies of 
the Union. The EU is today a major donor of development aid and a very prominent 
actor in the development process, both at the regional and global level. The Union 
certainly plays a relevant role as a global actor in development cooperation, and raises 
great expectations around the world. Article 3(5) TEU places the promotion of 
sustainable development as a priority goal within its external relations.  
In this section I will try to frame how the international role of the Union in 
development cooperation has grown through the analysis of the evolution of the EU 
competence in development. This analysis will also be the basis to understand what 
notion and model of development the Union endorses and is likely to export. It will 
                                                
137 UTECA v. Administración General del Estado, C 222/07, para 33. See also the Opinion of AG 
Kokott to the case, delivered on 4 September 2008. 
138 Council Decision of 18 May 2006 on the conclusion of the Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2006/515/EC). 
139 See AG Kokott’s Opinion to the case, para 14. 
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also be useful to establish whether the acknowledgement of cultural connections with 
development also has a place in the external development policy. 
3.1) The EU competence on development 
3.1.1) Origins and evolution of the Union’s competence on development 
 
Under Article 3(5) TEU, the Union is committed “in its relations with the 
wider world to contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, 
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of 
poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well 
as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter.” 
 Development as a global goal, not only for the wealth and wellbeing of 
Europe, but also for the rest of the world was already present in the Schuman 
Declaration. Namely, Schuman referred to the development of the African continent, 
with which France – as well as the other European countries – had a close 
relationship. The European development policy, indeed, finds its origin in the colonial 
and post-colonial history of the relationship with the African countries.140 In spite of 
this ambitious declaration, the founding Treaties did not expressly attribute a general 
competence for development to the Union. This was introduced only in 1992, with the 
entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty.  
While an expressed competence for development cooperation was missing, 
Article 3 of the former Treaty on the European Community envisaged the 
“association with overseas countries and territories, in order to increase trade and to 
promote jointly economic and social development.” 141  The Treaty of Rome 
recognised a link between trade and development to be promoted within the 
framework of association agreements with third countries – namely those having 
historical relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands.142 Given the 
association between trade and development, the first steps towards a general 
                                                
140 Further on this: L Bartels, “The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union”, in M 
Cremona (ed), Developments in EU External Relations Law, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 128. 
141 Article 3(s) ECT. Previous Article 3 ECT has been replaced, in substance, by Article 7 TFEU and 
by Articles 13(1) and 21, paragraph 3, second subparagraph of the TEU. 
142 Former Article 182 ECT. It is interesting to note that the formula has only slightly changed under 
current Article 192 TFEU, which no longer mentions Italy and Belgium, but expressly includes the 
UK. 
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development policy were taken within the frame of the Common Commercial Policy 
(CCP), whose major goal was to boost further trade liberalisation (Article 207 TFEU, 
ex Article 133 ECT). Indeed, the first agreements concluded between the European 
Economic Community and its partners – listed under Annex IV of the ECT – dealt 
with free trade provisions and investments in order to further apply the internal 
market system to the associated partners. The countries listed under Annex IV were 
the former colonies of European States (grouped as the African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific countries (ACP)). When they gained independence in the 1960s, the 
agreements were revised because of the change of status of the partners. In this new 
political context, a five-year agreement between the EC and the newly-independent 
countries was signed in 1963 (the first Yaoundé Convention) and a second agreement 
in 1969 (Yaoundé II). Whereas most of the provisions remained the same, a political 
and institutional dimension was given to these kinds of associations through the 
creation of specific institutions (namely: an Association Council, a Parliamentary 
Conference, an Association Committee and a Court of Arbitration). This frame was 
complemented by a European Development Fund (EDF), which was established to 
give financial aid for building infrastructure like schools and hospitals and other 
investments in the overseas territories. Besides these aspects, the emphasis of these 
agreements was on the progressive elimination of trade barriers on the basis of 
reciprocity.143 This scheme was overcome with the adoption of the first Lomé 
Convention (1973) and the following Conventions, 144  which endorsed the 
establishment of a Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries. 
The GSP, together with the conclusions of trade agreements, are the major 
instruments through which the EU development policy has evolved under the 
umbrella of the CCP.  
The GSP unilaterally grants preferential trade treatment to other parties. It was 
firstly introduced in 1971 as an answer to the claims raised by developing countries 
for a differentiated treatment under the GATT system, and following the UNCTAD 
recommendation to create a tariff preferences system for developing countries.145 The 
                                                
143 L Bartels, above (n 140), at 137. 
144 1980-1985 Lomé II; 1985-1990 Lomé III, 1990-2000 Lomé IV Conventions. According to the 
principle of non-reciprocity, under these framework Conventions the ACP countries had no obligation 
to offer reciprocal market access.  
145 R Schütze, “EU Development Policy: Constitutional and Legislative Foundation(s)”, in (2012-2013) 
15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, at 702. In the 1960s, developing countries started 
to criticise the application of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause under the GATT, which 
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GSP scheme was renewed over the years and in the 1990s an additional chapter 
granting special incentives for sustainable development and good governance was 
added. This so called GSP+ conditioned additional tariff reductions to the ratification 
by developing countries of international conventions that are considered to further the 
goals of sustainability and democracy. Under the Lomé Conventions frame, the 
respect of human rights, principles of democracy and the rule of law also became 
constantly applied as conditions to grant financial and technical aid.146  
Within the broader framework of international trade law, the GSP scheme has 
often been challenged before the WTO Panel because of its alleged violations of the 
enabling clause and the principle of reciprocity under the GATT.147 This situation 
pushed the EU to revise the frame of its trade agreements with the ACP: in order to 
comply with its commitment under the WTO, the Cotonou Agreement was signed 
between the EU and the ACP group in 2000.148 This new frame is built on three 
pillars: the political, development, and trade pillars. Whereas the first two will last 
until 2020, the third pillar expired in 2007. After this deadline, a new season of 
partnership agreements based on reciprocity began: the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPA). The overall scope of the Cotonou Agreement is to conclude new 
WTO compatible trade arrangements, but also to contribute to poverty reduction and 
the promotion of sustainable development in ACP countries. It is based on an 
integrated approach, which includes political, social, environmental, and economic 
                                                                                                                                      
establishes that the most favoured treatment reserved by a State to another should be extended to all the 
other contracting parties (Article I:1 GATT). Developing countries argued that such a clause does not 
favour equality, but maintain existing inequalities. In 1968, the first United National Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) took place and spoke about a New International Economic Order. 
This affected changes under the GATT system, which allowed preferential tariffs to be applied to 
developing countries, and special preferential treatment for least-developed countries (the so-called 
Enabling Clause). Further on this: L Bartels, above (n 140), 143-146. 
146 In 1995 human rights conditionality became an official component of the EU trade and cooperation 
agreements with third countries. Commission Communication on the Inclusion of Respect for 
Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements between the Community and Third Countries, 
COM (95) 216; Commission Communication on the European Union and the External Dimension of 
Human Rights Policy: From Rome to Maastricht and Beyond, COM (95) 567. Further on this: L 
Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements, (Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
147 E.g.: the notorious EC-Bananas cases (the “Banana Wars”), WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, 
WT/DS27/R/MEX, WT/DS27/R/USA, WT/DS27/AB/R. In synthesis, the EU-ACP agreements under 
the Lomé frame were in breach of Article XXIV GATT and the development aim cannot justify 
exception to the MFN rule under Article XXIV GATT when the parties are not both developing 
countries. In a North-South relationship, reciprocity is required.  
148 Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States 
(ACP) on the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed 
in Cotonou on 23 June 2000. 
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dimensions. As we will see further in this chapter, cultural aspects are also taken into 
account.  
Throughout the years, the EC-ACP relationship model based on trade 
preferences, aid and institutionalised dialogue was increasingly extended to other 
regions, namely Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America. The relationship with the 
ACP is not longer considered to be special149 and the Union has gradually established 
a general development policy that seems to be going beyond trade. This was possible 
also through the introduction of a more comprehensive competence on development 
in 1992, which seems to rely on a wider understanding of the notion of development. 
3.1.2) The development competence under the Maastricht Treaty: development 
beyond trade  
 
The 1992 Treaty on the European Union introduced an entire title in the EC 
treaty dedicated to development cooperation and conferred an expressed development 
competence to the EU. Article 179 ECT allowed for the adoption of unilateral 
measures in the form of multiannual programmes; whereas Article 181 ECT entitled 
the EU to conclude international agreements in the field of development cooperation. 
This is considered to be the beginning of an autonomous development policy, 
independent from the CCP. The EU’s competence on development was conceived as 
a shared competence. In order to avoid conflicts and implement a coherent 
development operational framework, the Maastricht Treaty established three 
principles on which the EU development policy had to be based: complementarity 
between development policies of the member states and the EU’s programmes; co-
ordination between the Member States and the EU institutions to ensure effective 
operational implementation; and coherence of all the Community policies. In 1997, 
the Treaty of Amsterdam added a fourth principle: consistency of all external 
activities of the European Union in the context of its external relations.150 These 
principles should ensure the effectiveness of the external action of the EU as a 
                                                
149 According to commentators, the EU development policy developed on a two-track approach: a 
special relationship with the former colonies, while gradually establishing a broader development 
policy. See on this: Schütze, above (n 145). For a comment on the shift of interest from the ACP 
countries to other regions in the world, and in particular the neighbours of the Union, see: K E Smith, 
“The ACP in the European Union’s network of regional relationships: still unique or just one in the 
crowd?”, in K Arts and A K Dickson (eds), EU development cooperation From model to symbol, 
(Manchester University Press, 2004), 60-79. 
150 These four principles are often referred to as “the four Cs”. M Van Reisen, EU ‘Global Player’ The 
North-South Policy of the European Union, (International books, 1999). 
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promoter of development. In particular, they should help to overcome a sectoral 
approach to development, mainly based on trade, by coordinating goals and strategies 
of sectoral policies of the EU.151  
Under Article 177 ECT, the EU development policy shall contribute to the 
sustainable economic and social development of developing countries; the gradual 
and progressive integration of developing countries in the world economy; fighting 
against poverty; and fostering and consolidating principles of democracy, the rule of 
law, and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This ambitious 
agenda endorses a broader understanding of development, which goes beyond mere 
economic growth and embeds a social and environmental dimension. This seems to be 
confirmed by the reference to sustainable development, as well as by the reference in 
paragraph 4 of Article 177 to the EU’s obligation to comply with commitments and 
objectives undertaken under the UN and other competent international organisations. 
Recalling the international framework in which the EU acts is important. It should be 
noted that in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was adopted, discussions about a 
broader knowledge of development, and meeting environmental and social needs, 
were taking place.152 The ongoing international process towards the recognition of 
sustainable development seems to have influenced the notion of development 
embedded in the Treaty of Maastricht. Former Article 2 TEU lists the achievement of 
a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities among the goals, in 
line with the concept discussed at the Conference of Rio. 
The shift from a notion of development that is based entirely on economic 
growth and wealth to a more holistic concept had already started in the 1980s with the 
acknowledgement of the impact of EU trade and development policies on other fields. 
In particular, the first steps were made with the adoption of environmental protection 
measures.153 The Single European Act in 1987 extended the EC competence in the 
environmental field adding three new articles permitting the Community to preserve, 
protect and improve the quality of the environment, to contribute towards protecting 
human health, and to ensure a prudent and rational use of natural resources.154 The 
new EU engagement in environmental protection and the active participation of the 
                                                
151 M Van Reisen, ibidem, at 66. 
152 See Chapter 1. 
153 S Baker, “The European Union: Integration, Competition, Growth – and Sustainability”, in W M 
Lafferty. and J Meadowcroft (eds.), Implementing Sustainable Development. Strategies and Initiatives 
in High Consumption Societies, (Oxford University Press, 2000), 307-310. 
154 Artices 130R, 130S and 130T of the EEC Treaty of the Single European Act (SEA). 
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EU in international environmental-focused fora, such as the UNCED Earth Summit 
(1992), the negotiation of the United Nations framework convention on climate 
change, and the following adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (1998), contribute to bolster 
an understanding of the concept of sustainable development mainly based on the 
accommodation of environmental protection.  
As mentioned, the Treaty of Maastricht also referred to the need of ensuring 
the coherence and consistency of development policy in its external activities. 
Concerning the environmental dimension of development, a clause of integration was 
introduced within the ECT: Article 6 ECT established that “[e]nvironmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of 
the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable 
development.” That clause of integration has been reproduced under Article 11 TFEU. 
As for the social dimension, a similar clause of integration was not foreseen. The 
social pillar of the sustainable paradigm is mostly associated to the fulfilment of 
human rights and democracy. The EU committed to contribute towards the 
achievement of this goal through its development policy (art. 177 ECT).155  
No references to cultural aspects of development policy were introduced by 
the Maastricht Treaty under the title “development cooperation”. Culture was merely 
mentioned under Article 182 ECT to clarify that the association agreements with third 
Countries shall serve primarily “to further the interests and prosperity of the 
inhabitants of these countries and territories in order to lead them to the economic, 
social and cultural development to which they aspire” (emphasis added). In the 
overall context, that statement sounds more like a rhetorical justification of the EU’s 
interest in pursuing trade association agreements with third countries – conceived in 
political rather than judicial terms.156  
 
 
                                                
155 Nonetheless the integration of human rights clauses into development policies has never been a 
peaceful fact. For a critical appraisal on this: B de Witte “The EU and International Legal Order: The 
Case of Human Rights”, in M Evans and P Koutrakos (eds), Beyond the Established Legal Orders 
Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World, (Hart Publishing, 2011). 
156 The Union’s development policy with third countries, especially the ACP groups, has often been 
criticised for being in the interest of the Union, as far as it boosts its image in the developing world and 
beyond, and of the Member States, particularly France and the UK. Among the others, see: K Arts and 
A K Dickson, “EU development cooperation: from model to symbol?”, in K Arts and A K Dickson 
(eds), EU development cooperation From model to symbol, (Manchester University Press, 2004), at 5, 
14. 
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3.1.3) The Union’s competence on development after Lisbon 
 
Under the current post-Lisbon frame, Article 209 TFEU (replacing Article 177 
ECT) recites: “1. Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be 
conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union’s 
external action. The Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the Member 
States complement and reinforce each other. 
Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the 
reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take 
account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it 
implements which are likely to affect developing countries. 
2. The Union and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and 
take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations 
and other competent international organisations.”  
The new formulation of Article 209 TFEU does not seem to be changing the 
scope or extension of the Union’s development competence,157 which remains a 
shared competence. It seems, nevertheless, to be stressing the need to pursue a 
coherent and consistent external development policy. First of all, the Union’s action 
in the external development policy must be in harmony with the Union’s principles 
and objectives of the external action. This can be read as an express reference to 
Article 21 TEU and Article 3(5) TEU. Further, the complementarity aspect is 
strengthened by the express acknowledgement that the Union’s development policy 
and the Member States’ development policies complement each other and by Article 
210 that forecasts the possibility of EU/Member States’ joint actions and coordination 
between their policies on development cooperation, in order to promote the 
complementarity and efficiency of their action. Coordination among the Member 
States and the Union should fully respect the principle of conferral and the shared 
nature of the EU development competence. Indeed, Article 209(1) states that the 
Union’s power to conclude agreements in the area of development must not prejudice 
the Member States’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude 
agreements. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the respect of the principle of conferral is rather 
strong: Article 4(4) TFEU adds that the Union shall carry out activities and conduct a 
                                                
157 A broader competence in the specific field of humanitarian aid is given to the Union by Article 214 
TFEU. 
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common policy in the field of development without affecting Member States’ exercise 
of their competence.158  
In terms of scope and objectives, the development policy should be coherent 
with the overall principles and goals pursued by the Union. Some commentators point 
out that the emphasis on poverty reduction in Article 208 TFEU may confine the 
action of the Union to this specific goal.159 This interpretation is supported by the fact 
that while poverty reduction becomes a primary objective, the achievement of 
sustainable development, the smooth and gradual integration of developing countries 
into the world economy and the respect for human rights are no longer specific 
objectives of the development policy but have become general goals of the Union’s 
external action. Following this argument, in theory this may entail a different choice 
in terms of legal basis for Union initiatives not directly focusing on poverty reduction. 
However, actions aiming at poverty reduction may be broadly interpreted and fall 
within the development competence of the Union. Portugal v. Council is an example 
of the broad interpretation that may be given to the development competence.160 
Besides the discussion on the potentially more complicated frame for the choice of 
legal basis created by the Lisbon Treaty, the Treaty seems to endorse the broadest 
concept of sustainable development, as shaped under international law. Article 3 TEU 
includes sustainable development among the overall goals pursed by the Union;161 
further, several provisions in the Treaty recall environmental and social sustainability 
and the need to include sustainable development principles in the overall external 
action of the Union. Article 21(2) recalls that the Union shall foster the sustainable 
economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the 
primary aim of eradicating poverty (point d); help develop international measures to 
preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management 
of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development (point f); 
consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles 
                                                
158 Schütze seems to be suggesting that this formulation may be interpreted as excluding the pre-
emptive effect of Union legislation in this area (Schütze, above (n 145), at 708). In his comment on the 
imperfections of the new order of competences shaped by the Lisbon reform, he argues that the 
development competence may be conceived as a “hidden”, “parallel” competence and raises the 
question of how a competence so shaped can be complementary with the Member States’ actions. 
(Schütze, above (n 49)). 
159 Schütze, above (n 145). Also: K Lenarts and P Van Nuffel, European Union Law, (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2011), at 991.  
160 Case references above cited (n 106). 
161 Article 3 points (3) and (5) TEU. 
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of international law (point b). The stress on coherence between the Union’s policies 
highlighted in the Lisbon Treaty should require that the Union’s actions based on the 
development competence – whether they focus on poverty reduction or on wider 
goals – take these principles and goals into account. Further, all EU policies should be 
coordinated and consistent so as to create a coherent frame for pursuing sustainable 
development both on the Union’s internal and external level.  
It should be noticed that while the integration of environmental concerns is 
expressly foreseen by the Treaty (Article 11 TFEU) and the respect of human rights, 
the rule of law, democracy, and other principles of sustainable development are often 
recalled under several provisions, culture and cultural diversity do not have the same 
relevance. Under Title III TFEU on development, culture in not mentioned; nor is the 
protection of cultural diversity listed as a goal among the general provisions on 
external action (Article 21 TEU). 
3.2) The notion of development under EU law: any room for culture? 
 
The EU treaties do not define the notion of sustainable development. Looking 
at the origins of the Union’s development policy under the CCP frame, the initial 
understanding of development under EU Treaty law is mainly tied to economic 
growth. The connection between trade and development was also affirmed by the 
Court of Justice in the case Commission v. Council, in which Court estimated that the 
only CCP competence was a satisfactory legal basis to adopt measures aiming at 
fostering development because of the strong link between trade and development.162 It 
is interesting to note that the Court based its interpretation of “development” on the 
evolutions of international law (namely, those ongoing under the UNCTAD and the 
GATT’s frame). Indeed, the international debate over development highly influenced 
the shaping of the notion of development within the EU, especially as far as the 
integration of social and environmental components is concerned. Since the entry into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty, the Union shifted from a concept of development 
merely based on trade towards a more holistic approach.  
                                                
162 C 45/86 Commission v Council (Generalised Tariff Preferences), para 17, 18 e 19. In this case, the 
Commission challenged the Council’s choice of the legal basis for the adoption of two regulations 
concerning trade preferences. The Council had partly based the adoption of the contested regulations 
on former Article 308 ECT (352 TFEU), arguing that the purpose of such regulations was not only 
commercial, but mainly development. Thus, in a situation of lack of power in the development area, it 
was necessary to supplement the residual power clause under Article 308 ECT. 
  116 
The Union’s new broader understanding of development is expressed in the 
European Consensus on Development (ECD), a policy statement jointly adopted by 
the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission in 2005 which sets out 
common objectives and principles for a vision of common development and a 
common implementation strategy. 163  The overall scope of the document is to 
strengthen the role of the Union as a global partner and actor in development by 
adopting a vision and a strategy commonly shared by the Union and its Member 
States. The Union’s vision of development is based on the principles, fundamental 
values, and objectives (namely the MDGs) of sustainable development as agreed at 
the multilateral levels. The Union endorses the principle of ownership of development 
strategies by partner countries and acknowledges that developing countries have the 
primary responsibility for creating an enabling domestic environment for mobilising 
their own resources. Within this broad notion of development there is no great 
acknowledgement of culture and its contributions. The only mention is in relation to 
the EU’s commitment to promote human development through its policy framework 
for health, education, culture, and gender equality. Cultural aspects are rather 
encompassed under the social chapter, and they mainly refer to the improvement of 
education, training, and research programmes in developing countries. 
The evolution of the understanding of sustainable development still does not 
explicitly make reference to culture as a pillar of the EU development policy, but 
refers to a notion of sustainable development that includes the economic, social and 
environmental variables and considers cultural aspects as being part of the social 
sphere. 164 The EU’s re-thinking on sustainable modes of governance followed the 
major international evolutions: whereas consensus grew around the idea that 
importance had to be given to economic, social and environmental matters, culture 
has been left outside this process and synergies remained unexplored (and 
                                                
163 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union 
Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’, (2006/C 46/01). 
164 See, for instance, The Agenda for a Change, a Commission Communication adopted to increase the 
impact of EU development policy in the world: the document does not include culture as a lever of 
development; more efforts in spreading education for human development are recommended under the 
social chapter. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Increasing the Impact of 
EU Development Policy: An Agenda For Change, COM (2011) 637 final, point 3.1. See also: 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 24 July 2009 – Mainstreaming 
sustainable development into EU policies: 2009 Review of the European Union Strategy for 
Sustainable Development, COM (2009) 400 final. 
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unexploited). This gap certainly derives from the absence of strong political 
commitments to cultural mainstreaming, as well as the lack of a procedural 
mechanism enabling the EU institutions to delve into the cultural impact of their 
actions.165 In fact, most of the instruments set up for the assessment of economic, 
social and environmental impacts of EU policies and projects do not address cultural 
impacts. On the internal level, the EU procedure for the Environmental Impact 
Assessment and the Strategic Impact Assessment limit their application to physical 
impact on tangible cultural heritage, namely historical buildings, monuments, and 
works of art.166 Impacts on the intangible heritage and other manifestations of cultural 
expressions are not addressed. The evaluation of potential impacts on the cultural 
dimension of development are not included in the unified system for ex-ante impact 
assessment of policy proposals introduced in 2002 to implement the EU Sustainable 
Strategy.167 Similarly, on the external level, the Sustainability Impact Assessment, a 
policy tool for the prior assessment of the economic, social, and environmental 
implications of a trade negotiation, only addresses economic, social and 
environmental impacts.168 
Comparing the evolution of the notions of culture and of development on the 
basis of the competences attributed to the EU, the following consideration arises: 
whereas under the cultural competence (Article 167 TFEU), the cross-cutting nature 
of culture is recognised and the integration of culture in development cooperation is 
recommended, the development competence (Article 208 TFEU and ff.) does not 
acknowledge such a link and does not envisage any connection with the cultural 
competence. Nonetheless, this sectoral approach should be overcome under the post-
Lisbon frame. The accent on coherence calls for further coordination of all the EU 
policies and consistency among the strategies adopted. If cultural diversity is a 
common concern for the Union, to be protected and promoted also on the external 
                                                
165 E Psychogiopoulou, above (n 78), at 83. 
166 Directive 11/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (Article 3); Council 
Directive 2001/42/EC of 27 June 2001 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and 
Programmes on the Environment. 
167  Communication from the Commission on Impact Assessment, COM(2002) 276 final; 
Communication from the Commission Action Plan "Simplifying and improving the regulatory 
environment", COM(2002) 278 final. 
168 These assessments were first developed in 1999 for the WTO-DDA negotiations. Since then they 
have been applied to all the EU's major multilateral, regional or bilateral trade negotiations. They are 
carried out during the underlying negotiation. Handbook for Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment, 
(available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127974.pdf). 
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level, culture should be granted more space within the policies implementing 
sustainable development. The new wording referring to the respect of the Union’s rich 
cultural and linguistic diversity and the safeguard of Europe’s cultural heritage under 
Article 3 TEU can be interpreted as a better acknowledgement of the potential 
impacts of development policies – mostly those related to fostering trade liberalisation 
– on culture, at least on the internal level.169 Furthermore, in recent years something 
has moved towards the awareness of the positive interplay of culture with 
development issues, in particular since 2006 when the EU ratified the UNESCO 
Convention on Cultural Diversity.  
 
4) Culture and development in the European Union’s external relations 
 
The EU Treaties do not expressly recognise the link between culture and 
development, at least not in the wording of Articles 167 and 208 TFEU. Nor do the 
policy documents on development embed an official recognition of the cultural 
interaction with development. In spite of this lack of official acknowledgement, 
culture has never been an unknown element within the frame of the EU’s external 
action, with a view to contribute to development objectives. As envisaged by Article 
167(3), the Union has integrated culture in the form of cultural cooperation since the 
IV Lomé Convention was enforced. Culture as values and vehicle of principles is also 
present in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to strengthen intercultural 
dialogue, and contribute to the overall objective of this policy. Under this frame, the 
EU recognises the role of culture as a soft power in diplomatic relations.170  
                                                
169 The introduction of Article 13 TFEU seems to be confirming this interpretation (above section 
2.2.1). An anticipated application of Article 13 can be found in Article 3 of the Regulation (EC) no 
1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 On Trade In Seal 
Products, which establishes an exception for products deriving from traditional Inuit hunting in order to 
preserve their lifestyle (Article 3 Conditions for placing on the market: “The placing on the market of 
seal products shall be allowed only where the seal products result from hunts traditionally conducted 
by Inuit and other indigenous communities and contribute to their subsistence”). 
170 For instance, in 2004 the Communication from the Commission on European Neighbourhood 
Policy-Strategy paper invited States to adopt measures in order to facilitate and foster the movement of 
people in the sectors of education, training, science and culture, in order to put in practice the people-
to-people contacts strategy. The Commission acknowledged that “an effective means to achieve the 
ENP’s main objectives is to connect the peoples of the Union and its neighbours, to enhance mutual 
understanding of each others’ cultures, history, attitudes and values, and to eliminate distorted 
perceptions. Thus, in addition to contacts between public bodies or businesses, the ENP will promote 
cultural, educational and more general societal links between the Union and its neighbourhood” 
(COM(2004) 373 final). For a broader appraisal on the ENP: M Cremona “The European 
Neighbourhood Policy More than a Partnership?”, in M Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External 
Relations Law, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 244-299. 
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In this section we will see that, so far, most of the EU actions integrating 
culture into development cooperation have focused on cultural cooperation, aiming at 
promoting cultural development rather than culture as a vector of development. Yet, 
in the last few years, something has changed. Since the entry into force of the 
UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity in 2006 within the EU legal order, the 
Union has undertaken international legal obligations to promote cultural diversity and 
integrate cultural interests in all its policies, both at the internal and external levels. 
From an international perspective, this new international commitment highly 
contributed to give more visibility to the EU and created new expectations from other 
world actors and civil society. Such expectations were further nourished by the fact 
that the EU not only ratified the Convention, but also played a leading role for its 
negotiation and worldwide ratification.171 Following this ratification, the EU endorsed 
a broader notion of culture and recognised it as a central element for human 
development. I will now briefly map the evolution of the integration of culture within 
the external development policy from a cultural development-centred approach to a 
wider one, shaped on the lines of the major ongoing “culture and development” 
debate on the international landscape. Then, I will introduce what major challenges 
arise for the Union from implementing culture as a vehicle of development in its 
external relations. 
 
4.1) Cultural cooperation under the bilateral framework: cultural development 
or culture for development? 
4.1.1) Culture under the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements 
Nuances of culture as a possible vector for development were present under 
the partnership agreements that the Union concluded with the ACP countries. Above, 
I mentioned Article 139 of the Lome IV Convention, aiming at establishing a dialogue 
and mutual understanding between the ACP and the Community.172 Under Articles 
145-149, actions in this field of cooperation had to focus on the recognition and 
                                                
171 The Convention was jointly negotiated by the European Commission, on behalf of the Community, 
and the Council Presidency, on behalf of the Member States, on the basis of the Code of Conduct 
5518/05 CULT 3. Furthermore, according to the Statute of UNESCO, only sovereign States can 
become members and participate in the General Assembly of UNESCO. Nonetheless, in this concrete 
situation, UNESCO was very inclined to permit the EU to take part in the negotiation; in order to allow 
this participation, a provision opening the participation to regional organisations was specifically 
introduced in the text of the Convention (Article 27). 
172 Above quoted (n 101). 
  120 
promotion of the cultural identities of the ACP countries, preservation of their cultural 
heritage, stimulation of the production and distribution of cultural goods and the 
organisation of cultural events in and outside ACP countries. Mostly, the support of 
the Community took place through the funding of these cultural activities. 
Nonetheless, references to culture under the Lomé regime were scarce. A step 
forward was made with the signature of the Cotonou Agreement173 – which became 
the cornerstone for a strong cultural development policy in external relations. Article 
27 of the Agreement states that development policy in the area of culture shall aim at 
integrating the cultural dimension at all levels of development policy; at recognising, 
preserving and promoting cultural values, heritage and identities to enable inter-
cultural dialogue; at supporting the development capacity in this sector, developing 
cultural industries and enhancing market access opportunities for cultural goods and 
services. The formulation of Article 27 shows an increased awareness towards the 
protection of cultural diversity as a global concern: the EU also engages in protecting 
and promoting cultural heritage and diversity of third countries through its cultural 
cooperation programmes (going beyond the protection of European cultural diversity 
alone). 
On the basis of Article 27, the financial and technical assistance initiatives in 
the cultural sphere mainly focused on the preservation of tangible cultural heritage, as 
well as on the exchange of best practices, teaching and training, and dissemination of 
information.174 Looking at the EU initiatives in the field of cultural cooperation, a 
high degree of convergence is noticeable between the internal and the external 
dimension: as above described, several programmes were promoted to grant financial 
and technical supports to Member Sates in heritage conservation and the promotion of 
local cultures. In the light of this, it can be stated that the Union focused on ‘cultural 
development’ rather than the “culture for development”.  
Within the overall Cotonou frame, culture was treated in a traditional sense of 
mere cooperation between nations and not as a potential vehicle of development 
interacting with other policies, (e.g. trade). Indeed, the Cotonou Agreement contains 
provisions – largely general or hortatory – that establish a framework for cooperation 
in the area of cultural heritage-safeguard and inter-cultural dialogue. However, it is 
                                                
173 Above quoted (n 101). 
174 J A McMahon, “Preserving and Promoting Differences? The External Dimension of Cultural 
Cooperation”, in R Craufurd Smith (ed.), Culture and European Union Law, (Oxford University Press, 
2004), 327-352. 
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worth remarking that the cultural dimension of the EU-ACP relationship emerges also 
in Article 41 of the Cotonou Agreement, which states that “the Community shall 
support the African Caribbean and Pacific States’ efforts to strengthen their capacity 
in the supply of services” and “particular attention shall be paid to services related to 
labour, business, distribution, finance, tourism, culture and construction and related 
engineering services with a view to enhancing their competitiveness and thereby 
increasing the value and the volume of their trade in goods and services.” Such a 
provision already shows a certain understanding of the economic dimension of 
culture, yet it does not establish any specific commitment to include it in commercial 
strategy and accommodate cultural concerns.  
4.1.2) Cultural cooperation with other world regions 
 
Culture is also integrated into the policy dialogue in the framework of Asia–
Europe meetings (ASEM) and EU–Latin America, Caribbean (LAC) summits. 
Concerning the Mediterranean region, cultural actions form part of Chapter III 
“Partnership in social, cultural and human affairs” of the 1995 Declaration on the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona process) in which the dialogue 
between cultures is the core of the third pillar. The Barcelona process started on 
November 1995 with the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs. The conference marked the starting point of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership for a broad framework of political, economic and social relations between 
the Member States of the European Union and partners of the southern 
Mediterranean. Since the Barcelona process was launched, two main regional 
initiatives dealing with culture have been launched: Euromed heritage, which has 
been one of the main financial instruments for the implementation of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership; and the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for 
the Dialogue between Cultures.175 The final goal behind these programmes is to 
support the dialogue beyond the traditional mechanisms of international and regional 
cooperation and assistance, in order to promote mutual awareness and understanding, 
not only among States and institutions but also among the societies and people living 
within this area. 
                                                
175 Based in Alexandria (Egypt), this is an institution jointly established and financed by all 35 
members of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. It is a network of networks and promotes dialogue 
between cultures.  
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4.2) The 2007 Agenda for Culture: a shift to culture as a vector of development 
 
In 2007 the adoption of a European Agenda for Culture in a globalising world 
signalled a step forward for the acknowledgment of culture as a component and a 
vector of development. 176  The Agenda for Culture was adopted following the 
European consensus on the ratification of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural 
Diversity177 and aims at strengthening the international role of the Union within the 
“culture for development debate”. While recognising that the worldwide protection of 
cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue have become major global challenges, the 
EU places itself at the centre of the international efforts towards the integration of 
culture in development policies: “Europe’s cultural richness and diversity is closely 
linked to its role and influence in the world. The European Union is not just an 
economic process or a trading power, it is already widely – and accurately – 
perceived as an unprecedented and successful social and cultural project. The EU is, 
and must aspire to become even more, an example of a "soft power" founded on 
norms and values such as human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, freedom of expression, 
respect for diversity and intercultural dialogue, values which, provided they are 
upheld and promoted, can be of inspiration for the world of tomorrow.”178 Further, 
the Commission acknowledges that “[t]he rapid entry into force of the UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
illustrates the new role of cultural diversity at international level: as parties, the 
Community and its Member States have committed themselves to strengthen a new 
cultural pillar of global governance and sustainable development, notably through 
enhancing international cooperation.”179 The Commission does not refer expressly to 
culture as the fourth pillar of sustainable development governance, nonetheless the 
wording adopted in the text and the emphasis on a “new cultural pillar of global 
governance” strongly recalls the debate towards the affirmation of culture as the 
fourth pillar of development.  
It is interesting to note that the Commission upholds the definition of “culture” 
as shaped under the major international debate and embedded in the UNESCO 
                                                
176 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European agenda for culture 
in a globalizing world”, COM (2007) 242 final. 
177 Council Decision of 18 May 2006, above (n 138). 
178 Agenda for Culture, at 3. 
179 Ibidem, at 7. 
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Convention on Cultural Diversity: culture as a complex phenomenon and a double 
dimension. In this way, the Commission reveals it has a broader and more 
comprehensive understanding of culture, in line with the evolutions of this concept 
developed under different international fora. Indeed, culture is taken into account both 
in its anthropological meaning – as values, beliefs, and way of life – and as creativity, 
cultural goods and services. According to the words of the Commission, the social 
and economic dimensions of culture play a fundamental role for human sustainable 
development.180   
The European Agenda for Culture adopts a “two-track” strategy: a systematic 
integration of the cultural dimension and of the various components of culture in all 
external and (not only) development policies, projects and programmes as a means of 
consolidating the efforts made in terms of cultural cooperation; and support for 
specific action in the cultural sector and cultural industries. Whereas the first track 
enhances the role of culture as a soft and diplomatic power, the second track 
addresses culture as a resource in its own right and upholds access to culture as a 
priority for development. As a legal basis to carry out these activities, the 
Commission expressly refers to Article 167 TFEU, and in particular to the clause of 
integration under paragraph 4. In order to put this strategy into practice, the 
Commission singles out three interrelated sets of objectives out: a) the promotion of 
cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue; b) the promotion of culture as a catalyst 
for creativity in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs; c) the 
promotion of culture as a vital element in the Union's international relations. Under 
the first set of objectives, promoting the mobility of artists and professionals in the 
cultural field and the circulation of all artistic expressions beyond national borders is a 
priority. The second set of objectives takes culture into account as a catalyst for 
creativity and requires its integration in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for 
growth and jobs. With this aim, in 2010 the Commission published the Green Paper 
Unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries, which recognises the 
potential of the creative and cultural industries to create jobs, enhance creative 
economy and release positive spill-over effects for the whole society.181 While the 
first two sets of objectives concern the internal dimension of the EU, the third set of 
objectives of the Agenda for Culture deals with the external action of the Union. 
                                                
180 Ibidem, at 3. 
181 Green Paper Unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries, COM(2010) 183. 
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Aware of the diplomatic power of culture, the EU commits to fostering political 
dialogue with all countries and regions in the field of culture and promoting cultural 
exchanges between the EU and third countries and regions. On a parallel level, the 
EU commits to promoting market access, both to European and other markets, for 
cultural goods and services from developing countries through targeted actions as 
well as through agreements that grant preferential treatment or trade-related assistance 
measures. The EU further endorses to use its external and development policies to 
protect and promote cultural diversity through supportive actions for the preservation 
of cultural heritage and the active encouragement of cultural activities across the 
world. So, while on the one hand the EU commits to open its market to cultural goods 
and services from developing countries by fostering trade exchanges, on the other 
hand it shows an awareness of the fact that more trade can both hinder and promote 
the protection of cultural diversity. The renewed efforts in granting technological and 
financial support to heritage conservation projects and the promotion of cultural 
events appears to be a tool to counterbalance possible negative effect deriving from 
further trade liberalisation. Similarly, the Union’s statement that “all its cooperation 
programmes and projects take full account, in their design and their implementation, 
of local culture” seems to be responding to another emergency: the need to take into 
account the local context when implementing projects and programmes in order to 
preserve local identities and not to impose a foreign model. 
4.3) Implementing “culture for development”: EU challenges in the challenge 
 
The European Union, through the ratification of the UNESCO Convention on 
Cultural Diversity and the adoption of the 2007 Agenda for Culture, embraces the 
global challenge to mainstream culture as a vector of development while ensuring the 
protection of cultural diversity. Bearing in mind the issues of coherence and the 
features characterising the external action of the Union, this sounds like an overly 
ambitious task. Indeed, the implementation of the 2007 Agenda for Culture demands 
an enormous effort in coordinating the goals and activities of the EU policies, and a 
greater commitment of the Member States and of the EU institutions in collaborating 
and carrying out complementary activities. In particular, a greater effort is necessary 
to pursue the following objectives: increasing the access to market of cultural goods 
and services coming from developing countries; fostering the mobility of artists and 
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cultural workers, and avoiding collateral negative effects of other EU cooperation 
policies on local cultures. From an outside perspective, achieving concrete results in 
pursuing these objectives is an indicator of the degree of coherence between what the 
Union says and what the Union does. Yet, the concrete implementation of these 
objectives demands the coordination of different policy areas, which may fall within 
the exclusive or not-exclusive competence of the Union and may require a careful 
balancing of the different (and often opposing) interests at stake. Risks of erosion of 
Member States’ competences may be supposed with such a complicated framework. 
Hence, it is not a case that the Commission within the text of the 2007 Agenda for 
Culture holds its hands up by clarifying that “[c]ulture is and will therefore primarily 
remain a responsibility of Member States” and recalls that Article 151 does not allow 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States in the cultural area.182 
It is quite striking, though, the formulation used by the Commission to declare that all 
action undertaken at EU level must fully respect the principle of subsidiarity, with the 
role of the EU being to support and complement, rather than to replace, the actions of 
the Member States. While the declaration is included under a general chapter in a way 
that would concern both the internal and the external dimension, the emphasis seems 
to be on the necessity to respect the principle of subsidiarity in the internal level (EU 
level), so as to interfere with Member States’ cultural competence only when 
necessary to support and complement it. The same emphasis on the principle of 
subsidiarity is not stressed for the action on the external level. This seems to suggest 
that a certain flexibility for a margin of manoeuvre in external relations – where the 
mainstreaming of culture as a vector of development becomes an even greater 
challenge – may be needed. Indeed, flexibility in the cultural sector is also claimed by 
the Council Resolutions on a European Agenda for Culture, which approves the 
Commission’s proposal, when it asserts “these objectives should be considered as a 
flexible framework for guiding future action in the cultural field”.183  
More precisely, as far the enhancement of the circulation of cultural goods and 
services is concerned, this can be considered a matter falling under the Common 
Commercial Policy: an exclusive competence of the Union, but with some special 
rules for the cultural sector that allow Member States to have a significant weight in 
                                                
182 Agenda for Culture, above quoted, at 4. 
183 Point 5 of the Resolution of the Council of 16 November 2007 on a European Agenda for Culture, 
(2007/C 287/01). 
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the decision-making process.184 In particular, Member States become very active 
actors when such an objective must be combined with the protection of cultural 
expressions in the frame of multilateral negotiations, namely under the WTO. These 
issues will be the object of a thorough analysis in Chapter 4, in which I will look at 
the position of the EU within the WTO negotiations concerning the battle for the 
cultural exception, firstly moved by Member States and later upheld by the EU. The 
Union’s trade competence encroaches upon the Member States’ cultural interests to 
preserve and promote their internal market, namely in the audiovisual field.  
Further, fostering cultural exchanges also means strengthening the mobility of 
cultural workers and artists. Although this issue may be treated as supplying of 
services (mode 4 under the WTO frame), it overlaps with national migration regimes. 
In the last decade migration has become a hot issue for the Union, whose competence 
in the field is very fragmentary. In fact, although the Lisbon Treaty introduced 
structural change to the legal foundation of the Area of Freedom, Security, and 
Justice, and the Union extended its competence in the field of economic migration, 
migration policy still remains mostly within the Member States’ sphere of 
competence. Facilitating the mobility of artists and cultural professionals coming 
from developing countries to the Union demands a high level of cooperation (and a 
strong political will) between the Member States and the Union. Issues related to the 
mobility of artists and cultural workers will be object of analysis in Chapter 4. 
In addition, the Union committed to take into account the needs of local 
cultures. This also entails avoiding the superimposition of the European model on 
local contexts. Although the Agenda for Culture does not mention the protection of 
traditional knowledge in developing countries, this issue can be conduced to the 
overall goal to preserve cultural diversity and local identities. Under the research and 
technological development chapter, the Union carries out technical assistance projects 
focusing on Intellectual Property rights in developing countries.185 These projects 
usually aim at helping third Countries to bring their domestic regulatory framework 
into conformity with the standard of TRIPS agreements and/or WIPO standards. In 
this way, the Union is contributing to the worldwide strengthening of the protection of 
intellectual property and fighting piracy. However, it is also contributing to spread the 
                                                
184 Cremona, “A policy of bits and pieces”, above (n 104). 
185E.g.: Technical Assistance to the Uganda Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry in the Area of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Project Reference: 9.ACP.RPR.007. 
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Western understanding of IP property rights, which may be in conflict with local 
models of development. Further, the Union is a party to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and ratified the Nagoya Protocol (recently entered into force). Hence, the 
EU is involved in the discussion around finding an appropriate framework for the 
protection of traditional knowledge related to the genetic resources. Again, the EU 
does not enjoy a full mandate in negotiations concerning Intellectual Property and the 
Union position in international negotiations depends upon internal balancing. This 
situation will be analysed in Chapter 5.    
 
5) Conclusive remarks 
 
In the last decade the European Union strengthened its role as global actor 
within the frame of the “culture and development” debate. The EU, as a successful 
model of regional integration and a major global actor capable of influencing rules 
and governance processes, raises great expectations amongst those supporting the idea 
of culture as a fourth pillar of development. Although the Union never officially 
affirmed that culture should be integrated as the fourth pillar of development, since 
the ratification of the 2005 UNESCO Convention and the adoption of the 2007 
Agenda for Culture the Union is showing a greater favour towards promoting culture 
as a vector of development. Further, the Union committed to promote cultural 
exchanges, access to market of cultural goods and services from developing countries 
and to protect cultural diversity as a common interest of mankind.  
Whereas cultural cooperation is not a controversial issue, mainstreaming 
culture of development can turn out to be a contentious field. This is due to the 
interplay of different policies and issues at stake. In order to be successful in 
achieving this ambitious agenda and fulfil the expectations created, the EU needs to 
set up a coherent and consistent “culture and development” approach. Yet, pursuing a 
coherent strategy for the mainstreaming of culture and development in the external 
relations seems to be a real challenge because of the encroaching of culture with 
different policies and the difficulties of striking the right balance between the 
different interests at stake. Moreover, so far, actions in the cultural sector and in the 
development sector have mostly developed along different lines, without being based 
on a joint connection between the cultural competence and the development 
competence. In spite of the recognition of the transversal nature of culture since the 
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adoption of a cultural competence in 1992, the potential of Article 167(4) TFEU as a 
clause of integration has not been fully exploited.  
Under the new frame set up by Lisbon, which strengthens the accent on coordination, 
complementarity and consistency for achieving coherence, such fragmentation should 
be overcome. But a coherent approach in mainstreaming culture for development also 
means applying principles of sustainable development that allow a sustainable use of 
culture as a resource. In the next chapters, the analysis of the EU actions in the three 
concrete cases will try to assess whether and how the Union is mainstreaming culture 
as a vector of development vis à vis major international trends and the internal 
constraints that influence its functioning. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE EU VIS À VIS CULTURE AND TRADE: 
THE CIRCULATION OF CULTURAL GOODS AND SERVICES 
WITHIN THE MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL FRAMEWORK 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1) Introductory note 
 
In the first chapter, I singled out three specific cases out in which the use of 
culture as a vector of development can create tensions and lead to controversial 
outcomes, namely: the enhanced circulation of cultural goods and services; fostering 
the mobility of artists and cultural professionals; and the application of Intellectual 
Property Law to traditional knowledge related to the use of genetic resources. This 
chapter focuses on the first case study, and more specifically on the need to foster the 
circulation of cultural goods and services while protecting cultural diversity within 
multilateral and bilateral trade relationships. In order to provide a framework of the 
main legal initiatives addressing the interface between trade and culture at the 
international level, I will look at the provisions addressing the “culture and trade” 
interaction under the WTO regime, in particular to understand to what extent such 
rules are inadequate to cope with the protection of cultural diversity. To the eyes of 
most experts in the field of “culture and trade law”, the above-sketched portrait may 
appear incomplete. The purpose of this chapter is not, in fact, to treat the subject 
extensively, but rather to analyse the legal context that is relevant to the analysis of 
this thesis. Further, bearing in mind the emergent need to find a balance between the 
promotion of development through more cultural exchanges and the risk of cultural 
homogenisation, I will look at the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions as a specific instrument addressing this issue within the 
international legal context. The preliminary analysis of the international context will 
be used to see how the EU’s action fit within this (changed) landscape. In particular, I 
will analyse the position adopted by the Union within the multilateral frame of 
negotiations (WTO and UNESCO) and its bilateral trade agreements (in particular, 
the EPA with the CARIFORUM States, the FTA with South-Korea and the trade 
agreements with the Andean Community and Central America). More broadly, the 
  130 
overall analysis aims at assessing whether the Union is acting coherently on the 
external level in the light of its internal constitutional boundaries – the division of 
competences in the “trade and culture” arena,  and its international engagements – in 
particular the obligations deriving from the WTO and the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention. Once I have assessed to what extent the Union is acting coherently in 
respect of these aspects, I will try to assess whether the Union’s integration of culture 
within its external economic relations is responding to principles of sustainability. 
A note needs to be made about the choices in selecting the relevant legislative 
framework under the WTO: in this chapter I focus on the likely cultural impacts of 
provisions included in the GATT and the GATS, because, in my opinion, they have 
driven the debate surrounding the relationship between culture and trade in the past 
decades, and determined the birth and evolution of concepts and instruments to 
address (and redress) such a complicated relationship. Yet, I am fully aware that the 
relationship between culture and trade also involves the TRIPS Agreement for 
Intellectual Property Rights under the WTO. The TRIPS Agreement aims at 
expanding Intellectual Property law standards worldwide, namely those based on the 
protection and enforcement of patent law and authors’ rights, such as copyright and 
moral rights. Therefore, to a certain extent the TRIPS Agreement regulates and 
facilitates the legal cross-border movements and can contribute to foster lawful 
culture trade, with a positive return for development goals as well. Indeed, by limiting 
risks of counterfeit and allowing authors, artists and creators to gain remuneration 
from their authors’ rights, the TRIPS Agreement is likely to create a positive legal 
framework in which creativity, cultural exchanges and development can flourish. In 
particular, Western Countries see copyright as an essential source of revenue for 
artists and the main instrument to secure investments for the marketing 
(advertisement) of cultural goods and services (mostly those distributed by big 
entertainment corporations). In this sense, most argue that global standards and rules 
to enforce copyright protection and the rest of IP related rights would benefit both 
developed and developing countries and produce positive spillover effects, such as 
boosting creativity. Although today this view is greatly challenged by some 
commentators who have expressed their doubts about the fact that “author’s rights” 
can protect the creativity and originality of author’s works, and see them rather as the 
commercial prerogative of a few with detrimental effects for the cultural/creative 
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flourishing and development of poorer countries,1 I have decided not to focus on this 
debate for the purpose of this thesis. Rather, I have chosen to focus on the TRIPS 
Agreement for its implications on the protection of traditional knowledge related to 
genetic resources, a highly debated issue under international law (see Chapter 1) 
which also reveals a potential clash of two different understanding of “property” and 
“development”, namely one based on IP law as a source of economic growth (the 
Western model) and another based on common property and traditional heritage as 
elements of a local and more sustainable model of development (those still 
perpetrated by indigenous and rural communities in most developing countries or 
emergent economies).  Thus, I will explore relevant provisions under the TRIPS 
agreement, namely Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreements, in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis.  
 
2) “Culture and trade”: circulation of cultural goods and services under 
the current international law framework 
2.1) Challenges under the WTO law framework: liberalisation v. protectionism 
 
Strengthening the positive contribution of culture for development – and in 
particular the economic, social and cultural dimension of development – calls upon 
the enhancement of the circulation of cultural goods and services. Increasing the 
flowering of cultural goods mainly involves removing barriers to the cross-border 
trade of works of art, records, films, books, etc. Similarly, enhancing the flowering of 
cultural services is about creating a regulative framework which facilitates the cross-
border mobility of broadcasting programmes, and other intangible services, or of 
                                                
1 For example Joost Smiers argues that, for the good of culture, freedom of creativity, and the 
development of poor countries, it would be better to abolish the copyright regime. Briefly, he affirms 
that copyright and authors’ rights have always been strictly related to the importance of securing 
investments. In the last century, the trade system increasingly moved in the direction of investment 
protection and copyright is about extremely large investments that enjoy an ever-longer protection in 
time and scope. The consequence is that the public domain of artistic creativity and knowledge is being 
increasingly privatised. Moreover, in many branches of art copyright has never fulfilled the expectation 
of providing many artists with a reasonable income. Others, such as Geiger, also believe that copyright 
and related intellectual property rights are increasingly evolving into an investment protection 
mechanism, in favour of big investors (usually the big corporations that own copyrights and distribute 
cultural goods and services). Further on the work of these two authors:  J Smiers and M Van Schijndel, 
Imagine there is no copyright and no cultural conglomerates/An essay, (Institute of Network Culture, 
2009); C Geiger, “Constitutionalizing Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights 
on Intellectual Property Rights in the European Union”, (2006), 37:4 International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 379. 
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peoples providing such services, as well as theatre, music and other forms of cultural 
performance. Further, looking at the whole issue through the development lens, more 
mobility of cultural goods and services has to be combined with more access to global 
cultural markets for cultural products originating in developing countries. Within the 
frame of international economic law, wider liberalisation in the cultural sector may, 
then, be desirable. Nonetheless, over the last decades, the relationship between 
“culture and trade” has rather been depicted as “culture versus trade” and further 
liberalisation of trade in cultural goods and services has been object of a fierce 
debate.2 At the different levels and fora, many NGOs, interest groups, and even States 
argue that more liberalisation of trade in the cultural sector is a threat to the 
preservation of national identities and cultural diversity. 3 The discussion around 
“culture and trade” is often framed in terms of “protectionism versus liberalisation”. 
From the point of view of those in favour of the free market, cultural policies and the 
quest for exempting cultural goods and services from free trade rules are a disguised 
form of protectionism. From the standpoint of those supporting trade restrictions to 
cultural products, further liberalisation commitments would lead to cultural 
homogenisation, in particular under the WTO rules which do not grant appropriate 
recognition of cultural values and permit the coexistence with more protective cultural 
national policies. This last view argues that the current treatment of cultural products 
under the WTO frame does not take into account the double nature of this special 
category of goods and services and advocates for the establishment of a general 
“cultural exception”. In the following paragraph I will assess why the WTO regime is 
deemed to be inappropriate for the protection of cultural values and trace the lines of 
the claims towards the adoption of a cultural exception. 
2.1.1) Cultural values and trade values under current WTO law: an appraisal  
 
As with the protection of the environment or social values, increased trade 
liberalisation intensifies the possibility of a clash between trade values and cultural 
                                                
2 M Burri Nevona, “Trade and Culture: Keep the Border Fuzzy Please”, Working Paper N. 2009/2, at 
1. 
3 For instance, in 1996 the OECD’s negotiations were initiated in order to draft a comprehensive 
agreement on investment in favour of a special treatment for cultural goods and services under 
international trade. The attempt to draw a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was abandoned 
in 1998. 
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values.4 Nonetheless, WTO texts seem not to take into account the potential conflicts 
between trade and cultural values. At first glance, no connection between cultural 
concerns and development issues is directly or indirectly inserted in the preamble of 
the Marrakesh Agreement, which seems to be embedding a notion of sustainable 
development that mostly focuses on economic development and some concern about 
environmental emergences, along the major international mainstream.5 Indeed, the 
preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement, while clarifying that the WTO’s final goal is 
to eliminate all barriers and national discriminations hindering free trade, 6 
acknowledges the importance of certain values – like the environment, and certain 
specific issues – like developmental concerns for developing and least-developed 
countries and the optimal use of the world’s resource in accordance with sustainable 
development; but it does not formally recognise culture as a value in need of 
protection from the probable impacts of free trade. Similarly, the text of Article XX of 
the GATT 1994 listing the general exceptions to the WTO rules, allows Members to 
adopt measures to protect human, animal and plant life and health, and the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, but does not include the protection of 
cultural identities or cultural expressions that are at risk.7 Other tools under the WTO 
address biosafety related issues, such as the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).8 Some 
special clauses take into account the disparities among countries and developmental 
                                                
4 For an extensive literature on conflicts between trade and other values, see, among the others: P Van 
den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (2005), 
(ch. 4 and 5); J Trachtman, “Trade and…Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity”, (1998) 
9:1 European Journal of International Law. 
5 As some have commented, the notion of sustainable development endorsed by the WTO is a very 
narrow one and is still mainly focused on the economic component, see: F Macmillan, “Development, 
cultural self-determination and the World Trade Organization”, in A Perry-Kessaris, Law in the pursuit 
of development Principles into Practice? (Routledge, 2010), 68-96. 
6 Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (LT/UR/A/2, 
signed 15 April 1994 in Marrakesh as the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations). The 
Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement recites “Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and 
expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the 
world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect 
and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their 
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development”. See also GATT chapeau 
and GATS’ preamble, Ministerial Declaration to Launch the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations MIN.DEC (20 Sept 1986).  
7 Para (b) and (g) of Article XX GATT 1994. 
8 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 Apr 1994, available at 
http//www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT), 15 Apr 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm. 
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issues, like the Enabling Clause allowing some discrimination in favour of developing 
countries.9 However, as far as cultural concerns go, no trade-off devices are envisaged 
by the WTO rules.  
Looking in more depth at the provisions under the GATT, a certain degree of 
awareness about the protection of cultural heritage is revealed under the general 
exceptions of Article XX. Article XX(f) GATT allows Members to adopt exceptional 
measures for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historical or 
archaeological value.10 Such a provision, already envisaged in GATT 1947, has the 
potential to provide some flexibility to Member States to derogate from the general 
rules on free trade in order to preserve their cultural heritage. Yet, the exception under 
para (f) has quite a narrow focus: its application is limited to cultural goods that are 
notably recognised as “national” and embedding “artistic, historic and archaeological” 
values. Thus, it is mostly antiquities, archaeological relics, historical artworks, and art 
objects representing the national cultural heritage of a State that may fall under this 
category. Cultural goods that are not formally recognised as having a national status 
(most often by being inscribed in national lists), and “new” or “modern” cultural 
products like those generated by the audiovisual and printing-publishing industries – 
which are unlikely to be of historical and archaeological value and might not be of 
sufficient artistic value – are excluded.11 In particular, the exclusion of cultural 
industries’ products from the notion of “national treasures” is supported by the 
absence of an equivalent exception within the GATS.12 Furthermore, exceptions 
under Article XX (f) are bound by the general requirement for all general exceptions 
to comply with the chapeau of the GATT. As a consequence, exceptional measures 
are admitted to the extent they do not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised 
                                                
9 Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries, Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903). 
10 Para (f) Art. XX General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947). This provision inspired Article 30 
of the former Treaty on the European Community, mentioned in chapter 2.  
11 T Voon, Cultural Products and the World Trade Organization, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
at 105. On the exclusion of audiovisual services from the field of application of Article XX(f) see also: 
C Graber, “Audio-Visual Policy: The Stumbling Block of Trade Liberalisation?”, in D Geradin and D 
Luff (eds), The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 200. 
12 T Voon, supra (n 11). Cultural industries generally involve both goods and services. Audiovisual 
products are mostly considered as being “services” (in particular, this is the position of the European 
Union) and, therefore, they fall under the field of application of the GATS. 
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restriction on international trade.13 In order to fully empower the potential of the 
cultural exception embedded in Article XX(f) an “evolutionary” approach in 
interpreting its content is sought. Until now, no case relying upon Paragraph (f) of 
Article XX has been raised under the WTO, and so no interpretation of the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) on this provision is available.14 In future, interpreting Article 
XX(f) through a more evolutionary approach could be a possible path to carve out 
more space for cultural exceptions. As some commentators notice, there are no 
international or commonly defined guidelines for the interpretation of “treasure” or 
for the assessment of “artistic, historical and archaeological values” – which may vary 
according to times, taste and the way people relate to art.15 Nonetheless, as others 
suggest, an evolutionary interpretation of these words according to evolutions under 
international law and emergent changes/needs over time may help to wided the 
ordinary meaning of these terms.16 The Appellate Body (AB) has often recognised the 
utility of referring to different relevant international instruments to interpret the 
ordinary meaning of particular words (in accordance with article 31(1) of the VCLT). 
This has been the case for the interpretation of the notion of “exhaustible natural 
resources” under Article XX(g). In the famous case US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body 
held that such an interpretation must be carried out “in the light of contemporary 
concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the 
environment” and by drawing upon other relevant international conventions.17 In this 
case the AB, referring to international treaties such as the UNCLOS and the CBD, 
concluded that the words “natural resources” include living resources. Similarly, the 
AB could refer to more specific cultural-matter conventions, such as the UNESCO 
Convention on Cultural Property18 or the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, 
to include new cultural goods (such audiovisual products) or manifestations of 
cultural diversity (whose protection is a contemporary concern recognised by 
international law) under the notion of national treasures. A broader interpretation of 
                                                
13 See: chapeau to GATT 1994, Article XX. 
14 World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index – Guide to WTO Law and Practice, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/analytic_index_e.htm  (last access on 1st 
June 2014).  
15 J M Cheng, “The Problem of National Treasure in International Law”, (2010), 12 Oregon Review of 
International Law, at 142. 
16 T Voon, above quoted (n 11). 
17 Appellate Body Report, US-Shrimp, 129, 130 and 131. 
18 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted on 14 Nov 1970, Records of the General 
Conference, 16th Session. 
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Article XX(f) is certainly an interesting proposal, yet the practice developed so far by 
the Dispute Settlement Body in disputes concerning cultural issues is not very 
encouraging in this regard. During recent years, the Dispute Settlement Body has 
been frequently called to decide about disputes encompassing various cultural aspects. 
For instance, in a case involving Japan and the US, the latter challenged a Japanese 
law demanding import licences on certain kinds of leather and the respect of import 
quotas. In its defence, Japan argued that such measures aimed at protecting the 
traditional tanning industry of a Japanese minority group, namely the Dowa 
communities, that would otherwise collapse in a regime of free international 
competition. The Panel stated that these provisions did not provide a justification for 
import restrictions and refuse to take into account Japan’s historical and socio-cultural 
arguments “since its terms of reference were to examine the matter in the light of the 
relevant GATT provisions” 19 (emphasis added). In a rather more notorious case 
concerning Canada and its adoption of certain domestic measures supporting the 
Canadian magazine industry, the Panel did not accept Canada’s argument affirming 
that such measures aimed to safeguard and promote Canadian cultural identity. The 
Panel did not consider that the issue of cultural identity was at stake and instead 
condemned Canada for an infringement of its trade obligations.20  
Although very different by nature and in terms of the interests involved, these 
claims represent concrete examples of the likely repercussions of free trade on 
culture. They also reflect the different approaches of WTO Members towards “culture 
and trade” issues, as well as a certain insensibility on the part of the DSB to deal with 
such issues. One may argue that the lack of cultural clauses (or similar instruments 
recognising the specificity of cultural issues) does not entitle WTO Members to found 
their arguments on a cultural basis under the WTO and would explain the DSB’s 
propensity to neglect the relevance of cultural concerns.21 In spite of this, cultural 
concerns increasingly enter through the back door in trade disputes and their 
                                                
19 Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, L/5623, BISD 31S/94 (adopted 15 May 1984), (44). To 
support its opinion, the Panel recalled a previous report adopted by the Contracting Parties in 1983 
which, in a similar situation, concluded ‘that [such matters] did not come within the purview of 
Articles XI and XIII of the GATT and ... lay outside its consideration’. See: Panel report on 
Quantitative Restrictions against Imports of Certain Products from Hong Kong (L/5511, paragraph 27). 
20 The case referred to is Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R 1997, 
which will be further analysed in the following paragraphs.  
21 On this see: T Voon, above (n 11), at 18. Tania Voon argues that Members are aware that the 
absence of a legal basis to legitimise their measures in defence of cultural interests does not leave hope 
for a successful action in this sense. This is probably why they often use cultural arguments as a 
“complementary argument” rather than the founding basis for their measures. 
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emergence sounds like an alarm bell for the inadequacy of the WTO rules to address 
the relationship between “culture and trade”.  
 
2.1.2) The treatment of cultural products under the WTO 
The lack of sensitivity towards issues concerning cultural diversity under 
international trade seems to be a consequence of the absence of a specific definition 
of cultural products under WTO law and the consequent assimilation of cultural 
goods and services to other trade goods and trade in services. The General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services22 
do not define cultural goods or services, nor do they acknowledge the special nature 
of cultural products, as tradable products embedding both economic and cultural 
values.23 Therefore, commitments concerning the reduction of tariff barriers and the 
elimination of other measures restricting the import and export of goods undertaken 
under the GATT and rules concerning the elimination of barriers and restrictions to 
trade in services under the GATS apply indiscriminately to cultural products. In more 
specific terms, obligations under the GATT centre around two crucial non-
discrimination rules: the Most Favoured Nation clause (MFN) 24 and the national 
treatment provision.25 Hence, a priori if a WTO Member offers more favourable 
treatment to certain cultural goods traded to one State, it equally has to offer the same 
treatment for the same or like products over all other contracting parties. Further, 
imported cultural goods should enjoy the national treatment as like domestic cultural 
products. As for the provision on services, Article I(3)(b) GATS states that "services" 
includes any service in any sector (except services supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority); cultural services are then covered by GATS provisions.26 
                                                
22 Respectively: Annex 1A and Annex 1B to the Marrakesh Agreement. 
23 Looking closely, the GATT do not contain any definition of “goods”, whereas a limited definition of 
“services” is contained in Article I(2) of the GATS where it defines “trade in services” as the supply of 
a service: (a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member (Mode 1); (b) in 
the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member (Mode 2); (c) by a service 
supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member (Mode 3); 
by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory 
of any other Member (Mode 4). As some comment, the emphasis is on the way the product is traded 
rather that its characteristics and nature. Further on this: F Smith and L Woods, “A Distinction Without 
A Difference: Exploring The Boundary Between Goods And Services In The World Trade 
Organization And The European Union”, (2005) 12(1) Columbia Journal of European Law, at 14.  
24 Article I, GATT. 
25 Article III, GATT. 
26 It is worth clarifying that “services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority” refers to 
services that are not supplied on a commercial basis, or in competition with one or more service 
suppliers. In several countries governments provide for supplying certain cultural products, like TV or 
  138 
GATS draws mostly upon GATT’s rules: it includes the application of the MFN 
clause and national treatment to the provision of services.27 Besides these general 
measures, article XVI of the GATS includes a specific market access commitment 
greatly connected to the MFN and national treatment rules.28 Article XVI(2) lists the 
measures that a Member cannot maintain or adopt in sectors where market-access 
commitments are undertaken, such as limitations in the form of numerical quotas, 
monopolies, the number of peoples that can work in that specific sector, etc.29  
The aim of both the GATT and the GATS is to achieve a higher level of trade 
liberalisation in all goods and services’ sectors, however the WTO Members have the 
capacity to decide whether to undertake or exclude commitments to liberalise certain 
products or service sectors. This possibility leaves room for some flexibility in terms 
of liberalisation commitments for cultural products. Under the GATT, States can list 
specific goods subject to tariff barrier reduction commitments in schedules that are 
annexed to the main agreement, and specify exceptions (a negative list or “top-down” 
approach).30 Within the GATS, contracting parties enjoy greater flexibility: Article 
XVI (market access) and Article XVII (national treatment) are not general 
obligations, but strictly apply to the sectors and to the extent of the specific 
commitments included in the Schedules of Member States annexed to the main 
agreement. Each State so defines its commitments in a positive list (“bottom-up 
approach”) and is even allowed to impose limitations and conditions to such 
commitments. 31  For instance, so far a only few Member States have made 
commitments in the audiovisual sector. As a consequence, most WTO Members are 
still able to adopt and to maintain national policy measures to protect and promote 
their audiovisual industry, even if these measures represent a restriction to trade in 
this sector.  
                                                                                                                                      
radio transmissions through public broadcasting, or partially finance broadcasters through public fees 
imposed on television and radio users and owners (as in the case of the Italian fee on Television 
(“Canone RAI”). One may think, then, that such services may fall under the exclusion for services 
supplied in the exercise of governmental authority. Yet, this is very unlikely due to the fact that many 
public broadcasters compete with private broadcasters and increasingly operate on a commercial basis. 
They may rather fall under the application of Article VIII GATS imposing additional obligations on 
Members in connection with monopolies and exclusive service suppliers. Further on this, T Voon 
above (n 11), at 91. 
27 Respectively Article III and Article XVII of the GATS. 
28  Article XVI of the GATS, according to which any member undertakes full liberalisation 
commitments without restrictions in one service sector in their schedule to give MFN treatment to all 
services and service suppliers in that sector from other members. 
29 See para (a)-(f) of Article XVI of the GATS. 
30 Article II of the GATT. 
31 Article XX of the GATS. 
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Besides this margin of flexibility, another provision taking into account 
cultural concerns is Article IV of Part II of the GATT agreement, named “Special 
provisions relating to Cinematographic Films”. Article IV GATT permits screen 
quotas to require the exhibition of domestically made films for a specified minimum 
proportion of total screen time.32 Article IV GATT exceptionally derogates from the 
general rule on national treatment. It was inserted at the time of the drafting of GATT 
1947 under the pressure of those States – mostly European ones – willing to protect a 
slice of the market for their domestic film industries.33 These States feared that the 
import of foreign films, in particular American films, would have been a threat to the 
survival of their weak domestic movie industries, and argued that the regulation of 
film production is a matter of cultural policy rather than economic policy.34  
The protection of cultural interests was already a concern under GATT 1947, 
and still seems to be a major preoccupation today under the overall WTO system of 
rules. The margin of flexibility under the GATT, and in particular under the GATS, 
has never been considered sufficient by most WTO Members.35 Further, it should be 
recalled that under the WTO, Member States are committed to reach the furthest 
extent of liberalisation, both in trade of goods and services. Therefore, they are bound 
to progressively remove trade barriers to foster trade exchanges, despite their 
permitted margin of flexibility. 36  In particular, the achievement of greater 
liberalisation in the audiovisual sector is highly problematic. Considering the digital 
shift and the technology evolution in the audiovisual market, it is rather difficult today 
to draw a clear distinction between cultural goods and cultural services and Article IV 
of the GATT focusing on cinematographic products sounds almost obsolete.37 New 
media and new forms of emissions have appeared (e.g. satellite transmissions of 
television programmes or the delivering of audiovisual services through the internet), 
                                                
32 Screen quotas are allowed under certain conditions specified in para (a), (b), (c), and (d) of Article 
IV GATT. 
33 See: GATT, Application of GATT to International Trade in Television Programmes: Report of the 
Working Party, L/1741 (13 March 1962). See also: B de Witte, “Trade in Culture: International Legal 
Regimes and EU Constitutional Values”, in G de Burca and J Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal 
and Constitutional Aspects, (Hart Publishing, 2001), at 242. 
34 GATT, Application of GATT to International Trade in Television Programmes: Report of the 
Working Party, (here above quoted), at 8. 
35 M Burri-Nevona, above (n 2), quoting S Cahn and D Schimmel, “The Cultural Exception: Does It 
Exist in GATT and GATS Frameworks? How Does It Affect or Is It Affected by the Agreement on 
TRIPS?”, (1997) 15 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal, at 287-289. 
36 See the WTO Preamble, above quoted. 
37 For a different view on this and a suggestion for interpreting Article IV GATT in a more modern 
key, see: L Ehring, “Article IV of the GATT: an obsolete or still a basis for cultural policy?”, in I 
Govaere et al (eds), Trade and Competition Law in the EU and Beyond, (EE Publishing, 2011), 96. 
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which are mostly distributed in non-traditional cross-border ways. These kinds of 
cultural products may fall both under the GATT or the GATS, yet it seems that the 
GATS provisions are the ones most directly affecting the exchange of these cultural 
goods and services.38 The querelle about whether audiovisual products should be 
considered goods or services exploded in the 1980s, when the expansion of the trade 
in television programmes brought the European Union to adopt common measures – 
namely quota provisions – to favour the European broadcasting market and limit the 
exportation of American TV programmes.39 According to the US, Article IV had to be 
interpreted in a narrow sense, as applying only to cinema films and leaving aside TV 
broadcasting. To the contrary, the EU (still the European Community at the time) 
argued that TV programmes are services rather than goods.40 It was during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations for the new General Agreement on Trade and Services 
(GATS)41 that the debate around this issue became very animated, and the claim for 
inserting an explicit exception culturelle for cultural products within the text of the 
GATS was advanced. Broadly speaking, the underlying rationale for the formal 
introduction of a cultural exception in the WTO context is that such an exception 
would justify subsidies and quota restrictions in favour of national cultural industries’ 
productions. Indeed, because the current rules under the GATT and the GATS are 
considered inadequate to strike a proper balance between trade and cultural interests, 
Member States adopt domestic cultural policy measures to counterbalance the 
implications of WTO rules on cultural diversity. Domestic cultural policy measures 
very frequently consist in States’ financial support for national creative productions, 
or the adoption of quotas to restrict the import of foreign cultural products. Although 
                                                
38 L Richieri Hanania, “The International Commercial Rules on the Exchange of Cultural Goods and 
Services”, ESIL Founding Conference Paper (Florence, 2005), available at http://www.esil-
sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Hanania_0.PDF, at 3. 
39 The European common measures grounded in the Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989, OJ 
L298, as amended by Directive 97/36/EC of 30 July 1997. Directive 89/552/EEC is known as the 
“Television without Frontiers” Directive.  
40 B de Witte, above (n 33), 242-243. As far as it concerns the definition of “cultural services”, 
UNESCO highlights that, currently, there is neither a common definition, nor a single standardised 
system of descriptions for traded cultural services. According to UNESCO’s understanding of “cultural 
services”, this includes: performing services (theatres, orchestras, circuses, etc.), publishing, news, 
communication and architectural services, as well as audiovisual services (distribution of films, 
television/radio programmes, and home videos; all aspects of production such as dubbing and print 
duplication; exhibition of films; and ownership and operation of cable, satellite and broadcasting 
facilities or cinemas, etc.). Library services, archives, museums are also included. See: UNESCO, 
Culture, Trade and Globalization: Questions and Answers (2000). 
41 The Uruguay Round started in 1986 and takes its name from the place where this international 
negotiation was started (Punta del Este in Uruguay). The Uruguay Round lasted 7 years and ended in 
1994 with the signature of the Marrakech Agreement, creating the WTO.   
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justified by the aim to preserve national cultural integrity and diversity, this kind of 
national measure may often be in conflict with the application of the WTO regime, 
and can turn into an infringement of the international obligations of the State within 
the WTO. Therefore, in the past decades, several WTO Members have extensively 
discussed the urgency to create a special regime for the treatment of cultural goods 
and services, which would recognise the dual nature and public function of cultural 
products under the WTO. 
2.1.3) Searching for a tool to redress cultural imbalances: the rise and demise of 
the “exception culturelle”  
2.1.3.1) Origin and evolution of the “exception culturelle” under the WTO  
 
Supporters of the “cultural exception” argue that cultural products are the 
expressions of national and cultural identity and, as such, need special protection and 
support. It is actually true that quite often cultural industries – film and audiovisual 
ones in particular – can survive thanks to certain national policy measures, such as 
import restrictions, subsidies, domestic content quotas, etc.42  If subject only to 
commercial considerations, many local (and small) cultural industries would hardly 
resist the competition of those with greater financial structures, because of their 
multinational presence and monopoly position.  
During the Uruguay Round a clear demand for a special trade regime for 
cultural goods and services stood out. On this occasion, the possibilities to reach 
further liberalisation on trade in services through a new General Agreement and to 
bring intellectual property rights under common international GATT/WTO rules were 
widely debated.43 Some countries expressed a concern that the enforcement of the 
GATT principles – in particular MFN and national treatment rules – on cultural goods 
and services as well as on copyright-protected products would undermine their 
cultural specificity and only consider their commercial aspects. Canada, many 
European Countries, and the majority of the Group of 7744 asked, then, for a general 
                                                
42 For a detailed description and discussion on domestic cultural policy measures: M Footer and C B 
Graber, “Trade Liberalization and Cultural Policy”, (2000) 3 Journal of International Economic Law, 
115, 122. 
43 During the Uruguay Round the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) was also negotiated and concluded. 
44 The Group of 77 (or G-77) was established on 15 June 1964 by seventy-seven developing country 
signatories of the “Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries” issued at the end of the first 
session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. Although 
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exemption for cultural products under GATS.45 In particular, the idea of an “exception 
culturelle” was strongly cherished by France and Canada, which aimed at maintaining 
tariffs and quotas to protect their cultural market from other cultural products, most 
notably US films and television. However, the European Union, as a member of the 
WTO,46 chose not to sit on a side and joined the battle for a cultural exception by 
taking the French request under its aegis. The exception culturelle soon became the 
flag of the EU advocacy for the protection of European cultural diversity.  
The Union, together with Canada, took the leadership of this battle within the 
Uruguay Round, with the US as the major opponent. Since the beginning the 
emphasis of the Union for a cultural exception was placed on audiovisual services. 
Indeed, while the European Union has engaged with certain commitments under 
GATS for recreational, cultural and sporting services, it has never undertaken 
commitments on further liberalisation of the audiovisual sector. 47 The attention of the 
EU in protecting the specificity of the audiovisual sector is grounded on internal EU 
law interests: further commitments to liberalise audiovisual services would hinder the 
integrity of the Television Without Frontiers Directive,48 whose ultimate aim is to 
create a European broadcasting space, while undermining national monopolies in the 
                                                                                                                                      
the members increased to 131 countries, the original name was retained for historical reasons. The 
Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organisation of developing countries in the UN providing 
the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests 
and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the 
United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for development. For more information, 
see: http://www.g77.org/doc/. 
45 Other countries supporting this request were Austria, Peru, Brazil, Egypt, India, and the Nordic 
countries. Although all of these Countries aimed to obtain an exceptional treatment for cultural goods 
and services due to their peculiar nature, they differed about the fields of application of a cultural 
exception: some were in favour of a general exemption, whereas others preferred a sectorial approach 
for services, and others only for audiovisual services (namely, the EU). Tania Voon offers a detailed 
and precise description of these different positions, see: T Voon, Cultural Products above (n 11), 22 
and ff. 
46 The European Union has been a member of the WTO since 1 January 1995 (until 30 November 2009 
it was the European Community 
(http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/countriese/europeancommunities.htm). 
47 It is worth pointing out that cultural services encompass two main categories: recreational, cultural 
and sporting services, and audiovisual services. The WTO services classification currently lists the 
following sub-sectors as part of “Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services”: entertainment services, 
news agency services, libraries, archives, museums and other cultural events, sporting and other 
recreational activities. According to WTO, audiovisual services include motion picture and videotape 
production and distribution services, motion picture projection services, radio and television services, 
radio and television transmission services, and sound recording. See: 
http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUincoming/summaries/Recreational.pdf and 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/audiovisual_e/audiovisual_e.htm. 
48 References above (n 39). 
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sector.49 In spite of the EU’s strong contribution to the battle, it never gained the 
expected success: a formal “cultural exception” was not included in the final text of 
the GATS. Indeed, the current GATS does not contain any special clause for cultural 
products, nor official recognition of their special nature.50  
Nevertheless, WTO Members have managed to obtain some flexibility for 
liberalising services. In the end, the Uruguay Round’s concluding negotiations did not 
insist on applying all the GATT rules to film and audiovisual goods and services 
(falling under the GATS).51 Since then, this tacit understanding (or compromise) has 
been known as the “cultural exception”.52 The “cultural exception” lacks a proper 
legal status and can, rather, be considered as a doctrine based on the principle that 
cultural products are not like any other merchandise because of the values they 
embed; hence they should be treated differently.53 Relying on this argument, WTO 
Members have gained the right to decide individually whether to accept commitments 
                                                
49 M De Cock Buning, Cultural Diversity in Mass Media Regulation, in H Schneider and P Van Den 
Bossche (eds.), Protection of Cultural Diversity from an International and European Perspective, 
(Intersentia, 2008), 250. B de Witte, “The European Content Requirement in the EC Television 
Directive – Five Years After”, (1995), 1 The Yearbook of Media and Entertainment Law, 101. 
50 Three main options took place during the Uruguay Round negotiations: 1) a cultural exclusion 
clause; 2) a cultural exception clause; 3) a cultural specificity clause. Under the first option, a total 
exclusion of cultural goods and services from trade’s rights and obligations was claimed. The second 
option, instead, would limit such exclusion to those goods and services of cultural relevance; in this 
case, the extension of the exclusion will depend upon the definition and interpretation of the cultural 
exceptional aspects. The third option calls upon the introduction of a formal recognition of the cultural 
specificity of cultural goods and services: it goes beyond the sole recognition of economic aspects, but 
does not deny them and would allow cultural goods and services to benefit from a special treatment. 
None of these proposals succeeded. Instead, an example of cultural exclusion from trade obligations 
can be found in Article 2005 CUSFTA (NAFTA), exempting cultural industries from the provisions of 
that Agreement. For a commentary on this norm see: R Neuwirth, The Cultural Industries in 
International Trade Law. Insights from the NAFTA, the WTO and the EU, (Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2006), 
69-78. 
51 The exclusion of audiovisual services from further commitments under GATS has been extended 
also to future agreements in the sector: for instance, in January 1998 the WTO adopted an agreement 
on basic telecommunication services – which came into force as the Fourth Protocol to GATS – that 
does not apply to the distribution of audiovisual services. 
52 As B De Witte observes, the result was a de facto exclusion of audiovisual services from the GATS 
regime, above quoted (n 33), at 244. It is interesting to note that France was the first Country to 
introduce the concept of “cultural exception”, given the strong role played internationally to protect the 
French language and the French cultural industries. For instance, in 1994 France legislated to protect 
the French language and the French music industry by imposing a quota of French-language songs on 
radio play-lists. However, the principle underlying this doctrine was evoked by the USA in the early 
1950s when it adhered to the Florence Agreement, the first multilateral treaty of cultural goods. See: 
UNESCO, Culture, Trade and Globalization, above (n 40), at 37. 
53 Several efforts have also been made within other international fora to strengthen the worldwide 
acceptance of a “cultural exception”. For example, a few years later, following the recommendations of 
the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development (Stockholm, 1998), UNESCO 
brought together a group of experts to discuss the issue ‘Culture: a Form of Merchandise Like No 
Other?’ (1999). The shared understanding that ‘culture was not only a matter for the economy or an 
economic concept’ inspired the conclusions of this symposium. 
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concerning market access and national treatment, and to exempt some cultural policy 
measures from the MFN obligation. So far, only a few Members have made 
commitments for the audiovisual sector,54 whereas most of them, the EU and Canada 
included, inscribed a great part of cultural services in the Annex to Article II 
Exemptions. Article II(2) of GATS, indeed, establishes that the Members can 
maintain national measures, which would normally be incompatible with the WTO 
rules, as far as they are included under (and meet the conditions of) the Annex on 
Article II Exemptions.55 On the basis of this provision, today the EU is still allowed to 
develop public policies to support the audiovisual sector, such as broadcasting (TV 
and radio) quotas, financial aid (for production and distribution programmes like 
MEDIA), regional co-production agreements (like Eurimages) and the Directive 
Television Without Frontiers. The doctrine of cultural exception was also reflected in 
the decision to maintain Article IV of Part II of the GATT agreement.  
2.1.3.2) The demise of the “cultural exception” and rise of “cultural diversity” 
 
The de facto exclusion of cultural services, and mainly audiovisual services, 
from the GATS appears to be a Pyrrhic victory within the overall WTO system.56 In 
fact, we should not forget that Members had to agree on the principle of progressive 
liberalisation in the trades’ services in order to reach this agreement: this entails that 
all kinds of exemption from provisions on liberalisation will have to progressively 
decrease. The formal inclusion of an exception based on the recognition of the special 
nature of cultural services could strengthen the support for States’ choices in 
maintaining this category outside the GATS. Further, the cultural exception seems not 
to apply within the GATT, which is less flexible in allowing exemptions for cultural 
products other than the cinematographic ones (for which Article IV GATT is still in 
                                                
54At that time, the number of WTO members with commitments in this sector was still the lowest (30, 
as of 12 January 2010). A large proportion of these commitments have emerged from accessions 
negotiations (12 Members). Almost all Members with commitments in the sector are developing 
countries, except Japan, New Zealand and the United States. See: WTO, Council for Trade in Services, 
Audiovisual Services - Background Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/310 (12 January 2010), at 17. See 
also: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/audiovisual_e/audiovisual_e.htm (last access 30 July 
2014). 
55 According to the wording of the GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions (para 5 and 6), the 
exemptions included under the Annex that are intended to last more than five years, shall be reviewed 
and they shall not be exceed a total period of 10 years.  
56 Commentators often refer to the outcome of the Uruguay Round on cultural services as the 
“agreement on disagree”. See: B de Witte, above quoted (n 33), at 245; T Voon, above (n 11), at 14; R 
Neuwirth, above at (n 50), at 204. 
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force).57 This unsolved tension came back to fore in the 1997 Panel decision Canada 
– Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals.58 On that occasion, indeed, the WTO 
Panel declined to acknowledge a cultural distinction between certain goods, namely 
some kinds of magazines. The dispute concerned the US claim against certain 
domestic measures59 adopted by Canada in the periodical sector, considered overly 
protectionist and in violation of the GATT’s rules. To be more specific, the measures 
at stake directly affected some special editions of US magazines, the so-called split-
runs, limiting their access to the Canadian market. Canada argued that the measures 
were part of a broader and longstanding policy aimed at the protection of Canadian 
culture.60 Further, Canada contested that magazines are not like regular trade objects, 
but they should be considered as cultural goods because of their intellectual content.61 
In arguing this, Canada tried to gain a differentiated treatment for magazines and 
split-runs under the GATT, based on the intellectual uniqueness of the Canadian 
magazines’ content. None of these arguments were taken into consideration by the 
Panel, which instead stated that “the ability of Members to adopt measures to protect 
cultural identity” was not at issue.62 As for the question concerning the likeness of the 
products, the Panel ended up by recognising no distinction in their common end use 
and considered them as “like products”. 63 Both Canada and the US appealed the 
Panel Report under the WTO. The following Appellate Body’s decision did not 
reverse the Panel’s report, however it reached a different conclusion concerning the 
likeness of the products: it considered the kinds of periodicals under analysis as 
                                                
57 B de Witte, above (n 33). 
58 See references above at (n 20). 
59 The incriminated measures were: 1) The prohibition of certain periodicals considered a ‘special 
edition’, including a split-run or regional edition that contains an advertisement that was primarily 
directed to a market in Canada and that does not appear in identical form in all editions of that issue of 
the periodical that were distributed in the periodical’s country of origin’; 2) the imposition of a tax 
equal to 80% of the value of all the advertisements contained in split-run editions (not already 
prohibited), in which more than 20% of the editorial material was the same or substantially the same as 
editorial material that appeared in other issues of one or more periodicals and contained an 
advertisement that did not appear in identical form in the aforementioned editions; 3) The preferred 
treatment of Canadian magazines by the Canadian Post Corporation (which is controlled by the 
Canadian Government). See Canada Periodicals, para 2.2-2.19. 
60 Ibidem at para 3.23-3.26. Sharing a large border and (for the majority) a common language with the 
United States, Canada is directly exposed to the US attempts at the Canadian market and faces the 
general diffusion of American culture (not only in the globalised media arena). See: C Carmody, 
“When ‘Cultural Identity Was Not at Issue’: Thinking about Canada – Certain Measures Concerning 
Periodicals”, (1999) 30 Law and Policy in International Business, at 302. 
61 Canada Periodicals, at para 3.61, 3.84. 
62 Ibidem at 5.45. 
63 Nonetheless, the Panel showed some sensibility advocating the need for a case-by-case analysis to 
assess whether the Canadian magazines and the US split runs would be “like-products”. Ibidem at 
3.114. 
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directly competitive products.64 In its analysis, the Panel avoided discussing any 
possible cultural implications in the case.  
The Canada – Periodicals decision threw more oil on the fire that was lit 
during the Uruguay Round and revealed that the real efficacy of the “cultural 
exception” doctrine is rather weak. In striking a balance between trade and cultural 
interests at stake under the GATT, a lot will depend upon the interpretation of the law 
and the appreciation of the interests at stake by the Panel. The choice to disregard all 
cultural implications involved in the Canada – Periodicals dispute leads us to think 
that there is (and will be) little room for the assessment of cultural contents, or the 
distinct cultural goals inspiring certain national laws. Thus, it is quite hard to imagine 
that future WTO Panels will abandon the “dominant gaze”, which seems to be mostly 
economic-oriented.65 Such an approach is in conflict with the emergent international 
tendency, which calls upon the protection of cultural diversity and national cultures 
from the effects of increased globalisation. The introduction of a clear cultural clause 
or waiver within the WTO texts would probably help to orient Panel’s decision 
towards a more “cultural friendly” interpretation of the issues and law at stake.66  
However, “cultural exception” sounds today like a failing concept and the 
support towards its formal recognition is declining. It evokes a negative idea of 
hidden protectionism that goes against the principle of enhancing cultural exchange as 
a means to foster development. Both within and outside the WTO, the idea that 
cultural exchanges should be fostered rather than limited in order to promote 
development opens the door to seeing culture and trade as mutually supportive. The 
focus has shifted from cultural exception – which seems to be promoting a policy of 
“cultural exclusion” rather than inclusion, integration and mutual understanding – 
towards the more appealing concept of “cultural plurality (or diversity).67 Some 
cultural operators argue that “defending cultural diversity means allowing everyone to 
                                                
64 Canada – Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R (30 June 1997), para. 29. 
65 See C Carmody, above (n 60), at 240 and 302.  
66 C Carmody, 309. 
67 H Dauncey, “L’exception Culturelle”, in T Chafer and E Godin (eds), The End of the French 
Exception? Decline and Revival of the ‘French Model’, (2010), 77-78; C B Graber, “The New 
UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: a Counterbalance to the WTO?”, (2006), 9(3) Journal of 
International Economic Law, 555. Also: F S Galt, “The Life, Death, and Rebirth of the Cultural 
Exception in the Multilateral Trading System: An Evolutionary Analysis of Cultural Protection and 
Intervention in the Face of American Pop Culture's Hegemony”, (2004) 3 Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review, 909-935. 
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enjoy their own culture and to access the culture of others”68, while cultural exception 
excludes – and exclusion is not compatible with the idea of culture as a positive 
vehicle for social and economic development. Finally, the notion of cultural diversity 
sounds more neutral,69 and less binding in terms of political and legal measures. In 
effect, cultural exception shows a clear political will often associated with 
protectionist goals or some form of cultural ideology.70 Instead, cultural diversity 
sounds like a more appealing concept: as Graber points out,  “after the demise of the 
cultural exception doctrine, advocates of culture recognized that a new concept was 
required to defend legitimate cultural values in the realm of international economic 
law.”71 It is interesting to note that the concept of cultural diversity first entered the 
scene of international economic law towards the end of the 1990s. Again, the 
European Union played a relevant role: in the autumn of 1999, during the run-up to 
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, the EU Member States chose the 
safeguard of cultural diversity to be the new official guiding policy goal in 
negotiations regarding trade in audiovisual media.72 
 
2.2) The 2005 UNESCO Convention for the Protection and Promotion of 
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions: a new international answer  
 
Since the evidence of the failure of the cultural exception, the international 
debate on the need to combine protectionism and liberalisation in order to ensure a 
balance between culture and trade moved under UNESCO’s aegis. In 2001, the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity signalled a step forward 
for the recognition of the protection of cultural diversity.73 The Declaration had an 
important political echo, but in terms of legal strength it was an inadequate response 
                                                
68 Hugh Dauncey, above f. 203, at 77. The author quotes a speech by Jean-Marie Messier (2001), Head 
Director of the media-music-film conglomerate Vivendi-Universal. 
69 M Hahn: “A Clash of Cultures? The Unesco Diversity Convention and International Trade Law”,  
(2006), 9:3 Journal of International Economic Law, 528. 
70 C B Graber, “The New UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: a Counterbalance to the 
WTO?”, (2006), 9(3) Journal of International Economic Law, 555. 
71 C B Graber, ibidem. 
72 European Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, The EU 
Approach to the WTO Millennium Round, COM(1999) 331 final, 8 July 1999. 
73 The 2001 UNESCO Declaration is the first international instrument recognising cultural diversity as 
affecting human dignity and a right in need of protection. However, the debate on the necessity to 
affirm cultural diversity as a per se value and a human right had already led to the adoption of a 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity by the Council of Europe in 2000 (adopted by the 733rd Meeting of 
the Ministers’ Deputies of the Council of Europe on 7 December 2000).    
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for the complex issues related to culture and trade.74 Therefore, in 2003, ministers of 
culture together with the International Network on Cultural Policy (INCP)75 submitted 
to UNESCO a formal request to negotiate a truly binding standard-setting instrument 
on cultural diversity. The General Assembly of UNESCO accepted the task to 
negotiate a convention dealing with “the diversity of cultural contents and artistic 
expressions”.76 On 20th October 2005, UNESCO’s General Assembly adopted the 
Convention on the Promotion and Protection of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions.77 At the global level, the Convention was greatly welcomed by States, 
NGOs, and other stakeholders;78 the EU strongly supported the adoption of this 
instrument and participated in the negotiations together with its Member States. This 
support was reflected in the following ratification process and in March 2007 the 
Convention entered into force.  
2.2.1) The UNESCO Convention for the protection and promotion of the 
diversity of cultural expressions: content and main features 
 
The 2005 UNESCO Convention’s major aim is to fill a legal lacuna in the 
field of trade and culture regulations, as well as to establish the integration of cultural 
concerns in development cooperation policy, in order to erase disparities in 
development and global trade. It came to give a juridical status to cultural diversity as 
a human right and a per se value. Yet, the Convention does not establish new cultural 
rights. Although during the negotiations many Members preferred a human rights 
                                                
74 The 2001 UNESCO Declaration does not award a juridical status to cultural diversity. See the 
Preliminary Study on the Technical and Legal Aspects Relating to the Desirability of a Standard-
Setting Instrument on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO doc. 166EX/28, Paris, 12 March 2003 available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001297/129718e.pdf .  
75 The International Network on Cultural Policy was created at the end of the Decade on Culture and 
Development in Canada and was composed of more than 40 Ministers of Culture. INCP’s official 
website:  http://incp-ripc.org/. 
76 See Preliminary Study on the Technical and Legal Aspects, above (n 74). 
77 The Convention (references in chapter 1) was adopted on 20th October 2005, 148 States voted in 
favour, only four States abstained (Australia, Honduras, Liberia and Nicaragua) and two voted against 
(the USA and Israel). For a detailed history of the negotiations of the Convention, see: Y Donders, 
“The History of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions”, in H Schneider and P Van Den Bossche (eds.), Protection of Cultural Diversity from an 
International and European Perspective, (Intersentia, 2008), 15; see also, H Ruiz Fabri “Jeux dans la 
fragmentation: la Convention sur la promotion et la protection de la diversité des expressions 
culturelles”, 43 Revue générale de droit international 2007, 43-87. 
78 Many NGOs, independent and institutional networks dealing with cultural issues, such as the 
International Network for Cultural Diversity (INCD), the Campaign for Communication Rights in the 
Information Society (CRIS) and the Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group (SAGIT), were 
involved and played an important role in the drafting process of the Convention. 
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approach to cultural diversity and proposed the adoption of a specific and 
comprehensive instrument on cultural rights,79 priority was given to an instrument 
that could regulate problems between culture and trade. Herein, the majority of the 
States on UNESCO’s Executive Board opted to focus on a specific aspect of cultural 
diversity: the diversity of cultural contents and artistic expressions. The choice to 
narrow the scope of the Convention to the forms of cultural expressions was 
considered more appropriate to face the negative impacts of a wild economic 
globalisation and to counterbalance the WTO.80 Nonetheless, the Convention recalls 
the respect for cultural rights as a fundamental guarantee for the full protection and 
promotion of cultural diversity.81 
The important novelty of the Convention is the formal recognition of the 
double nature of cultural activities, goods and services as vehicles of identity, values 
and meaning (Art. 1.g) and as embedding cultural expressions, irrespective of the 
commercial value they may have (Article 4.4).82 In this sense, the Convention fills a 
vacuum under international law. However, only a few provisions turn this concept 
into binding obligations. The language of the Convention is, in effect, often vague and 
imprecise. States are usually “invited” or “exhorted” or “may” take measures in order 
to support artistic and creative production, as well as the free circulation of ideas and 
cultural products on the national territory. What first strikes the attention of the reader 
is the emphasis on the word rights rather than obligations in the set of articles dealing 
with the rights and obligations of parties at the national level (articles 6-11). Indeed, 
the Convention strongly reaffirms the sovereign right of States to adopt, maintain and 
                                                
79 The other options proposed were: 1) a new comprehensive instrument on cultural rights; 2) an 
instrument on the status of artists; 3) a new Protocol to the Florence Agreement on Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Materials.  
80 Canada and France played a leading role in the negotiations: their primary intention was to create an 
instrument shaped on the idea of an improved cultural exception to use it as a counterbalance for the 
WTO rules. The two countries exercised their influence on the entire block of French speaking 
countries and created the so-called “group de la Francophonie”. For a history on the evolution of the 
subject matter of the Convention during the travaux préparatoires, see: I Bernier, “A UNESCO 
International Convention on Cultural Diversity”, available at http://www.diversite-
culturelle.qc.ca/fileadmin/documents/pdf/update0303.pdf. 
81 Article 2(1) of the Convention. See also the Preamble of the 2005 UNESCO Convention. 
82 This definition was one of the main causes of conflict among the States delegations during the 
negotiation. Major oppositions came from the US: they saw in this definition a clear attempt to create 
an international instrument aimed at ensuring a special treatment to cultural goods and services in trade 
negotiations. The US abandoned the negotiations of the Convention at their final stage, arguing that the 
subject matter of the UNESCO Convention was not cultural, but rather trade and economics and that 
UNESCO’s mandate did not include the competence to negotiate such an instrument among its 
functions. They stressed that the participation of the European Union, which joined the negotiations in 
2004, demonstrated the commercial nature of the Convention. On this issue: Y Donders, supra (n 77), 
15-21. 
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implement cultural policies and measures, as if to clarify that culture is a matter of 
States’ sovereign power and no supranational powers should interfere with this 
principle.83 A symbolic example of this “affirmation of sovereignty” is Article 6, 
establishing that each Party may adopt measures aimed at protecting and promoting 
the diversity of cultural expressions within its territory. Article 6 expressly refers to 
regulatory, institutional, and financial measures that can provide assistance both to 
private and public sectors, such as public broadcasting measures. Clearly, this set of 
provisions focusing on national powers in the cultural sphere aims at offering an 
offset against the WTO impingements. According to some commentators, the 
Convention is inclined towards a return to some forms of protectionism and public 
intervention in the field of culture: in particular, they argue that because no mention 
of principles of proportionality or effectiveness is present in the text, distorting effects 
on competition are more likely to take place.84  
From Articles 7 to 11, the Convention switches the focus towards the 
protection of cultural identities of groups and individuals. The Parties are “invited” to 
encourage the dissemination and the access to cultural expressions of individuals and 
groups, with special attention to women, minorities and indigenous peoples (Article 
7); to preserve cultural expressions at risk of extinction (Article 8); to promote public 
awareness of cultural diversity through education (Article 10); to encourage the active 
participation of civil society in the efforts to pursue the objectives of the Convention 
(Article 11). Such provisions recall the human rights language, and advance the 
protection of a broader concept of cultural diversity, which is not all about cultural 
goods and services (namely, audiovisual services). Yet, their weak formulation does 
not empower individuals or groups to sue a State in case of non-action or non-
compliance.  
The most relevant articles for the purpose of this thesis are Articles 13-18, 
which rely on the principle of solidarity and expressly make the link between culture 
and development. These articles aim at strengthening international cooperation 
between developing and developed countries in the field of cultural exchange, trade 
                                                
83 During the negotiations, the importance given to the issue of sovereignty even resulted in the 
introduction of the “principle of sovereignty” among the guiding principles underpinning the 
Convention. 
84 M Burri-Nevona “Reconciling Trade and Culture: A Global Law Perspective”, (2010), 40 Journal of 
Arts Management, Law and Society, 4-3; R Craufurd Smith, “The UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions: Building a New World Information 
and Communication order?” (2007) 1 International Journal of Communication, at 40. 
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and development, in order to promote mutual understanding and sustainable 
development. Adopted under the strong pressure of the developing countries group, 
this part of the Convention becomes much more specific and surprisingly sets out 
more detailed arrangements. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Article 13 establishes a duty 
on Parties to integrate cultural considerations in all their development policies and at 
all levels. This provision should lead to a careful assessment of the cultural impact of 
all actions undertaken in the framework of development policies at local, national and 
international level. Similar to what happens for an environmental impacts assessment, 
this “cultural impact evaluation” should be based on principles such as: 
intergenerational and intragenerational equity, precautionary principle, 
interconnectedness of economic, social, cultural and environmental issues, and the 
importance to protect diversity as a benefit for the humankind. 85 Hence, the 
Convention suggests various tools of cooperation, such as: technical and professional 
cooperation through the mobility of professionals and the exchange of best practices 
and knowledge in strategic fields, the reinforcement of partnership based on the 
interplay of all the stakeholders (civil society, local communities, governmental 
institutions, etc.). Particular emphasis is given to co-production and co-distribution 
agreements, facilitating the access to viable local and regional markets and the 
international distribution of cultural goods and services so as to foster the cultural 
industry of developing countries.  
 As the free flow of ideas is a central element of the Convention86 and has a 
pivotal role for cultural cooperation, Article 16 of the Convention creates an 
obligation on Parties to ensure a preferential treatment to artists, cultural 
professionals and practitioners, as well as cultural goods and services from 
developing countries (emphasis added).87 It is quite striking that the language of 
Article 16 differs from the rest of other obligations under the Convention: indeed, 
Article 16 is formulated as a clear-cut obligation; the non-fulfilment of a State could, 
thus, be challenged by a Party to the Convention. The implementation of Article 16 
raises several interesting issues. It is clear that this provision is likely to affect delicate 
                                                
85 D Throsby,“Culture in sustainable development: insights for the implementation of art. 13”, (2008), 
3 Economia della Cultura, Anno XVIII, 389-395. 
86  Recital 11, Preamble of the Convention.  
87  Article 16 of the 2005 UNESCO Convention: “Developed countries shall facilitate cultural 
exchanges with developing countries by granting, through the appropriate institutional and legal 
frameworks, preferential treatment to artists and other cultural professionals and practitioners, as well 
as cultural goods and services from developing countries”. 
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areas of national policies, such as migration and visa. It can also impact the internal 
labour and trade markets of States. It is natural to think, then, that States will be very 
cautious in implementing this provision. Indeed, at the time of negotiations, most of 
them insisted on introducing a safeguard clause of their internal national regulations: 
the preferential treatment has to be granted conformably to the appropriate 
institutional and legal framework of the States.88  
 
2.2.2) Strengths and weaknesses of the 2005 UNESCO Convention  
 
The 2005 UNESCO Convention introduces two important novelties: first, it 
formally recognises the double nature of cultural activities, goods and services as 
vehicles of identity, values and cultural expressions and as having commercial value; 
second, it recognises culture as a strategic component of national and international 
development policies and creates a favourable framework for the integration of 
cultural elements in development policies at all levels. Building on the principle of 
complementarity between culture and economics,89 the 2005 UNESCO Convention 
adopts a broader notion of sustainable development in which both cultural and 
economic aspects have been granted an important role to play.90 The 2005 UNESCO 
Convention encompasses the principle of sustainable development, equitable access 
and openness and balance as guiding principles for the Parties’ action, so as to reach 
both goals of enhancing cultural exchanges and protecting cultural identities.91 The 
principles of “equitable access” and “openness and balance” should mitigate 
distortive effects that may be embedded in some provisions (like the above-mentioned 
Article 6). They should help Parties to single out what measures are licit or illicit and 
contribute to override the uncertainties of the text and the risk of becoming an 
instrument of disguised protectionism.92 Further, the exercise of the sovereign rights 
                                                
88 Some authors have argued that this clause limits the effects of Article 16, reducing it to a bona fide 
obligation, or simply to an obligation of results: M C Ciciriello and F Mucci,“La cooperazione 
internazionale per lo sviluppo in materia di diversità delle espressioni culturali: un tratto saliente della 
Convenzione UNESCO del 2005”, (2008) 1 Studi in Onore di Vincenzo Starace,130-132. 
89 Article 2(5) of the Convention. 
90  An interesting critical comparison between the different notions of sustainable development 
endorsed respectively by the WTO and the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity is proposed by 
F Macmillan in “Development, cultural self-determination and the World Trade Organization”, above 
(n 5). 
91 Article 2(6)(7)(8) of the Convention. 
92 I Bernier, “The relationship between the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and other International Instruments: the emergence of a new 
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of States should also be limited by the obligation to respect fundamental and human 
rights. In fact, although the Convention is not a human rights instrument, it is clear 
that the success of its full implementation is tightly connected to the respect of 
(cultural) human rights as promoted by other international and regional treaties.93  
Looking at the overall Convention, despite its good intentions, it is a rather 
weak-binding instrument, which mostly sets out a series of incentives, good faith, and 
best-effort obligations. In particular, there is serious doubt as to whether it can 
counteract the WTO. In terms of interaction with other treaties, indeed, Article 20 
limits the strength of the Convention. The first part of the article affirms that the 
Convention’s implementation should not be subordinated and should be accomplished 
in mutual supportiveness with other treaties. It adds that the Parties should take into 
account the provisions of the Convention when interpreting and applying other 
treaties. In the second part, Article 20 takes a step back and clearly states that the 
Convention does not modify rights and obligations of the Parties under other treaties. 
So, the power of the Convention is conditioned by several elements. First of all, its 
application must be done in mutual support with other treaties: this means that the 
implementation of the Convention should be complementary or, at least, not 
contradictory with the provisions of other relevant treaties for the parties. Then, the 
second paragraph of Article 20 establishes a “non-prejudice” clause that prevents the 
Convention from having effects on other treaties. Hence, in case of conflicts between 
the Convention and the WTO law, it is very unlikely that the Convention could be the 
winner. This doubt has been resolved by the 2009 WTO Panel decision China – 
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications 
and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, where the Panel referred to the wording of 
Article 20 of the Convention to diminish its legal strength in the context.94 In the end, 
                                                                                                                                      
balance in the interface between commerce and culture”, August 2009, available at 
http://www.diversiteculturelle.qc.ca/fileadmin/documents/pdf/ANG_Relations_entre_Convention_Une
sco_instruments_internationaux.pdf., at 60 and ff. 
93 According to the US position during the negotiations, the Convention may, instead, threaten the 
respect of freedom of expression as shaped under Article 19 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. For a comment on this: Graber, above (n 70). 
94 Briefly, the case involves a dispute about Chinese restrictions on import and distribution of foreign 
films for theatrical release, audiovisual home entertainment products, sound recordings, and 
publications. The US challenged seventeen legal measures for inconsistency with various provisions of 
the WTO, including the WTO Accession Protocol, Article III94) of the GATT, Articles VVI and WVII 
of the GATTS. China justified its measures on the basis of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural 
Diversity and the 2001 Declaration on Cultural Diversity. The WTO dismissed the recourse to the 2005 
UNESCO Convention referring to Article 20.2. For a commentary on the decision see: R J Neuwirth, 
The “ ‘Culture and Trade Debate’ Continues: The UNESCO Convention in Light of the WTO Reports 
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it seems that the Convention should rather have an impact on the interpretation of the 
application of the WTO rules, as well as of any other treaty (Article 20.1). In this 
sense, the 2005 Convention can contribute to reach a balance between cultural and 
economic interests in trade negotiations. It is quite striking, indeed, that such a 
possibility is explicitly mentioned in the Convention: it is the first case in 
international law that Parties agreed to use one instrument as an interpretative tool 
when negotiating and applying others.95 However, even if the merit of the political 
will of such a clause can be acknowledged, the doubts about its effective 
implementation remain legitimate.  
To conclude, the major merit of the Convention seems to be the inclusion of 
culture as a component of development, which underpins the idea of a sustainable 
development embedding a cultural dimension. In this sense, the Convention can act as 
an innovative tool for an evolutionary interpretation of sustainable development, 
perhaps also within the WTO.96 Yet, the consideration made for interpreting article 
XX(f) of the GATT also applies in this case: evolutionary interpretation depends a lot 
upon the will of judges. More relevant in terms of practical implications seems to be 
the fact that the relationship between “culture and trade” is inscribed within a frame 
guided by sustainable development principles, which should drive the action of States 
and Organisations in terms of including culture in trade and development’s 
agreements.  
2.3) Interim considerations: towards more exchange or a return to 
protectionism? 
 
2.3.1) The current situation: the Doha Round stalemate and the growth of 
bilateral negotiations 
 
In 2001, the WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha adopted a Declaration 
                                                                                                                                      
in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products: Between Amnesia or De ́ja` Vu?”, (2010), 44 (6) 
Journal of World Trade, 1333–1356. See also: WTO Panel Report, 3, WT/DS 363/R (12 Aug. 2009), 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 363r_e.pdf. 
95 H Ruiz Fabri, supra (n 77), at 83-86: Craufurd Smith, supra (n 84), at 46-52. For an overall comment 
on Article 20: I Bernier, “The relationship between the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and other International Instruments”, above at (n 
92). 
96 To support this vision, see: S V Uytsel, “The CDCE and the WTO – in search for a meaningful role 
after China-Audiovisuals”, in L Richieri Hanania (ed), Cultural Diversity in International Law The 
effectiveness of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, (Routledge, 2014), 40-53. 
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including a priori all kinds of services to reach further progressive liberalisation, and 
therefore the audiovisual sector as well.97 The Doha Round is the latest round of trade 
negotiations among the WTO membership: its aim is to achieve major reform of the 
international trading system through the introduction of lower trade barriers and 
revised trade rules. The work programme covers about twenty areas of trade.98 This 
round of negotiations was expected to have been concluded in 2005, yet it is still 
ongoing. Several issues were debated and did not meet the agreements of the 
contracting parties; in particular key topics concerning trade in services and IPR 
enforcement were strongly debated. In December 2013, the Ministerial Conference 
held in Bali re-launched the negotiations and adopted a work programme to conclude 
the Doha Round by the end of 2014.99 The post-Bali action plan puts new emphasis 
on the need to achieve further liberalisation to broaden market access areas for trade 
in services, in parallel with other trade sectors such as agricultural products. Further, 
the promise to keep making progress in implementing the electronic commerce 
agenda may have relevant repercussions for the audiovisual services, which are today 
increasingly available and broadcast over the Internet. 100  Yet, as far as the 
negotiations of commitments to liberalise the audiovisual market are concerned, since 
2001 these have reached a stalemate because of the opposing views and claims raised 
by Members. Currently, the audiovisual sector is still the one with the lowest 
commitments undertaken.101 To overcome this deadlock, States have turned from 
multilateralism toward bilateralism. Indeed, since the 2000s, several Members have 
increasingly engaged in bilateral negotiations. The US, for instance, in the last ten 
years concluded Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with a considerable number of 
countries in different regions of the world (such as Singapore, South-Korea, Australia, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Morocco, Oman, and 
                                                
97 Ministerial Conference, WTO, Ministerial Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (20 November 2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf. (Also known as the Doha 
Declaration or the Doha Development Agenda, given that ministers placed development and 
developing countries at the centre of the Doha Round). 
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99 Ministerial Conference Ninth Session Bali, 3-6 December 2013, WTO, Ministerial Declaration 
adopted on 7 December 2014, WT/MIN(13)/DEC (11 December 2013), para 1.11,  Available at 
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100 The "Work Programme on Electronic Commerce" was adopted on 25 September 1998 (WT/L/274). 
The Bali declaration reinvigorated the Work Programme on E-commerce, see Ministerial Conference, 
Work Programme On Electronic Commerce Ministerial Decision Of 7 December 2013, 
(WT/MIN(13)/32 WT/L/907), 11 December 2013. 
101 Above (n 54). 
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others).102 Canada also engaged in bilateral negotiations, and the European Union 
concluded new bilateral agreements in the last decade. Each Country is adopting a 
different approach to the treatment of audiovisual services within the bilateral context. 
The US strategy aims at restricting the regulatory capacity of governments in the 
cultural sectors, like the adoption of broadcasting quotas, so as to obtain more space 
in the foreign markets for their investors and cultural enterprises. Considering that in 
bilateral negotiations, the asymmetric power of the parties engaged has a relevant 
weight in favour of one or another country, the US has managed to limit (when not 
entirely refuse) specific reservations for the audiovisual sector advanced by its 
partners.103 Canada, instead, pursues a strategy aiming at the full exclusion of 
audiovisual services from agreements – a position that is very much in line with the 
original Canadian claim for a general “cultural exception” within the WTO 
negotiations. This strong protectionist approach fully emerged during the negotiations 
of the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) with the EU, launched in 
2009 and concluded on the 18th October 2013. Although the EU and Canada have 
been allies in the battle towards the recognition of a cultural exception in the WTO 
system and pushed for the adoption of the Cultural Diversity Convention, during their 
bilateral negotiation they revealed they had different understandings of what should 
be covered by a cultural exception. Canada uses a broad definition of cultural 
industries, including many services (such as telecom services) that the European 
Commission would not normally consider as falling under cultural sectors, and that 
the Members of the EU do not usually exclude from trade negotiations.104 The 
sticking point concerning the treatment of cultural industries under the EU-Canada 
agreement was overcome through “chapter by chapter” negotiations including cultural 
exemptions. Canada’s aim was to exempt certain sectors from the risk of judicial 
                                                
102 A Vlassis and L Richieri Hanania, “Effects of the CDCE on trade negotiations”, in in L R Hanania 
(ed), op. cit. (n 96), at 27; other source: http://www.ustr.gov/tpp. 
103 It is interesting to note that Chile succeeded in protecting its 40% quota for public tradition 
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104 A Vlassis “Accords commerciaux et diversité culturelle”, (Janvier 2013), Chronique des industries 
culturelles, vol. 8, Édition spéciale, at 3. It is worth remarking that the CETA’s negotiations highlights 
that Canada has not developed a coherent approach towards the protection of cultural diversity: while 
the Canadian government directs great efforts toward the protection of the French identity through 
linguistic policy and the strong defense of the Canadian audiovisual sector, the protection of intangible 
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interpretation that would not include them in cultural exemptions.105 Further, Canada 
insisted on including a reference to the Convention on Cultural Diversity in the 
Preamble of the Agreement, thus demonstrating that it interprets the Convention 
mainly as an instrument to justify protectionist measures in the field of culture and 
trade. 
As for the European Union, in the last years several bilateral and regional 
agreements concluded have been given a new “cultural component”. Regarding the 
treatment of cultural industries, although the EU seems to be adopting a more limited 
notion of cultural exception compared to the Canadian one, it has traditionally 
excluded the sector of audiovisual services from the non-discrimination rules of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements (usually through a horizontal exclusion of that 
sector under the services chapter). But what is more interesting is that since the entry 
into force of the Convention on Cultural Diversity, the EU has attempted to overcome 
the historical opposition between culture and trade by proposing the integration of 
cultural cooperation provisions expressly based on the Convention into trade 
agreements. As we will see later in this chapter, this has taken place in the form of a 
“protocol” or an autonomous “agreement” on cultural cooperation attached to the 
main trade agreement.  
2.3.2) From cultural exception to cultural diversity via development: emphasis 
on co-productions and co-distributions 
 
By looking at the debate on cultural exception through the development prism, 
some considerations will be made. First of all, it is interesting to notice that the battle 
for cultural exception within the WTO engaged both Southern and Western Countries 
against the hegemonic power of the US cultural industries.106 Indeed, the battle for the 
preservation of cultural identities seems to be a common priority. In this regard, it is 
important to remember that the EU played a central role in this battle. Although the 
conflict between the EU and the US concerning the cultural exception may firstly 
appear as another face of the typical opposition of the two actors on economic 
                                                
105 A Vlassis, “Accord Canada-UE: l’exemption culturelle spécifique et ses implications”, (Novembre 
2013), Volume 8, numéro 9, Culture, commerce et numérique, at 2. 
106 For a broader view comparing the position of developed countries and developing countries within 
GATS’ negotiations, see: M Footer, “The International Regulation of Trade in Services Following 
Completion of the Uruguay Round”, (1995) 29 International Lawyer, 453.  
  158 
aspects, it is the first time that the EU had Canada and Japan on its side, as well as the 
Group of 77 (guided by Brazil, China, India and South-Africa).107 The effects of a 
mainly US-driven globalisation for culture have been a common concern in the last 
thirty years and in particular since the fall of the Berlin wall, which signalled the 
victory of a certain cultural and economic model, namely the North American one.108 
Some governments have understood that international trade law is exercising growing 
pressure on their ability to influence the production and distribution of cultural goods 
and services within their borders. This has increasingly polarised positions in trade 
negotiations whenever they deal directly or indirectly with cultural issues, as has been 
evident for the Uruguay and Doha Rounds. The EU, through its motto “United in 
Diversity”, has been able to champion the battle for cultural identity and converge the 
interests of most of the developed and developing countries sharing the same 
preoccupation. At the same time, the strong political connections with its neighbours 
(and in particular the Mediterranean ones) highly contributed to create a homogenous 
Euromediterranean block that, together with Canada, Japan, and the Latin American 
countries, could counteract the US position.109 
One front that has seen the joint efforts of this group has been that concerning 
the inclusion of co-production and co-distribution arrangements for film and 
television within the Annex on Article II Exemptions of the GATS. Indeed, a decent 
number of WTO Members – including the Latin American, Nordic, European and 
Arab Countries, as well as Canada – inscribed such exemptions on the list. As 
observed by some commentators, regional and bilateral co-production and co-
distribution agreements are quite numerous and involve countries from almost all 
regions of the world (Asia, Middle-East, Africa, Europe, North and South America). 
Such agreements are by their nature incompatible with the MFN treatment, therefore 
it is only by including them in the Annex on Article II Exemptions that they could be 
preserved.110 What is interesting, it is that – in almost all cases – States justify these 
exemptions with the need to preserve and promote national or regional identities. For 
                                                
107 G Mazzone, “Dall’eccezione alla diversità culturale: ministoria di una sfida per l’Europa”, (2008), 3 
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108 Ibidem, 329-330. 
109 Further on the Euromediterranean alliance within the GATS negotiation of the Uruguay Round: V 
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110 I Bernier and H Ruiz-Fabri Evaluation de la faisabilité juridique d’un instrument international sur 
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instance, the EU and its Member States have expressed their wish to include co-
productions in the list of exemptions in order to keep promoting “cultural links”, 
others, like India and Brazil, to promote “cultural exchange”, or some, like the Arab 
and Nordic Countries, to preserve and promote the cultural identity of the region.111 
The EU also brought to the fore the importance of co-production for preserving and 
promoting cultural values and linguistic diversity within its internal borders.112 
The 2005 UNESCO Convention emphasises the role of co-productions and 
co-distributions. Both developing and developed countries positively perceive co-
productions and co-distribution arrangements. Through these forms of collaboration, 
developing countries are offered the possibility to boost and strengthen their 
capacities in the sector of creative industries and to gain access to foreign markets. In 
fact, their major problem derives from the lack of economic means and capacity-
building to make their national cultural industries truly competitive on the 
international market, as well as to avoid their domestic market being dominated by 
foreign (Western) products. As the UNCTAD Secretariat pointed out in a note 
concerning the audiovisual sector and developing countries, these last ones are 
“newcomers to global trade in this sector and their potential benefits are often 
limited, since they face the established global market structure and regulatory 
provisions at national levels”.113 Co-production agreements can help developing 
countries to find financial support and access to distributions channels, as well as give 
international visibility to their products. On the other hand, co-productions constitute 
a possibility for developed countries to enhance cultural exchanges, having both 
economic and cultural returns. Further, co-production and co-distribution agreements 
fit well within the new approach towards culture and trade, which was taking place in 
the ongoing debate outside the WTO and stressed the beneficial effects of cultural 
exchanges on culture and economics. Such an approach still acknowledges the threats 
to the survival of cultural identities that are posed by increased globalisation, but also 
recognises that culture is per se a dynamic process that necessitates the flow of ideas 
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113 UNCTAD, Audiovisual Services: Improving Participation of Developing Countries – Note by the 
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to maintain its richness and diversity. The focus slowly switched from a strategy 
mainly based on the protection and conservation of culture as a static element of 
societies towards the preservation of the conditions creating the diversity of cultural 
manifestations. The exchange of cultural goods and services, as well as the circulation 
of cultural operators become, then, essential instruments for ensuring such conditions. 
As already observed, the notion of cultural exception became rather less fashionable 
and has been replaced by that of cultural diversity. However, if globalisation cannot 
be stopped and can even be beneficial to boost cultural exchanges, it is recognised 
that the huge economic and technological gaps between developed and developing 
Countries do not allow the latter to take advantage of it and to limit the risk of cultural 
homogenisation. The great challenge is then to redress this situation and reach 
equilibrium in international trade exchanges. Co-production agreements seem to be a 
valid tool to contribute to filling this gap, as well as regional cooperation,114 although 
they cannot be fully sufficient to counterbalance the negative effect of unbalanced 
international trade rules on non-trade values.  
3) The EU and “trade in culture”: institutional and constitutional 
considerations 
 
At this point, it is interesting to look more in depth at the EU attitude when 
culture interacts with trade, and in particular with international trade. As it emerged in 
the previous section, the EU played both a leading role in the attempt to establish a 
cultural exception for cultural goods and services under the WTO and for the adoption 
of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity. On several occasions, during 
the GATS negotiations, the EU recalled the need for the recognition of the specific 
features of the cultural industries, focusing on the audiovisual services. Relying on 
this argument, the EU was able to exclude the audiovisual service from the 
application of the MFN rule due to the “special nature” and the “cultural content and 
objectives” of this sector.115 Until today, the Union and its Member States benefit 
from a room for manoeuvre in the audio-visual sector, which relates both to policies 
and measures at national and Union level. Nonetheless, the fact that the European 
Union, and in particular the Commission, took up the battle for cultural exception and 
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the leadership for the adoption of the 2005 UNESCO Convention has been a matter of 
concern for Member States, which always fear the extension of the Union’s powers 
and the erosion of their competences. Certainly, although trade and culture belong to 
two different kinds of competences, it is difficult to define a clear-cut line between the 
Union and the Member States’ competences. In the case of “trade in culture”, trade 
competence may overlap, or impinge on the national sphere of action in the cultural 
sector. Member States, therefore, have always tried to secure this “sensitive sector” 
(namely trade in cultural services) through safeguarding mechanisms, which can limit 
the exercise of power of the EU on the external level. 
In this section I will try to clarify what legal constraints limit the action of the 
Union in the “trade in culture” sector. This clarification on the linkages between the 
internal and the external dimension of the Union is instrumental here for 
understanding better the European position within the WTO and UNESCO.  
 
3.1) Institutional issues deriving from the overlapping of the EU 
competence in trade and culture: internal and external parallels 
 
The interest behind the EU struggle to obtain the exemption of the audiovisual 
services from international trade rules is determined by two main aspects: first, the 
protection of the internal acquis commuautaire – namely to secure an adequate 
protection of existing national and EU measures in the audio-visual sector – and 
second, the political influence played by some Member States in the decision-making 
process referring to trade in cultural services. As for the first aspect, the existing EU 
measures in the area of audiovisual services refer to the EU framework for the 
subsidisation and distribution of the audiovisual goods and services established 
through the 1989 Directive on Television without Frontiers 116  and the 2007 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD).117 As we saw in the Chapter 2, 
preserving the unity and integrity of the internal acquis is a priority for the European 
Union when undertaking initiatives on the external level. This is also a fundamental 
pre-requisite to ensure consistency and coherence of the Union legal system as a 
whole. Therefore, the necessity to preserve the internal system of subsidies and quotas 
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set up by the Audiovisual Directives highly influenced the choices of the EU within 
the GATS negotiations. The protection of the integrity of the acquis communautaire 
is, then, among the objectives behind the quest for a cultural exception. Although, the 
European Commission initially considered that a “cultural specificity” approach 
including minimal liberalisation commitments for audiovisual services could be 
sufficient enough for the purpose. Yet, States like France, Spain, Belgium and Ireland 
pressed for a full cultural exemption. 118  This leads us to the second element 
determining the EU choice in the field of audiovisual services: the political weight 
exercised by Member States on issues referring to trade in “sensitive sectors”. Indeed, 
before the Lisbon reform, trade in services was not a field falling under the exclusive 
external trade competence of the Union. Overall, the competence of the EU in trade in 
services has always been a contentious issue. In Opinion 1/94, the Court of Justice did 
not recognise an exclusive EU competence to sign the WTO agreements, and engaged 
in a highly fragmentary repartition of competences between Member States and the 
EU which attributed only certain aspects of trade in services to the exclusive 
competence of the Union, while others remained in the sphere of competence of the 
Member States (this explains the fact that the GATS Agreement was concluded as a 
mixed agreement). In brief, the Court upheld that only the cross-border supply of 
services falls under the exclusive trade competence of the EU, because it is a situation 
similar to trade in goods, which is by no doubt covered by the common commercial 
policy.119As a consequence of this division, if we consider audiovisual products as a 
form of “cross-border supply of services” rather than goods, they could fall under the 
common commercial policy, and this entails the exercise of the exclusive competence 
of the EU. Nonetheless, under the former version of Article 133 ECT, paragraph 6 
explicitly reminded that “agreements relating to trade in cultural and audiovisual 
services, educational services, and social and human health services, shall fall within 
the shared competence of the [Union] and its Member States. Consequently, in 
addition to a [Union] decision taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
Article 300, the negotiation of such agreements shall require the common accord of 
the Member States. Agreements thus negotiated shall be concluded jointly by the 
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Community and the Member States” (emphasis added). So, if on the one hand the 
recognition of the commercial dimension of cultural services could not but involve 
the Union’s intervention in the framework of multilateral trade negotiations, on the 
other hand such intervention had to take place through means of a mixed agreement 
and respect the limits fixed by the internal allocation of competences.  
The specific formulation of Article 133(6) ECT reflected Member States’ 
fears concerning the EU intervention in the field of trade in culture, and in particular 
trade in cultural services. 120  The power of the Union to engage in legislative 
initiatives in this “sensitive sector” has often been contested by the Member States 
both on the internal and external level. On the internal level, the first tensions 
emerged with the introduction of the Television Without Frontiers Directive, which 
established a system of content requirements (commonly identified as the television 
broadcasting quotas) in order to open national markets to European broadcasting 
services and create a common production and distribution market in this sector.121 
Member States with a limited linguistic audience or weak media industries feared the 
invasion of audiovisual products originating from other Member States with 
widespread languages and well-established cultural industries.122 States were afraid 
that such liberalisation in the audiovisual market would lead to a cultural 
homogenisation within the EU borders. In addition, Member States accused the 
establishment of content requirements for European works and independent 
productions123 of overlapping with national cultural policies and eroding their national 
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competence. When the EU brought the defence of the TWF to the external arena124 
additional concerns mounted among the Member States, who worried about a further 
extension of the EU power in the cultural sector. It is, then, understandable that in 
such a fired climate the Commission’s proposal within the GATS negotiations for a 
special treatment of cultural services including minimal liberalisation commitments 
encountered the opposition of the most conservative States. The mixed agreement 
condition, existing at the time of the negotiations, entitled each Member State to a 
veto right. Through this veto, protectionist States like France (and a few others) could 
heavily affect the status of the negotiations and re-direct the EU position towards a 
very conservative approach.  
The reforms brought by the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the Union 
competence on external trade and should overcome the problems deriving from the 
requirement of joint participation in agreements coping with the cultural and 
audiovisual services. Indeed, the new article 207 TFEU on the common commercial 
policy no longer contains references to shared competence and the joint participation 
of Member States and the EU. The whole CCP now falls within the exclusive 
competence of the Union, including cultural and educational services. But are the 
interests of the Member States in trade in “sensitive sectors” preserved (and if so, 
how) under the current Lisbon frame? According to the interpretation of the Court of 
Justice, the underlying purpose of former art. 133(6) ECT was to “allow the interest 
of the [Union] in establishing a comprehensive, coherent and efficient external 
commercial policy to be pursued whilst at the same time allowing the special interests 
which the Member States might wish to defend in the sensitive areas identified by that 
provision to be taken into account”.125 Article 133(6) was, then, a safeguard clause in 
specific cases in which different interests of the EU and of the Member States might 
be involved, like in the case of culture and trade in which the EU pursues the 
objectives of the CCP and the Member States may worry about the appropriate 
protection of cultural diversity. Under current article 207 TFEU, paragraph (4) now 
replaces this safeguard clause by introducing the requirement of the unanimity vote 
for the Council’s decisions concerning cultural and audiovisual services, when the 
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Union’s cultural and linguistic diversity is at risk. Indeed, Article 207(4) TFEU states 
that “the Council shall also act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these 
agreements risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural and linguistic diversity; and in the 
field of trade in social, education and health services, where these agreements risk 
seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the 
responsibility of Member States to deliver them”. Through the unanimity voting in the 
Council, Member States can still play a relevant role in decisions concerning cultural 
matters. Nonetheless, it should be noticed that unanimity is not the rule in all the 
agreements relating to the sensitive service sectors, but is rather the exception to the 
general qualified majority rule. Indeed, unanimity applies only when the agreement 
risks jeopardising the “Union’s cultural and linguistic diversity”. Considering that 
Article 207(4) does not give further indications, new difficulties may then arise to 
identify in which cases, according to whom and which standards, an agreement may 
imply risks for cultural and linguistic diversity. It is plausible that a Member State 
requesting unanimity will have to demonstrate the risks for cultural and linguistic 
diversity. In all cases, if other Members do not find the argument presented persuasive 
enough, they may reject the request and proceed with the qualified majority voting.  
Overall, the possibilities for a veto opposing a decision involving cultural 
issues are reduced in the post-Lisbon framework. Hence, one may question whether 
the protection of Member States’ cultural diversity and cultural-related interests 
involved in trade negotiations is appropriately ensured within this new frame. 
Although at first glance the answer seems to be a negative one, two considerations 
shall be made. The first one takes into account some procedural aspects, in particular 
the fact that the exercise of the new external trade competence may still take place 
through mixed agreements. As Marise Cremona comments, Article 207(4) is a new 
attempt to resolve the balance between the Union interest in a “comprehensive, 
coherent and efficient” external commercial policy and the special interests of 
Member States in the sensitive sectors, but it does not fully solve the problems of 
complexity existing under former Article 133(6) ECT.126 Indeed, a situation involving 
more and different interests at stake, like a trade agreement embedding audiovisual or 
                                                
126 M Cremona, “Balancing Union and Member State interests: Opinion 1/2008, choice of legal base 
and the common commercial policy under the Treaty of Lisbon”, (2010) 35:5 European Law Review, 
at 689. 
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cultural services provisions, may still involve the participation of the Member States 
to the negotiations by requiring the adoption of a double legal basis. In effect, while 
the Court’s approach shows a preference for the choice of one single legal basis, in 
agreements pursuing several objectives that are inseparably linked and where it is not 
possible to assess whether one is secondary or instrumental to another, a dual legal 
basis may exceptionally be admitted. 127  This may be the case of horizontal 
agreements relating to trade in cultural fields, or in other sensitive sectors for which is 
very difficult to apply the gravity test in order to assess what objective and scope of 
the agreement is predominant. For instance, the Free Trade Agreement concluded 
between the EU and South-Korea in 2010, including – among others – provisions 
related to transport, trade in cultural services, intellectual property and a protocol on 
cultural cooperation, has been adopted on multiple legal bases, such as Article 207 
TFEU, Article 167(3) TFEU for culture, and Articles 91 and 100(2) in conjunction 
with Article 218(5) TFEU for transport.128 Therefore, the EU-Korea FTA and the 
Cultural Protocol annexed to it have been jointly negotiated by the EU and its 
Member States. In more general terms, mixity in external commercial agreements can 
still apply for those agreements involving different objects and in which different 
interests of the Member States and the EU may be at stake and when is difficult to 
apply the predominant purpose analysis. So, in these cases unanimous voting does not 
seem to be a possible alternative to joint participation,129 and Member States can still 
try to protect their interests through participating in “trade in culture” negotiations. On 
the other hand, as AG Kokott notices “the more players there are on the European 
side at international level, the more difficult it will be to represent effectively the 
                                                
127 Opinion 1/2008, see para 23 in which the Court states that the choice of a dual (or multiple) legal 
basis is an exception. 
128 Council Decision of 16 September 2010 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and 
provisional application of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, on the other part (2011/265/EU). It is worth to recall 
that “transports” is another trade sector for which special rules apply, as established under Article 
207(5) TFEU. The FTA with Korea and the Cultural Protocol annexed to it will be further explored in 
the following part of this chapter. 
129 In Opinion 1/2008 the Commission argued that unanimous voting in the case of horizontal 
agreements is an alternative to joint participation, but the Court disagreed and specified that a rule 
which prescribes the manner in which competence is to be exercised is to be distinguished from a rule 
specifying the nature of that competence. (Opinion 1/2008, para 141-142). As Marise Cremona points 
out, Article 207 TFEU relies upon a rule which prescribes the manner in which the competence is to be 
exercised to protect the interests of the Member States (rather than the nature of the competence), one 
may argue that a standard centre of gravity test should be used to determine when the special voting 
rules will apply. But this seems to be very unlikely because of the difficulty to apply a case-by-case 
analysis centred on the purposes and objectives of the agreement at stake. See: M Cremona, “Balancing 
Union and Member State interests: Opinion 1/2008”, above (n 126), 688-690. 
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interests of the [Union] and its Member States outwardly, in particular vis-à-vis 
significant trading partners”.130 In mixed-agreement negotiations, the risk is that 
“individual Member States can obstruct or protract negotiations with non-member 
countries in order to secure concessions for themselves. 131  So, in the case of 
negotiations involving trade aspects related to the cultural and audiovisual sectors, 
more protectionist Member States can still advance their specific requests and 
influence the outcomes of the negotiations. Lastly, it should be recalled that if 
Member States fear that the new extended trade competence may erode their national 
competences, Article 207(6) TFEU recalls that the exercise of the competences 
conferred by Article 207 in the field of the common commercial policy “shall not 
affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States, and 
shall not lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member 
States in so far as the Treaties exclude such harmonization”.  This paragraph under 
article 207 may sound quite odd, because we know that the Union shall act in the 
limits of its conferred powers. However, this additional “safeguard alarm bell” may 
be connected to the changes brought by the Lisbon reform to the CCP competence, 
and which may affect the cultural sector (and thus the cultural competence of the 
Member States). The new wording of article 207 extended the scope of the (post-
Lisbon) CCP, as confirmed in the recent decision Conditional Access Services.132 In 
this case the Court annulled the decision to sign the European Convention on the legal 
protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access133 because of an 
incorrect legal basis (namely, the legal basis choose by the Council was article 114 
TFEU).134 Relying on the fact that the European Convention on protection and 
conditional access of services is international agreement dealing also with criminal 
sanctions against unlawful activities, and therefore involving judicial cooperation and 
measures of a criminal law nature, and that the aim of the Convention is linked to the 
internal market policy, the Council - supported by some Member States - argued that 
                                                
130 Opinion of the AG Kokott in Commission v Council (C-13/07), delivered on 26 March 2009, para 
72. 
131 Ibidem, para 73. 
132 Case C-137/12, Commission v. Council, (European Convention on Conditional Access Services) 
[2013].  
133 European Convention on the Legal Protection of Services based on, 
or consisting of, Conditional Access, signed in Strasbourg on 24 January 2001. 
134 The contested decision is Council Decision 2011/853/EU on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of 
the European Convention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional 
access. 
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article 114 TFEU was the right legal basis for the decision. Yet, the Court retained 
that the European Convention has an international dimension, because “a ban on the 
export of illicit devices to the European Union concerns the defence of the European 
Union’s global interests and falls, by its very nature, within the ambit of the common 
commercial policy”.135 Therefore, the correct legal basis for the adoption of the 
Convention is article 207 TFEU. In Conditional Access Services, the Court  pointed 
out that the existence of internal legislation similar to an international agreement 
adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU does not affect the competence to conclude 
the international agreement on the basis of article 207 TFEU if the focus of that 
agreement is outside the borders of the EU. This is to say that international 
agreements can be concluded on the basis of the internal market when the agreement 
predominantly regulate internal trade, whereas article 207 TFEU can be used for 
agreements that predominantly regulate external trade. In relation to previous case 
law, the Court seems generally less concerned about the potential for Article 207 
TFEU to encroach upon other competences and more willing to extend the scope of 
the CCP, as a result of Treaty amendments.  
 
3.2) Constitutional issues: balancing trade and cultural objectives 
 
The second consideration refers to some constitutional aspects, namely the 
balancing between the CCP objectives under Article 207 TFEU and the cultural 
objectives under Article 167 TFEU. The analysis above on the division of 
competences and procedural aspects to exercise the trade in cultural services 
competence served to show that Member States still have some mechanisms to 
safeguard their cultural interests. Nonetheless, we should not forget that the protection 
of cultural diversity is a constitutional objective of the Union, recognised by Article 
167 TFEU and strengthened by the ratification of the UNESCO Convention on 
Cultural Diversity. In the field of “trade in culture” two different policy objectives 
compete: on the one hand, the Union shall pursue the objectives of the common 
commercial policy as established under Article 207(1) TFEU; on the other hand, the 
protection and promotion of cultural diversity should be taken into account while 
realising trade objectives, as required by the clause of integration included in Article 
                                                
135 C-137/12, Commission v. Council, para 69. 
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167(4) TFEU.  
According to Article 207(1) TFEU, “the common commercial policy shall be 
based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and 
the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the 
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures 
to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The 
common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and 
objectives of the Union’s external action”. With regard to this last sentence, we just 
recalled that the protection of cultural diversity is among the objectives of the 
European Union. Further, among the general objectives of the Union’s action, Article 
3(3) TEU recalls that the Union “shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, 
and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced”. 
Therefore, the CCP shall be conducted in such a way to take into account the respect 
and the promotion of cultural heritage and linguistic diversity (and not only European 
cultural and linguistic diversity, but the world’s cultural diversity as we saw in 
Chapter 2). For this purpose, the clause of integration embedded in Article 167(4) 
TFEU may become useful. Indeed, Article 167(4) requires the EU to take into account 
cultural aspects in implementing all its policies, internal and external. By 
consequence, when acting within the framework of the WTO, or other multilateral 
and bilateral trade contexts, the Union should always balance between trade interests 
and the protection and promotion of cultural diversity. More precisely, the CCP shall 
be conducted in a way that does not threaten cultural diversity, but rather promotes it. 
Trade and cultural objectives should be seen as complementary. From this 
perspective, it can be observed that Article 167 TFEU does not directly affect the 
division of competences between the EU and the Member States in external trade, yet 
it affects the way these competences should be exercised.136 
In the light of these considerations it can be ascertained that the European fight 
for the cultural exception under WTO is in harmony with the implementation of 
Article 167(4) TFEU and the attempt to find a balance between trade and culture.137 
The EU defence of its acquis in the audiovisual sector has been attacked from outside 
– namely from the US – for being an attempt to close its external trade frontiers and 
                                                
136 B de Witte, above (n 33), at 253. 
137 Ibidem. 
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as a form of misguided protectionism, rather than a strategy for genuine cultural 
purposes. If Europe’s economic and competition interests certainly cannot be a priori 
excluded, it should be observed that the EU action in the audiovisual sector is bound 
by the respect of its internal allocation of competences and the obligation to achieve 
the objectives of the Treaties, among which there is the protection of cultural 
diversity. Further, the EU ratification of the UNESCO Convention for the protection 
and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions seems to be in line with the 
overall EU Treaties’ objectives, and has strengthened the acknowledgement to carry 
out a trade policy that is complementary to cultural goals. In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that complementarity between trade policy and the objectives of 
the 2005 UNESCO Convention is also mentioned in the 2010 Commission 
Communication “Trade, Growth and World Affairs Trade Policy as a core component 
of the EU's 2020 strategy”. More precisely, the Commission states that further 
liberalisation in the services sector should be obtained whilst maintaining objectives 
in line with the 2005 UNESCO Convention on cultural diversity.138 The 2010 
Commission Communication places trade at the heart of the external dimension of the 
European strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth (European 2020 
strategy)139 and focuses on the benefits that can derive from more opened markets. It 
also sets bilateral agreements as an important element to complement the multilateral 
level. In so doing, the Commission states that the EU will deliver balanced free-trade 
agreements – which should initiate improvements in social inclusion, both around the 
world and within the EU. Therefore, the EU will employ a differentiated approach 
depending on the level of development of third partners. Further, this trade strategy 
will pay systematic attention to coherence with development policies – such as 
poverty eradication – and to complementarity between the EU's internal and external 
policies as a whole.140 Linking this document back to the notion of sustainable 
development discussed in Chapter 2, it seems that the idea underpinning development 
is still based on increasing growth – albeit smart, inclusive and sustainable growth – 
and, for this purpose, trade still occupies a central place in the EU external dimension. 
                                                
138 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Trade, Growth and World Affairs 
Trade Policy as a core component of the EU's 2020 strategy”, COM (2010) 612 final, at 5. 
139 Communication from the Commission "Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth", COM (2010) 2020 final. 
140 COM (2010) 612 final, at 3-4. 
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The strategy is oriented towards achieving more liberalisation in all trade sectors, 
including services; and it is precisely in connection with the established goal to seek 
greater openness for the European services providers from main developed and 
emerging trade partners that cultural considerations find a space. So, while culture is 
not specifically addressed as a possible strategic sector in the 2010 Commission 
Communication on trade, the role of cultural and audiovisual products as a relevant 
sector of trade in services does seem to be acknowledged, at least as far as the 2005 
UNESCO Convention is concerned. Finally, it seems that services market openings 
must be balanced with the respect and promotion of cultural diversity.  
Hence, one might wonder whether the protectionist measures desired by some 
Member States – such as the full exclusion of cultural services from trade agreements 
through the affirmation of the “cultural exception” – are the appropriate means for 
this purpose, or whether economic and cultural goals may sometimes be achieved 
through the same instruments. The critical remarks about cultural exceptions 
expressed in the former section may question whether the EU “pro-exception” 
approach is promoting a sectoral cultural strategy that can entail negative effects on 
the global “culture and development” debate rather than positive ones. We saw that 
cultural exception has lost its power to enchant and is now perceived as a negative 
rather than a positive means for promoting cultural diversity. The focus has shifted 
from controlling and limiting the circulation of cultural products to their enhancement 
as a way to foster cultural exchanges and promote creativity and diversity, as well as 
economic growth. Further, it has been argued that cultural exception can undermine 
cultural pluralism and the full enjoyment of other fundamental freedoms (the right to 
information, freedom of expression, etc.), which is in contrast with the social function 
of culture as a means to spread and improve the respect of human rights and values 
such as tolerance and mutual understanding. A rigid EU application of cultural 
exception to external trade relations may, then, prove rather unpopular. 
The EU seems to be aware of this and in the last decades it changed its 
approach by making the protection of cultural diversity its new flagship. In 1999, in 
the Communication to the Council and the European Parliament expressing the EU 
approach to the WTO Millennium Round, the Commission quoted cultural diversity 
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among the priorities of the new international debate.141 In 2003, during the WTO 
Ministerial Meeting held in Cancun (Mexico), the EU reaffirmed its commitment to 
reach further liberalisation and market opening to improve the WTO functioning and 
increase the integration of developing countries in the world trade system. However, 
the EU clarified that it did not intend “to seek general deregulation or privatisation of 
sectors where principles of public interest are at stake”, and that “the EU is also 
committed to defending the right of WTO members to promote cultural diversity”.142 
Combining the preservation of cultural diversity (art. 167 TFEU) with trade goals (art. 
207 TFEU) seems to be an unquestioned element of the new external trade strategy of 
the Union. The ratification of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity has 
increasingly strengthened the external action in the cultural sector and contributed to 
the international advocacy for the world’s cultural diversity. In fact, as emerged from 
the analysis of the Convention, one of the central elements of this text is the 
integration of culture in all development policies and the commitment of all Parties to 
boost cultural exchanges through the mobility of cultural goods, persons and co-
operational projects. Let us now explore in further depth the role undertaken by the 
European Union during the negotiation of the UNESCO Convention, and what 
constitutional issues emerged from such ratification. 
 
3.3) The EU ratification of the UNESCO Convention for the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
3.3.1) Some constitutional remarks concerning the negotiations 
 
The EU ratification of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Expressions of Cultural Diversity seems to have strengthened the 
Union’s international commitment to protect and promote cultural diversity. Yet, the 
EU ratification of the 2005 UNESCO Convention – an instrument focusing on 
cultural matters – raised some concerns among the Member States, which questioned 
in particular whether there was a real competence of the Union to become a party to 
such a Convention. To address this question, we should return to the analysis of the 
                                                
141 European Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, The EU 
approach to the WTO Millennium Round, COM (1999) 331 final, 8 July 1999. 
142 WTO Ministerial Meeting held in September 2003 in Cancun (Mexico), source 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/ext/multilateral/gats/gats2000/consult_1999/index_en.htm. 
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text of the Convention above, which shows that the UNESCO Convention is not only 
about culture. Indeed, the Convention is also about trade and competition law, it 
overlaps with migration regulations, and it deals with international development 
cooperation. Therefore, it is clear that many provisions established in the UNESCO 
Convention are likely to interfere with the Union law, both on the internal and 
external level. In particular, as far as it concerns the enhancement of the circulation of 
cultural workers and artists and the facilitation of access to global markets for works 
from developing countries, obligations under the Convention can affect internal 
market rules (namely, provisions concerning the free movement of goods, services 
and workers under Title II and Title IV) as well as provisions concerning immigration 
under Title V. Moreover, it emerged that the UNESCO Convention is inclined 
towards certain forms of state intervention in the audiovisual sector and, more 
generally, in the area of cultural industries. As we know, the regulation of state aid is 
a matter of competition law and falls within the exclusive competence of the EU; 
further over the last two decades the EU has taken several initiatives to support 
Member States’ cultural industries (e.g.: TWF Directive and the Media Programme). 
In addition, the Convention can affect the European cultural policy and the cultural 
aspects of the development policy.143 Some of the issues involved fall within the area 
of the EU’s exclusive competence, such as the common commercial policy (Article 
207 TFEU), others fall within the area of shared competence, such as cooperation to 
development (art. 211 and art. 212 TFEU): therefore, the EU was entitled to negotiate 
the Convention. Further, as the majority of the EU Member States were taking part in 
the negotiations of the UNESCO Convention, the Commission estimated that there 
was an urgent need to preserve the acquis cammunautaire as well as the unity of its 
representation in the framework of such negotiations.144   
Considering the manifold objects covered by the Treaty and the fact that most 
of these fell within the area of shared competences, the Convention was adopted on 
the choice of multiple legal basis – namely former Articles 133, 151, 181 and 181a 
                                                
143 Recommendation from the Commission to the Council to authorise the Commission to participate, 
on behalf of the Community, in the negotiations within UNESCO on the Convention on the Protection 
of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions, 1.09.2004, SEC (2004) 1062 final, at 2-
3. 
144 Communication of the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament of 23 August 
2003 COM (2003) 520 final; Recommendation by the Commission to the Council to authorise the 
Commission to participate on behalf of the Community in the negotiations within UNESCO, doc. 
12063/04 CULT 61. 
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ECT – and negotiated as a mixed-agreement on the basis of former Article 300 ECT 
(now Article 218 TFEU).145 Nonetheless, the EU assumed a leading role in the 
negotiations and acquired new and greater visibility on the international scene:  
indeed, it was the first time that the EU did not sit as an observer within a UN 
Agency, but obtained the right to speak, propose and amend in an executive organ of 
the UN type (the drafting and negotiation of the UNESCO Convention was 
undertaken in the UNESCO Executive Council).146 It is also quite significant that 
UNESCO modified its internal rules for negotiating within its seat expressly for the 
European Union. In fact, according to the Statute of UNESCO, only sovereign States 
can become members and participate in the General Assembly of UNESCO. Hence, a 
provision allowing the participation of regional organisations was specifically 
introduced in the text of the Convention (namely: art. 27) in order to permit the EU to 
participate in the negotiations and drafting of the Convention on Cultural Diversity. 
This shows a certain acknowledgement of the EU’s influence and relevance as an 
actor of international law, capable to influence global processes and inspire other 
actors’ initiatives. The participation of the EU in the negotiations of the Convention 
was, indeed, seen as a positive element by other UNESCO Members involved in the 
process: first, because it could give greater visibility to the instrument, boost its 
adoption and contribute worldwide to raise awareness about cultural diversity; and 
second, because it could counterbalance the opposition of another major international 
actor such as the US.147 On the other hand, several Member States felt quite frustrated 
by the new leading role assumed by the Commission during the negotiation and saw 
the new visibility acquired by the EU within UNESCO as a threat to their national 
competence in the field of culture and education.148 In order to reassure Member 
States, a Code of Conduct was adopted at the time of the negotiations,149 establishing 
that the Commission would only negotiate those areas falling within its exclusive 
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competence. More precisely, point 3 of the Code clarifies that the Commission will 
express, on behalf of the Union, common positions on matters in relation to: the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital; common rules on competition, in 
particular concerning aid granted by states; the internal market; Common Commercial 
Policy; legislative acts taken under title V relating to visas, asylum, immigration 
(subject to the special position of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark under 
that Title); measures taken in the sphere of development cooperation, without 
prejudice to Member States’ capacity to express positions on measures taken under 
their national competence. Aspects of cultural policies, education, cultural awareness 
issues concerning international cooperation in the field of culture with developing 
countries (except for trade related issues) and other national domains still remain 
within the competence of Member States. Despite the clear distinction of 
competences made in the Code (which also serves as a map for the other parties to the 
Convention to understand whether the Commission or the Member States are 
responsible for a particular obligation), with culture being such a cross-cutting theme, 
it seems quite difficult to apply a clear-cut distinction between initiatives that are 
purely “cultural focused” and other dealing with  “trade and culture” or “culture and 
cooperation”. Further, the implementation of certain provisions of the UNESCO 
Convention depends upon a high level of coordination between the Member States 
and the EU in delicate areas such as immigration and visas regulations. Some 
commentators have argued that the implementation of the UNESCO Convention by 
the EU can contribute to the slow process of erosion of State’s competence and 
sovereignty. 150 It is undeniable that the ratification of the UNESCO Convention has 
strengthened the Union competence in the cultural field, in particular on the external 
level. While still leaving considerable autonomy to its Member States in defining their 
own cultural policies and cultural priorities, the Union has emerged as the common 
voice of its Member States in the world “trade and culture” arena.151 Nevertheless, the 
mechanisms set out under Article 207(4) TFEU and the relevance of the principle of 
conferral stressed by the Treaty of Lisbon should preserve and guarantee Member 
States’ sphere of competences. Further, as we saw above, within the multilateral trade 
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frame, the institutional framework still allows Member States to exercise a great 
influence in defining the EU position on international “trade and culture” 
commitments. The major role for the EU to be played in the cultural field seems than 
to be referring to the protection and promotion of cultural diversity in external 
relations. 
This observation drives us to some considerations concerning the scope 
pursued by the Union in joining the negotiation of the 2005 UNESCO Convention. It 
is obvious that the first concern of the EU was to protect the integrity of its internal 
acquis. This is confirmed by the “unilateral declaration” contained in Annex 2 of the 
Council Decision that ratifies the Convention, when it states that “Member States of 
the [EU] which are party to the Convention in their mutual relations apply the 
provisions of the Convention in accordance with the [Union]'s internal rules and 
without prejudice to appropriate amendments being made to these rules.” 152 Such a 
declaration, unilaterally adopted on behalf of the Union, produces a sort of 
“disconnection effect” of the EU Member States from the Convention regime: when 
they apply the Convention in their relations, they must firstly fulfil their EU 
obligations. It is worth noting that this kind of “unilateral declaration” is a legal 
technique often used by the EU as an alternative to disconnection clauses in the case 
of mixed agreements or multilateral conventions.153 The scope of this declaration is to 
affirm the supremacy and autonomy of EU law when the application of a Convention 
may interfere with the EU internal legislation; thus, unilateral declarations produce 
effects similar to a more classical disconnection clause.154 As Marise Cremona clearly 
explains, “the disconnection clause does not depend on a conflict existing between the 
Convention rule and [Union] law; it is there to protect the autonomy of the Union 
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legal order per se.”155 Klabbers observes that the disconnection clause can also be 
seen as a mechanism for the protection of the Union acquis from possible conflict 
with international law norms,156 by preventing a Member State from being put into a 
position of having to choose whether to apply, in its relation with another Member 
State, an EU law norm or a provision of another international agreement to which 
they are both parties. In this sense, the disconnection clause (or the unilateral 
declaration) adds new strength to the application of the principle of loyal cooperation 
(Art. 4(3) TEU); or, in other words, it can be considered an expression within an 
international law context of the loyalty obligation established within the Union legal 
system. The insertion in the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity of a 
unilateral declaration pursuing this scope shows that the preoccupation with 
preserving the integrity of the acquis communautaire has certainly determined the EU 
engagement in the negotiations. This should not be surprising: to the contrary, it 
seems to be responding to the need to pursue coherence and consistency on the 
external level and contributing to strengthen the effects of the duty of sincere 
cooperation in mixed agreements. 157  Further, the fact that the EU was mostly 
concerned with protecting the acquis communautaire from possible interference 
deriving from the Convention’s implementation does not mean that the protection and 
promotion of cultural diversity is not among the rationales underlying the EU’s 
ratification. In its Recommendation to the Council, the Commission “considers that it 
is important for the Community and its Member States to confirm at international 
level their commitment to cultural diversity. It considers that a common European 
Union approach is necessary in order to contribute effectively to the development of a 
world-wide strategy for the safeguarding and the promotion of cultural diversity.”158 
The Union has therefore clearly expressed its will to effectively contribute to the 
shaping of an international strategy for cultural diversity. Whether and how the EU 
will effectively contribute to this objective, and if its action is coherent with the 
overall goal of the Convention to mainstream culture as a vector of development is 
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153), it can be noticed that the first one acts more on a political level, whereas from the second one 
derives a binding legal obligation upon Member States. 
158 References above quoted (n 139). 
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another issue, which will be discussed through the analysis of the initiatives 
undertaken by the EU to implement the Convention (section 4 of this Chapter). 
 
3.3.2) Assessing the impact of the UNESCO Convention on the EU “culture and 
trade” strategy 
 
The entry into force of the 2005 UNESCO Convention within the Union’s 
legal order brought an added value to the constitutional protection and promotion of 
cultural diversity as a per se value within and outside the EU. In general terms, it 
seems that the Convention gives further strength to the interpretation of the Treaty 
provisions concerning the protection of cultural diversity. This is, at least, what can be 
deduced by the UTECA decision (discussed in Chapter 2), so far the only case in 
which the CJUE made reference to the UNESCO Convention. In her Opinion to the 
case, AG Kokott refers to Article 20(1)(b) of the Convention to remark that “the 
[Union] and the Member States that are Contracting States to the UNESCO 
Convention have undertaken to take that convention into account when interpreting 
and applying other treaties, that is to say inter alia when interpreting and applying 
the [EU] Treaty”.159 Indeed, both the Court and the AG referred to pre-existing 
Treaty rules and case law allowing for the protection and promotion of cultural 
diversity which can justify restrictions of fundamental freedoms,160 nevertheless the 
wording of AG Kokott suggests to the Convention is being used as an additional 
argument to interpret them and to ensure the protection of cultural diversity as a 
legitimate aim.161  
The ratification of the Convention also represented a significant step towards a 
greater acknowledgement of culture as a vector of development, which brought some 
changes in the EU strategy concerning “culture and trade”. We saw, indeed, that the 
UNESCO Convention looks at culture and trade as mutually supportive elements of a 
broader development strategy. In particular, enhancing cultural exchanges through the 
mobility of cultural goods, services and artists is a core obligation. Further, access to 
markets for cultural goods and services originating from developing countries should 
                                                
159 Opinion of AG Kokott to UTECA case, delivered on 4 September 2008, para 99. References of the 
UTECA case are quoted in Chapter 2 (n 133).  
160 AG Opinion, para 100. 
161 M Ličková, “The CDCE in the European Union – a mixed agreement and its judicial application”, 
in L Richieri (ed), Cultural Diversity in International Law, above quoted (n 96). 
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be facilitated through preferential treatment. The Convention promotes, then, a 
balanced open approach to the integration of culture in trade relations, which should 
be combined with the principles of sustainable development. So, what seems 
concretely strengthened by the ratification of the Convention is the international 
commitment of the Union to foster cultural exchanges and include culture in all 
developmental policies. Such engagement of the EU was already established in the 
framework of its cooperation to development policy. However, the ratification of the 
UNESCO Convention reinforced this engagement and enriched it with new elements, 
like the economic function of culture. By embracing the new international trend that 
favours the circulation of cultural products and operators, the Union shifted from a 
rather protectionist approach towards a more open one in the field of culture in trade. 
The real challenge is, then, to pursue this new approach through a coherent way, 
which respects the internal allocation of competences and consistency with the other 
EU policies, in particular with the principles underpinning the EU trade and 
development policy.  
Speaking in terms of concrete actions implementing the obligations deriving 
from the Convention, following its ratification the EU adopted the 2007 Agenda for 
Culture, which sets ambitious goals concerning the integration of culture and the 
protection and promotion of cultural diversity in the Union’s external relations, and in 
particular the external economic relations.162 Hints of the new integrated approach 
promoted by the Convention can be found in the Council Conclusions on Intercultural 
competences, a policy document adopted in the aftermath of the EU ratification of the 
UNESCO Convention. 163  The document, while referring to the importance of 
strengthening intercultural competences, sets a comprehensive agenda for the Union 
and its Members’ actions in the areas concerning culture, education, youth and the 
audiovisual sector. This document shows a full understanding of all the possible 
linkages of culture with the societal dynamics. Among other things, the Council 
Conclusions exhort the promotion of media and audiovisual content that is culturally 
rich, diverse, and informative for all individuals by means of – inter alia – 
encouraging co-productions at European, national and regional levels. 164  Great 
emphasis in given to cooperation in the cultural audiovisual sectors – and more 
                                                
162 References quoted in Chapter 2 (n 174). 
163 Council conclusions of 22 May 2008 on Intercultural Competences, (2008/C 141/09). 
164 Ibidem, section D. 
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broadly in the field of cultural industries – as a means to foster cultural exchanges.165 
This is confirmed by the fact that in the years following the ratification of the 
Convention, the Union’s major efforts to implement it dealt with the integration of 
specific protocols or annexes on cultural cooperation to new trade agreements 
concluded on the bilateral level. In 2008 the conclusion of the first Economic 
Partnership Agreement with the CARIFORUM States included an ad hoc protocol on 
cultural cooperation.166 Since then, the EU started to increasingly integrate special 
sections or protocols concerning cultural cooperation within the frame of its bilateral 
relations. Indeed, a cultural protocol was also attached to the Free Trade Agreement 
with South Korea, and a similar one to trade agreements concluded with the Andean 
Countries. The next section is dedicated to the analysis of these protocols and the 
provisions concerning culture and trade in the EPA and FTAs agreements. 
Finally, it should be noticed that although the Convention does not establish 
cultural rights and its focus is not on human rights, it affirms that the protection of 
cultural diversity as a common good and common concern for humanity passes also 
through the enforcement and the full enjoyment of cultural rights. More specifically, 
the Convention touches upon cultural rights, by recognising their fulfilment as a 
central element for the full implementation of the Convention. 167  Therefore, 
indirectly, the Convention should strengthen the EU’s engagement in promoting such 
rights within and outside the EU. It is also desirable that the European Union’s 
initiatives to implement the Convention’s obligations – falling under its competences 
– would contribute to spreading the respect of human rights, such as freedom of 
expression and communication, and more specific cultural rights, such as access to 
culture and the rights of minorities or other ethnic groups.  
 
                                                
165 See also Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the promotion of cultural diversity 
and intercultural dialogue in the external relations of the Union and its Member States, 2905th 
Education, Youth And Culture Council meeting Brussels, 20 November 2008. Here the Council 
reaffirms that “cultural exchanges and cultural cooperation, including in the audiovisual sphere, can 
help to establish relations based on partnership, strengthen the place and the role of civil society, 
foster processes of democratisation and good governance and promote human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”. 
166 PROTOCOL III On cultural cooperation of the EPA between the CARIFORUM States, the EC and 
its Member States, OJ (2008) L 289. This Protocol was expressly adopted under the umbrella of the 
implementation of the 2005 UNESCO Convention, as it is stated in the Preamble of the Protocol. 
167 Y Donders,  “The Cultural Diversity Convention and Cultural Rights: Included or Ignored?”, in T 
Kono and S Van Uytsel (eds), The Convention on the Promotion and the Protection of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions, (Intersentia, 2012), at 10 (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2015258). 
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4) Culture and trade under the bilateral agreements: the season of enhanced 
cultural cooperation 
In this section I will analyse the practice of negotiating Cultural Cooperation 
Protocols (CCP) within the frame of bilateral trade agreements, which started with the 
first Cultural Protocol to the EPA with the CARIFORUM signed in 2008, and has 
been extended to the following bilateral agreements. This practice is grounded on the 
2008 Council Conclusions on the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural 
dialogue in the external relations of the Union and its Member States and promotes 
the principle of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity and its 
implementation in the framework of EU relations with third countries.168 The 2008 
Council Conclusions call upon the Member States and the Commission, within their 
respective spheres of competence and with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity 
(emphasis added), to pursue the following objective: “strengthening the place and the 
role of culture in the policies and programmes conducted within the framework of 
external relations and promoting cooperation with third countries and international 
organisations with responsibility in the field of culture, in particular UNESCO and 
the Council of Europe, in order to improve the quality and diversity of the cultural 
activities carried out, and, more generally, to contribute to the attainment of external 
policy objectives and to sustainable development”. In order to set up a comprehensive 
and consistent approach to reach this goal, the Council needs to draw up a European 
strategy for incorporating culture consistently and systematically in the external 
relations of the Union. Such a strategy should contribute to the complementarity of 
the Union's activities with those of its Member States; establish specific regional and 
countries sub-strategies with a view to clarifying objectives and approaches in the 
area of cultural relations; and be tailored to the features and sustainable development 
prospects of third countries’ cultural sectors, to the state of cultural exchanges with 
the Union and to their economic and social situations.169 It is interesting to note that 
the systemic integration of culture into trade relations is framed within the broader 
external trade strategy and is in line with its objectives, so as to be coherent with other 
EU policies. Indeed the Council asks for an integrated approach that takes into 
account principles of sustainable development, local features and needs as well as 
regional specificities in the cultural sector. The inclusion of a tailored “culture and 
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trade approach” in agreements with an economic integration dimension is also in line 
with the new trade strategy approach of the EU, which sees regional and bilateral 
agreements as an important component of the Union external trade relations, to be 
carried on as complementary to the multilateral strategies, and as a tool to promote 
sustainable development.170 Further, in order to ensure also vertical coherence, the 
Commission and the Member States must act within their respective spheres of 
competence and with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity. 
Cultural Protocols constitute an attempt to foster cultural exchanges through 
development cooperation, while overcoming the “culture and trade” dichotomy. In 
addition, they can be seen as an alternative to the bilateral strategy of liberalisation of 
cultural and audiovisual sectors set up by some countries.171 Despite their good 
intentions and the enthusiasm through which the Commission introduced them as a 
tool to implement the UENSCO Convention, Cultural Protocols received several 
criticisms. Some criticisms came from the Member States and referred to the 
inadequacy of the “one size fits all” approach initially adopted by the Commission to 
draft the protocols and in contrast with the original Council indications. Other 
criticisms were raised by commentators and major stakeholders and concern the lack 
of a comprehensive approach to the cultural sector, as well as the legal weakness of 
most provisions. 
4.1) The Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the 
CARIFORUM and its Cultural Protocol 
 
4.1.1) Contextual background: the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
 
Before exploring the content of the first Cultural Protocol it is useful to say a 
few words about the contractual context in which it has been adopted. The 
negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the CARIFORUM 
have initiated the new Post-Cotonou era of cooperation agreements between the EU 
and third countries, based on reciprocity and more compliance with WTO principles 
and rules. The EPA was negotiated to supplement the trade provisions of the Cotonou 
                                                
170 See Commission Communication “Trade, Growth and World Affairs” above quoted (n 134). 
171 C Soury-Desrosier, “EU protocols on cultural cooperation An attempt to promote and implement the 
CDCE within the framework of bilateral trade negotiations”, in L Richieri Hanania (ed), Cultural 
Diversity in International Law, (n 96), at 211. 
  183 
Agreement, which governed trade, economic, and development relations between the 
EU and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries until 2007. The EPA 
includes provisions covering trade in goods and services, investment and trade related 
issues (competition, innovation, sustainable development, etc.) between the 27 
members of the European Union on the one hand and the 15 members of the 
CARIFORUM group (CARICOM and the Dominican Republic) on the other. The 
overall goal of this kind of agreement is to reach a greater level of liberalisation for 
goods, services, and investment between the two regions. The Union should provide 
special development support to build the capacity of firms and other entities to take 
advantage of the market access and other provisions in the EPA. Through these 
elements, the new generation of cooperation agreements should be able to achieve the 
goals that the former agreements under the Lomé and Cotonu Conventions could not. 
In particular, it should make the EU trade agreements with the ACP countries more 
compatible with the WTO rules, foster deeper integration at the local level, while 
taking into account the diversity of contexts and needs of the countries and regions, 
and strongly contribute to the achievement of sustainable development in the area.172 
Indeed, the EPA is built on four pillars: 1) partnership; 2) regional integration; 3) 
development; and, 4) connection to the WTO. The use of the word partnership 
suggests the idea of a new kind of relationship between North and South: a 
relationship based on equal weight and free will in terms of influencing the 
negotiations; and reciprocity in terms of expected results and respect of the 
obligations to comply with. 173  The goals of eradicating poverty and realising 
development in the regions are highly connected to the EU commitments under the 
WTO. The overall idea underlying the EPA is that the progressive removal of the 
trade barriers and greater liberalisation in all areas will enhance economic 
development in the region. Such a vision stems from the general assumption that 
developing economies with open trade regimes spur economic development. 174 
Further, in order to promote sustainability, economic development shall be 
                                                
172 For a comprehensive review of the EU-ACP EPA: G Thallinger, “From Apology to Utopia: EU-
ACP Economic Partnership Agreements Oscillating between WTO Conformity and Sustainability”, 12 
(2007) European Foreign Affairs Review, 499-516. 
173 M Farrell, “A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation Between the European Union and 
Africa”, 27:3 (2005) European Integration, 263-283. 
174 J Lodge, “A Trade Partnership for Sustainable Development”, A Beviglia Zampetti and J Lodge 
(eds), The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement A Practitioners’ Analysis, (2011, 
Kluwer Law International), at 20. 
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accompanied by the strengthening of social and environmental standards, the respect 
of fundamental rights, the rule of law and democracy.175 In relation to the Cotonou 
Agreement and the GSP schemes, the CARIFORUM-EU EPA represents a more 
comprehensive and sophisticated form of application of the principle of integration of 
sustainable development. In fact, sustainability is not only framed as conditionality 
for trade preferences, but it is integrated as a goal to be pursued through trade 
measures (see for instance provisions concerning renewable energy, the transfer of 
green technology or support for certification and label schemes which favour 
transition to the green economy and the fight against climate change; as well as 
provisions on tourism services seeking to promote sustainable tourism).176 
In spite of all these good proposals, the EPA has been criticised for not 
bringing any real changes or sustainable development to the regions. Some authors 
argue that it is rather a new kind of free trade agreement that privileges compatibility 
with the WTO regime over sustainability.177 For instance, Mary Farrell claims that the 
EPA does not build a genuine partnership, contending that the relationship still 
remains asymmetrical because of the unequal political and economic positions 
between the parties and the low bargaining power of developing countries. 
Reciprocity may lead to detrimental outcomes for the ACP markets, which are not yet 
well established and will have to compete with European products at the local and 
regional level. In addition, such an agreement is going to overlap with other sub-
regional agreements and may undermine the possibility for deeper South-South 
cooperation and regional integration. On the basis of these considerations, Farrell 
questions who is really going to benefit from this new generation of agreements and 
challenges the adequacy of the model of regional integration proposed by the EPA for 
the African continent.178  
It is within this controversial framework that the first Cultural Protocol has 
been adopted and annexed to the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. As far as it concerns 
                                                
175 The reference to sustainable development and sustainability widely recurs in the entire text of the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA. See, for instance, the Preamble and Part I “Trade Partnership for Sustainable 
Development”. See also Chapter 4 on Environment and Chapter 5 on Social Aspects under Title IV.  
176 See Articles 183-196 in Chapter 4 on Environment and Article 115 under the Section Tourism 
Services, Chapter 5 under Title II. 
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Regional Integration Agreements?”, (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review, 1343; M Cremona, “The 
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cultural provisions dealing with trade aspects, they are also included in the main EPA 
text, namely under Title II on Investment, Trade in Services and E-Commerce. The 
underlying principles of the EPA should then apply also to the cultural sector – and in 
particular to cultural industries. Therefore further liberalisation should be achieved 
also in the field of trade in cultural services (and namely audiovisual services), 
pursuing the idea that further liberalisation may contribute to achieve sustainable 
development: the principle of sustainability will also have to be applied to cultural 
industries; and the principle of reciprocity should apply to the EU-CARIFORUM 
relationship in cultural trade. As we will see, things are not exactly like this in all 
cultural sectors. 
4.1.2) Treatment of Cultural Industries in the EPA with the CARIFORUM 
 
The cultural and entertainment services are addressed through two instruments 
in the EPA with the CARIFORUM: a) through market access commitments by 
European States for entertainment services from CARIFORUM States that are 
governed by the rules of the Services and Investment Chapter and the general 
provisions of the EPA; and b) through a special Protocol on Cultural Cooperation 
annexed to the EPA. 
Market access provisions in the main text of the EPA contribute to extend a 
certain level of liberalisation to the cultural industries sector. The attempt to reach a 
further degree of liberalisation in services mirrors the EU commitments under the 
GATS within the WTO framework. As said in the previous section, the EU and the 
rest of the WTO members have engaged in the effort to reach further liberalisation in 
services. Nevertheless, as far as it concerns cultural services – and audiovisual 
services in particular – no great changes in terms of further liberalisation of the sector 
have been made. Trade in cultural services still remains a very debated topic, also at 
the regional level. Taking a brief look at the CARIFORUM-EU EPA provisions 
concerning cultural services, one may suppose that for the first time the EU further 
opened the door of its market to Caribbean firms operating in cultural services. In 
fact, entertainment services are listed among the sub-sector falling within the field of 
application of Article 83 establishing more favourable conditions for the temporary 
entry of contractual services suppliers and independent professionals.179 Yet, the 
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audiovisual sectors still remain outside the framework of broader liberalisation 
commitments.  
As for the recreational, cultural and sporting services, for the first time the EU 
and its Member States granted legally binding and significant market access to invest 
in entertainment activities in Europe and for the supply of entertainment services 
through the temporary entry of natural persons for up to six months (categorised as 
Contractual Service Suppliers (CSS) under the EPA).180 Looking at the provisions 
under the services chapter in the EPA through the lenses of the four modes under the 
GATS, the EU has liberalised its market to different degrees corresponding to its offer 
in each of the modes of supply under the WTO. Thus, the margin of preference 
granted to CARIFORUM countries for cross-border supply (Mode 1), as well as for 
consumption abroad (Mode 2) are not very significant given the EU listed 
reservations. More improvements have been reached for Mode 3 on commercial 
presence: in spite of the fact that the audiovisual services is still exempted, 
commitments for the other cultural services now cover more EU Members and 
involve the removal of several national requirements.181The area in which the 
CARIFORUM States gained the highest level of preferences deals with Mode 4 
(movement of natural persons). These provisions will be object of analysis in chapter 
4; here it will suffice to say that the conditions for doing business in the EU and the 
requirements to compete with local entertainment service suppliers are now more 
transparent. In some cases the commitments created new openings for Caribbean 
service providers in the EU Member States, in others they simply consolidated the 
existing situations.182 Overall, considering that entertainment services are usually 
considered part of the cultural sector, which is a very sensitive sector in many EU 
                                                                                                                                      
CARIFORUM-EU EPA; and Annex IV F List of Commitments in Services Sectors, Point 10 
Recreational, Cultural And Sporting Services (Other than audiovisual). 
180 Provisions and conditions concerning Contractual Service Suppliers (CSS) will be further analysed 
in chapter 4, dealing with the mobility of artists and cultural workers. Here, it suffices to say that such 
provisions correspond to Mode 4 under the GATS. CSS are defined as ‘natural persons (individuals) of 
the EU Party or of the Signatory CARIFORUM States employed by a juridical person (company or 
firm) of that EU Party or Signatory CARIFORUM State which has no commercial presence in the 
territory of the other Party and which has concluded a bona fide contract to supply services with a final 
consumer in the latter Party requiring the presence on a temporary basis of its employees in that Party 
in order to fulfil the contract to provide services’.  
181  K Nurse “The Economic Partnership Agreement and the Creative Sector: Implications and 
Prospects for CARIFORUM”, in A Beviglia Zampetti and J Lodge (eds), The CARIFORUM-EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement A Practitioners’ Analysis, (2011, Kluwer Law International), 157. 
182 KEA European Affairs, “Implementing cultural provisions of CARIFORUM-EU EPA. How do they 
benefit the Caribbean cultural sector?”, Discussion Paper N. 118, European Centre for Development 
Policy Management, June 2011, at X. 
  187 
states, it is the first time that a more comprehensive offer was made by the European 
Union in this sector. EPA’s cultural provisions concerning the entertainment services 
give Caribbean companies more legal certainty when entering the European market. 
However, if the EPA marks a step forward for the enhancement of circulation of the 
entertainment services, the exclusion of the audiovisual sector from all commitments 
is quite striking. Article 66(c), under Title II Investment, Trade in Services and E-
Commerce, clearly excludes audiovisual services from the field of application of this 
Title, without leaving room for future opening or negotiations. Another instrument 
has been set up to address the treatment of the audiovisual sector: the Protocol on 
Cultural Cooperation, here below presented. 
4.1.3) The Protocol on Cultural Cooperation 
 
Annexed to the main EPA, the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation has been 
adopted with the intention “to effectively implement the UNESCO Convention and to 
cooperate within the framework of its implementation, building upon the principles of 
the Convention and developing actions in line with its provisions, notably its Articles 
14, 15 and 16’.183 The Preamble of the Protocol acknowledges the relevance of the 
cultural industries and the double nature of cultural goods and services as “activities 
of cultural, economic and social value”. It also recognises that the regional integration 
process supported by the EPA is part of a “global strategy aimed at promoting 
equitable growth and the reinforcement of economic, trade and cultural cooperation 
between the Parties”. By doing so, the Protocol places the contribution that culture 
can bring to development within a broader and comprehensive framework concerning 
development strategy. In addition, the Preamble of the Protocol reminds the Parties of 
the need to take into account, on a case-by-case analysis, “the degree of development 
of their cultural industries, the level and structural imbalances of cultural exchanges 
and the existence of preferential schemes for the promotion of local and regional 
cultural content”.  
The Protocol creates a cooperative framework to improve the conditions 
governing the exchanges of cultural activities, goods and services and to redress the 
structural imbalances and asymmetrical patterns which may exist in trade between 
CARIFORUM states and the EU. By far, the most innovative element of the Protocol 
                                                
183 See Preamble of Protocol III on Cultural Cooperation, annexed to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
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is the inclusion of the audiovisual sector within the scope of application of its 
provisions.184 The market access asset granted by the EU in the entertainment sector 
should, then, be complemented with this Protocol, which provides for bilateral 
cooperation on all cultural fronts and with special provisions on the audiovisual 
sector. The Protocol is based on the principle of preferential treatment established in 
Article 16 of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, stating the duty upon 
developed countries “to facilitate cultural exchanges with developing countries by 
granting, through the appropriate institutional and legal frameworks, preferential 
treatment to artists and other cultural professionals and practitioners, as well as 
cultural goods and services from developing countries”. The text of the Protocol is 
composed of 2 sections: the first one encompassing horizontal provisions, and the 
second one concerning sectoral provisions.  
The horizontal provisions cover issues dealing with the facilitation of cultural 
exchanges and dialogue through cooperation in all cultural fields.185 The horizontal 
strand also addresses the issue of temporary entry for artists and cultural practitioners 
(Article 3 of the Protocol) and establishes a framework for enhancing technical 
assistance (Article 4). As for the temporary entry of artists and cultural professionals, 
the Protocol’s rules apply to those who are not involved in commercial activities in 
the EU and, therefore, are not covered by the cultural provisions contained in the 
main text. In Chapter 4 I will describe in more depth the content and the limits of the 
provisions concerning the temporary movement of artists and cultural workers. Here 
it is worth recalling that, through the frame set by the Protocol, artists and cultural 
practitioners coming from the CARIFORUM Countries can enter the EU space to 
collaborate on projects, receive training, learn new techniques, engage in production, 
etc. Whereas previous EU trade agreements had almost nothing concerning the 
movement of artists. As for the technical assistance, the Protocol invites the Parties to 
strengthen their effort to improve technical assistance through different measures, 
inter alia, training, exchange of information, expertise, experiences and best practises, 
and counselling in elaboration of policies and legislation as well as in usage and 
transfer of technologies and know-how. This support will include cooperation 
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between private companies, non-governmental organisations as well as public-private 
partnerships. 
The sectoral provisions address the particularities of some specific sectors 
such as audiovisual cooperation and, where relevant, co-productions as well as 
cooperation in relation to publications, performing arts, and protection of heritage 
sites. The most advanced provisions are those concerning the audiovisual sector. As 
previously observed, the market access provisions contained in the EPA do not apply 
to the audiovisual services and confirm the EU position under the WTO and within 
the GATS’ negotiations. Differently, the Protocol seems to open a door in the EU 
market for external audiovisual producers through bilateral co-production agreements. 
In fact, under Article 5 of the Protocol, the Parties shall encourage the negotiation and 
implementation of new and existing co-production agreements between one or several 
Member States of the EU and one or several CARIFORUM countries, and are 
required to facilitate access of co-productions to their respective markets. This means 
that, when a bilateral co-production agreement is signed, it will give CARIFORUM 
producers access to national film funding and make it easier for CARIFORUM 
audiovisual products to enter the EU market as a co-produced work. It is important to 
remark that the Protocol as such does not give Caribbean producers access to EU or 
national film funds: a bilateral co-production agreement has to be signed in order to 
get access to EU funding. The criteria for audiovisual co-productions are based on the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMS), which also determines the definition 
of European works for co-productions. Although the AVMS is an act of secondary 
legislation and has effects on the internal level of the EU, it broadened the definition 
of “European work” to certain audiovisual productions with third countries.186 Under 
the Protocol, the conditions for a co-production to be qualified as a European work 
are the following: the Caribbean partner funds at least 20% and the European partner 
a maximum of 80% of the total budget. When a co-production meets this requirement, 
it can enter the European market as a European work and benefit from the custom and 
commercial treatment in the Member States like all similar European products. The 
qualification of European work will also allow the CARIFORUM-EU Member State 
co-productions to benefit from the television broadcasting quotas set in the AVMS 
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Directive. In addition, the co-productions will benefit from the existing preferential 
schemes for the promotion of local or regional content, as well as from future 
preferential schemes if they will be adopted. In the light of this, the Protocol seems to 
be in line with the principle of enhancing cultural exchange through granting further 
market access and trade facilitations, although in principle the Protocol will make it 
easier for CARIFORUM audiovisual products to enter the EU market only as a co-
produced work. Nonetheless, the stress on co-productions seems also to be aligned to 
the international favour surrounding this kind of strengthened cultural cooperation, as 
above discussed.187 
The remaining sectoral provisions encourage signatory States to support the 
temporary importation of material and equipment for the purpose of shooting 
cinematographic films and television programmes by promoting their territories as 
locations for such activities; 188  to promote joint productions in the fields of 
performing arts189 and co-publications in the publishing industry190 and create a 
friendly framework for the exchange of best practices and expertise concerning the 
protection of historical and cultural sites.  
In line with the driving criteria of the EPA, all the criteria and provisions of 
the Protocol take into account asymmetries and are adapted for different partner 
countries.191 In terms of preferential treatment, the Protocol focuses on preferential 
treatment for cultural goods, services and practitioners from developing countries, but 
only outside the trade liberalisation framework set by the main general trade 
agreement. According to some experts, the notion of preferential treatment included 
in the Cultural Protocol does not correspond to the notion of preferential treatment as 
used within the WTO framework, because it is based upon Article 16 of the UNESCO 
Convention. These voices argue that there are strong differences between the concept 
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of preferential treatment or special and differentiated treatment under the WTO and 
the concept of preferential treatment deriving from Article 16 of the UNESCO 
Convention. Indeed, the first one is conceived as an exception to the rule that should 
temporarily redress a given situation, and it is therefore meant to have a limited field 
of application. In the second case, preferential treatment shall become the rule within 
the cultural cooperation framework and should lead to structural and durable effects 
on cultural exchanges.192 This preferential treatment should be perceived as a “new 
deal” to contribute to redress the imbalances and disparities in the exchanges of 
cultural goods and services.193 
 
4.1.4) Some considerations on cultural provisions under the CARIFORUM-EU 
EPA and its Cultural Protocol 
As observed in Chapter 2, culture was already included in the Cotonou 
Agreement: in such a framework, it was treated in a traditional sense of merely 
cooperation between nations and did not really address market access for cultural 
products and services. The Cotonou Agreement contains, indeed, limited provisions 
concerning culture, most of which are largely general or hortatory, which establish a 
framework for cooperation in the area of cultural heritage-safeguard and inter-cultural 
dialogue.194 Although these provisions already showed a certain level of awareness 
about the economic dimension of culture, they did not establish any specific 
commitment able to include it in commercial strategy and accommodate cultural 
concerns. In this sense, the provisions addressing cultural industries (excluding the 
audiovisual sector) encompassed by the EPA and the annexed Cultural Protocol 
(including the audiovisual sector) go beyond the cultural cooperation frame envisaged 
by the Cotonou Agreement.  
Perhaps the most innovative aspect of the EPA is its Protocol on cultural 
cooperation. It is the first time that an additional instrument specifically addressing 
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cooperation in the cultural sector is negotiated and annexed within the framework of a 
trade agreement between the EU and third countries. In particular, the inclusion of 
provisions for a greater cooperation of exchange in the audiovisual sector is an 
important new element. However, it must be recognised that the Protocol establishes 
only a set of best endeavours rather than real binding obligations. It is still not clear to 
what extent the provisions of the Protocol could create certain obligations for the EU 
Member States. Their binding strength seems to be more political than legal and 
recalls the nature of the provisions contained in the 2005 UNESCO Convention. So 
far, only the provisions allowing the CARIFORUM audiovisual sector to benefit from 
the broadcasting quotas for co-productions seem to be binding. This is due to the clear 
connection between the provisions concerning co-production under the Cultural 
Protocol and the AVMS Directive, which grants to co-productions the status of 
European work.  
4.2) The Free Trade Agreement with Korea and its Cultural Protocol 
4.2.1) The Cultural Protocol to the FTA with South-Korea  
 
In 2009, the Union and South Korea finalised the negotiations for a Free Trade 
Agreement. The FTA was signed in 2010 in Brussels and began to be applied in 2011. 
Given the growing importance of South Korea on the international trade scene and the 
fact that Korea is one of the EU’s largest trade partners,195 the FTA was welcomed as 
a truly successful step forward for the Union’s bilateral trade relations. Indeed, the 
agreement aims at achieving a greater level of liberalisation by lifting trade barriers 
and setting a friendly cooperation framework for European and Korean companies. 
Namely, the FTA includes regulatory convergence, provisions to further liberalisation 
in investment and services on a mutual basis, competition rules and the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.196 However, such wider liberalisation does 
not encompass cultural services: differently from the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, there 
are no specific cultural provisions within the FTA addressing cultural services. For 
instance, under the Chapter dealing with trade in services, establishment and e-
commerce, there is no mention of the entertainment sector.197 Nevertheless, once 
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again audiovisual services are excluded from the scope of the trade agreement: both 
Article 7.4 on the cross-borders supply of services and Article 7.10 on establishment 
list audiovisual services among the areas to which their related provisions do not 
apply. 
However, similarly to the EPA with the CARIFORUM, the treatment of 
cultural industries, and audiovisual services in particular, is addressed in another 
instrument called Cultural Protocol and attached to the main FTA with Korea. The 
structure of this second Cultural Protocol looks very similar to the CARIFORUM-EU 
Protocol on Cultural Cooperation. Also the Preamble of the Cultural Protocol with 
Korea recalls the duty to implement the UNESCO Convention on cultural diversity 
and the provisions are divided into horizontal and sectoral provisions. The entrance 
into force is subject to South Korea’s ratification of the UNESCO Convention. Like 
the first Cultural Protocol, the Korea-EU Protocol also has its own institutional 
structure independent from other parts of the FTA, and also offers a special 
mechanism to settle disputes. 
The Protocol sets a framework to cooperate in facilitating exchanges regarding 
cultural activities, notably in the area of performing arts, publications, protection of 
cultural heritage sites and historical monuments, as well as in the audiovisual sector. 
It also aims at ensuring a facilitated movement for artists and other cultural 
professionals and practitioners who are not engaged in providing services. The 
objectives and the scope sound very similar to those declared in the CARIFORUM-
EU case: also for the Korea-EU Protocol, the Parties “shall endeavour to collaborate 
with the aim of improving the conditions governing their exchanges of cultural 
activities, goods and services and redressing the structural imbalances and 
asymmetrical patterns which may exist in exchanges”.198 Co-productions in the 
audiovisual sector are also envisaged. In particular, the Protocol's sectoral provisions 
on audiovisual co-productions encourage the conclusion of bilateral co-production 
agreements between South Korea and the Member States and allow certain finished 
audiovisual works co-produced by European and Korean partners to qualify as 
European and Korean works, for the purposes of respective legislations on the 
promotion of local and regional cultural content provided they meet the strictly 
defined criteria defined therein. These criteria should ensure that a balance is 
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maintained between financial and technical/artistic contributions of the parties and 
that that the rich tradition of cooperation between operators from different EU 
Member States is maintained by requiring participation from co-producers from 
several different EU Member States. In the case of animation works, the criteria are 
stricter and at least three partners from the EU are necessary in order to qualify as co-
production.199 As far as it concerns the audiovisual cooperation in order to promote 
audiovisual works produced by the Parties, no binding commitments providing 
market access are envisaged in the Protocol, but merely best endeavours provisions to 
enhance the exchange of audiovisual products, through festivals, seminars, etc., and to 
foster the dialogue to encourage cooperation in the area of broadcasting.200 
The similarities in the structure and part of the content with the Cultural 
Protocol with the CARIFORUM generated a heated discussion and a lot of concern 
over the negotiation and adoption of the Protocol with Korea. Member States, France 
in primis, were very sceptical about using the same instrument on cultural cooperation 
and the same strategy to negotiate it together with a main economic agreement.201 In 
addition, as for the specific case of South Korea, they argued that the conditions were 
not the same because of Korea’s strength and development in the audiovisual sector. 
Also cultural diversity coalitions and cultural professional organisations expressed 
their concern about this new unilateral strategy of the EU: they alleged that the 
Commission speaking as the EU’s single voice in these trade negotiations, would not 
adequately take into account the specificity of culture. They feared that the EU could 
stretch its competences by incorporating culture into trade negotiations and put 
culture and the audiovisual sector back into mere trade negotiations, whereas this 
sector should primarily belong to the Member States’ policy domain. Moreover, they 
worried that through the new practice of linking negotiations on trade and cultural 
cooperation, the Commission could use the cultural and audiovisual sectors as just 
another bargaining tool for use in trade negotiations. This may put cultural diversity at 
risk rather than promoting it.202  
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In spite of all the criticisms, the European Commission maintained the new 
practice of negotiating Cultural Protocols within the frame of trade agreements. 
Following the Cultural Protocol to the Free Trade Agreement with South-Korea, other 
similar protocols have been negotiated in conjunction with other trade agreements, 
namely in the case of the Association with Central Agreement and the trade 
agreement with Colombia and Peru. The Commission’s argument to support the 
strategy of cultural protocols as a new specific instrument to enhance cultural 
cooperation in trade exchange mainly relies upon the need to implement the 
UNESCO Convention and to counterbalance WTO rules. 203  The Commission 
advocates that such protocols will benefit cultural exchanges and diversity and are 
envisaged as a means to put into practice the UNESCO Convention’s provisions 
concerning culture, trade, and development. In addition, it seems to be a good tool 
able to gather global support.204  
Nevertheless, the Commission retained some of the criticisms raised and 
changed parts of the content of the final Korea Protocol version. This is what emerges 
when looking at the first draft and the final draft of the Korea Cultural Protocol, and 
from comparing the final version with the CARIFORUM Cultural Protocol. More 
generally, the criticism affected the whole negotiation strategy adopted by the 
Commission, which in the end gave up on the practice to annex the Protocol to the 
main agreement and developed it under new forms, as in the case of Central America 
and the Andean Community.  
4.2.2) Comparing the EU-CARIFORUM and the EU-South Korea Cultural 
Protocols 
 
Although at first glance the EU-CARIFORUM and the EU-KOREA Cultural 
Protocols may seem almost identical, some differences between the two have been 
underlined since the initial drafting of the Korean Protocol. Starting from the 
beginning, whereas the EU-CARIFORUM Protocol refers in the preamble to the 
implementation of Articles 14 and 16 of the UNESCO Convention, the preamble of 
the first version of the EU-Korea Protocol mentioned Articles 7, 11,12, 20 and 21 of 
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the Convention, namely those best-efforts provisions referring to strengthening 
international cultural cooperation without establishing clear duties. In the final version 
of the EU-Korea Protocol there is no mention of this set of Articles, but just a general 
reference to the UNESCO Convention and its principles. So, while in the EU-
CARIFORUM case the accent is on development and preferential treatment, there is 
no reference to such elements in the Korean Protocol. In addition, the latter one 
indicates that the protocol has to take into account the degree of development of both 
parties and, consequently, the different nature of cultural cooperation pursued. 
Further, this Protocol is based on strict reciprocity and balance on the basis of Article 
12 of the UNESCO Convention, whereas the Protocol with EU-CARIFORUM 
countries is asymmetrical by nature. Both Protocols have the enhancement of cultural 
exchanges and cultural cooperation as their objectives, however the change in the EU-
Korea Protocol’s preamble seems to reflect the acknowledgement that Korea has 
well-developed cultural industries which do not necessitate the same preferential 
treatment granted to the Caribbean countries. 
A more significant difference is given by the mechanism to solve possible 
disputes arising in the framework of the Protocols. Vis-à-vis the EU-CARIFORUM 
Protocol, the EU-Korea Cultural Protocol puts more stress on the institutional 
framework to control the follow-up of the Protocol’s content. Indeed, it established 
the creation of a Committee on Cultural Cooperation to monitor the implementation 
of the Protocol,205 made of senior officials with expertise and experience in cultural 
affairs and to which parties can ask for consultations about issues concerning the 
application of the Protocol. In addition, it is made clear that the Committee on 
Cultural Cooperation and the Trade Committee set up within the EU-Korea FTA are 
two independent and distinguished bodies. In particular, it is specified that the Trade 
Committee has no jurisdiction over the Cultural Protocol and the Committee on 
Cultural Cooperation shall exercise all functions of the Trade Committee as regards 
the implementation of the Protocol.206 Such clarification has been introduced to 
exclude all possible hints of a trade-oriented approach to the Protocol and ensure, as 
much as possible, a cultural cooperation approach to it. Moreover, Article 3 
establishing the Committee on Cultural Cooperation is complemented by the new 
Article 3BIS concerning the dispute settlement in the final text of the Korea’s 
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Protocol. Article 3BIS establishes that in case a dispute arises and the Committee 
does not reach a consensus, a general arbitration procedure as envisaged under 
Chapter Fourteen (Dispute Settlement) of the main Free Trade Agreement can be 
initiated, according to the following modifications: all the references in Chapter 
Fourteen to the Trade Committee shall be understood as referring to the Committee 
on Cultural Cooperation and the arbitrators must have necessary knowledge and 
experience on the subject matters of the Protocol.207  It is clear that there is the will to 
keep any dispute referring to the content of the Protocol independent from the Free 
Trade Agreement.  
Besides these aspects, the most striking differences are probably those 
concerning provisions on the audiovisual cooperation. The parallel Article 5 in the 
EU-CARIFORUM Protocol is divided into two provisions in the EU-Korea Protocol, 
separating audiovisual co-productions from other audiovisual cooperation.208 As far 
as it concerns audiovisual co-productions, the EU-Korea Protocol sets stricter 
requirements than those in the EU-CARIFORUM Protocol by demanding higher 
thresholds for a balanced financial and artistic input by the Korean and European 
producers participating in a co-production.209 Also the requirements for qualifying co-
productions as a European work are more severe: EU Member States involved in the 
co-production must be at least two; while in case of animation co-productions, they 
should be at least three. Moreover, the co-production system can benefit from this 
entitlement on a limited temporal frame (for three years), after which it will be 
evaluated in order to assess the results of the implementation of the entitlement in 
terms of enhancement of cultural diversity and mutually beneficial cooperation on co-
produced works.210 A balanced cooperation over time is also preserved through a 
suspension mechanism, which can be activated if one of the parties was to modify its 
cultural content legislation in a way that adversely affects the other co-producers.211 
The final text of the EU-Korea Protocol seems to have been influenced by the 
criticism raised during the drafting of its first version. The EU members were ready to 
accept this Cultural Protocol only after the changes concerning audiovisual 
                                                
207 Article 3BIS(a)(b), ibidem. 
208 Article 5 and Article 6, ibidem.  
209 Minimal financial participation cannot be lower than 30% (Article 5.6(d)). 
210 It can be renewed for other three years, unless one of the parties wishes to end it. 
211 Article 5.10, ibidem. 
  198 
coproduction were made.212 In the end, through the basis of their participation, 
Member States highly influenced the outcome of the protocol’s negotiations. It is 
clear that the interests at stake underlying the adoption of the EU-CARIFORUM 
protocol and the EU-KOREA protocol are very different and a mere transposition of 
the CARIFORUM model to the Korean case would have not been appropriate. The 
high level of development of the cultural industries in Korea is considered a major 
threat by the EU member States: offering the same conditions for a preferential 
treatment to audiovisual co-productions would entail a risk for the protection of 
cultural diversity, which should be the overall priority of all the protocols. 
 
4.3) Cultural Protocols to the Trade Association agreement with Central 
America and the Trade Agreement with Perú and Colombia 
 
Since the negotiation and adoption of the EU-Korea Cultural Protocol were 
rather complicated and attacked both by EU Member States and civil society 
stakeholders, the Commission had to take seriously this criticism and changed its 
strategy to negotiate cultural protocol together with trade agreements. With regard to 
the Andean countries – Peru and Colombia – as well as with Central America, the 
negotiations concerning a Cultural Protocol have not been carried out in the same 
negotiation framework of the major trade agreement. They have still been 
simultaneously negotiated, but they are not annexed to it. The Cultural Protocols 
adopted in these cases are two stand-alone agreements on cultural cooperation. 
Although their title and structure look rather similar to the EU-CARIFORUM and the 
EU-Korea Protocols, some differences are clearly visible in the content. No 
preferential treatment on co-productions in the audiovisual sector has been included in 
these frameworks. In the case of negotiation with the Andean Community, 
audiovisual co-production – and in particular co-production of television programmes 
in the Colombian case – has been a controversial issue.213 No agreement has been 
reached on this topic and the Protocols do not contain specific connections to trade 
but only best-efforts provisions to enhance cultural cooperation. This is probably why 
they are disconnected from the main trade agreement altogether.  
                                                
212 J Loisen and F De Ville, above (n 118), 264. 
213 Ibidem, 264. 
  199 
However, the case of Central America is slightly different: it is a stand-alone 
agreement on cultural cooperation whose provisions are attached to the cooperation 
provision on cultural and audiovisual matters included in the Association Agreement. 
Indeed, title VIII of the Association Agreement between the EU and Central America 
is dedicated to culture and audiovisual cooperation. It does not contain very detailed 
provisions concerning co-production, nor are clear duties in the field of audiovisual 
cooperation established. Under Title VIII the Parties are encouraged to promote 
cultural cooperation through the enhancement of balanced cultural exchanges and 
intercultural dialogue.214 The UNESCO Convention is also recalled and parties shall 
coordinate their action under its umbrella. In particular, cooperation shall include 
promotion of cultural diversity, including that of the indigenous peoples and cultural 
practices of other specific groups, as well as the education in autochthon languages.215 
Such provision does not appear in other contexts, like the Caribbean or the Korean 
framework. It is evident that different interests were at stake in the negotiation with 
Central America, namely the protection of indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage and 
their traditional lifestyles. Such concerns are also linked to developmental issues, 
specifically when talking about the relationship between traditional knowledge (that is 
part of their intangible heritage) and intellectual property rights. However, this issue 
will be further addressed in Chapter 5 dedicated to culture and intellectual property 
rights. 
As for the trade agreement concluded between the EU and Perú and Colombia, 
not many provisions concerning cultural industries and cultural goods and services are 
present in the main text of the agreement. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the EU 
attitude towards the treatment of audiovisual services, the audiovisual sector is always 
recalled among the exceptions to the application of the rules aiming at further 
liberalisation, such as those affecting the establishment in any economic activity or 
the supply of services.216 Although directly referring to cultural products only when 
listing the exceptions to the application of the agreement’s provision, the trade 
agreement with Peru and Colombia deals with culture and development in its title VII, 
concerning Intellectual Property Rights and traditional knowledge.217 Under title IX 
dealing with trade and sustainable development, there is no mention of culture, 
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whereas there are provisions clearly referring to the sustainable use of natural 
resources, the protection of biodiversity, the enforcement of international 
commitments concerning climate change and other environmental issues, as well as 
the enhancement of the respect of social and labour rights. Nor are there specific 
references to action supporting and promoting technical and financial assistance to the 
cultural industries under the section concerning technical assistance and trade 
capacity building.218 It seems that the broader vision of a sustainable development 
inclusive of culture and to be realised through the contribution of cultural activities 
does not apply to this trade agreement. 
 
4.4) Current developments and some interim remarks 
 
The Cultural Protocol adopted in the framework of the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA launched the season of the enhancement of cultural exchanges through an ad hoc 
instrument linking up trade and cultural cooperation in bilateral negotiations. Cultural 
Protocols can be considered a valuable tool promoting culturally enriching and more 
balanced exchanges, without challenging the need for a specific legal treatment for 
cultural goods and services in trade agreements and without requiring commercial 
market access commitments beyond those that the Parties are willing to grant. From 
this perspective, Cultural Protocols are a useful tool to implement principles and 
obligations of the UNESCO Convention: they promote a balanced approach between 
trade openness and the protection and promotion of cultural diversity. Further, the 
first two Protocols grant sufficient flexibility to Member States for maintaining the 
largest policy space possible for existing and new national cultural measures, while 
indicating new methods and means supporting intercultural exchanges.219 In the case 
of the Cultural Protocol with the CARIFORUM, the development precepts of the 
overall EPA context added new strength to the cultural cooperation framework by 
offering CARIFORUM contractual suppliers cultural services binding market access 
to the EU.  
Nonetheless, the drafting strategy of the two first Cultural Protocols has been 
harshly criticised at different stages and the Commission had to change its practice to 
accommodate the various requests. In particular, the need for a differentiated 
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approach, tailored on a case-by-case assessment of the different conditions of 
development of national cultural industries and the relevant cultural contexts emerged 
as an issue to be addressed. In particular, Member States brought this aspect to the 
fore at the time of the FTA negotiations with South Korea, and influenced the 
following practice of the Commission. Indeed, although at a first look all three 
Cultural Protocols and the stand-alone Cultural Cooperation Agreement concluded 
with Perú and Colombia may appear identical, it has been shown that their content 
varies according to the conditions of cultural industries, general development of the 
parties involved and major interests at stake. In some cases, the protocols are attached 
to the major trade agreement and complete the cultural provisions included in it. In 
the case of the Agreement with Perú and Colombia, parties opted for an independent 
tool to strengthen cultural cooperation. At the time of writing, no new Cultural 
Protocols have been concluded, whereas a considerable number of bilateral trade 
agreements has been signed. The negotiation of a protocol on cultural cooperation 
with Central Africa in the context of the EPA is ongoing; in the case of trade 
negotiations with Singapore, a cultural protocol was considered inappropriate because 
of the missed ratification of the UNESCO Convention and a lack of national policies 
and measures to support cultural diversity.220 In the case of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement concluded with Iraq in 2012 – the first trade agreement 
signed between the EU and this Country – no cultural protocol is annexed to it, but 
the Agreement integrates a more general provision on bilateral cultural cooperation 
which makes – inter alia – express reference to the UNESCO Convention.221 Within 
the frame of the Canada-EU CETA a cultural protocol was initially discussed, but 
then the idea was abandoned due to the large exemptions taken by both sides to the 
MFN in the cultural sector and the lack of a real added-value of such a framework in 
this specific case. In the ongoing negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the USA, the adoption of a 
cultural protocol seems not to be an option. Cultural issues other than strengthening 
the frame for cultural exchanges are crucial in the TTIP negotiations. The 
Commission and EU Member States are here concerned with keeping the audiovisual 
sector outside the trade agreement and the ability of the EU or EU Member States to 
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provide financial support to cultural industries.222 This approach shows that the 
Commission received the concerns and proposals expressed by Member States and 
stakeholders, 223  and is increasingly developing a case-by-case approach to 
mainstream the integration of culture within trade agreements. 
Returning to the concluded Cultural Protocols and the Cultural Cooperation 
Agreement, the most revolutionary aspect of the protocols is the inclusion of the 
audiovisual sector among the area of cultural cooperation (although this is not the 
case of the EU-Central America Cultural Protocol). This is complementary to the 
traditional exclusion of the audiovisual services from further liberalisation 
commitments in trade agreements retained by the EU. This should reassure Member 
States – especially France – cultural professionals, and stakeholders about the risk to 
open up the market for the audiovisual service.  
But, considering that no substantial change has been brought to the trade in 
audiovisual services and that most provisions are measures of cultural cooperation, do 
the cultural protocols really add something new to the trade and cultural relationship 
of the EU with third countries? To some extent, the answer can be a positive one. 
Certainly it is the first time that an ad hoc instrument with very detailed provisions 
and a mechanism of dispute settlement and control over its implementation has been 
adopted in the field of cultural cooperation. Further, the accent on cooperation may be 
a signal of the fact that cultural cooperation may be a more valuable path to foster 
cultural exchanges and promote cultural diversity than purely trade-oriented 
mechanisms. In addition, this strengthened cultural cooperation is integrated within a 
trade frame, or a “trade and development” frame like in the case of the EPA, so as to 
cope with the emergent needs to combine culture and trade within a more balanced 
scheme, as required by the UNESCO Convention, with a view to contribute to 
development goals.224 In fact, via the frame created by the cultural protocol, those 
countries that have kept a certain level of flexibility for preferential cooperation in the 
field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services by listing exemptions to the MFN 
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clause within the WTO enjoy possibilities for developing independent cultural 
exchanges with the EU under the form of cultural cooperation measures.225 Another 
positive aspect in terms of improvement to foster cultural exchanges through 
cooperation schemes is given by the introduction of co-production in the audiovisual 
sector. For example, in the case of developing countries, audiovisual co-productions 
may constitute a good opportunity to find co-funding partners, gain technological 
support, improve skills, and acquire better knowledge concerning the making of 
audiovisual products. In addition, the qualification of co-production products as 
European products grants them access to the EU market, offering the co-producers 
coming from developing countries the possibilities to make contacts and be known on 
the European scene. Nonetheless, some critics in the CARIFORUM countries argue 
that the percentage of the budget to be financed by CARIFORUM individuals or 
producers to qualify as a European work would be in practice very difficult for them 
to meet.226 Thus, this will not make it easier for Caribbean co-productions to enter the 
EU market. Other criticism towards the co-production provisions has been raised 
under the umbrella of the EU-Korea cultural protocol. Although the final version of 
the protocol adopted stricter financial thresholds for co-productions in order to be 
qualified as European products, most EU members fear that, given the level of 
development of the Korean audiovisual industry, Korean products will increasingly 
enter their markets and this may be detrimental for the protection of their cultural 
industries, as well as cultural identities. However, it should be recalled that all the 
provisions in the EU-Korea protocol should be implemented on a reciprocal basis. 
This entails that access to the Korean market should also be facilitated for the EU 
members. It is difficult to abandon traditional visions and old habits, however it may 
also be counterproductive to maintain a very protective approach in the audiovisual 
services and reduce the protection of cultural identities to trade provisions on market 
access. If it is true that cultural services have a double nature, then their social 
function as vectors of values, traditions, and knowledge also has to be recognised. To 
achieve this goal, they should circulate as much as possible. The final scope of 
cultural cooperation as framed in the EU cultural protocols is to foster the exchange 
of cultural goods and services in order to promote both economic development and 
                                                
225 E Psychogiopoulou, “The External Dimension of EU Cultural Action and Free Trade”, above (n 
214), at 86. 
226 KEA European Affairs, “Implementing cultural provisions of CARIFORUM-EU EPA”, above (n 
178), at 14. 
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mutual understanding. Therefore, it seems that co-productions can help to reach this 
goal. Then, for future negotiations of cultural protocols, it is important to bear in mind 
the differences among the partners and take into account their level of economic and 
technological development in order to avoid the trade and cultural dominance of the 
richer party over the others. For this reason, the principle of asymmetrical duties and 
reciprocity as a driving principle for the implementation of the co-production 
provisions may be helpful. 
Finally, in order to be more efficient in achieving sustainable development 
goals, it is desirable that the Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) usually 
undertaken by the Commission during the negotiation of a trade agreement will also 
include the assessment of potential cultural impacts of measures adopted within the 
frame of the Protocol. In fact the SIAs carried out in the agreements analysed here do 
not take into account possible cultural impacts.227 As observed in Chapter 2 in more 
general terms, the existing Strategic Impact Assessment and the Sustainability Impact 
Assessment do not take into account of cultural impacts (or at least only to a limited 
extent such as impact on tangible cultural heritage). This gap is related to the lack of a 
comprehensive understanding of sustainable development, in which culture does not 
play a relevant role except as a component of the social pillar. The time seems to be 
ripe for a broader inclusion of cultural considerations within these instruments. Prior 
consultation with stakeholders and cultural associations, which have been done for the 
cultural protocol with the CARIFORUM and South Korea, 228 should also be better 
structured and more transparent. In this respect, dialogue among decision-makers and 
stakeholders must be improved not only between the EU institutions, national levels 
and civil society, but also within Member States. 
 
                                                
227 Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements Summary of 
key findings, policy recommendations and lessons learned, May 2007; Trade Sustainability Impact 
Assessment of the EU-Korea FTA: Final Report – (Phase 3), March 2008 Revised June 2008; 
Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-ACP Economic EU-Andean Trade Sustainability Impact 
Assessment, Final Report October 2009; Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Association 
Agreement to be negotiated between the EU and Central America TRADE08/C1/C14 & C15 - Lot 2 
Final Report September 2008, all available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-
making/analysis/sustainability-impact-assessments/assessments/.  
228 Source: interview with the former legal adviser of the DG Culture and Education. The interview was 
conducted at a meeting during the 3rd Intergovernmental Committee on the Implementation of the 2005 
UNESCO Convention, held at UNESCO Headquarter, 7-11 December 2009, Paris. 
  205 
5) Concluding remarks: a critical appraisal of the EU action in culture and 
trade  
 
The protection and promotion of cultural diversity in the context of trade 
seems to be an eternal dilemma, whose solution can be achieved only at the price of 
one or the other. For the EU Member States, this issue appears as a double challenge: 
on the one hand, most States fear the risk that more liberalisation in trade in cultural 
services, especially audiovisual services, would undermine their national cultural 
industries and identities; on the other hand, they are concerned about the increased 
presence of the Commission in the international “trade and culture” arena. In 
particular, the EU ratification of the 2005 UNESCO Convention increased Member 
States’ scepticism, which saw in the growing action of the EU in the field of culture 
an attempt to erode their national competences. To the contrary, the EU ratification 
was warmly welcomed by other international actors, stakeholders and associations, 
which counted on the positive influence that the EU as a global actor could exercise in 
fostering the implementation of the Convention. Furthermore, since the adoption of 
the Convention, the Union took a step towards the integration of culture within all its 
external relations. 
As far as it concerns the Member States’ fears, they do not seem to have been 
warranted: several safeguard mechanisms are available under the EU constitutional 
treaties to guarantee the respect of the principle of conferral. In the pre-Lisbon asset, 
the action of the Union dealing with trade in culture in the multilateral frame was very 
much bound by procedural limits fixed under Article 133(6). According to this 
provision, agreements relating to trade in cultural, educational, and audiovisual 
services belonged to the shared competence of the EU and its Member States and the 
negotiation of such agreements required the joint participation of the EU and the 
Member States. We saw that such a mechanism highly influenced the EU approach 
towards agreeing to open the cultural services sector under the GATS: although 
through the cultural exception the EU aimed at preserving its internal acquis, the 
original position was not a full exclusion of cultural services from the GATS. Under 
current Article 207 TFEU, possibilities for Member States to apply a veto in trade 
negotiations are reduced: indeed, joint participation is no longer a requirement. Yet, 
paragraph (4) of Article 207 TFEU now replaces this safeguard clause by introducing 
the requirement of the unanimity vote for all the Council’s decisions concerning 
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cultural and audiovisual services. Although unanimity is not the rule, but only occurs 
when the agreements at stake risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural and linguistic 
diversity, Member States can still foresee the possibility for mixed agreements which 
allow their participation. This is the case when two or more different objectives are at 
stake and it is not possible to establish which one is predominant, so the agreement 
will be concluded on multiple legal grounds which may touch upon the shared 
competences of the Member States and the Union, as in the case of culture (see for 
instance the FTA with South Korea, which was adopted on both Article 207 and 
Article 167). Finally, Member States should bear in mind that the protection of 
cultural diversity is a constitutional objective of the Union: therefore a coherent 
external action in the field of culture and trade requires that the external commercial 
competence should be exercised in a way to be complementary with the cultural 
objectives under Article 167 TFEU.  
On the bilateral level the Union made a step forward towards the integration of 
trade and cultural objectives through the adoption of Cultural Protocols within the 
frame of trade agreements. As we saw, this strategy raised strong criticism regarding 
the way new Protocols on Cultural Cooperation were initially negotiated, yet the EU’s 
attempt offers a practical example of implementation of the principles included in the 
Convention and creates a favourable context for cultural exchanges. The new EU 
strategy seems to be aimed at striking a balance between the two opposite trends: a 
protectionist one, set up in the name of protecting existing cultural diversity, and a 
more liberalist one, calling for more cultural exchanges in the name of cultural 
diversity and more development. Also the adoption of co-productions as a framework 
for cooperation is positive. Nonetheless, Member States were able to maintain within 
the Union’s bilateral trade agreements the “cultural exception” for the audiovisual 
sector, which does not allow developing countries to gain access to the cultural 
market.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE EU VIS À VIS THE MOBILITY OF ARTISTS AND CULTURAL 
PROFESSIONALS 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1) Introductory note  
  
Enhancing the free flowering of ideas and the interaction of cultures is 
connected to the free mobility of artists and cultural professionals in the world. In 
Chapter 1, we clarified how artists and cultural professionals play a social, cultural 
and economic role and bring multidimensional benefits to the development of 
societies. We also saw that when artists and cultural professionals come from 
developing countries or difficult contexts, moving in the context of provision of 
services or for professional training is becoming increasingly difficult. These 
difficulties not only derive from economic and social disparities, but mostly from the 
fact that the movement of artists coming from developing countries is often 
assimilated to “migration”, a political minefield in many European and developed-
world countries. The overall situation is made more complicated by the lack of a 
harmonised definition of artists, and the lack of a regime for the recognition of 
diplomas and qualifications for cultural workers, which would facilitate the release of 
visas for the purpose of cultural exchanges.  
Since the ratification of the UNESCO Convention, the European Union 
committed to strengthen the framework for facilitating the cross-border mobility of 
artists and cultural workers and enhancing mobility of artists is among the core 
objectives of the 2007 Agenda for culture. Yet, the realisation of this objective faces a 
double challenge: on the one hand, the traditional aversion of Member States towards 
opening their borders to foreign providers of cultural services, especially in the 
audiovisual sector; on the other hand, the difficulties deriving from different and rigid 
economic migration regulation, a field belonging to national competence. Putting in 
place a coherent approach towards facilitating the transnational mobility of artists and 
cultural workers is quite a challenge for the Union.  
In this chapter I will firstly frame the issues deriving from the lack of the 
recognition of a special regime for artists and from their assimilation to migrant 
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workers in the framework of international regimes. Then, I will focus on the same 
issues within the frame of EU law. 
 
 
2) Culture and migration: mobility of artists and cultural workers under current 
international law  
 
2.1) Mobility of artists and cultural workers: the lack of a uniform regime 
 
It has been said that the overall question of mobility is strictly connected to the 
problematic definitions of the status of “artists” and “cultural workers”, and the lack 
of a harmonised international legal and policy frame addressing mobility as a 
fundamental condition of artistic and cultural professions. At the regional level, the 
European Parliament is among the institutions that have shown more awareness about 
this problem. In the 2003 report on creative industries, the European Parliament 
recalls that the cultural and creative industry “could not develop without the leading 
role of creators”, 1  and in its 2007 resolution on the Social Status of Artists 
acknowledges that “flexibility and mobility are indissociable in the context of 
professional artistic activity”, and, by virtue of this, stresses the need to “distinguish 
between mobility specifically relating to artists and that relating to workers in 
general in the EU”.2 The recognition of the need to differentiate artists from other 
workers calls for the need to guarantee a special treatment of this category under 
national and international law, in order to properly ensure their enjoyment of the right 
to free movement. The EU Parliament seems to be taking into account the peculiarity 
of the artistic and cultural professions. Assuming the category of artists and cultural 
professionals can be included within the broader category of ‘workers’ can be too 
reductive. Certainly, under legal and economic terms, artists and cultural 
professionals are workers since, either as self-employed or regularly employed, they 
undertake activities that have both cultural and economic value.3 Therefore, they are 
entitled to fully enjoy their economic and social rights and – with free circulation 
                                                
1Report on cultural industry of the Committee of Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport of the 
European Parliament, 14 July 2003, FINAL A5-0276/2003. 
2 European Parliament resolution of 7 June 2007 on the social status of artists (2006/2249(INI)), 
P6_TA(2007)0236, point E and point 12. 
3From a labour law perspective, artists are usually deemed atypical workers, because they easily switch 
from the self-employed status to that of salaried worker or to that of company head, all the while being 
able to combine one or another status. 
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being among such rights – to move freely for the purpose of creating, performing or 
supplying services. Yet, when treating them as ‘workers’,4 the special nature of their 
activity and the fact that mobility is an essential condition for such activity should be 
taken into account, in order to properly ensure their enjoyment of the right to freedom 
of movement. There is, thus, a need to differentiate the status of artists or cultural 
professionals from other workers, so as to guarantee a special treatment of this 
category both under national, regional and international law. 
Certainly, a uniform definition of the cultural-professional categories 
worldwide would facilitate the release of visas and work permits, contributing, in this 
way, to support cultural exchanges. To be more precise, it is the aim here to make a 
differentiation between issues deriving from the lack of a clear definition of the artist 
and a lack of a uniform definition of cultural professionals. In effect, even though the 
absence of a unanimously accepted definition of cultural professionals does not help 
to establish a uniform framework of provisions granting them special protection, it 
must be admitted that the existence of a contractual work relationship – though 
atypical – contributes to identify ‘who is a cultural worker’. The label usually refers to 
people involved in the field of creative industries and whose activity is patterned on 
the creative, innovative practices of the artist,5 such as distributors of films, festival 
promoters, cameramen, photographers, etc. Diversely, considering that artists quite 
often work as self-employed and outside the framework of regular work contracts, the 
lack of a uniform definition of the artist creates problems in order to distinguish ‘who 
is an artist’. Within the framework of International Organisations and academic 
research, several attempts to define a universal status for artists have been made, but 
with scarce practical outcomes. 6 At the international level, the most notable 
contribution to provide a universally accepted definition of ‘artist’ is given by the 
UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of the Artist,7 adopted in 1980. 
                                                
4 To avoid misunderstanding with the terminology commonly used under EU law, the world  “worker” 
is used here to indicate both employed and self-employed.  
5 G Yudice, The expediency of culture: Uses of culture in the global era Durham, NC, 2003, at 331. 
6 Capian and Wiesand observe in their report on the status of artists produced for the Commission that, 
traditionally, defining the term ‘artist’ has been difficult and, by consequence, it was ambiguously 
used. See: S Capian, J A Wiesand, The Status of Artists in Europe, ERICarts for the Directorate 
General, Policy Department Structural and Cohesion Policies, Bonn 2006, p. 7. Among the relevant 
authors on the subject, I quote here: R Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class – and how it’s 
transforming work, leisure, community and everyday life. New York, 2004; G Yudice, The expediency 
of culture: Uses of culture in the global era Durham, NC, 2003. 
7UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of the Artist, adopted on the report of Programme 
Commission IV at the thirty-seventh plenary meeting, on 27 October 1980. 
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However, before further discussing the provisions contained in the 1980 UNESCO 
Recommendation, it is important to focus on the interaction between cultural 
mobility, development and migration law and policy. In fact, broadly speaking, 
hindrances and obstacles to mobility affect all sorts of artist and cultural professionals 
from around the world. Nevertheless, the mobility of artists and cultural workers 
coming from developing and least-developed countries is more seriously threatened 
by regulative migration measures and visa policy. As will be underlined in the next 
paragraph, this sectoral mobility shows elements of connection with the broadest 
“migration and development” nexus. 
 
2.2) Association and (dis)similarities with the ‘migration and development’ nexus 
2.2.1) The migration and development nexus: an introduction 
 
Undoubtedly, the mobility of workers across borders is an integral feature of 
our modern globalised societies. However, today a great number of workers from 
developing and least-developed countries still move towards the wealthier parts of the 
world with the hope of finding a better life, attracted by work opportunities and higher 
living standards. Migratory movements can have multiple serious impacts on 
development: when migrants leave their countries looking for opportunities to gain a 
better life, sending countries are often deprived of their labour force and skilled 
workers. On the other hand, receiving countries benefit from the professional and 
labour contribution that migrants workers can bring to their economies, but, at the 
same time, have to deal with issues relating to the economic, social, and cultural 
accommodation of people coming from very diverse socio-cultural contexts. In 
addition, host countries also face challenges of irregular migration, whose control has 
become a priority in national, regional, and international agendas over the last few 
decades of increased international migration waves. 8  Migration presents, then, 
different challenges and opportunities to countries of origin, transit, and destination. 
                                                
8The 2012 World Population Prospect of the United Nation Population Division reports that net 
migration to the more developed regions has been increasing constantly from 1960 to 2010, with 
Europe being the major area with the highest level of net migration from 2000 to 2010. UN DESA 
Population Division, ‘World Population Prospect: The 2012 Revision, Highlights and Advance 
Tables’, ESA/P/WP.228, 2013, at 21. 
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For a long time, migration has been seen as a primary cause of brain drain, 
therefore aggravating problems of underdevelopment in the countries of origin, which 
remain unable to solve the structural conditions at the roots of migration. This 
negative approach considers migration as a factor increasing developmental 
disparities inter and infra regions and, by consequence, maintaining the conditions for 
more migration, creating a sort of vicious circle.9 Nevertheless, in the past years, the 
international community has shown a new and growing interest towards the 
‘migration and development nexus’, which has become the new formula to foster 
dialogue and cooperation between sending and receiving countries.10 For instance, in 
2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution International migration and 
development,11which calls upon all relevant international, regional and sub-regional 
bodies, agencies, and organisations to cooperate in addressing the issue of 
international migration and development, including a gender perspective and cultural 
diversity, in a more coherent way within developmental strategies.12 
The strengthened cooperation under the ‘migration and development nexus’ shows a 
shift from the negative approach to a more positive view: migration is eventually 
considered as a primary fact and an opportunity for development rather than a 
problem in itself or the failed outcome of development. In truth, the underlying ratio 
of the institutional initiatives at regional and international level dealing with 
‘migration and development’ aim at using development as a tool to control 
migration.13 
2.2.2) Similarities and dissimilarities between the mobility of artists/cultural 
workers and migrants’ circulation  
 
                                                
9This phenomenon is also known as the ‘migrant syndrome’, a theoretical framework according to 
which migration deploys a series of negative effects contributing to the ‘development of 
underdevelopment’ and, by consequence, creates more migrants. Further on this: J S Reichter, ‘The 
migrant Syndrome: Seasonal U.S. Labor Migration and Rural Development in Central Mexico’, (1981) 
40 Human Organization, 56-66. For an exhaustive analysis of the “migration and development” 
theories: H De Haas, “Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective”, (2010) International 
Migration Review, 227-264. 
10 See, for instance, recommendations and programmes under the Global Commission on International 
Migration, the International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM) or the UN High Level 
Dialogue on Migration and Development. 
11Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 6 March 2007,61/208 International migration and 
development, A/RES/61/208. 
12Ibidem, point 7, emphasis added. 
13V Chetail, “Paradigm and Paradoxes of the Migration-Development Nexus: The New Border for 
North-South Dialogue”, Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641210. 
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How is the case of artists and cultural professionals’ mobility connected to the 
migration and development nexus? As previously mentioned, major obstacles 
hindering artists and cultural workers’ mobility derive from visa and work permit 
issues. Artists and cultural workers coming from developing and least-developed 
countries – as well as from certain critical areas such as the Middle-East and 
Mediterranean areas – are those whose mobility is more hampered by visa and work 
permit issues. Artists and cultural professionals coming from disadvantaged contexts 
are often assimilated to all other migrant workers coming from developing or least-
developed countries: host countries, relying on a biased approach, deem that arts and 
culture are just a special channel to grant people coming from third countries a 
preferential treatment to cross national borders. Once having entered the country, they 
are alleged to stay longer and reside illegally in the country, thus increasing irregular 
immigration. 14 Because of such prejudices, artists and cultural professionals from 
developing countries receive a discriminatory treatment when applying for visas and 
entry permits, compared to their more famous colleagues from more privileged 
contexts. Besides this discrimination, it should be highlighted that the existing 
disparity of economic, social, and cultural conditions between the North and the 
South already heavily affects the possibility for artists and professionals coming from 
the South to travel for work purposes. 15 Most of them can only move thanks to 
bilateral agreements and cultural cooperation programmes, and frequently the nature 
of these exchanges shows the unfairness and imbalance between the Southern and the 
Northern position. Further the objectives of these exchanges are differently perceived 
by the parties and such different expectations lead Northern countries to raise barriers 
in order to stop the free movement of Southern artists and cultural workers, which 
could allegedly turn into an uncontrolled flow of migrants. By consequence, artists 
and cultural workers have to deal with national migration rules and increasingly 
restrictive policy.  
Mirroring the issue through the lens of migration and development, artists and 
cultural workers from developing countries temporarily moving to different contexts 
for the purpose of economic improvements, as well as cultural and professional 
                                                
14 In the report Visas/The discordant note, a respondent reflecting on the behavior of embassy’s 
officers, says that “Visa application procedures have huge human costs. Artists are subject to pointless 
queuing, often in disgraceful conditions and subject to disrespectful treatment by embassy staff.” 
Quoted in Chapter 1 (n 103) at 12.  
15 See para 2.3.2 in Chapter 1. 
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growth, can be seen as a specific category of migrants. Concerning mobility, it is 
worth noting that artists and cultural workers not only move to give live 
performances. For their education and professional growth, it is also fundamental to 
travel and reside for shorter or longer period in different countries, which can offer 
diverse cultural backgrounds and opportunities to train by acquiring new knowledge 
and better technologies. On the other hand, they enrich the economic and cultural 
contexts of host countries and create opportunities to foster dialogue among 
diversities. Facilitating the conditions to boost the mobility of artists and cultural 
workers is, therefore, a tool to contribute not only the economic dimension of 
development, but to the social and cultural ones as well. Nevertheless, a coin always 
has a double face: looking at the situation from the perspective of the countries of 
origin, they risk losing their artists and most qualified cultural professionals, who are 
a resource for local economies as well as for the cultural richness of the country.16 In 
this sense, facilitating artists and cultural workers’ mobility may be a cause of brain 
drain, with the consequent incapacity to remove the roots of underdevelopment.  
In my opinion, it is important to look at the whole set of issues bearing in 
mind that mobility of artists and cultural workers is mostly temporary and very 
atypical. Indeed, they move and reside abroad for shorter or longer periods, often 
changing country, sometimes in order to supply services, sometimes as self-employed 
individuals, and sometimes simply in search of inspiration. After moving abroad, they 
may come back to work and reside in the country of origins for certain periods of 
time. Under certain aspects, this sort of mobility can be assimilated to the so-called 
category of “circular migrants”, referring to the tendency of migrants to move back 
and forth between the source country and the destination country. Within the debate 
concerning migration and development, circular migration – together with return 
migration – is perceived as a solution to mitigate the effect of brain drain and to offer 
significant potential for both source and destination countries, as well as the migrant 
and his/her relatives in the country of origin.17 It fosters brain circulation, defined as 
the possibility for developing countries to draw on the skills, know-how and other 
forms of experience gained by their migrants. According to this idea, artists and 
                                                
16 On this issue, African countries have showed great concern regarding their African musicians. See: 
M Tchebwa, Musiques Africaines: Nouveaux enjeux, nouveaux defies ,(2005, éditions UNESCO). 
17 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Migration and Development: some concrete 
orientations, COM(2005) 390 final, at 25. 
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cultural professionals returning, even temporarily, to the country of origin are likely 
to lead to the transfer of skills, know how and/or new cultural attitudes. Removing 
obstacles to and facilitating circular mobility of artists and cultural professionals 
would help liberate the potential of brain circulation for development in the creative 
and cultural sectors.  
The mobility of artists and cultural workers certainly shares similar traits with 
circular migration, yet cultural artists and workers moving from developing countries 
cannot be fully assimilated to circular migrants. As discussed in Chapter 1, mobility is 
an inner element of artistic and cultural production and an essential condition for 
artists to work and provide services. In this sense, the reasons motivating artists to 
move are different from those of migrants. It is perhaps more appropriate to look at 
the issue of artistic mobility through the lenses of diversity. If artistic mobility must 
be promoted in order to avoid the risk of cultural homogenisation, it is important to 
ensure equal opportunities to travelling for artists coming from different parts of the 
world. For this purpose, provisions concerning the cross-mobility of services 
providers may prove to be useful: economic law can serve the cause of diversity. 
2.3) Possible solutions to facilitate the mobility of artists and cultural workers 
under international law 
2.3.1) The UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of the Artist 
 
A first step for overcoming the obstacles hindering mobility would be to have 
an internationally recognised definition of an artist. The most ambitious attempt in 
this sense is the UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of the Artist. The 
UNESCO Recommendation was adopted in 1980 with the scope to establish an 
overall framework for the conditions in which artists can exist as creative workers. At 
present, only a few States have ratified the 1980 UNESCO Recommendation and 
transposed it into national and regional regulations or cultural policies.18 Some 
attribute the failure of the UNESCO Convention to the fact that it contains more 
philosophical tenets concerning the role of culture and artists in society rather than 
detailed measures aiming at achieving and preserving such a role.19 Indeed, the 
definition of the artist given by the UNESCO Recommendation is mainly based on a 
                                                
18Only Canada, France, Germany and recently Latvia adopted a comprehensive framework of law and 
cultural policy implementing the Recommendation. Source: www.unesco.org. 
19See again Capian and Wiesand, above (n 6), at 5. 
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“merits-based” approach instead of touching upon the atypical elements justifying 
special provisions for the social treatment of artistic professionals. Article 1 of the 
Recommendation defines an artist as any person who creates or gives creative 
expression to, or recreates works of art, who considers his artistic creation to be an 
essential part of his life, who contributes in this way to the development of art and 
culture and who is or asks to be recognized as an artist, whether or not he is bound by 
any relations of employment or association.20 The definition, while underlying the 
merits of the artistic and creative process, seems quite abstract and does not 
effectively help to shape artists as a category of special workers, whose work needs to 
be assisted through special measures. As for the mobility aspect, the definition does 
not contain any reference to mobility as an essential feature of the status of the artist. 
However, under the title dealing with vocational and training aspects, the UNESCO 
Recommendation recognises that artistic life and the practice of the arts have an 
international dimension and asks the States Parties to “take all appropriate steps to 
promote the free international movement of artists, and not to hinder the freedom of 
artists to practice their art in the country of their choice”. Although not establishing a 
serious obligation upon the Parties, the Recommendation recognises in some way the 
importance of international mobility for artists and links it to the enjoyment of the 
right to work (“freedom of artists to practice their art”). However, in order to facilitate 
international mobility, no mention to visa facilitation in national legislations or 
regional agreements is given in the text of the Recommendation. Only soft-instrument 
or policy initiatives fostering cooperation, like the establishment of travel and study 
grants, are suggested.  
Ultimately, it is interesting to note that the Recommendation shows an 
awareness of the potential conflict between fostering cultural exchanges, preserving 
diversity, and local development. It recommends that States Parties, while promoting 
international mobility, ensure that this does not prejudice the development of 
endogenous talents and the conditions of work and employment of national artists, as 
well as to give special attention to the needs of traditional artists, in particular by 
facilitating their travel inside and outside their own country to serve the development 
of local traditions. 
                                                
20Ibidem, Article I.1. 
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In spite of the good intentions, because of its legal weakness the 
Recommendation did not succeed in establishing a common definition and a policy 
framework for artists at the global level. However it contributed to raise awareness 
about issues concerning the status of the artist and to nourish the debate over the need 
for a definition. Today, the most common definition of the artist in existing literature 
in the field of art and creative economies, refers to the artist as a person who gives 
his/her important contribution to the economic, social and cultural development of a 
society through its creative work.21 
 
2.3.2) The 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity 
 
Under the UNESCO aegis, a stronger contribution may derive from the 
adoption of the UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the 
diversity of cultural expressions in 2005, which celebrates cultural exchanges as a 
central element for development. The 2005 UNESCO Convention was welcomed by 
most cultural organisations representing professional artists, authors, and other 
cultural workers as an important reference towards a practical change of 
administrative procedures regarding visa and work permit procedures. Indeed, the 
Convention specifically addresses measures that are relevant to mobility in the 
cultural and creative sector. 
First, under Article 14 concerning cooperation to development, the 
Convention establishes a duty upon the Parties to cooperate with the aim to foster the 
emergence of a dynamic cultural sector in developing countries, by, inter alia: 
- facilitating wider access to the global market and international distribution 
networks for their cultural activities, goods and services (Art. 14, point a (ii)); 
- adopting, where possible, appropriate measures in developed countries with a 
view to facilitating access to their territory for the cultural activities, goods 
and services of developing countries (Art. 14, point a (iv));  
- providing support for creative work and facilitating the mobility, to the extent 
possible, of artists from the developing world (Art. 14, point a (v)). 
 
                                                
21 R Florida., The Rise of the Creative Class – and how it’s transforming work, leisure, community and 
everyday life. New York, 2004. 
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Through this provision on cooperation, the UNESCO Convention aims at creating 
equal opportunities for freedom of expression of the economically weaker cultures. 
The Convention asks developed countries to take all appropriate measures to facilitate 
mobility of both cultural works and workers, including artists, in order to enhance 
cultural flows and give developing countries a chance to use their cultural resources to 
build development. 
Nonetheless, the most relevant obligation is contained in Article 16, which 
establishes a preferential treatment for developing countries in the sector of cultural 
exchange. Article 16 states that “developed countries shall facilitate cultural 
exchanges with developing countries by granting, through the appropriate 
institutional and legal frameworks, preferential treatment to artists and other cultural 
professionals and practitioners, as well as cultural goods and services from 
developing countries’. Even if the provision addresses the movement of cultural 
goods and services and the free movement of artists and cultural practitioners, this last 
element is certainly the most innovative. For the first time, Article 16 clearly 
establishes a duty to facilitate, also through legislative measures, the mobility of 
artists and cultural workers from developing countries. Looking at the multilateral 
framework, this preferential treatment obligation is consistent with the ratio 
underlying the “Enabling Clause for Developing Countries” of the GATT and the 
general acceptance of WTO for differential and more favourable treatment for 
developing countries. 22  However, during the Convention’s negotiations, such 
provision was overly discussed and reshaped because of the implied implications on 
delicate national policies, such as migration and visa policy.23 The sentence “through 
the appropriate institutional and legal frameworks’ was inserted at the final stage of 
negotiations in order to reach an agreement among the parties, as if to confirm that 
States remain sovereign over their policies.  
Article 16 is a clear-cut obligation among the Parties whose non-fulfilment 
could turn into a dispute between them under the dispute settlement procedure of the 
Convention.24 Nevertheless, some argue that, despite its effort, Article 16 is likely to 
be reduced to a bona fide obligation because of the clause requiring compliance with 
the appropriate national institutional and legal frameworks, which conditions its 
                                                
22 For a general discussion on the Enabling Clause under the GATT: P Van den Bossche, The Law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organization, 2005, Cambridge University Press, at 679-682. 
23 For more details on this:  M C Ciciriello and F Mucci, quote in (n 88) chapter 3, at 130-132. 
24 Article 25 and Annex to the Convention rule the settlement of disputes. 
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application.25 Since its entry into force, States parties within the framework of their 
national legislation have set up no real changes to implement Article 16. However, the 
raised awareness around the issue pushed the Parties to promote studies and round 
tables aiming at finding solutions to overcome obstacles to mobility. Among the 
parties to the Convention, the EU, together with France and Canada, have been the 
most pro-active in this sense. As we have seen, the adoption of Cultural Protocol 
within the EPA with the CARIFORUM falls within the implementing actions of the 
2005 UNESCO Convention. Later in this chapter I will look at the relevant provisions 
concerning mobility contained in the Protocol. 
 
2.3.3) Solutions within the WTO framework: mobility under the GATS 
 
Once it is ascertained that artists and cultural professionals, from a legal point 
of view, are also workers, the possibility for mobility offered by Mode 4 of Article I:2 
of GATS26 deserves to be taken into account. Under GATS, services are supplied 
through one of the following four modes: 
Mode 1 - cross-border supply: supply from the territory of one Member into the 
territory of any other Member; 
Mode 2 – consumption abroad: supply in the territory of one Member to the 
service consumer of any other Member; 
Mode 3 – commercial presence: supply by a service supplier of one Member, 
through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member;  
Mode 4 – presence of natural persons: supply by a service supplier of one 
Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any 
other Member.27 
 
For the purposes of our analysis, the supply of services under Mode 4 is the 
most relevant. In fact, artists, but mainly cultural workers, temporarily move as 
providers of cultural services. According to Mode 4, services are supplied through the 
presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of another Member. Also 
under Mode 3, the service supplier moves across borders, yet under Mode 4 he/she is 
                                                
25M Hahn M.: “A Clash of Cultures? The UNESCO Diversity Convention and International Trade Law 
(2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law, 515-552. 
26 General Agreement on Trade and Services, signed 15 April 1994. 
27 Article I:2(a)(b)(c)(d) of GATS. 
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only present as a natural person and does not establish a commercial presence. Given 
that the free movement of natural persons across borders is involved, Mode 4 is likely 
to encroach with national labour migration rules and policy, although access to the 
labour market is not covered by GATS. Indeed, the Annex on Movement of Natural 
Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement, complementing Mode 4, clarifies 
that GATS does not apply to measures concerning access to the employment market 
and measures regarding citizenship, residence, or employment on a permanent basis.28 
Therefore, permanent migration is not covered by Mode 4, which only involves 
services provided by non-nationals that are self-employed or employees of a foreign 
employer, who have temporarily moved to another State.  
In light of this, Mode 4 potentially offers a path for managing labour 
migration and, in particular, for promoting circular migration schemes.29 The Annex 
on the Temporary Movement of Natural Persons encourages commitments within the 
entire range of skills: from lower skilled to highly skilled. Paraphrasing with the arts 
and culture labour sector, Mode 4 offers a scheme for mobility of cultural workers 
such as light technicians and photographer’s assistants and for highly skilled 
performers, such as musicians, dancers, art directors, etc. Recalling the principle of 
the Most Favoured Nation (MFN), at the heart of the WTO’s functioning, artists and 
cultural workers from developing countries should benefit from the same treatment as 
their colleagues from developed countries to access the cultural services market of all 
WTO Members.  
Nevertheless, the regulation of temporary mobility under Mode 4 remains 
quite unexplored and underestimated for several reasons. First, because of its 
connection to national political issues, such as the regulation of labour migration, 
most WTO members are sceptical towards the application of Mode 4. This is 
confirmed by the very few Mode 4 commitments undertaken during the Uruguay 
Round. 30 States remain biased towards the regulation of temporary migration under 
Mode 4 because of a gap under GATS commitments to manage irregular migration 
risks. There are no measures requiring regulatory obligations upon the source country 
                                                
28 Point 2 of the Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement. 
29M Panizzon “Standing together apart: Bilateral migration agreements and the temporary movement of 
persons under “mode 4” of GATS”, Working Paper n. 77, University of Oxford, 2010. 
30 Only 17% of all WTO members’ commitments in low skills under Mode 4 were done at the Uruguay 
Round. Currently, Mode 4 flows represents a very small percentage of the global services trade (around 
5%). IOM, GATS Mode 4, http://www.iom.int//jahia/Jahia/about-migration/developing-miration-
policy.  
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to ensure the timely return of the service providers at the end of the contract. This 
means that liberalising low-skilled migration, where the risk for overstaying and the 
potential burden on the country’s social welfare system are higher, is not a good 
option under Mode 4 for WTO members. Instead, they prefer to use Mode 4 for 
highly skilled migration and to conclude bilateral migration agreements to regulate 
low skilled migration, which introduce obligations concerning returns.31 Such a 
situation entails two consequences mainly affecting developing countries’ interests. 
First, Mode 4 is likely to exacerbate the risk of brain drain because it fosters highly-
skilled labour liberalisation at the multilateral level, while the already limited 
liberalisation of low-skilled labour is left to unequal bilateral negotiations; and 
because there are no commitments upon receiving countries to reduce the risk of skill 
depletion in sending countries. 32 Second, privileging bilateral migration agreements 
mainly answers the host countries’ interests and needs, such as border control and 
return warranties, while Mode 4 of GATS would offer a less biased approach towards 
labour migration.33 According to some authors, because GATS Mode 4 disconnects 
labour mobility from migration, it is likely to apply a market-based logic of offer and 
demand to global migration governance rather than a border-control based approach.34 
Such a neutral approach would better suit developing and least-developed countries’ 
interests in market access to developed countries, whereas bilateral migration 
agreements do not really liberalise services market.35  
However, the potential for Mode 4 to regulate temporary (or circular) labour 
migration is challenged by major shortcomings deriving from the scheduling structure 
of GATS commitments. Indeed, through the Scheduling systems WTO members 
decide to what extent they are committed to liberalising their services market.36 The 
Schedule of commitments contains WTO members’ clarifications concerning the type 
                                                
31  See, for instance, the bilateral migration partnership agreement concluded by France or the 
cooperation agreement signed by Spain, as well as the Mobility Partnerships concluded by the 
European Union (which will be further discusses in Section II of this chapter). 
32M Panizzon, supra (n 29), at 9-10.  
33A Carzaniga, “A warmer welcome? Access for natural persons under preferential trade agreements’, 
in J A Marchetti and M Roy (eds.), Opening Markets for Trade in Services Countries and Sectors in 
Bilateral and WTO Negotiations, (2009, Cambridge University Press), at 500.  
34 Panizzon, supra (n 29), at 24; A Betts and K Nicolaidis, “The Trade and Migration Linkage: GATS 
Mode IV”, memo prepared for the Global Trade Ethics Conference, presented at Princeton University, 
19 February 2009. 
35M Panizzon, “GATS Mode 4 Trade and Labor Migration Agreements: A Tale of Two Speeds”’, 
(2010), 47 Dialogue on Globalization Occasional Paper Series, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, at 10. 
36 J P Trachtman, ‘The International Law of Economic Migration: Toward the Fourth Freedom’, (2009) 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, at 249. 
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of services sectors opened to foreign competition, how much market access is offered, 
the length of stay for the categories of persons included in the list and what equal or 
more favourable conditions will be applied to foreign services providers. The 
possibility to limit or exempt access to services sectors, to qualify and condition such 
access and the rigid structure of scheduling commitments, which are binding and 
difficult to modify, makes it hard to apply GATS Mode 4 on a broader scale. In order 
to fully deploy its potential benefits to international migrants and development, Mode 
4 under GATS requires some amendments, like the addition of regulatory clauses 
within the scheduling structure to ensure migrants’ timely return and to retain skill 
exhaustion.37 In any case, as we know, the GATS revision is proceeding very slowly 
and changes to Mode 4 do not appear to be at the top of the WTO Members’ 
agendas.38   
2.4) Some remarks: when migrants are not migrants 
 
The mobility of artists and cultural operators shares certain similarities with issues 
connected to migration and development, especially circular migration. Because of 
the peculiarity of the status of artists and the centrality of mobility for their creative 
activity, the assimilation to migrant workers can be reductive. In many cases, it is 
because artists coming from developing countries are alleged to move for migration 
purposes rather than for practicing and providing their services that they encounter 
difficulties when applying for visas. Unfortunately the UNESCO Recommendation on 
the Status of Artists is not of concrete help to solve issues deriving from this problem. 
So, while an international recognition of the category of artists is still missing, States 
play a relevant role in establishing rules and programmes that can facilitate the 
mobility of artists. Economic law appears in this specific case a more convenient 
frame to facilitate their mobility through channels concerning the freedom to provide 
services.  
                                                
37 Panizzon M., “GATS Mode 4 Trade and Labor Migration Agreements”, (n 29), 24-26. The author 
also highlights that there is a residual mandate from the Uruguay Round in Art. X GATS for WTO 
members to negotiate safeguard mechanisms to temporarily close markets to adjust labour market’s 
demands, but industrialized countries have so far refused to concretize this mission. Ibidem, at 28.  
38For a wider vision of proposals to improve GATS Mode 4 horizontal scheduling, see: L Puri, 
“Assuring development gains and poverty reduction from trade: the labor mobility and skills trade 
dimension”, UNCTAD Document UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2007/8, UN Publications (2008) 73-74 
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3) Mobility of artists and cultural professionals through the lenses of the Union  
3.1) The EU and the mobility of artists and cultural professional 
 
Within the EU’s architecture, freedom of mobility of workers is a central 
element that has gained more and more relevance in the new enlarged and globalised 
European context. Free movement of persons is one of the four freedoms established 
in the founding Treaty of Rome for the realisation of the internal market and, today, is 
also an important element of the EU strategy for growth and employment. 39 
Enhancing mobility of persons within Europe today also means dealing with the 
increased presence of third-country nationals.  
As far as the specific mobility of artists and cultural professionals in the EU is 
concerned, this has not always been among the priorities of the Union’s internal 
and/or external action. Special attention has been given to this issue since the 
establishment of the Culture 2000 programme (as highlighted in Chapter 2). However, 
it is with the entry into force of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of Cultural Expressions that the EU’s attention to this issue has been 
emphasised. Following this ratification, the Union is committed to enhancing cultural 
exchanges both on the internal and the external level. The European agenda for 
culture in a globalizing world, adopted by the Commission in 2007, recognises 
mobility as a cross-cutting theme in the three civil society platforms (Access to 
Culture, Cultural Industries and Intercultural Dialogue) and as a means to facilitate a 
structured dialogue with the cultural sectors, which is fundamental in order to 
promote the European cultural heritage, to foster creativity and enhance social 
cohesion and multicultural understanding.40 The improvement of the conditions for 
the mobility of artists and other professionals in the cultural field is, then, 
instrumental to achieve the objective under article 167 TFEU and was among the 
priorities of the 2007 European Agenda for Culture. 
The renewed EU emphasis on the need to improve and foster cultural 
exchanges is paralleled by an increasing understanding of the relevance of improving 
                                                
39 Point 3.3 of the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
“Common Actions for Growth and Employment: The Community Lisbon Programme”, COM(2005) 
330 final. 
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a ‘European agenda for culture 
in a globalizing world’ COM (2007) 242. See also the interview with Xavier Troussard, Head of Unit – 
Culture at DG for Education and Culture of the EU Commission, in Special Mobility e-zine - European 
Cultural Foundation, April 2007, by Cristina Farinha, available at http://www.eurocult.org/uploads/docs/598.pdf.  
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the transfer and the exchange of artists and cultural professionals as a way to promote 
development in this globalised world. At the same time, the EU seems to be well 
aware of the debate surrounding the need to protect and promote the diversity of 
cultures against the negative effects of fostering cultural exchanges in a globalised 
world.41 Within the EU context, this awareness has been recently confirmed by some 
research projects on the impediments to the mobility of artists, promoted under the 
conjoined initiative of UNESCO and the European Commission. 42 The state of the art 
in this field shows, indeed, that there are a number of difficulties that inhibit artists 
and cultural professionals from crossing their national borders and that the mobility of 
performing artists and cultural professionals within the EU is not without frontiers. 
On the one hand, since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the free 
movement of EU workers in the European Union is a fundamental right. The full 
enjoyment of this right is complemented by a system for the coordination of social 
security schemes and by a system to ensure the mutual recognition of diplomas. 
However, this system does not seem to be fully efficient because EU artists and 
cultural workers still encounter difficulties in working outside their national borders 
and the main hindrances to their mobility derive from a lack of harmonisation of the 
recognition of qualifications and social security regulations. On the other hand, third-
country national artists and cultural workers have to face – in addition to the above-
mentioned issues – even greater problems when trying to cross the EU borders. Also 
in this case, the major obstacles for artists coming from developing countries relate to 
the release of visas, work permits and the diversity of national migration policies.43 
Such domains fall within the area of shared competence between the EU and its 
                                                
41 The Union’s adoption of the 2005 UNESCO Convention follows this stream. On this point: C B 
Graber, Substantive Rights and Obligations under the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, in 
Hildegard Schneider and Peter van den Bossche, (eds), Protection of Cultural Diversity from an 
International and European Perspective, 2008, 141 
42 E.g.: O Andeoud, Study on the Mobility and Free Movement of People and Products in the Cultural 
Sector, Study No DG EAC/08/00, Study for the Commission and the Directorate General Education 
and Culture, Partnership CE JEC- Université de Paris 2002; S Capian, A J Wiesand, The Status of 
Artists in Europe, ERICarts for the Directorate General, Policy Department Structural and Cohesion 
Policies, Bonn 2006; D Cliche, A J Wiesand, Arts and Artists in Europe: New Challenges, ERICarts, 
Bonn 2007; R Polacek, Study on impediments to mobility in the EU Live performance sector and 
possible solutions, Mobile.Home, Brussels 2007. These studies have involved the participation of 
cultural associations, leagues of artists, cultural professionals and other relevant stakeholders in the 
field.   
43 The European Parliament also showed concerns about this problem. Point E of the EP Resolution on 
the Social Status of Artists recognises that artistic productions frequently involve Third Country 
performers whose mobility if often restricted by difficulty in obtaining medium-term visas. EP 
Resolution on the Social Status of Artists, references above quoted.. 
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Members. Despite the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which establishes the 
ambitious objective of a common immigration policy, there is still no full 
harmonisation in the field of visas, asylum and immigration in the Union. Given the 
increase of migrant flows from the South and threats to security posed by terrorism, 
most of the Member States are adopting restrictive migration policies likely to affect 
the mobility of third-country artists and cultural workers. Yet, if we look at some 
initiatives on the external level – like the Cultural Protocols trying to facilitate the 
entry into and temporary stay of performing artists, cultural professionals and 
practitioners in the EU’s territories – it seems that the Union is following an inverse 
trend. However, the facilitation of the mobility of artists and cultural professionals 
coming from third countries is not as easy a task as it might appear. To the contrary, it 
is a delicate topic since it overlaps with other sensitive areas where Member States’ 
competences and national interests have a relevant weight. Before analysing what 
solutions exist in the framework of the Union’s external multilateral and bilateral 
relations and current EU law regulating regular labour migration, it is important to 
have a quick look at the EU competence in these delicate areas and the evolution of 
the European migration policy. 
 
3.2) The EU competence on external borders and the evolution of the European 
migration  
 
Initially, a common migration policy was not included among the objectives 
of the European integration process. The term “immigration” did not appear in the 
founding Treaties, meaning the absence of an established legal basis for the EC/EU 
competence in this area. However, like most of the subjects not included in the 
Treaties, migration increasingly became a matter of interest for the EC/EU because of 
its interaction with the EU Treaties’ objectives, namely the realisation of the four 
fundamental freedoms.44 Indeed, free movement of persons and services involve 
migration related aspects. The lack of harmonisation concerning these aspects and the 
fragmented governance deriving from the different national provisions regulating 
third country nationals’ residence entailed risks for the full realisation of the internal 
                                                
44 Being precise, some references to Third Country nationals can also be found in the EEC Treaty: the 
second paragraph of Article 59 extended the rules to nationals of third countries who provide services, 
so long as they are established within the Community. However, this option has never been exercised. 
See: A Coninanzi, A Lang, B Nascimbene B., Citizenship of the Union and Freedom of Movement of 
Persons, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 201. 
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market. Around 1970, when migration flows towards Europe started to become more 
significant, to reach a certain degree of coordination among the Member States 
became a priority within the EU’s Agenda. The first attempts towards such 
coordination were made by the Commission with the adoption of Regulation 1408/71 
extending the protection of Community’s social security rights to third-country 
workers in the territory of the EU.45 The full extension of social rights to non-
Community workers, however, occurred only in 2003.46 
Legislative initiatives dealing with migration policy issues have been the 
object of an intense competence debate. Member States have persistently challenged 
the legitimacy of the EU’s legislations on the ground of a lack of competence. 
Claiming for the preservation of their national spheres of competences, Member 
States have always preferred intergovernmental cooperation to regulate migration’s 
issues at the Community level. Such competence skirmishes often left migration 
policy regulations in a sort of limbo between intergovernmentalism and the 
Community’s method.47  
The adoption of the Single European Act, adopted to re-launch the common 
market goal and provide the EC with a set of new legal foundations for the adoption 
of relevant measures, represented a small step forward for the harmonization of 
borders controls and visa rules. It did not confer any specific competence on 
migration to the EC institutions, but the reinvigorated abolition of controls at the 
internal level called for a strengthening of controls at the external borders, which 
necessitated common rules for visas and asylum in all the Member States. The latter 
opted for strengthening intergovernmental cooperation in this sense, however the 
Community’s institutions were increasingly involved in these forms of cooperation.48 
The following adoption of the Schengen Agreement (1985), establishing certain 
common provisions for external border control and the release of short-term visas, 
was an additional part of the construction of a common migration policy. However, it 
was with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, and the following amendments 
                                                
45 Regulation No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971. 
46 Regulation No 859/2003 of May 2003 extending the provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 and 
Regulation No 574/72 to nationals of third countries who are not already covered by those provisions 
solely on the ground of their nationality. 
47 G Papagianni, Institutional and Policy Dynamics of EU Migration Law, (Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 
2006), 1, 42-51. 
48 For a detailed description of the debate surrounding the SEA on this issue see again: Papagianni, 
ibidem, 9-13; Coninanzi et al., supra (n 44), 205-209. 
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brought by the Amsterdam Treaty, that a real improvement for a common migration 
policy was reached. Title IV of the Treaty on European Union finally established the 
EU’s competence in the field of immigration, by introducing the third-pillar of the 
EU’s temple devoted to justice and home affairs. This pillar set rules for 
intergovernmental cooperation between the Member States concerning immigration 
policy, conditions of entry, movement and residence of third countries and the fight 
against illegal migration.49 If the Maastricht Treaty was still marked by a strong 
attachment to intergovernmentalism, the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
provided for the communitarisation of relevant aspects of migration policy by moving 
them from the third-pillar to the first. Article 63, under the new Title IV of the Treaty 
of Rome, conferred the competence to the Council for some aspects on visas, asylum, 
immigration and other policies related to the free movement of persons. Through a 
Protocol Annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Schengen acquis was integrated 
into the EU framework.50 
Certainly the Treaty of Amsterdam provided a strong legal basis for the EU to 
enact a common migration policy. However, the exercise of such powers was 
hindered by the partial character of the communitarisation of the former third pillar. 
In fact, not all of the Member States were involved in this change51 and the 
communitarised provisions preserved intergovernmental features, which are reflected 
in primis in the choice of submitting the decision-making process to the unanimity 
vote.52 Indeed, today, the European migration policy is mainly constituted by a 
fragmented body of regulations and directives concerning third-country nationals’ 
entrance, movement and residence in the EU, which are often mismatched with the 
intentions and goals declared by the EU institutions.53  In 1999, the first multiannual 
programme on the EU’s area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), held in 
Tampere, contained an Agenda for the development of a “Union for Freedom, 
Security and Justice” during the years 1999-2004 and called for a common EU policy 
and approach to be progressively established on issues such as labour immigration, 
integration of third countries nationals (TCNs), external border controls and asylum, 
                                                
49 Article K(1)(3) of the Treaty on the European Union, 1992. 
50 Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union. 
51 Ireland and the UK are out and Denmark is only bound on the basis of an international agreement. 
52 Papagianni, supra (n 47), 25-45. 
53 E.g.: the Long-Term Residents directive, the Family Reunification Directive. 
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in order to make “full use of the possibilities offered by the Treaty of Amsterdam”.54 
In terms of implementations, the ambitious political goals of the Tampere Programme 
did not always correspond to legislative initiatives. Such discrepancy is mostly 
attributed to the difficulties to reach an agreement during the decision-making 
process.  
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which introduced important 
transformations to the legal foundations of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
and its policies on migration, borders and asylum, together with the endorsement of 
the Stockholm Programme by the European Council – the third multiannual 
programme setting a new AFSJ political agenda for the next five years – in December 
2009 created great expectations in terms of strengthening the EU powers and, finally, 
achieving a uniform common immigration policy.55 The Treaty of Lisbon extended 
the Union’s competence in the field of migration and the ordinary legislative 
procedure (the former co-decision) to measures on the visa format, the visa list, as 
well as to aspects concerning labour migration.56 Indeed, by extending the ordinary 
legislative procedure to this sector, Article 79 TFEU confirmed the existence of a 
legal competence by the EU to legislate in the field of legal economic migration. In 
addition, according to some authors, by recalling that that the provision of this Article 
shall not affect the exclusive right of Member States to determine volumes of 
admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in 
order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed, the Treaty gave the 
competence to the EU for legislating on labour immigration policy covering other 
aspects of the admission of economic migrants, such as the technical aspects of the 
admission process or the grounds of admission.57 As Carrera argues, the existence of 
such a competence on the internal level leaves the door open for an implied external 
competence of the Union to undertake legal initiatives concerning labour migration 
issues also in its relations with third countries.58  
                                                
              54 European Parliament, Tampere European Council 15/16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions. 
55 S Carrera, “The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon over EU Policies on Migration, Asylum and Borders: 
The Struggles over the Ownership of the Stockholm Programme”, in E Guild and P Minderhoud (eds), 
The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law, (2012, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 229-254.  
56 Articles 77-79 of the TFEU. For a detailed analysis of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty in 
the field of migration, see, inter alia: Carrera, ibidem; S Peers., E Guild. and J Tomkin (eds), EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary): Second Revised Edition. Volume 1: Visas and 
Border Controls, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 7-31. 
57 Article 79.5 TFEU. For the interpretation in this sense, see Peers (2008) quoted above. 
58 Carrera, supra cit., at 248. 
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This new phase of the common migration policy, however, did not have a 
shining beginning. In fact, the Commission’s Action Plan to implement the 
Stockholm Programme, ‘Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for 
Europe’s citizens’,59 published in 2010, was perceived by certain EU Members as an 
attempt of the Commission to go too far beyond the Council’s guidelines and, for the 
first time since 1999, the AFSJ has witnessed a direct clash between the Council and 
the European Commission over the ownership of the policy and legislative agenda 
stipulated inside the Stockholm Programme.60  
In spite of the re-allocation of areas like cooperation on migration, borders and 
asylum to the shared EU competence, a strong “intergovernmentalism” is still 
influencing the governance of such domains. This mainly translates into the transfer 
of national political priorities at the EU policy level, which has led and still leads to 
the frequent re-shaping of the EU agenda and challenges over the existence of legal 
grounds for the Commission to enact legislation in these fields.  
3.3) The EU approach to the Migration and Development nexus  
 
Notwithstanding the piecemeal development of EU migration policy, an 
increased number of issues related to the management of immigration flows has been 
covered by EU legislation and policy documents. In order to overcome the difficulties 
in reaching an agreement within the Council on legislative proposals concerning 
migration matters, the Commission often adopted a sectoral approach by choosing to 
address specific targets like categories of persons61 or the readmission of migrants in 
the country of origin.62  
In 2000, in the Communication on a Community Immigration Policy,63 the 
Commission suggested following a two–tier approach: to define a common legal 
framework on admission of economic migrants and to launch an open coordination 
mechanism on Community immigration policy. Since then, the EU’s attention 
                                                
59 Commission Communication, Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s 
citizens: Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 171 final. 
60 This skirmish is also known as the Stockholm Affair. For more details on this, see Carrera, supra 
cit., at 230. 
61 E.g.: Directive 2004/114/EC on admission for the purpose of studies, pupil exchanges, 
unremunerated training and voluntary service; Directive 2005/71/EC on the admission of Third 
Country researchers; Directive on Long-Term residents; Directive for highly skilled persons (see infra 
para. 5.1.2) 
62 Several agreements containing readmission clauses have been concluded by the EU, both within the 
bilateral and multilateral framework. 
63 COM(2000) 757 of 22 November 2000. 
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towards the economic aspects of migration has grown significantly. The ambitious 
Tampere programme already included the management of economic migration within 
the goals of a comprehensive immigration policy, together with the fight against 
illegal migration. So far, due to the difficulties above highlighted, the adoption of 
legislative measures in the field of economic migration has been the most difficult. 
This, of course, has consequences also on the external dimension of the common 
migration policy, which is progressing through soft-power instruments rather than 
hard law tools.64 Indeed, the EU implied external competence is narrow, given the 
few far-reaching EU regulations dealing with migration aspects on the internal level. 
Most of the agreements concluded with third countries focus on the establishment of 
visa facilitations or cooperation against irregular migration and readmission, these 
latter topics being highly cherished by Member States. Nevertheless, in light of their 
tight connection to developmental issues, the economic aspects of migration gained 
increasingly attention within the external policy of the EU.  
In the 2002 Communication on the integration of migration issues within the 
EU relations with third countries65 for the first time the Commission explores the 
links between migration and development, taking into account issues concerning 
remittances, returns, brain circulation and skill depletion. The Commission looks at 
both negative and positive aspects of migration for the countries of origin and 
destinations and also recalls the necessity to promote coherence between the two 
policies.66 With this Communication, the EU endorses the root causes approach, 
which constitutes the first of its three-pronged strategy to boost cooperation on 
migration with third countries. When addressing the causes of migration, the 
Commission promotes a balanced overall approach, ranging from the promotion of 
human rights and democracy to combating poverty, preventing conflicts and 
improving the economic and social situation in general. The second prong of the EU 
migration strategy is to build a partnership on migration stemming from a definition 
of common interests with third countries, in order to more effectively manage 
migration flows. The Commission points out that the dialogue should focus not only 
                                                
64 A Wiesbrock, Legal Migration to the European Union, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), at 153. 
65 COM (2002) 703 final, 3.12.2002. 
66 The importance of ensuring coherence and consistency between migration and development is also 
reiterated in the Council/Commission Joint Statement on Consensus, see in particular: points 38, 49, 
110. (Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union 
Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’, (2006/C 46/01). 
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on illegal immigration but also on the channels for legal immigration. The third prong 
is the assistance to third countries in increasing their capacity in the area of migration 
management, supporting third countries in their efforts to deal with the problems 
associated with both legal and illegal migration. In 2005, the Commission published a 
Communication providing for some concrete orientation on migration and 
development.67 The Commission breaks down the whole set of questions concerning 
the migration and development nexus. Among the others, circular migration emerges 
as a useful tool to foster the transfer of skills to developing countries, together with 
other forms of brain circulation. In order to facilitate temporary migration, the 
Commission reiterates the necessity to improve access to short-term visas. 
Concerning the mitigation of the brain drain effect, the Commission admits that a 
uniform and simple answer is not possible, given the complexity of the issue. 
However, it has to be said that the Commission in the 2002 Communication proposed 
the idea of a EU code of conduct with a view to disciplining recruitment in cases 
where it would have significantly negative repercussions on developing countries. 
Yet, this proposal did not receive any follow-up: such a code of conduct would 
encroach on national policies concerning admissions’ quotas, an area of Member 
States’ exclusive competence.  
Circular migration has become a core goal of the EU’s Migration and 
Development Agenda. In 2007, the Commission released a new Communication on 
this topic, individualising mobility partnerships as an innovative instrument to favour 
this kind of migration.68 This is in line with the new Global Approach to Migration 
adopted by the EU. Indeed, in December 2005, the European Council launched the 
Global Approach to Migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa and the 
Mediterranean,69 which was subsequently endorsed by the Commission with the 2006 
Communication The Global Approach to Migration one year on: Towards a 
comprehensive European migration policy.70 The Global Approach, aiming to tackle 
migration comprehensively, addresses a vast range of migration issues and links them 
                                                
67 Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations, COM (2005) 390 final. 
68 On circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries, 
COM, (2007) 248 final 
69 Doc. 15914/05, 17.12.2005. The need to approach migration as a global phenomenon was firstly 
highlighted by the Commission in its Communication Priority actions for responding to the challenges 
of migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court COM (2005) 621. 
70 The Global Approach to Migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive European migration 
policy, COM (2006) 735. 
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together with various relevant policy areas including external relations, development, 
employment, and justice, freedom and security. Although the fight against irregular 
migration and the return of migrants remain high on the list of priorities of the Union, 
the Global Approach tries to go beyond the sectoral approach adopted so far and puts 
mobility at the heart of the tools to foster such an approach. The Global Approach 
foresees the adoption of a Mobility Packages with a number of interested third 
countries, which would enable their citizens to have better access to the EU. This has 
to be realised through ‘mobility partnerships’, which should combine the interests of 
the countries of origin and the Member States. Dialogue among the EU and third 
countries is, then, highly important to shape the content of the mobility partnerships, 
which should be tailored according to case-by-case interests. The stress on ‘mobility’ 
makes us think that such agreements will focus only on one aspect concerning 
migration: the mobility of third-country nationals across the external EU borders. 
However, as the Commission makes clear, a series of commitments is expected from 
the third country concerning the fight against illegal migration (although the 
commitment would differ from case to case).71 The Communication on the Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM),72  issued by the Commission in 
November 2011, further puts the accent on the mobility aspect and re-launches the 
visa dialogue within the broader framework of the Global Approach. This is always 
connected to the need to ensure legality within the framework of migration 
movements.73  
Although aiming at controlling and reducing migration, through its Global 
Approach to Migration the European Union seeks to ensure that the positive benefits 
of migration are harnessed to bring mutual benefit to the EU and its partner countries. 
The Policy Coherence for Development process is also instrumental to ensure such a 
delicate balance. However, it is quite striking that in all the documents and initiatives 
concerning this new comprehensive approach to migration, cultural aspects are rarely 
mentioned. Certainly, when the EU lists among its priorities the promotion of human 
rights and the need to take into account intercultural elements concerning migrants, 
                                                
71 COM, (2007) 248 final, supra (n 68), at 4. 
72 Communication on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM (2011) 743 final. 
73 The Commission says that the GAMM should be based on four equally important pillars: 1) 
organising and facilitating legal migration and mobility; 2) preventing and reducing irregular migration 
and trafficking in human beings; 3) promoting international protection and enhancing the external 
dimension of asylum policy; 4) maximising the development impact of migration and mobility. 
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cultural rights receive some attention. However, culture as a vector of development 
does not seem to be considered by the Union within its migration and development 
agenda.  
 
4) Mobility of artists and cultural professionals within the Union trade 
multilateral and bilateral framework 
 
If the facilitation of cultural mobility is not a target of the Union’s Global 
Approach to migration, after the entry into force of the 2005 UNESCO Convention 
this issue received great attention within the external trade framework. However, if 
bilateral negotiations reached interesting results through the adoption of the Cultural 
Protocols, the same outcomes are not being achieved within the multilateral 
framework of negotiations, namely the WTO. 
 
4.1) Implementing article 16 of the UNESCO Convention: cultural mobility in 
the bilateral trade agreements  
 
Agreements facilitating visa access are not a new thing within the framework 
of bilateral relations of the Union with third countries. Association and Partnership 
Agreements with third countries often contain special provisions in this field. The 
Association Agreement with Turkey, for instance, contains a facilitating regime for 
the admission of Turkish nationals. However, they also contain a clause on 
readmission and cooperation to combat illegal migration. The Cotonou Agreement 
goes even further: it integrates the goals of the EU migration agenda within the EU-
ACP partnership agreement and ensures equal treatment to ACP workers in the 
territory of the EU as a counterpart to their cooperation, but does not establish any 
initial right of entry to the territory of the Union.74  
None of the existing bilateral agreements concluded before the ratification of 
the UNESCO Convention contain provisions directly addressing matters related to the 
mobility of artists and cultural workers. In this sense, the Cultural Protocols annexed 
to the EPAs with the CARIFORUM and the Trade Agreements with Korea, Central 
America and Peru and Colombia constitute a real innovation. The Cultural Protocols 
so far adopted pursue the objective to put Article 16 of the UNESCO Convention into 
practice. The Cultural Protocol of the EPA with CARIFORUM establishes a duty 
                                                
74 Article 13, Cotonu Convention (references quote in footnote 96 of Chapter 2). See also: Wiesbrock, 
supra (n Error! Bookmark not defined.), 130-131. 
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upon the Parties to facilitate, in conformity with their respective legislation, the entry 
into and temporary stay in their territories of artists and other cultural professionals 
and practitioners from the other Party.75 A similar provision is contained in the 
Cultural Protocol annexed to the FTA with Korea (Article 4), in the Cultural Protocol 
with Central America (Article 3), and in the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation with 
Perù and Colombia (Article 5). These provisions do not contain a definition of 
cultural worker or artist, but they make a non-exhaustive list of the cultural 
professionals and practitioners that may enjoy the preferential regime.76 Since the 
most relevant provisions are very similar, when not identical, in all the mentioned 
agreements, as an example I will focus on the CCP within the CARIFORUM-EU 
EPA. According to Article 3 of the Protocol, artists, actors, technicians and other 
cultural professionals, included those working in the audiovisual sector, are allowed 
to stay in any EU state for periods up to 90 days in any 12-month period (provided 
that they are not engaged in commercial activities). The scope of this provision is to 
set better conditions for the entry into and the temporary stay in the EU (or the 
Cariforum) of artists and cultural professionals so as to facilitate their training, 
exchange of information, expertise and experiences and to make contacts. Previous 
EU trade agreements said almost nothing concerning the movement of artists: the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA is the first to have provisions of this manner, likely to have 
an impact on visa policy. The Protocol’s mechanism will be useful, in particular, for 
the smaller artists and entertainers and any cultural practitioners who do not yet 
operate as a firm or have a well-established position on the market and often 
encounter financial or technical difficulties to get a waiver or visa to travel into other 
countries.77 Through the Protocol, they should be granted the possibility to enter EU 
states under the cooperation element and, over time, develop contacts that can lead to 
commercial contracts. Yet, it must be recognised that the clause conditioning the 
granting of preferential treatment to national rules may hinder the full implementation 
of this provision. It would be ideal to have a standard visa procedure for the purpose 
of article 3 of the Protocol – agreed and applied by all the EU Members – but for now 
this is not a concrete option.  
                                                
75 Article 3 of the Cultural Protocol III. 
76 See, for instance, Article 3(4) of the Cultural Protocol III within the CARIFORUM-EU EPA.  
77 KEA European Affairs, “Implementing cultural provisions of CARIFORUM-EU EPA. How do they 
benefit the Caribbean cultural sector?”, Discussion Paper N. 118, European Centre for Development 
Policy Management, June 2011, at XII. 
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Further, as far as it concerns the Agreement with the CARIFORUM, the 
EPA’s market access provisions concerning the temporary presence of natural persons 
for business purposes on a partner’s territory (mode 4) and touching upon the 
entertainment services sector offer wider opportunities for artists and cultural workers 
coming from the Caribbean area to move within the frame of economic exchanges. 
With respect to this, it must be observed that the EU-Cariforum EPA differs 
substantially from the EU-Korea, the EU-Central America, and the EU-
Peru/Colombia agreements, as the EU Member States (with the exception of 
Belgium) have granted their CARIFORUM partners binding market access for the 
supply of entertainment services (other than audiovisual services) by contractual 
services suppliers (CSS). The market access provisions for the entertainment sector 
included under the chapter “Investment, trade in services and e-commerce” contribute 
to enhance the mobility of CARIFORUM cultural professionals. They grant, indeed, 
legally binding access to almost all the EU markets, including those significant 
markets where the culture-trade interface is a contentious and very sensitive issue, 
with the exclusion of the audiovisual sector. It is the first time that the EU and its 
Member State made significant market access commitments for the provision of 
entertainment services by professionals of third countries in the EU. We should bear 
in mind that developed countries are normally willing to allow the supply of 
entertainment services through investments and commercial presence, but 
immigration concerns make them more reluctant to allow the temporary entry of 
natural persons into their territories: from this point of view, the commitments made 
by most EU Member States (except Belgium) for the temporary entry of natural 
persons under the EPA are of particular relevance. A wide range of Contractual 
Service Suppliers (CCS) in entertainment services is addressed by these wider 
commitments, such as theatrical producers, singing groups, bands and orchestras, 
authors, composers, sculptors, entertainers and other individual artists, etc.78 As we 
                                                
78 Contractual Service Supplier include the following areas:  
CPC 9619 Entertainment services (other than audio-visual): 
• 96191 Theatrical producer, singer group, band and orchestra entertainment services 
• 96192 Services provided by authors, composers, sculptors, entertainers and other 
individual artists 
• 96193 Ancillary theatrical services n.e.c. 
• 96194 Circus, amusement park and similar attraction services 
• 96195       Ballroom, discotheque and dance instructor services 
• 96194 Circus, amusement park and similar attraction services 
• 96195       Ballroom, discotheque and dance instructor services 
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saw in Chapter 3, the provisions under the Title on Investment in the main EPA 
covers mostly modes 1, 3 and 4 of the supply of entertainment services. This last one 
is probably the area in which the CARIFORUM States gained the highest level of 
preferences (and is the most relevant for the purpose of this analysis). The EPA 
market access provisions increase the possibilities for the temporary presence of 
natural persons for business purpose as it follows: Cariforum staff can work in a EU 
Member State if the Cariforum company has a commercial presence in that EU 
Member State; and Cariforum entertainers (CSSs) are allowed to provide services in 
the EU Member States. 79  However, access to artists and professionals in the 
entertainment sector is not unconditional. The EPA lays down some limitations to the 
market access commitments that also apply to entertainment services.80 According to 
this, CSSs from the Cariforum countries wishing to provide entertainment services in 
the EU Member States may be subject to Economic Needs Tests (ENT)81 and specific 
qualifications may be required. It is interesting to remark that the economic needs 
tests (ENTs) condition was negotiated in exchange for a full commitment to market 
opening by the EU without quotas. ENTs are not a new tool, but they have been put in 
practice in several states for a long time.82 Since the EPA did not introduce any 
changes to the way the ENTs are applied in the different Member States, nor a set of 
criteria for uniform application, each Member State will use its own definition and 
will apply the Test according to its national practice. This may provide some 
uncertainties and disparities in terms of access to European national markets.83 
Further, qualifications may still be required. If the qualification has not been obtained 
in one of the EU Member States, the country concerned may evaluate if they are 
equivalent to the qualifications required in its territory: this may be an additional 
                                                                                                                                      
• 96199 Other entertainment services n.e.c. 
79 See respectively Article 83 and 80 of the EPA. 
80 Annex IV D to Article 83 on Reservations on Contractual Services Suppliers and Independent 
Professionals, CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
81 Point 6 of Annex IV D. The main criteria for economic needs tests will be the assessment of the 
relevant market situation in the Member State or the region where the service is to be provided, 
including with respect to the number of, and the impact on, existing services suppliers. 
82 For instance, in the case of the United Kingdom see, Work Permits, Sports and Entertainment: 
Guidance for Employers, 19 November 2007 – 30 March 2008. 
(www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/workingintheuk/workpermits/workpermitarrangements/sportsandentertai
nments/) 
83 KEA European Affairs, “Implementing cultural provisions of CARIFORUM-EU EPA. How do they 
benefit the Caribbean cultural sector?”, Discussion Paper N. 118, European Centre for Development 
Policy Management, June 2011, at 12. 
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obstacle.84 Finally, in order to take advantage of the market access granted under the 
EPA, persons supplying entertainment services are expected to meet other conditions 
stipulated in the EPA, such as obtaining a service contract for a period not exceeding 
12 months and possess at least three years professional experience in the sector of 
activity that is the subject of the contract.85  
Either included within the main text of the bilateral agreement, or in a specific 
protocol focused on culture and annexed to the main agreement, mobility of artists 
and cultural professionals is fostered via the basis of economic and cooperation 
relations. Although certain limitations to the entrance and stay of third-country artists 
and cultural workers still remain – mainly because of Member States’ concerns about 
the impacts on their cultural industries and labour market – the effort of the 
Commission to include special provisions facilitating cultural exchanges within the 
frame of bilateral economic agreement is laudable. Of course, from the perspective of 
artists, cultural organisations and other stakeholders, a better result was expected. But 
that expectation does not take into account the limits on the external action of the EU 
when dealing with the mobility of persons and services, especially if this mobility 
concerns sectors of national competence such as admissions quotas and culture. 
Indeed, we should not forget the Cultural Protocols, the EPA and the other trade 
agreements taken into account were negotiated as mixed agreements: therefore, 
Member States could play a significant role in negotiating provisions touching upon 
sensitive sectors (such as trade in cultural services and mobility of artists and cultural 
workers). As we saw in Chapter 3, the exclusive competence of the Union in trade 
matter is, to some extent, less exclusive in these delicate areas. As for provisions 
concerning the facilitation of visa release, an area in which the Union gained a 
considerable degree of harmonisation, the Union could extend the Schengen acquis to 
the Cariforum artists and cultural workers. However, if these subjects wish to travel 
and stay in a European Country for a period longer than 90 days, their application will 
be subjected to national rules. 
From the perspective of migration and development, facilities granted under 
these provisions to artists and cultural workers can be seen as a step forward to 
facilitate circular migration. Mitigation of brain drain, however, does not seem to be 
taken into account. Yet, it must be remarked that co-productions, which are strongly 
                                                
84 Ibidem. 
85 Article 83(2) of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
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promoted under the Cultural Protocols, can offer a possible solution. Indeed, within 
this co-productions frame, artists and cultural workers involved in such activities 
should be granted visas that allow them to move back and forth from the country of 
origin to the EU. Co-productions have been put forward as the appropriate tool to 
promote the exchange of ideas, knowledge, and skills in the field of cultural 
industries. Under this framework of cooperation, artists and cultural workers from 
third countries can take advantages of their experiences abroad and use the acquired 
skills and knowledge back in their own countries. However, the real impact of such a 
tool will depend upon the allocation of funds and investments that the Member States 
would be willing (or not) to provide. 
 
4.2) Implementing GATS Mode 4  
 
Observing the EU’s attitude within the framework of multilateral negotiations, 
we noticed that the possibility to limit access to services is quite relevant for the 
cultural sectors, especially in terms of access to the EU services markets. In fact, the 
preference for a sectoral approach adopted by the EU in its external trade policy, 
which was officially introduced by the Treaty of Nice and re-confirmed in the Lisbon 
Treaty,86 lead to the exclusion of liberalising commitments for the cultural services. 
Former Article 133, as amended by the Nice Treaty, submitted those services sectors 
considered more sensitive and problematic – like cultural, audiovisual, and 
educational services – to the shared competence of the EC and its Member States. As 
we saw in Chapter 3, the Lisbon Treaty cuts down all reference to the competence 
question in the field of culture, but introduces the unanimity vote for the Council 
when negotiations cover trade in cultural, audiovisual and educational services. By 
making the decision-making process harder at the Union level, Member States’ 
interests in such sensitive sectors should be better preserved on the external 
dimension. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Union still excludes the audiovisual sector 
from the application of GATS commitments. Although audiovisual services do not 
entirely cover the definition of cultural services, their exemption certainly limits the 
access of third-country nationals to a considerable part of the Union’s cultural 
services market. In Chapter 3 I widely discussed the reason underlying such a 
                                                
86 M Krajewski, “Of Modes and Sectors External Relations, Internal Debates, and the Special Case of 
(Trade in) Services”, in M Cremona, Developments in EU External Relations Law, (2009, Oxford 
Scholarship Online), at 25. 
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restrictive approach, mostly determined by the combination of constitutional internal 
legal constraints (the overlapping of different competences and the respect of the 
principle of conferral) with political considerations (the protection of the EU 
Members’ national interest, as well as of cultural diversity). It must be added here that 
the Court of Justice in Opinion 1/94 underpinned such sectoral approaches specifying 
that “the treatment of nationals of non-member countries on crossing the external 
frontiers of Member States cannot be regarded as falling within the common 
commercial policy” and “[…] the existence in the Treaty of specific chapters on the 
free movement of natural and legal persons shows that those matters do not fall 
within the common commercial policy”. 87  While assessing the extent of the 
Community’s external competence on trade in services, the Court’s reasoning focuses 
on the distinction between the movement of persons and the Common Commercial 
Policy without mentioning the fact that the GATS does not deal with migration and 
permanent access to the employment market. The Court’s approach seems rather to 
rely on a conscious knowledge of the intimate interaction of trade in services with 
national policies such as migration, visa regulations and access to the labour market. 
The Court seems to be assuming that the movement of services providers is a 
“sensitive area”, placing it within the shared competence sphere.88  
Considering that freedoms of movement of workers and services are among 
the four pillars of the internal market’s construction, one may see restrictions to 
further liberalisation of the EU services market within the multilateral frame of 
negotiations as a sort of schizophrenic European behaviour in international trade. This 
could be judged even more inconsistent if we recall that, although culture remains 
mostly a matter of national competences, on the internal level the Commission 
triggered several legislative initiatives, such as the Audiovisual Directives, to open the 
internal cultural services market.89 However, fostering liberalisation in the services 
sector does not appear to be the priority of the Union in the multilateral trade 
framework of negotiations. As Cremona points out, in Article 133 ECT (now Article 
207 of the Lisbon Treaty) there is no reference to the principle of non-discrimination 
in the common commercial policy, whose aim is, instead, to ensure uniformity as 
between the Member States in the context of the principles and objectives of the 
                                                
87 Opinion 1/94 WTO, para 46. 
88 M Krajewski, supra (n 86), at 20. 
89 See chapter 3 
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Union’s external action (Art. 133(1)).90 As highlighted in Chapter 2, preserving 
uniformity also means ensuring harmony and consistency between all the EU policies, 
on the internal and external level. So, at first sight, the fact that on the internal level 
the EU made the elimination of trade barriers and discrimination its flagship in order 
to create an open internal market based on freedom of movement of goods, services, 
workers and capital, while on the external level the EU endorses a more protectionist 
attitude towards liberalisation, may appear inconsistent. Yet, as far as it concerns 
trade in cultural services, this apparent inconsistency responds to the need to combine 
the CCP with other constitutional priorities, namely the protection of cultural 
diversity, as highlighted in Chapter 3. When trade also encroaches on other areas, 
such as economic migration, impinging on the sphere of national competence and 
interests, external coherence may be limited by internal constraints.  
In conclusion, the Union is, in practice, adopting a more restrictive approach 
concerning mobility of services providers within the multilateral framework of trade 
negotiations than at the bilateral level. Considering the repercussions stemming from 
the battle for the cultural exception, there is no concrete reason to imagine that the EU 
will engage in a further use of GATS Mode 4 to foster the mobility of artists and 
cultural professionals. 
5) Other relevant frameworks: initiative concerning visa facilitation  
 
5.1) An ambitious project: the rise and fall of the EU proposal for a Cultural 
Visa 
 
In April 2009, during the International colloquium “Culture and creativity, 
vectors for development”, held in Brussels and organised within the framework of 
development cooperation between the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
countries and the European Union, the idea to create a uniform cultural visa for artists 
and cultural workers was advanced.91 The aim of the international meeting was to 
provide a forum in which new solutions can be identified that might substantially 
contribute to future EU action with its ACP partners in the fields of culture and 
development. The outcomes of the forum were highly influenced by the enthusiasm of 
cultural operators following the recent (at the time of the symposium) EU adoption of 
                                                
90 M Cremona, “Neutrality or Discrimination? The WTO, the EU and External Trade”, in G De Búrca 
and J Scott (eds) The EU and the WTO. Legal and Costitutional Issues, (2001, Hart Publishing), at 152, 
160. 
91 http://www.culture-dev.eu/website.php?rub=documents-generale&lang=en.  
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the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity. However, the ambitious proposal 
soon became silent and was forgotten. 
From a realistic point of view, the abortion of the idea to create a uniform 
Cultural Visa was quite predictable. The idea would certainly have helped artists and 
cultural workers coming from the ACP countries to easily move to and cross the EU’s 
borders, by creating a simplified visa release procedure specifically addressing the 
category of artists and cultural workers. It would have also facilitated a homogenous 
implementation of the provisions contained in the Cultural Protocols and concerning 
the facilitation of cultural movements. Nevertheless, the proposal appears overly 
challenging. First, such a visa would require the adoption of a uniform definition of 
artists and cultural workers, at least among the parties involved in a facilitating 
agreement promoting the adoption of a cultural visa. As is known, similar proposals, 
also concerning other categories of workers, have already been discussed in other 
multilateral frameworks, like the WTO, with unsuccessful results. There is little 
reason to think that this would have been an easier task within the EU framework, if 
we consider the fears and interests of the EU Members when dealing with the further 
opening of their external borders. Second, thinking about the tensions characterising 
the adoption of legislative initiatives under the AFSJ umbrella, it is hard to foresee 
that such a political initiative could become a concrete legislative initiative. On the 
one hand, visa still falls within the area of a shared competence, which is still largely 
depending upon national policies. Second, the Commission lacks the power to carry 
out such an initiative, which would not favour Member States’ support  (or that of the 
Council). Let us recall here the fiery debate around the Action Plan implementing the 
Stockholm Programme, published only one year after the colloquium, and in which 
the Commission tried to overcome the traditional intergovernmentalism that had 
characterised the working method in the AFSJ. On that occasion, the Commission 
pointed out that the Action Plan was not supposed to be a fixed agenda and, in order 
to be able to face unexpected events, future challenges and opportunities, the 
Commission will use ‘its rights of initiative whenever necessary’.92 Such a declaration 
was interpreted as a provocation by some Member States, who manifested their 
opposition within the Council. Among the main points of divergence was the idea to 
                                                
92 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 20 April 2010 – Delivering an 
area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens – Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm 
Programme, COM (2010) 171 final. 
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propose by 2013 an Immigration Code focused on the Consolidation of legislation in 
the area of legal migration, taking into account the evaluation of the existing 
legislation, needs for simplification and where necessary extend the existing 
provisions to categories of workers currently not covered by EU legislation.93 It is this 
last point that could offer the Commission a path for extending rules facilitating the 
release of visa and other aspects of mobility to new categories of workers, as artists 
and cultural professionals potentially are. Yet, this is clearly a non-feasible path. 
Notwithstanding, to conclude this parenthesis on the short rise and fall of the proposal 
for a cultural visa, it can be acknowledged that the Commission’s efforts, under the 
auspices of DG Culture and Education, gathering together thousands of artists and 
cultural professionals from around the world and embracing their proposal for a 
uniform visa is quite striking. Further, it is worth remarking that in early April 2014, 
the Commission announced proposals to shorten and simplify the procedures for visa 
applications for individuals from third countries, including artists and cultural 
professionals, who wish to make short visits to Schengen area countries. The 
proposals include a new type of visa (touring visa) enabling legitimate travellers to 
circulate in the Schengen area for up to one year. Measures to facilitate the granting 
of visas to attend major events are also envisaged. As these proposals need to be 
accepted by both the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, the earliest they 
could come into force would be 2015.94  
 
5.2) Sectoral approach for visa facilitation: the Blue Card Directive  
 
The proposal for a directive concerning the conditions of entry and residence 
of highly skilled workers appeared for the first time in the Policy Plan95 following the 
Commission’s Green Paper on a EU approach to managing economic migration.96 
The proposal came after the Commission’s proposal to the Council of a 
comprehensive directive on the admission of workers and self-employed97 in 2001. 
                                                
93 Ibidem.  
94 Six Member States would not adopt these measures: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and 
the UK. Source: “Preparatory Action Culture in EU External Relations”, Report prepared for the 
European Commission, published in June 2014, at 118. This report is the outcome of a sixteen-month 
inquiry that has been the centrepiece of the Preparatory Action “Culture in EU External Relations”.  
95 Communication from the Commission, Policy Plan on Legal Migration , COM(2005) 669 final. 
96 Green Paper on An EU approach to managing economic migration, COM (2004) 811 final. 
97 Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities (presented by the 
Commission) COM (2001) 386, 11 July 2011. For a commentary on the draft directive see: G 
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Because of the difficulty to reach an agreement on this text, the proposal was soon 
withdrawn and the debate surrounding labour migration was re-launched by the use of 
a sectoral approach. Given that most Member States objected to a general EU 
instrument regulating legal labour migration arguing that demographic, social and 
structural diversities among the Members’ contexts did not allow them to establish 
what common issues had to be addressed, except for certain sectors, 98  the 
Commission opted to propose four sectoral directives concerning labour migration 
issues.99   
The Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment (Directive 2009/50/EC) 100 
was adopted in 2009 with the scope to regulate admissions of highly qualified third-
country nationals to the EU Member States. It is known as the Blue Card Directive 
because it intends to create a mechanism similar to the US Green Card. The overall 
goal of the Directive is to attract and retain highly qualified third-country workers in 
order to strengthen the EU’s economic competitiveness. More precisely, the Directive 
recognises that legal migration can play an ‘important role in enhancing the 
knowledge-based economy in Europe, advancing economic development’.101 In order 
to reach this goal, it is necessary to address major shortages deriving from the often 
complex and very diversified legal provisions concerning TCN admissions to the 
Member States. Therefore, Directive 2009/50/EC establishes a set of common 
provisions facilitating the admission and the mobility of highly qualified TCNs for 
more than three months into the territory of the Union by issuing a European Blue 
Card that entitles the holder to reside and work in the territory of a Member State.102 
Only a ‘highly qualified employer’ who hold higher professional qualifications 
proving that they have the required adequate and specific competence can apply for a 
EU Blue Card. Besides holding higher professional qualifications, for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                      
Papagianni, Institutional and Policy Dynamics of EU Migration Law, (Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 
2006), 170-172 
98 Y Pascouau, La politique migratoire de l’Union Européenne. De Schengen à Lisbonne, (Fondation 
Varenne, 2010), at 482. 
99 Besides the Directive concerning highly skilled workers, the three other proposals focused on 
conditions for the entry and stay of seasonal workers, Intra-Corporate Transferees (limited to 
temporary movement) and remunerated trainees. 
100 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment. The UK and Ireland opted out of the 
Directive and Denmark did not take part.  
101 Ibidem, Recitals 4 of the Preamble. 
102 See Article 1 and Article 2(c) of the Directive 2009/50/EC. 
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the Directive a ‘highly qualified employer’ is defined as an ‘employee protected 
under national employment law and/or national practice, irrespective of the legal 
relationship, for the purpose of exercising genuine and effective work for, or under 
the direction of, someone else’ and ‘is paid’ (with no further specification on this 
point).103 The Directive does not apply to some categories of persons, like those in 
seek of temporary protection, family members of EU citizens who already enjoy free 
movement rights under the umbrella of other EU legislations104 or persons who 
entered on the basis of international agreements facilitating the cross-border 
movement of certain categories of natural persons (such as services providers under 
the GATS).105 Nor does it apply in the case of more favourable conditions granted to 
TCNs within the framework of other bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded by 
the EU and/or the Member States.106 
To obtain the Blue Card, the highly qualified TCN has to meet the following 
conditions: to have a ‘valid work contract’ or, if specified under national law, a 
‘binding job offer for highly qualified employment’, show documents attesting the 
relevant higher professional qualifications, present a valid travel document and visa 
application or a valid residence permit if required and be covered by a sickness 
insurance. Of course, he/she must not be considered a threat to public policy, public 
security or public health. Member States can also require the applicant to provide his 
or her address in the territory of destination.107 An additional room for manoeuvre of 
Member States is given by the requirement concerning the gross annual salary 
received by the TCN, which must not be inferior to a relevant salary threshold defined 
by the Member States (and at least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary in the 
Member State concerned).108 If the TCN applicants comply with all these conditions, 
the Member State concerned by the application shall facilitate the release of the 
requisite visas and issue a EU Blue Card to the applicant. The EU Blue Card holder is 
entitled to enter, re-enter and stay in the territory of the Member State issuing the 
                                                
103 Article 2(b) of the Directive; for the definitions of higher professional qualification see point (g) of 
the same Article. The definition of employer under the Blue Card Directive is similar to the definition 
of ‘worker’ under EU free movement law. 
104 E.g.: family members of EU citizens who are not EU-citizens are granted free movement rights 
under Directive 2004/38, also known as the EU citizens Directive. 
105 For the full list of categories excluded from the field of application of the Directive, see Article 3. 
106 Article 4(1) of the Directive 2009/50/EC. 
107 Article 5(1)(2) of the Directive 2009/50/EC. 
108 Article 5(3) of the Directive 2009/50/EC. 
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Blue Card and to enjoy freedom of movement rights among the Member States. 109 
For the first two years, the EU Blue Card holder’s access to the labour market is 
limited to those paid employment activities that permitted their entrance. After this 
period of time, he/she can be granted equal treatment as nationals of the Member 
States regarding access to highly qualified employment.110 
The set of mandatory requirements for a successful application seems to be 
quite complex and this can discourage TCN professionals from opting to apply for a 
EU Blue Card. Further, the Directive does not establish a complete set of common 
requirements valid for all the EU Members. To the contrary, it leaves a considerable 
power to Member States to make the admissions requirements more demanding when 
implementing the Directive at the national level, as in the case of the minimum salary 
threshold.111 
 The Directive also recognises a large discretion to Member States concerning 
the decision to refuse or issue the Blue Card. Besides the non-fulfilment of mandatory 
conditions set out in the Directive, Member States can reject applications on the 
ground of national policies, such as quotas on labour migration,112 or after having 
examined the conditions and needs of their internal labour market (such as temporary 
vacancies or unemployment), or if the employer has been sanctioned under national 
law on employment.113   
The adoption of a legal scheme facilitating the mobility of highly skilled 
migrants towards Europe raises concerns about a possible brain drain in developing 
countries. Although the impact assessment report prepared by the Commission 
advanced the possibility to require Member States to pursue ethical recruitment 
policies by avoiding recruiting in countries suffering from recognised situations of 
skills depletion,114 the adopted text of the Directive does not contain a clear obligation 
in these terms. Using the language of soft law, Article 8, which establishes the 
                                                
109 Article 7 of the Directive 2009/50/EC. Concerning the freedom to move to a Member State other 
than the first for the purpose of highly qualified employment, Article 18 establishes a condition of 18-
months of legal residence in the first Member State, after which the person and his/her family can 
freely move. 
110 Article 12 of the Directive 2009/50/EC. 
111 On this point, Pascouau reflects that due to the very diverse social and economic contexts of the EU 
Members, it is likely that the implementation will lead to 27 different thresholds. Y Pascouau, supra (n 
98), 484. 
112 The Directive, indeed, does not affect the right of Member States to determine the number of third-
country national admissions (Article 6 of the Directive 2009/50/EC). 
113 Article 8 of the Directive 2009/50/EC. 
114 Impact Assessment Report (SEC (2007) 1403), at 65. 
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grounds for refusal of the application, says that Member States may reject an 
application ‘to ensure ethical recruitment in sectors suffering from a lack of qualified 
workers in the countries of origin’. As formulated, this seems to be an additional 
option for Member States to decide whether to grant (or not) a Blue Card, rather than 
an obligation to cooperate with the country of origin to properly address the brain 
drain issue. In any case, as some have commented, if a good number of Member 
States will exploit the many opportunities granted by the Directive to restrict its field 
of action, the brain-drain effect will not occur as frequently.115 In fact, as above 
remarked, the frame of demanding requirements and the large discretion for refusal 
left to the Member States do not encourage applications from third countries. Others 
have pointed out that other existing schemes for highly skilled workers have proved to 
be more successful in attracting workers when they provide for permanent stay.116 In 
conclusion, it is quite a common opinion that the Blue Directive’s potential in making 
the EU more attractive for highly skilled migrants is quite weak and that, eventually, 
Member States opted for an instrument which saved the integrity of their national 
migration policies.117 
Looking at the Blue Card Directive from the perspective of artists and cultural 
workers, we can ask in what ways can they benefit from the Directive? If we consider 
that the Blue Card grants the right to enter for a temporary period, in which the holder 
can leave and re-enter the territory of the Member States, and move between Member 
States (although after 18 months of permanence in the first State), the Blue Card 
Directive seems to be offering a potential alternative framework to facilitate the 
atypical mobility of artists and cultural workers from third countries. However, some 
further considerations demonstrate that this potential is quite limited. First, the 
Directive only addresses employees and not the self-employed. This is already a limit 
for the broader impact of the Directive: if its scope is to attract highly skilled persons 
to Europe, it is hardly understandable why it should focus only on employees and not 
create a frame for the self-employed too.118 In the case of artists and cultural workers, 
this limitation is particularly relevant: as above specified, artists mainly work as self-
employed; when they do work for someone, they often have atypical contracts that 
                                                
115 Peers S., et al (eds), EU Immigration and Asylum Law, above (n 56), 69. 
116 P Zalatel, “Competing for the Highly Skilled Migrants: Implications for the EU Common Approach 
on Temporary Economic Migration”, (2006), 12 European Law Journal, at 627. 
117 In this sense, see Y Pascouau, supra (n 98), 482-488; S Peers, E Guild et al, (n 56), at 69. 
118 Peers S., Guild E. and others, p. 67. 
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may not fulfil the requirement of the directive for a valid work contract. So, the Blue 
Card is more of an option for cultural professionals, who frequently work under a 
contract as an employee, and only those artists who can prove they have a work 
contract or a binding offer of employment. Considering the difficulties for artists and 
cultural professionals of developing countries to get information about vacancies, as 
well as limited access to the internet and other communication services for making 
such applications, the Directive seems to be benefitting only a small elite of artists 
and cultural professionals from third countries. In addition, the problem of recognition 
of higher education and higher professional qualifications should not be 
underestimated: as documented by several studies on the status of artists and cultural 
workers, major hindrances to their mobility derive from difficulties concerning the 
recognition of diplomas and qualifications. If we think that the Directive only gives 
general definitions of higher professional qualifications and higher education 
qualifications, and that the assessment of their adequacy is left to Member States’ 
national authorities, the Directive does not appear to offer an efficient solution to such 
a problem. Finally, it must be recalled that the Directive does not affect the most 
favourable provisions under existing bilateral or multilateral agreement concluded the 
EU or its Member States: therefore, in the case of artists and cultural professionals, it 
would apply only to those coming from third countries which have not signed any of 
these agreements.    
In conclusion, the implementation of the Blue Card Directive presents only a 
small contribution to fostering the mobility of artists and cultural workers from third 
countries. However, it would be auspicious to extend the application of the sectoral 
approach, which led also to the adoption of other directives – like the one concerning 
researchers – facilitating the entrance of specific categories to the EU’s territory. 
Ideally, to propose (and adopt) a sectoral directive concerning the access, movement 
and residence of third-country artists and cultural professionals would signify a 
concrete step forward.  
 
5.3) Visa facilitations through Mobility Partnerships: a possible room for artists 
and cultural workers? 
 
Mobility Partnerships are the privileged instruments of the new Global 
Approach to Migration and Development. The choice to use a “partnership” rather 
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than other forms of agreement usually used by the Union in its relations with third 
countries corresponds to the reparation of competences within the EU system. Indeed, 
concerning a vast array of legal and illegal aspects of migration, a more legally 
binding agreement would require the participation of all Member States (as in the case 
of mixed agreements). With the partnership form, Member States can choose whether 
to take part given their relationship and interests with the third-country involved. 
Partnership also evokes a negotiation frame in which all the parties engaged share 
equal positions. Indeed, such a form of agreement should also accommodate needs 
and interests of the third countries.  
So far, the Union concluded mobility partnerships with Cape Verde, the 
Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Georgia, and Armenia. Given the case-by-case 
approach that should tailor the content of mobility partnerships, once may expect that 
these concluded partnerships differ from each other. In fact, they are all very similar 
in terms of substantial provisions included in the text. First, there are no real binding 
obligations established in the texts: the mobility partnerships concluded so far are 
more similar to a political programme or declaration of intents. Second, there are no 
concrete actions set by the Parties to achieve the goals declared in the text. The most 
deceiving aspect is the lack of real binding obligations upon the Parties in terms of 
visas. In fact, although the Parties engage in further improving aspects of the 
conditions of consular services and procedures for the issuing of Schengen visas and 
simplifying the procedures for access and legal stays (including the possibility of 
issuing multiple-entry), such a commitment remains a mere declaration. Great 
attention is given, instead, to strengthening cooperation for border control and 
fighting irregular migration. The implementation of visa-issuing facilities seems to 
depend upon the level of real engagement of the third parties in achieving, first, these 
goals. In addition, no specific categories are addressed by the partnership: concerning 
the cultural sector, there is no mention of facilitating mobility in this area.  
In the end, mobility is not really included in these partnerships – other than in 
the name. So far, there seems to be little room for concretely encouraging the mobility 
of artists and cultural professionals through this instrument. On the one hand, it is 
clear that the Member States’ interests highly influence the content of such 
partnerships. On the other hand, the Commission should focus more on the EU acquis 
on visa liberalisation today and adopt the same schemes regulating security aspects 
and visa facilitations as in those of association agreements. To use a sectoral 
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approach, addressing specific categories, may – once again – be the solution for 
including specific provisions on visa issuing. Artists and cultural workers could be 
among these categories.  
 
6) Concluding remarks 
 
Artists and cultural workers coming from developing countries or other 
critical areas often encounter more problems than their colleagues from developed 
countries because of their association with economic migrants. Although certain 
similarities between the circulation of cultural professionals and economic migrants 
can be singled out, especially when looking at the whole question through the lenses 
of the migration and development nexus, assimilating the movement of cultural 
workers coming from disadvantaged contexts to the general category of migrants can 
be reductive. Indeed, transnational mobility is an inner aspect of the professional 
activities of artists and cultural workers: this aspect should be taken into account and 
specific regulations tailored to the needs of this category should be adopted. While 
such specific regulative regimes are missing, rules concerning the cross-borders 
supply of services under the frame of international economic law may help to support 
the mobility of artists and cultural workers. The UNESCO Convention seems to be 
aware of this and requires its Parties to establish preferential treatment scheme to 
facilitate the mobility of artists and cultural workers coming from developing 
countries so as to increase their possibilities for market access (Article 16 of the 
Convention). Further, preferential mobility schemes should also aim at facilitating 
cultural workers’ training, exchange of information and experiences. The European 
Union strategy to foster transnational mobility of artists and cultural workers in the 
framework of bilateral trade agreements seems to be based on both these aspects: 
increasing possibilities for non-EU cultural professionals to access the EU market 
through provisions improving the temporary presence of cultural services suppliers 
(in cultural sectors other than the audiovisual one); and creating better conditions 
though the Cultural Protocols to simplify and promote mobility of artists and cultural 
workers within the frame of co-productions, cultural and training exchanges. At this 
point, two distinctions are needed: the first one relates to the evidence that on the 
bilateral level the Union is able to engage in more ample commitments than in the 
multilateral framework; the second one concerns the differences between the EPA 
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with the CARIFORUM and the other trade agreements analysed in relation to cultural 
services’ market access concessions. As for the first point, once more it is 
unsurprising that the Union is more daring at the bilateral level than the multilateral 
one. Within the multilateral framework the Union’s action is highly influenced by 
internal policy interests and legal constraints, as we saw in the case of GATS Mode 4. 
Yet, Member States also influenced the Union’s final decisions concerning the 
temporary presence of natural persons supplying cultural services within the frame of 
bilateral trade negotiations. This links with our second observation, concerning the 
substantial differences between the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the other 
Agreements. In the EU-Korea agreement Member States strongly opposed the 
allowance of preferential treatment for co-productions and further access to cultural 
sectors because of the level of development of Korean cultural industries, in order to 
defend the European cultural creative sector in the name of cultural diversity. As we 
saw, the criticism towards the Commission’s approach in negotiating the FTA with 
Korea strongly affected the following negotiations for the EU-CA and EU-Colombia 
and Peru agreements. In both these contexts, a wider access for services providers in 
the entertainment services like in the CARIFORUM-EU agreement has not been 
granted. The unprecedented market access commitments granted for cultural services 
suppliers in the EPA are therefore characterised by a strong development policy 
paradigm. Overall, they seek to facilitate the circulation of CARIFORUM artists and 
other cultural professionals and practitioners in the EU, which might generate 
important capacity building effects.119 This approach is coherent with the international 
commitments undertaken by the EU, coping with the promotion of culture as a 
vehicle of development. The different level of commitments undertaken in the other 
Trade Agreements is in line with the case-by-case approach, yet the fact that the EU-
CA and the EU-Colombia and Peru agreements do not contain the same level of 
access for cultural services suppliers shows that a better prior assessment should be 
made. Indeed, it is also unclear for what reasons artists and cultural workers from 
Central America, Colombia and Peru cannot enjoy the same preferential treatment 
granted to the cultural workers of Caribbean countries. In these two contexts 
development issues are also at stake, but do not seem to play the same significant role 
as in the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. The mobility of artists and cultural workers from 
                                                
119 E Psychogiopoulou, “The External Dimension of EU Cultural Action and Free Trade: Exploring an 
Interface”, (2014) 41 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, at 79. 
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Central America, Colombia and Peru is facilitated only through the basis of the 
cultural cooperation provisions contained in the cultural protocol/agreement.  
Besides the need to preserve cultural diversity, the EU’s undertaking of 
commitments to foster the mobility of artists and cultural workers is made more 
complicated by the fact that these initiatives encroach upon sensitive national spheres 
like visas and migration control. As we saw, visa issues are at the heart of the 
obstacles hindering the mobility of artists and cultural workers from third countries. 
Current EU legislation on migration does not offer appropriate solutions for this 
problem. For the future, the sectoral approach, which led to the adoption of directives 
such as the one dealing with researchers, could be a good way to promote the 
adoption of a directive concerning artists and cultural workers. Yet, it is difficult to 
imagine that this could take place with the agreement of all Member States. 
Nonetheless, the intention of the Commission to work on proposals to shorten and 
simplify the procedures for visa applications for individuals from third countries, 
including artists and cultural professionals, who wish to make short visits to Schengen 
area countries, re-launched in April 2014, still leaves room for better future outcomes.   
The analysis of the Union’s policy documents on migration and development 
shows that only little attention is given to culture within the frame of the legal and 
political initiatives adopted addressing mobility issues. The analysis of mobility and 
migration carried out in this chapter demonstrates that “culture as a vector of 
development” seems to be relevant mostly when the economic aspects of cultural 
activities are at stake. So far, the integration of culture as a vector of development has 
gained more space in the context of trade policy than in migration policy.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE EU VIS À VIS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, CULTURE 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1) Introductory note  
 
This chapter looks at the third selected case involving issues deriving from the 
relationship between culture and development, namely the protection of Traditional 
Knowledge, particularly when it is related to the use of genetic resources. In Chapter 
1 I explained why the protection of certain cultural traditions is highly debated today; 
and to what extent the protection of such traditions through intellectual property rights 
is connected to issues of sustainable development. To briefly recall the debate, there 
are two major issues associated with the implementation of current international 
Intellectual Property (IP) law: the first is that the possibility to patent biogenetic 
resources granted under international law limits the access of Indigenous and Local 
Communities (ILCs) to natural resources, therefore hindering the survival of their 
traditional ways of living; the second challenge, involves the inadequacy of IP law to 
adequately protect traditional knowledge (TK) holders – in particular from serious 
risks of misappropriation or biopiracy - and to ensure a fair distribution of benefits.  
European States, like most of the other industrialised Western countries, are 
directly interested in this debate because they are among the major users of genetic 
resources originating in developing countries. The EU, on behalf of its Member 
States, is also interested in the international negotiations around this debate. This 
European interest is evident in the ratification of the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity and of the recent Protocol of Nagoya,1 as well as its participation with the 
ongoing negotiations and discussions under the WIPO and the TRIPS’ framework.  
Further, the EU adopted internal regulation concerning the patenting of 
biotechnological inventions,2 and is widely engaged in spreading the fulfilment with 
IPRs worldwide in order to promote common IPRs standards. In this chapter I will try 
                                                
1 Council Decision 93/626/EEC of 25 October 1993 concerning the conclusion of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity; Council Decision of 14 April 2014 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Union, of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
2 Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, OJ L 213/13. 
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to scrutinise the attitude of the Union towards major threats to the protection of 
traditional knowledge connected to the use of genetic resources on the international 
level. As with the previous chapters, I will first present the international landscape, so 
as to consequently focusing on the EU position within this multilateral frame of 
negotiations - namely the TRIPS’ review of Article 27.3(b) and the WIPO’s initiative 
to adopt a legal text to protect TK worldwide. Then, I will explore whether and how 
TK and IPR-related issues are integrated and treated under the bilateral agreements 
taken into analysis in the former chapters. Finally, I will highlight some relevant 
internal initiatives, such as the 2013 adoption of the European Parliament Resolution 
on development aspects of intellectual property rights on genetic resources, and the 
more recent adoption of the EU Regulation 511/2014 on Access to Benefit Sharing 
(16 April 2014), implementing compliance aspects of the Nagoya Protocol. 
 
2) Culture and Intellectual Property Law: Traditional Knowledge, IP law and 
development issues under the international law framework 
2.1) How Traditional Knowledge, IPRs and development issues link together 
 
2.1.1) The notion of Traditional Knowledge  
Before exploring the theoretical debate and major criticism of the relationship 
between IPRs and development, it is convenient to specify the meaning of the term 
traditional knowledge (TK). Article 2 of the 2003 UNESCO Convention on the 
Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, when defining the expression intangible 
heritage, lists traditional knowledge among the elements that constitute the 
immaterial cultural heritage of people and communities.3  Yet, the 2003 UNESCO 
Convention does not give any clearer definition of this terminology. In effect, there is 
no universally accepted definition of traditional knowledge because it is a term that 
                                                
3 Article 2 of the 2003 UNESCO Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage so 
defines intangible cultural heritage: “[…] ‘intangible cultural heritage’ means the practices, 
representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural 
space associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as 
part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to 
generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their 
interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, 
thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. For the purposes of this 
Convention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible 
with existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual 
respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development. […]”.  
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takes on many meanings for different people and cultural contexts.4 However, when 
studying the main literature on this topic, some general criteria based on the collective 
understanding of the term as developed by leading experts, academics and directly 
involved stakeholders in international fora can be detected. 5  According to the 
common perception, TK is widely understood as knowledge that has developed over 
time and is transmitted from generation to generation. It is typically orally transmitted 
and collectively held, owned and shared by groups of peoples and communities who 
have developed and safeguarded it over time. It is usually of a practical nature – 
indeed, it often relates to the use and management of natural resources -– and is 
tightly connected to the specific features of the surrounding environment. Given this 
peculiarity, it can be said that TK is embedded in specific environmental settings, as 
well as in customs, languages, local practices, and cultural heritage. It often takes the 
form of stories, songs, folklore, proverbs, cultural values, beliefs, rituals, community 
laws, local languages, and agricultural practices. Although it is quite common to think 
about TK as a fixed and static set of knowledge,6 TK is quite dynamic and evolves 
according to environmental and external influences. A concrete examples of such 
innovation is provided by the maintenance system – such as the management of lands, 
forests and natural resources – practiced in indigenous contexts,7 that are constantly 
challenged by (and thus adapted to) the natural evolving of ecosystems, as well as the 
effects of climate change...    
This brief introduction to the peculiarities of the notion of TK highlights two 
major issues. First, there is no common and worldwide-accepted definition of TK, but 
only a broad definition given by the 2003 UNESCO Convention and some general 
parameters which have been elaborated at the national and international level. This 
                                                
4 D Robinson, “Beyond ‘Protection’: Promoting Traditional Knowledge Systems in Thailand” in J 
Gibson, Patenting Lives. Life Patents, Culture and Development, (Ashgate Publications, 2008),121-
138, at 121. 
5 The features here presented draws upon the work of the 8(j) Working Group of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’s Secretariat (more extensively treated in the following part of this chapter), the 
work of the Traditional Knowledge Division of WIPO Secretariat, and major literature on the subject 
such as: G Dutfield, Intellectual Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, 
(Earthscan 2004); P Drahos, “When cosmology meets property: indigenous people’s innovation and 
intellectual property”, (2011), 29:3 Prometheus; R J Coombe, “Protecting Cultural Industry to Promote 
Cultural Diversity: Dilemmas for International Policy-making Posed by the Recognition of Traditional 
Knowledge” in K Maskus and J Reichman (eds), International Public Goods and Transfer of 
Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, (Cambridge Press 2005), 563; J Gibson, 
“Traditional Knowledge and the International Context for Protection”, (2004) 1:1 SCRIPT-ed.. 
6 Commonly, according to the Western understanding of TK, TK is associated with the revival of old 
traditions that have been preserved as such and have not changed over time.  
7 See P Drahos, “When cosmology”, above (n 5), at 5.  
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implies that each State can decide what traditions and practices fall under this 
definition, and what level of protection is necessary. Secondly, the peculiarities of this 
notion show a certain degree of incompatibility with the standard criteria for IPRs, 
such as the fact that practices and knowledge are not written and are commonly 
shared among different communities, or the difficulties to identify the original owner. 
These features do no reconcile with the application of IPRs rules: thus, this kind of 
protection seems to be, than, inappropriate in the case of TK, as we will see later in 
this chapter.  
 
2.1.2) Consequences deriving from Art. 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement: the 
risk of misappropriation, biopiracy and unfair benefit-sharing.  
 
Under international law, among the several treaties’ provisions regulating IP law,8 
those contained in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) are particularly relevant for TK protection and development. The 
TRIPS Agreement, adopted in 1994, reinforced the protection of IP rights by 
establishing a framework of minimum standards binding all WTO members. Under 
article 27 of the TRIPS, States are obligated to grant patent protection for innovations 
in all fields of technology implying novelty, an innovative step and a potential for 
industrial application.9 Paragraph 3(b) of Article 27 establishes the possibility for 
States to exclude certain kinds of inventions from patenting, such as plants, animals 
and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals, other than 
non-biological and microbiological processes. This exclusion is rather narrow. In fact, 
micro-organisms, and non-biological and microbiological processes are eligible for 
patents, and this is particularly relevant in the case of biotechnological applications in 
the agricultural, pharmaceutical and cosmetics sectors, as well as other 
biotechnological industries which rely upon the use of genetic material and TK 
related to the use of such genetic material.10 As for plant varieties, some form of 
                                                
8 I recall here, among others, the whole set of WIPO Conventions concerning all aspects of IP law. 
However, in order to narrow down the research area, I will mention here only international law 
provisions concerning IP law that are more pertinent for the protection of TK and “culture and 
development” related issues. 
9 Art. 21(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.  
10  Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) defines biotechnology as “any 
technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make 
or modify products or processes for specific use”. Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted on 5 
June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro and entered into force on 29 December 1993. 
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intellectual property eligibility needs to exist, either through patent protection, or a sui 
generis system created specifically for the purpose, or a combination of the two. 11 
Therefore, the choices are rather restricted, given that “some kind of protection” for 
plant variety is generally required by the provision, and micro-organisms, like the 
ones used today in biotechnology which cannot be exempted. In addition, even when 
the State can claim that plants and animals already exist in nature and no inventor can 
be identified, this is not enough to adequately protect the traditional knowledge and 
practices of indigenous and local peoples from the impacts of biotechnological 
engineering.12 For instance, biotechnological agriculture includes a range of tools that 
scientists employ to understand and manipulate the genetic make-up of bio-resources 
– such as seeds, microorganisms, plant cells, etc. – for use in the production or 
processing of agricultural products. Often, the initial step for such genetic engineering 
is based on the acquisition of the specific traditional knowledge that isolated the 
natural element from the environment and made its potential application obvious. 
Starting to use the IP law language, such knowledge can be considered the prior art 
likely to make that discovery –  and the connected invention – obvious.13  
According to the TRIPS, the patent holder is the exclusive owner of the 
patented product and has exclusive rights to use and sell it. To provide concrete 
examples of the consequences that can arise from this situation for Indigenous and 
Local Communities in vulnerable contexts, I will use the narrative of biotechnological 
agriculture (BT agriculture). In the case of BT agriculture, seeds – that are used in 
genetic engineering to produce hybrids or GM seeds – are normally patented. The 
right to use these seeds includes: harvest, collection, saving, planting, re-planting and 
the exchange of patented plants or of plants containing patented cells and genes.14 As 
a consequence, a great range of traditional agricultural practices – such as those based 
on the collection and conservation of seeds – as well as traditional agricultural 
systems are disappearing. Thus, unemployment is growing in indigenous and local 
                                                
11 An example of sui generis protection for plant verieties in the multilateral framework of agreements 
is the WIPO International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), 1961. 
12 M Footer and E Opuku Awuku, “Sustainable Agricultural Resources and Food Security: the Seed 
Treaty and Equitable Benefit Sharing” in M C Cordonier Segger and C G Weeramanatry (eds), 
Sustainable Justice: Reconciling Economic, Social and Environmental Law, (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2005), 250. 
13 G Wei, “Fitting Biological Products Within the Intellectual Property Framework: Challenges Facing 
the Policy Makers”, in B Ong (ed.), Intellectual Property and Biological Resources, (Marshal 
Cavendish International, 2004), 28, at 35-40. 
14 Article 28(1) TRIPS Agreement.  
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Communities that largely thrive upon these traditional activities. Moreover, 
requesting and obtaining a patent is usually a long and expensive procedure that 
cannot be initiated by those belonging to indigenous and local communities. The real 
subjects benefiting from this patent protection are essentially large transnational 
corporations, mainly based in Western Countries. Further, the whole patent system is 
based on the Western model of private intellectual property, based on the logic of 
individual economic profit, which encroaches and conflicts with the local sustainable 
model of development of these Communities. In fact, such a way of recognising 
individual property rights over natural resources does not suit the model of 
governance adopted within most indigenous and local communities.15  First, the 
concept of individual ownership is right for these societies whose governance of 
public goods is mainly based on the logic of “common property”.16 Second, in terms 
of access, the sharing and conservation of traditional knowledge concerning the use 
and management of natural resources may rely on factors such as kinship relations, 
confidentiality or forms of spiritual respect that are unknown and not recognised 
under IP law. 17  These cultural differences, together with the economic and 
technological disparities affecting developing countries, makes it hard to envisage 
how IP rights over genetic resources might contribute to a better development for 
indigenous and local communities, as argued by those supporting the extension of the 
IP law-based system to the governance of genetic resources and related TK. Further, it 
should be remarked that the patenting of seeds and plants is increasing the 
phenomenon of unlawful appropriation of indigenous and local knowledge and 
related biogenetic resources, also known as biopiracy.18 Indeed, most GM crops or 
hybrids derive from knowledge and technical skills already developed by Indigenous 
and local peoples. When such techniques are patented, original holders not only 
                                                
15 Considerations about what the most appropriate model of governance on natural resources would be 
cannot be properly addressed in the context of this paper. See: F Francioni, “Genetic Resources, 
Biotechnology and Human Rights: The International Legal Framework” in F Francioni (ed) 
Biotechnologies and International Human Rights, (Hart Publishing 2007), 3; also: K Aoki, “Weeds, 
Seeds and Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars”, (2003-2004), 11 Cardozo Journal of Int’l and 
Comp. Law, 305. 
16  F Lenzerini, “Biogenetic Resources and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights”, in F Francioni (Ed) 
Biotechnologies and International Human Rights, (Hart Publishing, 2007).  
17 Drahos, above (n 5), 238-239; R J Coombe, “Protecting Cultural Industry to Promote Cultural 
Diversity: Dilemmas for International Policy-making Posed by the Recognition of Traditional 
Knowledge” in K Maskus and J Reichman (eds), International Public Goods and Transfer of 
Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, (Cambridge Press, 2005), 563. 
18 F Lenzerini, “Biogenetic Resources”, (n 17), at 192.    
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cannot freely adopt them, but do not benefit from the revenues deriving from the 
patent system. I focused in this context on the narrative of agriculture as a concrete 
example, but a similarly negative scenario could be framed for the enforcement of 
patent law in traditional medicine.19 The TRIPS rules allowing the patentability of 
genetic resources are likely to lead to disastrous consequences for vulnerable 
communities, such as the misappropriation of knowledge and unequal benefits 
sharing.  
Nowadays the application of IP law to biogenetic resources also raises ethical 
and moral concerns: indeed, its compatibility with the respect of social, economic and 
cultural fundamental rights is highly questioned and debated.20  Further, the current 
patent system regulating the trade and use of genetic resources such as plants and 
seeds significantly jeopardises the conservation of biodiversity and cultural diversity. 
As initially mentioned, in vulnerable contexts  – like those of indigenous and local 
communities – the link between these two elements is crucial to ensure their 
sustainable existence.21 It has been recognised internationally that biological and 
cultural diversity are mutually supportive: indigenous and local traditional knowledge 
contribute to preserve biodiversity and are eco-friendly, and at the same time the 
conservation of ecosystem biodiversity allows indigenous and local peoples to 
maintain traditional ways of living, therefore respecting their right to self-
determination of development. 22  As we saw, by reducing in-situ biodiversity 
conservation and preventing the use of original domestic plants or seeds protected by 
                                                
19 One of the most famous case of medicine narrative is that one concerning the Neem Tree. For more 
on this, see: O B Arewa, “TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, 
and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks”, 10 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 155 2006, at 170. More 
generally on tensions concerning the relationship among the right to health, access to medicine and the 
TRIPS Agreement: D Matthews, “Lessons from negotiating an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement: 
Compulsory licensing and access to medicines”, in G Westkamp (ed), Emerging Issues in Intellectual 
Property. Trade, Technology and Market Freedom: Essays in Honour of Herchel Smith, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2007, 222-249. 
20 Conflicts between the TRIPS Agreement and human rights have been addressed in several UN 
documents. See: Sub-Commission on Human Rights, ‘Intellectual property and human rights’, 
Resolution 2000/7 and resolution 2001/21; High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Impact of the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights’, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13. 
21 This is also affirmed in the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 65/166, ‘Culture and 
development’, A/RES/65/166. 
22 This has also been recognised by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
See, for instance:  Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 
31 August 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001); Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of June 17, 2005, available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_125_ing.pdf.   
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patents, a great number of traditional activities are abandoned. If no longer practiced, 
skills and cultural knowledge, which are part of the intangible heritage of indigenous 
and local communities, are lost.23 This undermines the integrity of the cultural 
identity of these groups, as well as their possibility of innovation.24 To come full 
circle, the loss of sustainable cultural practices leads to unpleasant consequences for 
ecosystem biodiversity and the environment.25 
2.2) Possible solutions to redress the inadequacy of IP law to TK under 
international law 
 
2.2.1) The revision of Art. 27 TRIPS Agreement  
 
Certain types of local knowledge such as folklore were not protected within 
existing intellectual property frameworks until the twentieth centuries. Only in the 
post-colonial era, when newly independent former colonies had a place at the 
negotiating table of international IP law treaties, was attention paid towards those 
types of knowledge that had not previously been protected.26 However, being mainly 
concentrated in Third World Countries, the hierarchical power dynamics that had 
played an important role in shaping international negotiations during the previous 
centuries drove the assumption that traditional knowledge is in the public domain and, 
therefore, freely accessible. 27 Although nowadays post-colonial countries have  
increased negotiating leverage, unequal power relationships still remain and highly 
influence the outcomes of international negotiations.  
This is, for instance, the case of TRIPS negotiations and the revision of its 
article 27. The TRIPS Agreement has no specific provisions on the issue of traditional 
                                                
23  Traditional knowledge survives through practice. As with most of the elements labelled as 
“intangible heritage”, they are not written, but orally conserved and passed from generation to 
generation.  
24  Innovation in an indigenous context refers mainly to the maintenance system (sustainable 
management of lands, forests and natural resources). See: P Drahos, “When cosmology” (n 5), at 244. 
25 For an extensive list of cases concerning the impacts of biotechnology, especially in the field of 
agriculture, on environment, see: V Shiva et al., The GMO Emperor has no clothes, A Global Citizens 
Report on the State of GMOs - False Promises, Failed Technologies, report coordinated by Navdanya 
and Navdanya International, the International Commission on the Future of Food and Agriculture, with 
the participation of The Center for Food Safety (CFS), (2001), available at 
www.navdanyainternational.it.  
26 During the 1967 Stockholm Revision Conference of the Berne Convention the lack of protection of 
folklore was raised by the Indian delegation. The Berne Convention was amended in 1971 to include 
folklore in the enumeration of literary and artistic works. 
27 Arewa, above footnote 41, at 162-163 and Dutfield G., TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional 
Knowledge, (2001) 33 Case W. Res. Journal of International Law 233, 238. 
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knowledge. Aware of the necessity to overcome the inadequacy of the patenting 
system for genetic resources and traditional knowledge, developing countries have 
asked for an amendment of Article 27.3(b) TRIPS. The review of Article 27.3(b) was 
already envisioned by the text of the TRIPS Agreement after four years from the entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement (1995). The reviewing process started in 1999 and 
is still ongoing. At the same time, WIPO, the UN Agency for Intellectual Property, 
organised a Roundtable on intellectual property protection and traditional knowledge. 
From this Roundtable, the voice of a group of indigenous leaders called for reform of 
the entire international body of IPRs, and for a ban of patenting on all forms of life 
under Article 27.3(b) TRIPS.28 This request was encompassed within the proposals 
presented by developing countries to amend the TRIPS Agreement. The majority of 
them asked for the exclusion of patenting on life forms and all microbiological 
processes. They also requested recognition of not only formal systems of innovation 
but informal systems29 as well, especially with regard to biodiversity and traditional 
knowledge. Since the Doha Ministerial Declaration, it has been clear that the 
protection of biodiversity, its sustainable use, and its tied connection with traditional 
knowledge could not be sidelined from the implementation of TRIPS.30 Therefore, 
WTO has been increasingly involved in discussions concerning the tensions between 
access to intangible cultural heritage and the excessive patent protection system. 
In 2010, Bolivia raised a significant claim in a Communication to the Council 
for TRIPS.31 Bolivia asked for a ban on patenting of all life forms, including gene 
sequences, microorganisms as well as all biological, microbiological and non-
biological processes, in order to ensure “the protection of the innovations of 
indigenous and local farming communities and the continuation of the traditional 
farming practices including the right to save and exchange seeds, and sell their 
harvest” and the “protection for the rights of indigenous communities” in order to 
“prevent any private monopolistic intellectual property claims over their traditional 
                                                
28 S Ragavan, “Protection of Traditional Knowledge”, (2001) 2 Minnesota Intellectual Property 
Review, 40. 
29 The expression “informal system” indicates the set of oral knowledge and practical skills that are not 
recorded in written material or codified. This kind of knowledge cannot be protected under classic IP 
law systems, but is usually protected through customary law.  
30 Article 19 of the Declaration charges the Council for TRIPS to examine the relationship between the 
TRIPS Agreement, the CBD and the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, in order to 
pursue its review of Article 27.3(b). (WT/MIN901)/DEC/1). 
31 Communication from Boliva, IP/C/W/545, 26 February 2010. 
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knowledge”. 32  Bolivia called upon the Bolivian Constitution which expressly 
recognises indigenous Cosmovision and local traditional knowledge as the common 
heritage and expression of the identity of the State33. It also refers to the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), that recognises 
the “right of indigenous peoples to practice and revitalise their cultural traditions and 
customs, including the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and 
future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, 
artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and 
literature”.34 According to Bolivia, the regime set by article 27.3(b) is inconsistent 
with its Constitutional provisions and the UNDRIP, and threatens the sovereignty of 
people regarding their own resources. The Bolivian position is shared and supported 
by most developing countries.  
It is clear that issues concerning genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
are highly connected with development. Therefore, it is of crucial importance for 
developing countries to reach a better regulation under the WTO. Unfortunately, as 
recalled here, the bargaining power of developing countries is not strong enough and 
no agreement on the review of article 27.3(b) has been reached so far.35 In addition, 
together with the request to modify Article 27.3(b), developing and least-developed 
countries strongly call for a solution to reconcile the TRIPS provisions with the 
content of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which provides a better frame for 
the recognition and protection of TK and related genetic resources (this point will be 
further explored in the following paragraph).36  
                                                
32 Ibidem, Point 30(a)(b)(c)(d). 
33 Bolivia quotes Article 100 of the Constitution, that “recognizes the Cosmovision, myths, oral history, 
dances and cultural practices, traditional knowledge and technologies of indigenous peoples and 
peasants as their heritage [and that] this heritage is part of the expression and identity of the State" and 
Article 382, that states: "it is the competence and duty of the State to defend, recover and protect 
biological material coming from natural resources, ancestral knowledge and anything else that 
originate in the territory". 
34 Articles 11.1 and 11.2 of the UNDRIP. 
35  Information about the current reviewing status of Art. 27.3(b) is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_background_e.htm, last accessed on 4th June 
2013. 
36 For a clear picture of the incompatibilities between TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, see: I Michael 
Q C Jeffery, “Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity Conservation: Reconciling the 
Incompatibilities of the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity”, in B Ong 
(ed.), Intellectual Property and Biological Resources, (Marshal Cavendish International, 2004), 185. 
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2.2.2) Other relevant international frameworks 
2.2.2.1) The FAO Seed Treaty   
 
The protection of traditional knowledge and the obligation of fair and 
equitable benefits sharing deriving from genetic resources is also encompassed in the 
1993 FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRA)37, also known as the Seed Treaty. The Seed Treaty directly acknowledges 
the valuable contribution of indigenous and farmers’ traditional knowledge and 
practices to modern agriculture and food variety, and establishes a multilateral system 
to facilitate access to plant genetic resources and benefit -sharing (Articles 10-13). 
The Treaty recognises the rights of farmers to conserve, use, exchange, and sell farm-
saved seeds, and to participate in decision-making regarding the use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture. It devolves the responsibilities for the realisation 
of farmers’ rights to Parties (Article 9(2)), including de minimis the protection of 
traditional knowledge. However, the recognition of farmers’ rights under the Seed 
Treaty does not include property rights, but only the residual rights, such as saving, 
using, exchanging and selling farm-saved seeds. This might be a limitation for 
granting appropriate protection of traditional knowledge and practices against patent 
law.  
2.2.2.2) The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol 
 
While waiting for the reform of the TRIPS, other solutions to grant fair 
recognition of the benefits deriving from TK to local communities and indigenous 
peoples can be detected in international tools focusing on environmental and cultural 
subject-matter.  
Already in Our Common Future, the World Commission on Environment and 
Development highlighted the importance of traditional knowledge in the sustainable 
development process. In particular, the WCED observed that tribal and indigenous 
people need special attention to safeguard their traditional lifestyle from the impact of 
                                                
37 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, adopted on 3 November 
2001 by Res. 3/01 FAO Conference, 31st Sess. The ITPGRA also abandons the “common heritage” 
wording, marking the change of mind about genetic resources’ governance under the FAO. 
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economic development.38 In 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity established 
upon its party a duty to respect, preserve, and maintain the knowledge, innovations 
and practices of indigenous and local communities.39 The Convention also advanced 
the affirmation of the principle of national sovereignty over genetic resources40 and 
set a framework for a fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilisation 
of genetic resources and knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and 
local communities. Most importantly, it creates the obligation of the prior informed 
consent of the Contracting Party providing access to genetic resources.41 This means 
that States, when facilitating access on a given genetic resource, should ensure that 
the original holder/s has been properly informed about the future use of that resource 
and consented to it. The Prior Informed Consent (PIC) should improve the possibility 
for indigenous and local communities to gain control on their own resources, as well 
as control over related knowledge and practices. It is also a fundamental base for the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits. 
Realising the equitable sharing of benefits and reaching an effective prior 
informed consent are challenging tasks. Some commentators observed that to reach a 
well-informed prior consent is difficult to put into practice within indigenous and 
local contexts.42 Besides the technical barriers like the language, they notice how 
difficult it might be in these specific contexts to define the holder of the knowledge or 
practice. In the case of traditional knowledge, to define the ownership and the limits 
and rights of such ownership is the major challenge. As mentioned in the former 
section, the governance of genetic resources and traditional knowledge often belongs 
to the community and is regulated by a set of spiritual meanings and customary law 
that cannot be disclosed. Another challenge is presented by the difficulty to introduce 
concepts referring to IP law, such as “patent”, “copyright” and all the set or related 
                                                
38 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, (Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 12. 
39 Art.8(j) of the CBD; see also Preamble of the CBD. 
40 Article 15 of the CBD. The idea that genetic resources are part of the common heritage of 
humankind had been largely dominant until concerns about genetic and diversity erosion and issues of 
fair and equitable benefits sharing arose. The evolution of this thinking and the shift from the regime of  
“common heritage of humankind” to the sovereign rights of nations is described well in Keith Aoiki, 
‘Weeds, Seeds, and Deeds’ above (n 16), 305. See also: C R McManis, “Intellectual property, genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge protection: thinking globally, acting locally”, (2003-2004) 11 
Cardozo Journal of Int'l & Comp. Law, 554. 
41 Article 15 CBD, Access to genetic resources.  
42 See for instance: J D Dalibard and T Kono, “Prior Informed Consent. Empowering the Bearers of 
Cultural Traditions”, in T Kono  (ed) Intangible cultural heritage and intellectual property: 
community, cultural diversity and sustainable development, (Intersentia, 2009), 247-259. 
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rights, in these societies. In the current system, the knowledge of these concepts is 
essential for a fair and equitable benefits sharing deriving from the use of a genetic 
resource. This last point constitutes an additional problem: indigenous and local 
communities are not familiar with these economic concepts and often are not willing 
to give (and accept) an economic value to something that entails spiritual values.43 
The complexity of the issues at stake demands a definition of a sui generis system that 
could adjust the special holistic approach of indigenous and local communities to the 
use of genetic resources and maintain the possibility for outsiders to access such 
resources.44 In this sense, the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits arising from their 
Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity45 in 2010 may signify a step 
forward. The Protocol expressly recognises that an innovative solution is required to 
address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the use of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that occur in 
transboundary situations, or situations for which it is not possible to grant or obtain 
prior informed consent. It also specifies that it is the right of indigenous and local 
communities to identify the rightful holders of their traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources within their communities, and establishes an obligation on the 
Parties not to restrict the customary use and exchange of genetic resources and 
associated traditional knowledge within and amongst indigenous and local 
communities when implementing the Protocol and the CBD. 46  However, the 
innovative element of the Protocol is the specific obligation to support compliance 
with domestic legislation or regulatory requirements of the Party providing genetic 
                                                
43 Lenzerini, above (n 17). 
44 Prohibiting tout court access to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge would 
probably constitute the most efficient way to preserve the cultural identity of indigenous and local 
communities. However, without entering into a more philosophical debate that might entail subjective 
and emotional approaches about the “right and wrong” of the access to genetic resources for 
commercial purposes, Lenzerini rightly observes that such a solution would prevent traditional 
knowledge holders who desire to make commercial use of such knowledge from exercising their own 
rights. This may also have consequences for future possibilities of development, hindering the exercise 
of their right to self-determination of their model of development. See F Lenzerini, “Indigenous 
Peoples’ Cultural Rights and the Controversy over Commercial Use of Their Traditional Knowledge” 
in F. Francioni and M. Scheinin (eds), Cultural Human Rights, (2008), 143. 
45 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted on 29 October  2010, 
and entered into force UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1. 
46 Article 12(3)(d) of the Nagoya Protocol. 
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resources, and contractual obligations reflected in mutually agreed terms (MAT).47 
The obligation to conform to domestic legislation when setting the framework for the 
prior informed consent and the benefits sharing can be seen both as a positive and a 
negative element. Indeed, where national legislations recognise and grant protection 
to local and indigenous customary laws, or offer ILCs a role to play at the national 
level, then they certainly offer a better protection of indigenous and local 
communities’ interests on their territory. For instance, domestic norms in numerous 
Latin American Countries recognise constitutional protection to indigenous and local 
communities’ traditions and their holistic and collective nature (e.g., the case of 
Bolivia quoted in the former paragraph). Nevertheless, it must be recalled that this is 
not always the case, and the reference to national legislations can become problematic 
when domestic law denies or does not recognise a role to customary rules. 
2.2.2.3) The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
 
The efficient protection of several domestic legal regimes protecting 
intangible heritage also emerges from the results of a study carried on by the WIPO 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore,48 which explores the best examples of domestic 
legislation in view of drafting an international sui generis IP framework for the 
protection of traditional knowledge. In late 2000, the WIPO Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge 
and Folklore was established with the aim to address both policy and practical 
linkages between the IP system and the concerns of TK holders. The Committee is 
carrying out various studies to collect diverse national and international experiences 
and tools to safeguard TK, in order to move towards an international understanding of 
the shared objectives and principles that should guide the protection of TK. The 
Committee’s work has not yet been completed, however progresses towards a draft 
text of an international legal instrument that will ensure the effective protection of 
                                                
47 Article 7 (Access to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources), Article 12 (Traditional 
Knowledge associated with genetic resources), Article 15 (Compliance with domestic legislation or 
regulatory requirements on access and benefit-sharing), Article 16 (Compliance with domestic 
legislation or regulatory requirements on access and benefit-sharing for traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources).  
48  Composite Study on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, (28 April 2003) 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/8. 
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Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions  has been made.49 The 
draft text draws upon emergent solution in international fora to redress problems like 
biopiracy and misappropriation and best examples of domestic legislation. 
To complete the overview of the international instruments aimed at the 
protection of cultural heritage, it is important to mention all the sets of Conventions 
under UNESCO’s aegis, and in particular the most recent 2003 UNESCO Convention 
for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage and the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention for the protection and promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 
The UNESCO Conventions expressly address the conservation and promotion of both 
the tangible and intangible dimensions of cultural heritage (therefore including 
traditional knowledge and practices),50 and aim at preserving their rich diversity from 
the impacts of economic development and globalisation. 
The UNESCO Conventions, as well as the Nagoya Protocol may constitute 
useful legal instruments to address all the specific issues for the protection of 
traditional knowledge and counterbalance the WTO rules. Nevertheless, in these cases 
the relationship between these instruments and the WTO is neither clear nor pacific 
and a great part of their success will depend upon the political will of State Parties 
and the interpretation of judges (in case of international dispute settlement).51  
 
2.3) Emergent paths for a solution: disclosure requirement, PIC and sui 
generis systems 
 
                                                
49 In Fall 2011, the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee received a mandate to expedite its work on 
text-based negotiations with the objective of reaching an agreement on a text (or texts) of an 
international legal instrument(s) which will ensure the effective protection of GRs, TK and TCEs. See: 
Decision “Matters Concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore Agenda Item 31”, Assemblies of Member States of 
WIPO Fortieth (20th Ordinary) Session (September 26 - October 5, 2011). 
50 Article 2 of the 2003 UNESCO Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage so 
definite intangible cultural heritage: “[…] ‘intangible cultural heritage’ means the practices, 
representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural 
space associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as 
part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to 
generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their 
interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, 
thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. For the purposes of this 
Convention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible 
with existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual 
respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development. […]”.  
51For instance, Article 20 of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity contains a “non-
prejudice” clause similar to that one contained in Article 22 of the CBD (see Section 3.b of this paper) 
that may weaken the strength of the Convention in case of conflict with the WTO.  
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Given that the primary reason pushing countries today to protect traditional 
knowledge is the urgency to stop biopiracy, major actors and stakeholders are 
exploring – within the frame of international negotiations – various possible paths to 
solve this issue. When using the term “biopiracy”, we usually refer to the use of 
biological resources and/or associated traditional knowledge without adequate 
authorisation, and/or patents based on such knowledge or resources without ensuring 
adequate compensation or recognition. A major problem is to identify who is entitled 
to grant the adequate authorisation, or, in other words, who holds the knowledge.52 
This is further complicated when a resource is widely distributed and traditional 
knowledge applications are applied in different geographical and social contexts. As 
Dutfield observes, “it is not always clear who the victims are, or indeed if there are 
any”.53 The attention granted to biopiracy grew out of the increasing recognition of 
the enormous value of TK and biological resources, especially for developing 
countries, where the world’s biological wealth is predominantly located.  
Although the contribution made by TK to local and global economies cannot 
be easily calculated, the attention towards the protection of TK shows its direct 
connection with the economic component of the developmental paradigm.54 In order 
to avoid the risk of misappropriation of genetic resources and related TK, a disclosure 
requirement has emerged as the predominant potential mechanism for traditional 
knowledge whose use is related to genetic resources protection. The disclosure 
requirement should be jointly applied with the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) – which 
developed under the umbrella of the Convention on Biological Diversity – and 
appropriate mechanism of Access to Benefit Sharing (ABS).  
Looking at the multilateral level of negotiations, a major role is played by the 
ongoing review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. In this frame, the 
adoption of the disclosure requirement has been discussed as a central aspect.55 The 
                                                
52 Here, the use of the verb “to hold” may sound inappropriate to experts in the field of traditional 
knowledge and related issues. To hold, indeed, implies the concept of ‘ownership’, which is generally 
understood and acknowledged as a Western concept and, therefore, inappropriate for different contexts 
like local or indigenous communities in Africa, Latin America, India, etc. 
53 Dutfield, above (n 5). 
54 For some concrete examples, see “Protecting and Promoting Traditional Knowledge: Systems, 
National Experiences and International Dimensions. Section III: Harnessing Traditional Knowledge for 
Development”, Sophia Twarog and Promila Kapoor (eds.), UNCTAD/DITC/TED/10, (2004). 
55 Point 6 of the document “Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b): Summary of Issues Raised and 
Points Made”, Note prepared by the TRIPS Secretariat, IP/C/W/369/Rev.1 (9 March 2006).  
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requirement for disclosure of the source of the genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge involved in the claimed inventions was first submitted by Switzerland.56 
However, the Swiss proposal did not consider the possibility to modify Article 
27.3(b) of the TRIPS and introduced the disclosure requirement as an additional 
possibility for Members.57 That proposal did not meet the favour of other WTO 
Members, especially those who struggled for a real reform of the patent system and 
called for a mutually supportive implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the 
CBD. Indeed, the African group counteracted by asking, together with the ban on 
patenting micro-organisms and non-biological and micro-biological processes,58 that 
the rights under TRIPS would protect genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
from misappropriation through requirements for disclosure of the source of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge involved in the claimed inventions, and for a 
demonstration of compliance with the applicable domestic procedures in the State 
where the genetic resources and traditional knowledge originate.59 By recalling the 
compliance with national legislation regulating the access to genetic resources and 
related traditional knowledge, the African group went further than the Swiss proposal. 
As clarified by the African group’s representatives, where certain domestic systems 
may fail to prevent patents that constituted a misappropriation of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge, the introduction of such requirements within the TRIPS 
obligations would be useful in preventing or reducing the occurrence of such cases.60  
                                                
56 Article 27.3(b), the Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge, IP/C/W/400/Rev.1 (18 June 2003). 
57 According to Switzerland, Article 27.3(b) as formulated represents a well-balanced solution for all 
the interests and needs of WTO Members (see document above quoted, at n. Error! Bookmark not 
efined.). Further, Switzerland pointed out that there was no necessity for an amendment of Article 
27.3(b) so as to create a farmers’ privilege, given that this is already possible under Article 30 
‘Exceptions to Rights Conferred’. Lastly, Switzerland observed that the most appropriate forum to 
discuss IPR issues and the protection of TK is WIPO, rather than the WTO. 
58 The African group underlined the incompatibility of the current patent regime established by Article 
27.3(b) with the protection of public policy goals such as food security, nutrition, the elimination of 
rural poverty, and the integrity of local communities. The African group sought to pass from a 
discretionary exclusion principle to a mandatory exclusion for all life patents. See ‘Taking forward the 
review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, Joint Communication from the African Group’, 
IP/C/W/404, (26 June 2003). 
59 It is important to note that Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement was considered as the most suitable 
for an appropriate modification to contain these rights and obligations. The African Group suggested 
that Article 29 be modified by adding the following sentence as paragraph 3: “Members shall require 
an applicant for a patent to disclose the country and area of origin of any biological resources and 
traditional knowledge used or involved in the invention, and to provide confirmation of compliance 
with all access regulations in the country of origin”. 
60 ‘Taking forward the review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, Joint Communication from 
the African Group’, here above quoted at Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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In addition, the African proposal addressed some specific issues concerning 
the inadequacy of applying IP law to traditional knowledge. Requirements like 
inventorship, novelty and industrial application do not reflect the way traditional 
knowledge is created and developed. Therefore, while recognising traditional 
knowledge as a category of intellectual property rights, the Group advanced the 
possibility for Members to adopt sui generis systems for more extensive protection. 
More precisely, the rights relating to traditional knowledge that shall be protected 
should focus on the empowerment and respect of local communities or traditional 
practitioners. The will and decisions of such communities and practitioners on 
whether or not to commercialise their knowledge shall be respected; as well as respect 
and honour of any cultural or religious value they attach to their knowledge. Prior and 
informed consent for any access and any intended use of their knowledge becomes, 
then, a central element to guarantee the respect of such rights, as well as the setting of 
a system for full remuneration for their knowledge. Finally, given that one of most 
critical aspects relating to the protection of TK is the difficulty to document the “prior 
art” and the prior existence of the knowledge belonging to local communities, 
Members may document traditional knowledge in their territories through competent 
authorities carrying out and maintaining registers and/or electronic databases of local 
communities and traditional practitioners. However, it is clearly pointed out that the 
lack of registration shall not prejudice the rights of any local community or traditional 
practitioner and local communities and the competent authorities shall have an 
exclusive right in perpetuity to any information that is documented or entered in the 
register, to prevent any access or use they have not expressly authorised or any 
application that is inconsistent with the rights of local communities and traditional 
practitioners.61 
The request to introduce the disclosure requirement, evidence of prior 
informed consent and evidence of fair and equitable sharing under the relevant 
national regime as conditions to acquire patent rights was also supported by other 
                                                
61 This clarification is meant to prevent the occurrence of unpleasant consequences depending upon the 
lack of appropriate means and systems to carry out appropriate research to document the existence and 
the structural elements of the knowledge. On the role of databases for TK protection, see: The Role of 
Registers and Databases in the Protection of Traditional Knowledge A Comparative Analysis, UNU-
IAS Report, January 2004, available at 
http://www.ias.unu.edu/binaries/UNUIAS_TKRegistersReport.pdf. 
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countries, like India and Brazil.62 In 2011, a draft decision to enhance mutual 
supportiveness between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD was submitted by Brazil, 
China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru, Thailand, the ACP Group, and the 
African Group.63 The draft decision is an attempt to introduce the mechanisms for 
PIC and the disclosure of origin64 as established by the Nagoya Protocol of the CBD 
within the TRIPS obligations. No decision has been reached today on this proposal 
and some industrialised Members, like the US, Japan New Zealand and Korea, have 
raised their voice against a compulsory disclosure requirement in patent application.65 
While the TRIPS process of review is making slow progress, the WIPO 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore recently proposed a draft text establishing an 
international frame to better protect TK and genetic resources.66 The provisional text 
introduces a principle of mandatory disclosure of country of origin and equity, 
including benefit sharing and sets up a specific provision for including the disclosure 
requirement in patent applications.67 If such a requirement, which shall be jointly 
implemented with the PIC mechanism, is not fulfilled, patent offices will reject the 
application. If the WIPO assembly adopts this version of the legal text, it may signal a 
significant step forward for reducing misappropriation and ensuring equity in ABS.68 
                                                
62 ‘The Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD and the Protection of Traditional 
knowledge’, IP/C/W/403, (24 June 2003). Led by India and Brazil, the group is made up of Bolivia, 
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela.  
63 Draft decision to enhance mutual supportiveness between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, 
Peru, Thailand, the ACP Group, and the African Group. TN/C/W/59, (19 April 2011). 
64 Under the CBD “country of origin” means the country that possesses those genetic resources in in 
situ conditions. Still under the CBD, “in situ conditions” means conditions where genetic resources 
exist within ecosystems and natural habitats, and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in 
the surroundings where they have developed their distinctive properties. 
65 One argument used by the US against the application of a mandatory disclosure requirement for 
biological invention is that it would lead to increased discrimination between fields of technology, see 
US submission IP/C/W/257. See also ‘Article 27.3(b), relationship between the TRIPS agreement and 
the CBD, and the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore’, IP/C/W/434, (26 November 2004), 
in which the US argues that only a ‘prior consent agreement itself (usually constituting a contract 
between two entities), and not a disclosure in a patent application, that manifests prior informed 
consent’ can prevent misappropriation. For a more detailed excursus of TRIPS’ negotiations on these 
issues, see: George Wei, above at (n. Error! Bookmark not defined.), 63-68. 
66  The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Draft Articles Rev. 2 (April 26, 2013), 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/24/FACILITATORS DOCUMENT REV. 2, published 14 May 2014 on 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=238182. 
67 Ibidem, Article 4bis of the draft text. 
68 Negotiations under the WIPO are still ongoing. The numerous brackets at the voice “Disclosure of 
origin” in the Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources Rev. 2 
of February 7, 2014 show that an agreement on this item is still far off. 
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3) Intellectual Property Rights in the EU external relations  
3.1) The Union’s competence in the field of intellectual property 
 
Before exploring in depth the EU’s position on the issues concerning 
Intellectual Property Law, it is appropriate to look at the competence of the Union in 
this area.  
Today, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, legitimises the Union’s legislative 
initiative on IPRs by establishing a specific legal basis under article 118 TFEU. This 
provision, indeed, confers to the Union the power to “establish measures for the 
creation of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of 
intellectual property rights throughout the Union”. However, the founding treaties did 
not contain any specific provision conferring competence to the European 
Community on intellectual property. Some authors even interpreted certain articles of 
the Treaty of Rome, such as article 295 ECT stating that the Treaty “shall in no way 
prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership”,69 
as refraining the Community legislator from intervening in this field.70 So initially the 
Community initiatives in the IP sector were based on fragmented legal basis. For 
instance, article 95 ECT (now article 114 TEU), which empowered the Community to 
act so as to approximate legislations that aim towards the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market, and article 308 ECT (now article 352 TFEU), 
which entitled the Community to adopt the appropriate measures when it should 
prove necessary to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties 
have not provided the necessary powers, functioned as a legal basis for several 
directives in the field of intellectual property. Legislation concerning Community 
trademark, designs, and plant variety protection was adopted on these legal bases. 
Other rules were, instead, adopted within the framework of different competences: 
this is the case of geographical indications and appellations of origin, which relied on 
article 37 ECT (now article 43 TFEU) falling within the Common Agricultural 
Policy.71 As the functioning of the internal market is one of its major goals, European 
                                                
69 In the TFEU article 295 became Article 345. 
70  C Geiger, “The Construction of intellectual property in the European Union: searching for 
coherence”, in C Geiger (ed.), Constructing European Intellectual Property Achievements and New 
Perspectives, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 6. 
71 Many authors argue that, given such a lack of explicit competence, the EU’s set of legislation on 
IPRs developed in a non-systematic and often incoherent way. See: C Geiger, ibidem, 5; G Tritton, 
Intellectual Property in Europe, 3rd Ed., (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008). 
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legislation on IP mainly approached IPRs issues from an economic perspective, 
leaving aside cultural, social, environmental and ethical concerns. However, such 
concerns increasingly entered the European sphere of debate the European 
Parliament, which often engaged in challenging discussions on controversial issues, – 
like ethical questions concerning biotechnology or impacts on human rights – and – 
played a pivotal role in pushing towards the adoption of more ambitious legislation.72 
On the other hand, looking at the competence of the Union on the external 
dimension, former article 133 ECT (now article 207 TFEU) clearly included the 
“commercial aspects of intellectual property” within the box of the common 
commercial policy. The Union enjoys, then, an exclusive competence on the external 
dimension of intellectual property rights’ commercial aspects. On this point, it is 
important to recall briefly here the Daiichi Sankyo decision released by the Court of 
Justice, in which, for the first time, the Court interprets article 207 as revised by the 
Lisbon reform..73 In this decision the Court overturned its previous case law on TRIPs 
in light of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and confirmed what some 
commentators had expected: the Treaty amendments of the Lisbon Treaty bring the 
TRIPs Agreement in its entirety within the scope of the Common Commercial 
Policy.74 The Court, indeed, upheld that the new Article 207 TFEU “differs noticeably 
from the provisions it essentially replaced” (Nice version of article 133) and “differs 
even more from the provision that was in force when the TRIPs Agreement was 
concluded” (Maastricht Teaty). As a result of this significant development of primary 
law, the question of the distribution of the competences of the European Union and 
the Member States must be examined on the basis of the Treaty now in force (the 
Lisbon Treaty).75 Then, the Court provided a wider interpretation of the concept of 
                                                
72 For instance, the adoption of Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions on 6 July 1998. For an overview on the EP’s role and positions in the field of intellectual 
property: C Geiger and E Py, La législation communutaire en matière de propriété intellectuelle et le 
rôle du Parlement européen, étude synthétique, (May 2009), available at www.cepi.edu.  
73  C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd, Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. DEMO Anonimos 
Viomikhaniki kai Emporiki Etairia Farmakon [2013]. Daiichi Sankyo concerned a reference for a 
preliminary ruling by a Greek court in a dispute between the Japanese company Daiichi Sankyo (the 
patentee) and the German company Sanofi-Aventis (a license holder), on the one hand, and the Greek 
company DEMO, on the other hand, on the patentability of a pharmaceutical ingredient called 
“levofloxacin hemihydrates”. As a preliminary matter, the referring court wanted to know – inter alia - 
whether the Court of Justice or the courts of Member States had jurisdiction to interpret the TRIPs 
Agreement and decide on its effect in the national legal order.  
74 L Ankersmit, “The Scope of the Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: The Daiichi Sankyo and 
Conditional Access Services Grand Chamber Judgments”, (2014) 41:2 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration, at 193.  
75 C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo, para 48. 
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“commercial aspects of intellectual property”. It first noted that the Common 
Commercial Policy operates within the context of the EU’s external action as 
specified by Article 207 TFEU and therefore “relates to trade with non-member 
countries, not to trade in the internal market”. The Court then reshapes the scope of 
the Common Commercial Policy in relation to other provisions of the E Treaties, by 
affirming that “a European Union act falls within the common commercial policy if it 
relates specifically to international trade in that it is essentially intended to promote, 
facilitate or govern trade and has direct and immediate effects on trade”.  Therefore, 
not all measures in the field of intellectual property will fall within the scope of the 
Common Commercial Policy, but, of the rules adopted by the European Union in the 
field of intellectual property, only those with a specific link to international trade are 
capable of falling within the concept of “commercial aspects of intellectual property” 
in article 207(1) TFEU. According to the Court, the TRIPS Agreement fall within the 
scope of article 207(1) TFEU, because TRIPS rules have a specific link with 
international trade.76 Thus, the Court here reversed its Opinion 1/94, under which only 
the TRIPs rules on the release into free circulation of counterfeit goods were found to 
be specifically related to international trade. In conclusion, the Court states that it has 
jurisdiction to interpret the TRIPS Agreement and, by consequence, to determine the 
effects of TRIPs within the legal orders of the EU and the Member States. The 
decision will also have effects on the balance of power between the EU and its 
Member States: indeed, Daiichi Sankyo signs a significant step forward for the EU’s 
visibility and power within the WTO.77  
3.2) The Union’s action on the external level: goals, instruments and new 
challenges 
 
Having assessed the competence of the Union, it is now time to look at the 
Union’s initiatives on the external level. Taking a broader overview, it seems to be 
difficult to pinpoint the most relevant actions for the issues raised in this chapter. In 
effect, whereas the Union’s endeavours in the field of cultural industries as a means to 
foster development as well as to preserve cultural diversity is greatly deployed, the 
same enthusiasm has not been shown towards the protection of forms of intangible 
                                                
76 Ibidem, para 53. 
77 The Commission will now be able also de iure  to be the sole representative at nearly all WTO 
meetings. On this, see L Ankersmit, (n 74), at 200. 
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cultural heritage which are directly connected to developmental issues, such as 
traditional knowledge. Certainly, within European borders, the protection of 
traditional knowledge is not a priority and major actions focus on the protection and 
valorisation of local traditional agricultural products and foodstuffs – like wine, 
spirits, olive oil, cheese, etc. – through Geographical Indications (GI) and Protected 
Designations of Origin (PDO).78 GI and PDO are certainly successful tools to protect 
and promote certain forms of local produce and, as a consequence, preserve cultural 
diversity and local identities. However, European citizens and governments do not 
always easily perceive the connection of local traditional products with 
developmental issues. Although the protection of local cultural identities is a highly 
cherished topic for the majority of Member States, European countries do not share 
the same concerns as developing countries about the use of traditional knowledge and 
the safeguarding of traditional knowledge in Europe is rather a matter of preserving 
folklore. However, some legal measures coping with TK linked to genetic resources 
have been made to protect traditional knowledge both at the national and at the Union 
level, such as the legal protection of “Traditional Specialties”. 79  Other legal 
initiatives, like Council Regulation 870/2004 and Council Regulation 1590/2004,80 
comply with international commitments undertaken by the EU, namely under the 
CBD. They include actions promoting the ex situ and in situ conservation, 
characterisation, collection and utilisation of genetic resources in agriculture 
exercised in the member states. Although answering some local farmers’ needs, in 
                                                
78 See, for instance, Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of 
geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs. However, 
it is worth mentioning that the Commission is involved in the effort to extend GI protection to non-
agricultural products, although keeping the focus on the economic aspects of such productions. In 
2009, DG Trade commissioned an independent study on the protection of geographical indications for 
products other than wines, spirits, agricultural products or foodstuffs. The Study analyses 28 non-
agricultural products of economic significance enjoying protection in certain EU Member States and in 
non-EU countries. It compares the protection systems available to these products and analyses the 
strengths and weaknesses of the protection systems identified. The study “Study on the protection of 
geographical indications for products other than wines, spirits, agricultural products or foodstuffs” is 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147926.pdf. 
79 For an extensive overview on these measures: A Leidwein, “Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
Associated with Biological and Genetic Resources. General Legal Issues and Measures Already Taken 
by the European Union and its Member States in the Field of Agriculture and Food Production”, in 9:3 
The Journal of World Intellectual Property (2006) 251–275. See also: T Kiene, “Traditional 
Knowledge in the European Context”, (2006) 2 Ressources Naturelles. 
80  Council Regulation 870/2004 establishing a Community programme on the conservation, 
characterisation, collection and utilisation of genetic resources in agriculture and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1467/94; Council Regulation 1590/2004 establishing a Community programme on the 
conservation, characterisation, collection and utilisation of genetic resources in agriculture and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1467/94. 
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Europe such initiatives do not encounter a general shared recognition and there is 
little awareness of their potential to contribute to sustainable development.  
Because the external action of the Union is highly influenced by the internal 
dimension, the protection of TK is not included among the priorities of the Union. 
Instead, great attention is dedicated to the enforcement of IPRs within third countries 
so as to ensure that intellectual assets belonging to EU right-holders are properly 
warranted outside the EU borders.81 Major goals of the Union are to preserve the 
integrity of the acquis communautaire as well as to create a favourable environment 
to enhance worldwide EU competitiveness and growth. In this sense, the Commission 
adopted in 2004 a Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Third Countries,82 which defines a broad framework to fight intellectual property 
rights infringements in third countries. The Union’s Strategy aims at ensuring the 
enforcement of European intellectual property rights in third countries and to 
effectively fight infringement of such rights through both legislative and non-
legislative tools. The non-legislative actions take place through intellectual property 
dialogues and programmes of technical co-operation and financial assistance within 
the frame of bilateral and regional cooperation.83 As for the legislative initiatives, the 
Union is actively engaged both within the multilateral (TRIPS, WIPO, ACTA, etc.) 
and bilateral frame of negotiations in promoting the harmonisation and strengthening 
of IPRs at the global level. On the bilateral level, the EU Strategy concentrates on the 
inclusion of an intellectual property chapter within the agreement with third parties 
(FTAs, the recent EPAs, Association Agreements). Considering the increased 
difficulties to achieve results within the multilateral framework (let us recall for 
                                                
81 O Vrins and M Schneider (eds), Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Through Border 
Measures Law and Practice in the EU, 2nd Ed., (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
82 Strategy for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third countries, 2005/C 129/03. The 
Strategy is drawn from the Enforcement Directive (Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights), aiming at 
harmonising enforcement legislation within the European Union, and the revision of the Customs 
Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 of 22 July 2003 concerning customs action against 
goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures to be taken against 
goods found to have infringed such rights), that provides action against counterfeit or pirated goods at 
the Community's border. 
83 Some examples are: the IPR2 project supporting technical assistance to build intellectual property 
capacity in the Chinese administration, performed by DG Development and Co-operation; technical 
and financial assistance projects carried out within the frame of the MEDA programme with 
Mediterranean countries; technical cooperation programmes under the framework of the Cotonou 
Agreement for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries; specific lines of the TAIEX 
(Technical Assistance and Information Exchange) programme within the EU’s European 
Neighbourhood Policy framework with Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and EUROMED countries. 
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example the impasse of the TRIPS review process), bilateral trade agreements are a 
more efficient tool to pursue the Union’s objectives.   
Among the priorities set in the Strategy’s agenda, fighting counterfeiting and 
piracy are certainly central issues. Besides having developed a detailed internal 
legislation to fight these phenomena84 at the EU and implementing the TRIPS and 
WIPO provisions on these issues, the Union recently signed the plurilateral Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).85 Although piracy and counterfeiting can 
also be analysed through the lenses of developmental issues, they are not of direct 
pertinence for the purpose of my analysis. Instead, it is useful to investigate what the 
Union’s attitude towards IP interacting with culture for development issues is when it 
engages in multilateral and bilateral initiatives.  
In effect, the 2004 Strategy’s goal clearly shows that the international 
harmonisation of IPRs is based on the predominant western idea of intellectual 
property, as developed by the TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO’s conventions. 
Notwithstanding that the Commission states that the Strategy does not intend to 
“impose unilateral solutions” to problems concerning the enforcement of IPRs and 
“to propose a one-size-fits-all approach to promoting IPR enforcement”, 86  the 
implementation of the Strategy turns into the diffusion of the Western model of 
understanding and implementing IP law, which can bring up tensions in developing 
and least-developed countries’ contexts. The EU has not been saved from the major 
criticisms raised by the international public opinion concerning IP and development 
issues. In particular, the IPR provisions included in bilateral agreements have often 
been blamed for being too demanding for developing countries, hindering the full 
enjoyment of fundamental rights and not meeting the interests and needs of third 
                                                
84 See above Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
85 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, signed on 26 January 2012 in Tokyo, between the European 
Union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican 
States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation 
and the United States of America. The ACTA negotiations have been quite controversial, they have 
been strongly criticised by public opinion for having been secret negotiations for over three years and 
setting an excessive frame of control hindering freedom of communication. See: C R McMains, “The 
Proposed Anti- Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Two Tales of a Treaty”, (2009) 46/4 
Houston Law Review, 1235. On the EU side, the adoption of the ACTA raised several concerns and has 
even been rejected by the Parliament (EP legislative resolution of 4 July 2012, P7_TA-
PROV(2012)0287). ACTA has been accused of changing the existing European IP law and creating 
new obligations on criminal enforcement, which is an area of shared competence and for which the 
Union does not yet have any similar legislation. 
86 See the ‘Introduction’ of the Strategy for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third 
countries, above (n Error! Bookmark not defined.). 
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countries.87 Some analysts even pointed out that the EU Commission often advocates 
a rigid and extremely precise framework for the measures and actions States should 
adopt regarding intellectual property, often being more restrictive than TRIPS’ 
obligations.88 “A flexible approach that takes into account different needs, level of 
development, membership or not of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and main 
problems in terms of IPR (country of production, transit or consumption of infringing 
goods) of the countries in question” seems to be the option adopted by the 
Commission to reply to such criticisms.89 However, from a preliminary look at the 
range of FTAs and other trade agreements concluded in the last years, the IP measures 
included are quite standard and flexibility has been used to accommodate the Union’s 
interests rather than those of third parties. For instance, the FTA with South Korea 
and the Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru contain provisions on geographical 
indications shaped on the EU existing legislation, but no special (or sui generis) 
provisions addressing the specific protection of traditional knowledge (as we will see 
in the following paragraphs).   
3.4) The Union position towards the “IPRs and culture for development” 
issues 
 
3.4.1) The multilateral framework: WTO, WIPO and CBD 
3.4.1.1) WTO 
 
Concerning the TRIPS’ review of Article 27.3(b), the EU is taking active part 
in the debate, demonstrating efforts to find a balance between the divergent claims of 
industrialized and developing countries. On the one hand, in a 2002 communication to 
the TRIPS Council, the EU clearly stated that there is no obvious reason to amend 
Article 27.3(b). The EU justifies such a position by arguing that the TRIPS 
                                                
87 See for instance:  D Cronin, “Strong EU Trade Provisions On IP Seen As Threat To Poor Nations’ 
Medicines Access”, published on 18 February 2009 for IP watch, available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/2009/02/18/strong-eu-trade-provisions-on-ip-seen-as-threat-to-poor-nations’-medicines-
access/ 
88 In most of the FTAs concluded, the EU wished to include the so-called ‘TRIPS-plus’ rules, which 
make it more difficult for states to use the WTO flexibilities. Most of the criticisms towards the IP 
chapter in EU bilateral agreements have been raised for IP measures likely to hinder access to medicine 
in developing countries. See, for instance, X Seuba Hernandez, Health Protection in the New 
Association Agreement between the Andean Community (or some of its members) and the European 
Community in light of its provisions concerning Intellectual Property and recent experiences, available 
at http://www.haiweb.org/20012009/19%20Dec%202008%20Policy%20Paper%20EU-
CAN%20Association%20Agreement%20%28Final%20EN%29.pdf.  
89 ‘Introduction’ of the Strategy, above n. Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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Agreement already grants Members sufficient flexibility to modulate patent protection 
according to national needs, interests and ethical standards on the basis of the 
exclusions under article 27.2 and the criteria for patentability under article 27. On the 
other hand, the EU did not completely ignore developing countries’ requests and 
manifested its willingness to take into account the possibility of introducing a 
requirement for patent applicants to disclose information on the origin of genetic 
resources or traditional knowledge used in an invention.90 A disclosure requirement 
would help Members to follow all patent applications at the global level concerning 
genetic resources for which they have granted access, therefore ensuring transparency 
of the patent system. However, the EU position is that such a disclosure requirement 
should be a “self-standing” clause and should be limited to information on the 
geographic origin of genetic resources and/or TK used in the invention, without 
requiring further evidence of compliance with ABS regulations. According to the EU, 
the “disclosure requirement should not act, de facto or de jure, as an additional formal 
or substantial patentability criterion”. By consequence, legal implications for the non-
respect of the requirement may only be invoked outside the ambit of patent law. It is 
obviously important to remark here that such a condition would not efficiently 
contribute to stop biopiracy and misappropriation, or to reduce economic, social and 
cultural impacts on the countries of origin. In fact, although a legal mechanisms may 
likely be activated under administrative or civil law (i.e.: asking a fee payment for 
refusing to submit information or a claim for compensation), this would not be 
enough to redress the consequences of having granted the patent in the first place. In 
addition, it is hardly conceivable that the TK-holder(s) would start an administrative 
proceeding or a civil trial against multinational corporations: as already highlighted in 
the case of filing a patent application, members of indigenous and local communities 
are often unaware they are entitled to such remedies; further, the linguistic obstacles 
and the costs to file such proceedings would prevent TK holders from taking the 
initiative. It is also hard to imagine that developing countries’ governments would 
take the lead in such a task: foreign corporations are a source of investment and 
starting such actions would not be strategically convenient for them, considering that 
they may make the political environment hostile for investors. Lastly, such solutions 
                                                
90‘Review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, and the Relationship between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore’, IP/C/W/383 (17 October 2002). 
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do not address the socio-cultural implications of the implementation of the patent 
system.  As for the limitations to geographical origin, this reflects Recital 27 of the 
Biotechnology Directive,91 which states that if an invention is based on biological 
material of plant or animal origin or on the use of such material, the patent application 
should include information on the geographical origin of such material, where 
appropriate and if known (and, in all cases, this is without prejudice to the processing 
of patent applications or the validity of rights arising from granted patents). The 
European proposal to limit information to geographical origin can be seen as an effort 
at preserving consistency and coherence between the external and the internal action 
in this field. Yet, taking into account that a great range of TK and genetic resources 
originate in more than one country and the difficulties to properly document the 
existence and development of TK,92 it does not offer an efficient solution against 
misappropriation of TK and genetic resources. The EU suggests resolving this kind of 
problems through arrangements among the source countries concerned and/or in the 
context of the CBD.93 Recalling the urgency of the issues at stake, this does not sound 
like a timely solution.94  
Whereas for solutions directly affecting the current patent system (and likely 
to change it in a way to make the release of a patents harder) the EU showed a 
cautious approach, on questions concerning TK protection the EU manifested a more 
empathic attitude towards developing countries’ claims. Although not considering the 
TRIPS Council as the right place to negotiate a tool for tackling TK legal protection 
issues and indicating WIPO as the most suitable arena, the EU left the door open for 
including TK issues on the future agenda of the TRIPS Council. The EU 
acknowledged that IP law is often inadequate to protect TK and the development of 
an international sui generis model of protection is suitable, hereby expressing its 
support for the adoption of an international model for the legal protection of TK.95 In 
                                                
91 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions. 
92 On geographical issues and the fact that similar TK have been documented in very different and 
distant geographical contexts, see Drahos, above (n 5). 
93 Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, Review of Article 27.3(B) 
of the Trips Agreement, and the Relationship Between the Trips Agreement and the Convention On 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, IP/C/W/383, 
(17 October 2002), Para 58. 
94 Discussions on the feasibility of such negotiations are already ongoing under the CBD, however 
negotiations require time and are not always successful.  
95EC Communication “Review of Article 27.3(b)”, above (n 93), para 67 and 69. The EU also recalled 
its operative contribution to the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee’s work. 
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spite of such political support, within the context of reviewing Article 27.3(b) the EC 
did not go any further in supporting actions to face specific issues of TK protection. 
Stating that, as a matter of fact, TK protection is relevant to other Articles of the 
TRIPS Agreement, 96  the EC approached the issue of preventing inappropriate 
patenting of TK mainly from an economic perspective, focusing on the facilitation of 
benefit sharing. Indeed, the EC does not contemplate the possibility of excluding TK 
from being patentable and suggests that the duly recognition of the “prior art” (e.g.: 
through databases and registers documenting and sharing information on TK) can 
constitute an effective way to halt misappropriation. When this is not possible, but TK 
is used as a basis for creating innovations, the inventor should enjoy the possibility to 
patent his/her innovation, without overriding existing legal or contractual conditions 
to reward TK holders or share the benefits deriving upon its use. The European 
position on ensuring fair access to benefit sharing and reward of TK holders is 
coherent with the engagement undertaken under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, to which the European Union is party since 1993. Yet, the EU could have 
adopted a more comprehensive approach for its analysis in order to take into account 
the social and cultural implications of patenting TK. 
However, the EU slowly manifested an openness towards developing 
countries’ requests for disclosure requirement - even within the implementation 
framework of other international agreements. In a Communication concerning the 
implementation of the Boon Guidelines of the CBD, the Commission states it is 
willing to discuss the possibility of making such disclosure requirement a formal 
condition of patentability in the relevant international fora.97  In that case, the 
consequences of the non-respect of the requirement would fall both within and 
outside the field of patent law.98 In 2008 the EU delegation, together with India, 
                                                
96 Such as Article 29 on Patent’s condition and Article 30 on exception to rights conferred. See Para 31 
and 31, ibidem. 
97  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “The 
Implementation by the EC of the ‘Bonn Guidelines’ on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
Sharing under the Convention on Biological Diversity”, COM (2003) 821, par. 18. The Bonn 
Guidelines support the implementation of the CBD on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing, 
adopted at the 6th Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in April 
2002, gives a possibility for Parties to the CBD of introducing a disclosure requirement in their legal 
systems, unilaterally, independently from the setting up of an international system. 
98 The Commission specifies that the disclosure requirement remains as a self-standing obligation 
under EU law. 
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Brazil, Switzerland and other countries,99 communicated its agreement to amend the 
TRIPS Agreement to include a mandatory requirement for the disclosure of the 
country providing/source of genetic resources, and/or associated traditional 
knowledge for which a definition will be agreed, in patent applications. In this case, 
patent applications will not be processed without completion of the disclosure 
requirement.  
3.4.1.2) WIPO 
 
Similar discussions concerning the appropriate protection of traditional 
knowledge are also happening within the UN World Intellectual Property 
Organization. It is important here to clarify that under the WIPO Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge 
and Folklore, the protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions (TCEs) and 
traditional knowledge (TK) is addressed separately. Although worldwide in many 
communities traditional cultural expressions (or expressions of folklore), traditional 
knowledge and associated genetic resources form part of a single integrated heritage, 
according to WIPO the protection of TCEs raises some particular legal and policy 
questions in IP law and they receive a distinct focus in many national and regional IP 
laws. Therefore, the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee opted for such 
separation.100  For the scope of this chapter, I focused on the activity dealing with the 
protection of Traditional Knowledge and with genetic resources. 
At the invitation of the Conference of the Parties of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, WIPO undertook the task to examine issues regarding the 
interrelation of access to genetic resources and disclosure requirements in intellectual 
property rights applications, including, inter alia, options for model provisions on 
proposed disclosure requirements.101 In 2005, the European Union and its Member 
States submitted a document to the Intergovernmental Committee, with the aim to 
outline the basic features for a balanced and effective proposal on the disclosure of 
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge (TK) in patent applications.102 
                                                
99 Draft Modalities for TRIPS Related Issues, TN/C/W/52 (19 July 2008). (Other countries: Albania, 
China, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, Indonesia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Liechtenstein, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, the ACP Group and the 
African Group). 
100 http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/folklore/. 
101 WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/13. 
102 Disclosure of origin or source of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge in patent 
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In the document the EU takes into account the whole set of developments in WIPO, 
WTO, FAO, the CBD and other relevant fora that have enriched the discussion on the 
current issues. Summarising the content of the document, the EU proposed the 
introduction of a mandatory requirement to disclose the country of origin or source103 
of genetic resources in patent applications. This should apply to all international, 
regional and national patent applications at the earliest stage possible. As for the 
disclosure of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, the EU 
considers it possible to introduce such a requirement on the applicant, if he is aware 
that the invention is directly based on such traditional knowledge. However, the EU 
thinks that there is not yet a clear definition of “traditional knowledge” and a further 
in-depth discussion on the concept of “traditional knowledge” is therefore necessary. 
Overall, the EU position within the WIPO seems to be consistent with the more recent 
attitudes showed under the WTO.  
3.4.1.3) Convention of Biological diversity and the Nagoya Protocol 
 
Finally, the Union is a party to the CBD since 1993104 and recently signed the 
Nagoya Protocol to the CBD, concerning access to genetic resource and benefit 
sharing deriving from their utilisation.105 The Nagoya Protocol has recently entered 
into force and the European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation 511/2014 
on 16 April 2014 to implement the Protocol.106 Having extraterritorial implications, 
the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol will require the EU and its Member States 
to ensure the respect of national legislations and requirement of the third country 
providing the genetic resource and related traditional knowledge. As it has been 
already pointed out, this is the most innovative aspect of the Protocol, which may 
contribute, in certain cases, to overcome problems deriving from the unclear ABS 
system under the CBD and grant a better protection to indigenous and local traditional 
                                                                                                                                      
applications, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/11. 
103 If the country of origin is unknown, the applicant should declare the source of the specific genetic 
resource to which the inventor has had physical access and which is still known to him. The term 
“source” refers to any source from which the applicant has acquired the genetic resource other than the 
country of origin, such as a research centre, gene bank or botanical garden. 
104 Council Decision 93/626/EEC of 25 October 1993 concerning the conclusion of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. 
105 Council Decision 2014/283/EU of 14 April 2014 on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the 
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity.  
106 EU Regulation No 511/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on 
compliance measures for users from the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the Union. 
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knowledge. On this point, it is worth recalling that during the Protocol’s negotiations, 
the EU created great expectations among ILCs members and stakeholders involved in 
the drafting process. Indeed, the Commission’s initial position was in favour of 
retaining references to “customary laws, community protocols and indigenous and 
local community laws” in the prevalent draft Protocol text.107 The EU negotiated the 
Nagoya Protocol on the basis of article 192(1) - in conjunction with article 
218(6)(a)(v) – referring to the objectives of article 191 on environment, an area of 
shared competence. Therefore the Nagoya Protocol was negotiated in the form of a 
mixed agreement, together with the Member States. It was under the pressure of 
Member States – France in particular – that the EU had to backtrack from this 
position. France, indeed, did not agree to accept any wording including references to 
customary or local laws, fearing the fact that such a reference would affect French 
interests vis-à-vis their overseas territories (namely, the risk of claims for more ILC 
members’ representation within the frame of their relationships with France). So, also 
in this case of joint participation of the EU and its Member States, Member States’ 
interests highly determined the common position of the EU. If on the one side the EU 
was able to preserve its image as a one-voice actor and was coherent with the respect 
of its internal rules, on the other side third parties’ expectations were deceived, 
therefore weakening the international image of the Union as an actor supporting ILC 
rights.108 In the end, an agreement was reached and the reference to “customary law, 
community protocols and procedures as applicable with respect to traditional 
knowledge associated to genetic resources” was retained.109  
The EU negotiating strategy was also disappointing for stakeholders and ILC 
representatives in that it aimed at keeping the compliance provisions preventing the 
misappropriation of traditional knowledge outside the Protocol’s negotiations (current 
article 16 of the Nagoya Protocol). According to the Union compliance provisions 
relating to traditional knowledge should be treated under the WIPO 
                                                
107  K Bavikatte and D F Robinson, “Towards A People’s History Of The Law: Biocultural 
Jurisprudence And The Nagoya Protocol On Access And Benefit Sharing”, (2011), 7:1 Law, 
Environment and Development Journal, 35, at 45.  
108 This conclusion derives from information acquired through an interview to an Expert Member of the 
WWF-Bruxelles taking part as a representative of stakeholders at the Nagoya Protocol’s negotiations, 
as well as from the participation to the ABS Expert Meeting organized by the Italian Ministry of 
Environment, Land and Sea in Rome, 4-5 September 2014, under the aegis of the Italian Semester of 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union.  
109  The reference to domestic law and the elimination of the wording “Indigenous and local 
communities law” were deemed satisfactory for France and helped to reach the agreement (article 12 of 
the Protocol). K Bavikatte, (n 107), at 46. 
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Intergovernmental Committee. 110  This forum shifting to WIPO from CBD of 
compliance provisions relating to traditional knowledge may be seen as an attempt to 
keep crucial aspects concerning access to genetic resources and TK under the 
umbrella of proper intellectual property law frames, such as WIPO. The original 
European position changed only when a paragraph requiring the Parties to the 
Protocol to take note of the developments at the WIPO IGC was introduced in the 
COP Decision.111This can certainly be seen as an effort to ensure coherence and 
coordination between similar decisions under different fora, such as the CBD and the 
WIPO in this specific case. Yet, the EU could use the negotiations of the Protocol on 
ABS as a playground to put forward improvements concerning some crucial aspects, 
which are highly debated under the WIPO, such as the adoption of the disclosure of 
origin as a mandatory requirement for patents. The final version of the Protocol does 
not mention the patent office among the checkpoints to monitor the respect of 
compliance measures: according to experts, including patent offices could have 
helped increasing pressure in forum such as the TRIPS Council towards an 
internationally binding disclosure of origin patent requirement.112 Thus, the EU could 
have played a relevant role in influencing negotiations in this sense. 
Overall, the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol appears quite challenging 
and its relation to other international instruments remains undefined and 
problematic.113 The future implementation of the recently adopted Regulation on 
measures of compliance for ABS will be a very interest test for the Union and its 
Member State. 
 
3.5) The bilateral framework: a look at the bilateral trade agreements 
 
Following the adoption of the Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Third Countries, the EU is systematically including an intellectual 
                                                
110 K Bavikatte, (n 107), at 44. 
111 Poin 6 of Decision X/1. Access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
arising from their utilization, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its Tenth Meeting, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (29 October 2010).  
112 K Bavikatte, (n 107), at 48. 
113 M Buck and C Hamilton, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity”, 
(2011), 20(1) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 47; V Koester, 
“The Nagoya Protocol on ABS: ratification by the EU and its Member States and implementation 
challenges”, 03/12 STUDY, June 2012, available at http://www.iddri.org/. 
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property chapter in its bilateral trade agreements. Through this IP chapter, the Union 
is trying to develop new and additional standards of IP enforcement in the context of 
bilateral relations, whose implementation will have a direct impact on the practical 
effect of the IPRs at national level. Provisions contained in the chapter are informed 
and influenced by two major sets of rules and standards for the IPR enforcement: one 
deriving from the international framework such as the TRIPS Agreement; the second 
one is the EU framework for IPR enforcement, namely the two Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Directives (IPRED). 
In this paragraph I will look at the IP chapters included in the FTA with 
South-Korea, the EPA with the CARIFORUM, the trade agreement with Colombia 
and Peru and the Association with Central America. The scope of this analysis is to 
establish whether issues concerning the protection of traditional knowledge are taken 
into account and, if so, in which terms. This analysis will also be of help to assess 
whether the Union is behaving coherently and consistently on the multilateral and 
bilateral frame of negotiations. 
Looking at IP chapters in the FTA with South-Korea, Article 10.40 addresses 
the topic “Genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore”. Paragraph 1 of 
article 10.40 states that “Subject to their legislation, the Parties shall respect, 
preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional life-styles relevant for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the 
involvement and approval of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and 
practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the 
utilisation of such knowledge, innovations and practices”. The wording of this article 
seems to be reproducing the language of the CBD: the recognition of the link between 
traditional knowledge and sustainable use and management of biodiversity’ resources, 
the need to ensure the equitable sharing of benefits deriving from the use of such 
traditional knowledge and practices, and the involvement and approval of the holder. 
The language is mandatory (shall), yet how such protection should be realized is not 
further explained. Finally, dialogue among the parties under relevant international 
fora (WTO, WIPO, etc) should be ensured. 
The CARIFORUM EPA’s chapter on IP contains a very alike provision: 
article 150 titled  “Genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore”, whose first 
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paragraph reproduces the same wording.114 However, article 150 CARIFORUM EPA 
is more detailed: under paragraph 2, which recognises the importance of taking 
appropriate measures, subject to national legislation, to preserve traditional 
knowledge, the parties engage in continuing to work towards the development of 
international sui generis models for the legal protection of traditional knowledge; 
paragraph 3 stresses that the patent provisions contained in the subsection shall be 
implemented in a mutually supportive way with the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. It is also worth noticing that article 149 of the EPA contains the 
possibilities for the parties to provide for exceptions to exclusive rights granted to 
plant breeders to allow farmers to save, use and exchange protected farm-saved seed 
or propagating material, provided they are in accordance with the international regime 
on plants variety (namely, the TRIPS Agreement. and the International Convention 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants - UPOV (Act of 1991). 
Both of the bilateral agreements contain provisions on geographical 
indications.115 However, Article 164 (on cooperation for the enforcement of IPRs 
provisions) demands that parties pay particular attention to promoting and preserving 
local traditional knowledge and biodiversity through the establishment of 
geographical indications protection.116 Finally, Article 73 of the CARIFORUM EPA 
may contribute to strengthen the level of protection of local traditional knowledge. 
Article 73 refers to foreign direct investment (FDI) and requires the parties to ensure 
that FDI is not encouraged by lowering or by relaxing inter alia standards or laws 
aimed at protecting and promoting cultural diversity. It can be observed that under the 
CARIFORUM EPA protection of TK goes slightly further than focusing on TK 
related to genetic resources. Yet, the instruments suggested to protect and promote the 
diversity of local traditions are still tools existing under EU IP law (such as GI) and 
there is no reference to domestic rules that may enact different kinds of protection to 
TK.  
                                                
114 CARIFORUM- EU EPA, Article 150.1. Subject to their domestic legislation the EU Party and the 
Signatory CARIFORUM States respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices 
of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the involvement and 
approval of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of such knowledge, innovations and practices. 
115 The geographical indication section is more extended and detailed in the EU-South-Korea FTA. 
116 Par. c of Article 160 CARIFORUM EPA. 
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The IP Chapter in the Free Trade Agreement with Central America also 
contains provisions on traditional knowledge related to use of biodiversity. Paragraph 
4 of Article 229 reaffirms the sovereign right of States over their natural resources 
and the access to their genetic resources as established under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. It adds that no provision contained in the IP section shall 
prevent the parties from adopting or maintaining measures to promote the 
conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable utilization of its components and 
the fair and equitable participation in the benefits arising from the utilization of 
genetic resources. Paragraph 5 focuses on TK, recognizing the importance of 
respecting, preserving and maintaining the indigenous and local communities' 
knowledge, innovations and practices that involve traditional practices related to the 
preservation and the sustainable use of biological diversity. The difference of the 
wording between the EU- Central America FTA and the CARIFORUM EPA is quite 
striking: provisions under the first one are shaped in a more general sense and no 
further reference to the protection of TK is made in the text of the agreement.  
The section dedicated to IP in the FTA with Peru and Colombia (COPE) 
contains a rather unique chapter focusing on biodiversity and traditional knowledge 
(Chapter 2 under Title VII). It is interesting to note that the title of the chapter is 
“Protection of biodiversity and traditional knowledge” and does not mention 
protection of genetic resources, as if the third parties’ intention was not to limit the 
protection of TK exclusively to TK connected with the use of genetic resources. It is 
also remarkable that there is a separate chapter named “Provisions concerning 
intellectual property rights” (Chapter 3). This seems to indicate that, although 
included in the IP Title, protection of TK is not a matter of regular intellectual 
property rights’ enforcement and should be addressed separately. Further, the 
language adopted is not so standard as in the FTA with Korea, the CARIFORUM 
EPA or the FTA with Central America. In this case, the wording is more precise and 
emphasises the value of biodiversity and traditional knowledge as per se value, 
without putting the accent on their commercial use. Of course, statements are present 
concerning States’ sovereign rights over natural resources and access to genetic 
resources, as well as to fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the 
utilization of these genetic resources.117 But the accent on biodiversity and traditional 
                                                
117 Article 201.1. 
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knowledge is such as to reflect a different way of approaching and understanding the 
link between traditional knowledge and development. Indeed, paragraph 2 of article 
201 highlights the contribution of traditional knowledge of indigenous and local 
communities to the culture and the economic and social development of nations. 
Indigenous and local communities are recognised as having a primary role in shaping 
and promoting sustainable and cultural development of the parties.118 This recognition 
is echoed in the following paragraph 3, where the Parties commit to respect domestic 
legislation (in accordance with article 8(j) of the CBD) when taking measures to 
preserve and maintain traditional knowledge and practices of indigenous and local 
communities. As known, domestic legislations in countries where local and 
indigenous communities are a relevant presence should often be shaped on the needs 
and interests of such communities. Respect of domestic legislation is stated again in 
paragraph 6 as a condition for ensuring that intellectual property rights will support 
the fulfilment of rights and obligations under the CBD. Once again, the detailed 
language is quite remarkable: besides using the adjective “supportive”, it is clearly 
stated that the enforcement of IPRs must “not run counter” to the enforcement of 
CBD provisions. Although not inserted in the text as a standard clause regulating the 
relationship between different international agreements, such a specification could be 
interpreted in a way to provide solution in case of conflict between CBD rights and 
obligations (namely concerning traditional knowledge, genetic resources and ABS) 
and rights and obligations deriving from the IP chapter of the trade agreement with 
the EU. 
Finally, concerning the possibility to patent innovations based on genetic 
resources and related TK, paragraph 7 “acknowledges the usefulness of requiring the 
disclosure of the origin or source”. Comparing this paragraph with the previous one, 
the language sounds weaker: a clear obligation to respect the disclosure requirement 
as mandatory when filing patent applications would have been auspicious. This would 
have been coherent with the proposal for a mandatory disclosure requirement to the 
TRIPS Council, presented in 2008, and with the current WIPO evolutions in this 
sense. However, it is true that there is still no a common agreement on the content and 
modalities of the disclosure agreement.  
                                                
118 Article 201.2: “The Parties recognize the past, present and future contribution of indigenous and 
local communities to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and all of its 
components and, in general, the contribution of the traditional knowledge of their indigenous and local 
communities to the culture and to the economic and social development of nations.” 
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Looking a the whole set of provisions contained in the agreement, the FTA 
with COPE pays particular attention towards issues like culture, the environment, and 
sustainable development, almost promoting a holistic understanding of development. 
It is quite striking, for instance, that there is a provision entirely dedicated to 
biodiversity under the title “Trade and Sustainable Development” which features 
biodiversity as a key element for achieving sustainable development.119 Under this 
provision, high relevance is given to indigenous and local communities’ traditional 
lifestyles as contributing to sustainable development: paragraph 5 of this 
“biodiversity” provision recalls the respect of CBD obligations and domestic 
legislation to preserve and maintain traditional knowledge. The text goes quite far by 
demanding that the prior informed consent of the holders of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices is acquired before promoting their wider application. 
Certainly from a “culture for development” perspective, the FTA with COPE is the 
most advanced trade agreement concluded by the EU in this new season of bilateral 
agreement. But before assessing the real impact of such a text, we need to see how it 
will be implemented.  
 
4) Relevant EU internal legislation  
 
To provide a comprehensive view on the approach of the EU towards the 
protection of traditional knowledge, it is appropriate to have a look at the internal 
legislation of the EU that may have impacts or influence the action on the external 
dimension.  
As it has been observed throughout the previous analysis, the EU often 
proposes geographical indications as a useful tool to protect traditional products. 
Besides the introduction or mutual recognition of GIs within bilateral agreements, 
Council Regulation n. 2081/92 on geographic indications120 may be of relevance for 
third countries. This regulation enables groups and natural or legal persons to register 
designations of origin and geographical indications for agricultural products and 
foodstuffs. Both terms describe the region, specific place or (exceptionally) a country 
                                                
119 Article 272 of the FTA with COPE. For a comment on this aspect, see: G Marin Duran and E 
Morgera, Environmental Integration in the EU’s External Relations Beyond Multilateral Dimensions, 
(Hart Publishing, 2012), at 126. 
120 Council Regulation n. 2081/92 (14 July 1992) on geographic indications. 
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where an agricultural product or foodstuff originates.121 A third country may apply for 
the registration of a designation in its territory and the European Commission has the 
authority to negotiate agreements with third countries for the reciprocal protection of 
designations. In the Commission’s view, regulations relating to the geographic origin 
and specific character of agricultural products and foodstuffs could work to protect 
associated traditional knowledge under certain circumstances.122  However, it is quite 
obvious that such a tool cannot address all the social and cultural issues deriving from 
the exclusive rights granted to a patent holder of a patented invention based on TK. 
Further, one author questioning whether geographical indications create a valid and 
effective form of cultural preservation and promotion, argued that they are merely 
“legal tools for granting commercial advantages to certain products, sectors and 
regions”.123 
Another useful internal instrument that can contribute to keep track of TK in 
order to avoid misappropriation is Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council (11 March 1996) on the legal protection of databases. The Directive 
extends copyright protection124 to the content of databases, and potentially enables the 
protection of information derived from the collection and use of genetic resources and 
the associated traditional knowledge, innovations and practices. Databases are defined 
as collections of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic 
or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other means. To 
qualify for protection, the database must be the author's own intellectual creation, 
whether by selection or arrangement of its contents.  
Finally, a valuable contribution can derive from the recent adoption of the 
European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2013 on development aspects of 
                                                
121 A designation of origin refers to the quality or characteristics of an agricultural product or foodstuff, 
which are essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical environment with its inherent 
natural and human factors. A geographical indication refers to the specific quality, reputation or other 
characteristics of an agricultural product or foodstuff, which are attributable to the defined 
geographical origin. Both terms also refer to quality and characteristics attributable to production, 
processing and preparation in the defined geographical area. 122 Second Report of the European Community to the Convention on Biological Diversity Thematic 
Report On Access And Benefit-Sharing, October 2002. 
123 T Broude, “Taking “Trade and Culture” seriously: Geographical Indications and Cultural Protection 
in WTO law”, (2005), 26(4) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 623, 
at 678. 
124 The Directive grants the author the right to authorise, amongst others: reproduction; translation, 
adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration; distribution, communication, display or performance 
to the public; as well as first sale in the Community (Article 5). 
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intellectual property rights on genetic resources. 125  The EP Committee on 
development (DEVE) carried out the preparatory work for this resolution. The 
Committee showed a very conscious approach to the issues arising from the 
dichotomy between IPRs and genetic resources. Clearly saying that biopiracy is a 
threat for the achievement of MDGs, the Committee recognises the need to protect the 
rights of indigenous and local communities and traditional knowledge. Concerning 
this, it is very interesting to note that the Committee highlights the danger of assessing 
traditional knowledge only from a mercantile point of view. Therefore, it points out 
that “the existing IPR framework does not fit such a heterogeneous group as 
traditional knowledge holders” and stresses the need to define a sui generis 
international IPR regime that preserves the diversity of interest of local communities 
and reflects customary law, etc. Aware of the fact that difficulties faced by TK 
holders include monitoring and enforcement, in its final version, the Resolution states 
that the EU should grant traditional knowledge at least the same level of protection as 
genetic resources when implementing the Nagoya Protocol. 126  The Resolution 
recognizes that IP law may have a positive impact on indigenous and local 
communities’ development (i.e. technology transfer), therefore, while emphasizing 
the need to prevent the negative impacts, it brings out that contracts between the 
parties may be identified by indigenous peoples or local communities as a more 
feasible solution to share benefits and to protect their interests while preserving the 
environment and preventing social and economic harm, e.g. by means of safeguard 
clauses. To halt biopiracy the Parliament stresses on the need to properly implement 
prior informed consent, although this may be a real challenge for developing countries 
as it requires substantial legal and institutional capacity building. Therefore, the EU 
development cooperation should provide developing countries with assistance for 
legal and institutional capacity building on access and benefit sharing issues. 
Concerning the proposal made by developing countries for a binding regulation 
requiring patent applicants to disclose the source and origin of genetic resources and 
associated traditional knowledge, the Parliament stresses that an international 
instrument comprising disclosure requirements should be adopted, and highlights that 
databases for genetic resources protection is not a substitute for an effective access 
                                                
125 European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2013 on development aspects of intellectual property 
rights on genetic resources: the impact on poverty reduction in developing countries (2012/2135(INI)). 
126 Emphasis added. 
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and benefit sharing mechanism at the national level. On the relationship between 
WTO-TRIPS and the CBD-Nagoya Protocol, the Parliament considers the 
establishment of a mandatory requirement on disclosing the origin of genetic 
resources during patent proceedings as crucial to ensure their compatibility and 
mutual support. 
 
5) Concluding remarks  
 
To connect the analysis here on IP and Development with the issues raised in 
the initial chapter, it is useful to offer some reflections concerning the evolutions of 
international law to protect TK (synthesised above) and models of development. 
Negative impacts may derive from the inadequacy of current IP law rules applied to 
sectors of development involving certain forms of intangible cultural heritage (i.e. 
traditional knowledge). These impacts could be economic, social, cultural, and 
environmental. In developing and least-developed countries these impacts not only 
affect local communities or peoples living in vulnerable contexts, but are also a threat 
for the sovereign rights of States over their national resources. From a more 
philosophical point of view, the wide application of current IP law in such contexts 
highly influences the model of development of States and affects the possibility for 
local communities to determine and preserve their own developmental model.127 This 
being said, the debate initially recalled in this chapter about the potential of IP law to 
promote development should be reframed in the following terms: what kind of 
development is current IP law likely to boost and who will it benefit? Is such a model 
a good one to implement culture as a vector of sustainable human development? The 
environmental, social, and cultural implications described in the previous paragraph, 
as well as the biopiracy threat, present a gloomy picture and thus a negative answer to 
these questions. Although it cannot be denied that the application of the patent system 
to protect traditional knowledge related to natural and genetic resources may entail 
economic returns for local communities and national governments, the economic 
improvement is not the only sufficient component to assess whether sustainable 
development is achieved. In addition, the major solutions currently discussed under IL 
to redress IP law impacts focus on the protection of traditional knowledge as an 
                                                
127 The issue to self-determine developmental strategies and models is of particular relevance for local 
communities and indigenous peoples. Article 3 and Article 23 of the UN Declaration on Indigenous 
Peoples Rights affirm the right to self-determination of development. For a broader and critical view on 
this issue, see: Karen Engle, above at n.Error! Bookmark not defined., at (insert p.) 
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element for economic revenues, like the disclosure requirement and the PIC. Instead 
respect of TK as a means for promotion and maintenance of cultural livelihoods, for 
conservation and sustainable use of the environment has hardly found space for 
discussion in legal and policy tools.128 As is evident, the formulation of TK protection 
has predominantly taken place in the discourse of Western trade-related intellectual 
property rights, gaining much attention in trade and IP fora. Some argue that there has 
also been a tendency to focus on developing mechanisms to control the scientific and 
commercial use of TK, with the apparent aim of enabling indigenous and local 
communities to capture the anticipated benefits of commercialisation of TK – usually 
through profit sharing mechanisms.129 However, they also note that such efforts are 
largely driven by national governments and are often in conflict with the expressed 
desire of indigenous and local communities to protect the integrity of traditional 
knowledge, as part of cultural heritage, rather than allowing it to become another 
marketable good.130  
While the current focus of negotiations in multilateral agreements is important 
for the exchange of technology and for the reduction of biopiracy, it does not 
necessarily address the problems that directly and immediately threaten host 
communities and the continuity of their culture. Johanna Gibson suggests that there is 
“likely a fundamental difference between the object of protection that is understood in 
conventional legal discourse, and that sought by traditional and indigenous 
groups”.131 Conserving the method of knowledge creation and evolution in these 
contexts should be more directly addressed in order to support the first two roles of 
TK, not just the tangible object or a documented version of the knowledge, in order to 
allow indigenous and local communities to maintain local cultural continuity and 
pursue their own model of sustainable development.  
In spite of all the critical aspects deriving upon a rigid application of IPRs in 
developing countries and the tensions arising with human rights, as above described, 
major trade actors on the international scene and international organisations have 
greatly spurred developing and least-developed countries into improving the 
                                                
128 I can quote here the efforts undertaken for the adoption of the 2003 UNESCO Convention on 
Intangible Heritage, though commercial aspects of TK are of relevance also in this framework.  
129 B Tobin, Customary law as the basis for Prior Informed Consent of local and indigenous communities, 
UNU-IAS, available at http://www.ias.unu.edu. 
130 Brendan Tobin, ibidem, 3; Daniela Robinson, above at 4, at123. 
131 Johanna Gibson, above at 5, 66. 
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enforcement of IPR. In the context of patent law applied to traditional knowledge and 
genetic resources, strong criticisms have been raised and developing countries call for 
a change to current IP law. The analysis carried out here shows that the Union is not 
fully replying to such request, both at the multilateral and bilateral level of 
negotiations. However, the EU Commission approach to tackling issues regarding IP 
law and TK is not really innovative. Following the major stream, which focuses on 
the economic damage caused by the current situation, the protection of cultural 
diversity and traditional lifestyle seems not to be so relevant. For instance, looking at 
the solutions proposed under the WTO and WIPO can certainly contribute to a better 
implementation of the ABS, however they do not tackle the social and cultural 
dimension of the problem at stake. In addition, it is important to be aware of the 
possibility that such laws and policies might conflict with another aspect of this issue: 
protecting traditional knowledge from extinction. The most important measure to 
protect traditional knowledge from extinction is the sharing of traditional knowledge. 
Laws and policies that make such sharing difficult, for example by providing for 
complicated procedures of prior informed consent, might negatively affect the sharing 
of traditional knowledge among farmers if they hinder conservation work. 
The request to modify Article 27.3(b) so as to include a ban on patenting life 
would probably be the solution. However, being realistic, it is hard to imagine that an 
agreement on such a ban will ever be reached. In addition, this would open a 
Pandora’s box on a new series of highly debated issues – such as reducing the 
possibility for fostering R&D, technological innovations, health care improvements, 
etc. So a balance could be found by looking at other instruments directly addressing 
the protection of intangible forms of cultural heritage or cultural diversity. The 
economic aspect is certainly important, especially when it can contribute to poverty 
reduction, but in the current debate the preservation of TK as a lifestyle is in danger of 
being forgotten entirely. Among the EU institutional actors, only the Parliament 
seems to be aware of this. As an effort to protect TK as a cultural model of life is 
required by the Union, the Union could sign up the 2003 UNESCO Convention on 
Intangible Heritage.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1) Culture and development: the lack of a global governance for a challenging 
connection 
 
This thesis was first motivated by my personal interest and curiosity in 
exploring the connection between culture and development, a topic that has been 
increasingly debated in recent decades. Looking through the lens of the European 
Union, as a major actor involved in international dynamics dealing with culture as a 
vector of development, this thesis has aimed at assessing whether a global governance 
for “culture and development” is emerging and, if so, to what extent the Union is 
contributing to such a process. More specifically, this research has explored the 
relationship between culture and other policies connected to development from a very 
practical angle, concerning concrete challenges and tensions deriving from the 
integration of culture with other policies.   
Reconnecting with the background, the first chapter of this thesis focused on 
how the understanding of this relationship has evolved. It showed that a shift from a 
negative to a positive perception of the role of culture for development has occurred 
in the past fifty years. This shift is mainly due to a broader understanding of 
development, which is no longer solely meant as economic growth, and a broader 
understanding of culture, which is seen as a constantly changing social process whose 
manifestations are able to provide positive inputs to the economic, social, cultural and 
environmental development of societies. Yet mainstreaming culture as a vector of 
development in our globalising world is a challenge, in particular for developing 
countries. The three concrete cases dealing with the relationship between culture and 
development – namely the mobility of cultural goods and services, the mobility of 
artists and cultural workers, and the protection of traditional knowledge – show that 
different and opposite tensions arise from the use of culture as a vector of 
development. In particular, if on the one hand more circulation of cultural works as 
well as cultural workers can increase economic growth and employment and bring 
positive spillover effects such as social inclusion, social cohesion and cultural 
development, on the other hand technological and economic disparities and 
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globalisation can expand the risk of cultural homogenisation. The need to foster 
cultural exchanges should then be balanced with the protection of cultural diversity. 
Protecting cultural diversity is also a priority when managing traditional knowledge, 
especially when it is related to the use of genetic resources – which are a primary 
source of economic returns and innovation not only for indigenous and local 
communities but also for western companies and countries, which are increasingly 
involved in biotechnological engineering industries and research & development 
activities.  
The main findings of the background analysis carried out in the first chapter 
demonstrate that a coherent and comprehensive global governance dealing with issues 
deriving from the interaction between culture and development has yet to be 
developed, although nuances of it are emerging – especially since the adoption of the 
UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity. Most difficulties are due to the fact that 
international law in the field of culture has developed through a sectoral approach 
(similarly to international environmental law), along with the fact that the relationship 
between culture and development remained unexplored for a long time. Further, 
developing a comprehensive global “culture and development” governance is 
extremely complicated, because of the peculiar issues of each specific case. In fact, 
besides the need to protect and promote cultural diversity, each concrete case is 
characterised by other challenges: for instance, in the case of artists and cultural 
workers, fostering their mobility meets the need to reduce illegal immigration and the 
management of labour migration; in the case of TK connected to genetic resources, 
the safeguard of such knowledge overlaps with the need to ensure fair and equal 
access and benefits-sharing deriving from its use, and to mitigate the risk of 
misappropriation. These practical challenges demand a case-by-case approach, in 
order to meet all the issues and interests at stake and strike the appropriate balance. 
In spite of this evident difficulty, a minimum layer for a global “culture and 
development” governance is proposed in Chapter 1. Considering that cultural capital 
shows great similarities with natural capital, mainstreaming culture into development 
policies should take place through the use of the principle of sustainability, so as to 
ensure the durability of, as well as equal and fair access to, cultural resources. In 
primis, the use of the principle of integration should ensure that cultural 
considerations are integrated and taken into account in all programmes and at all 
policy levels. This would help to improve a systemic integration of culture in 
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programmes and policies, as desired by those supporting the idea of culture as the 
fourth pillar of sustainable development. Secondly, the precautionary principle and a 
cautious approach should help to strike the right balance between openness and 
preservation, both in order to foster cultural exchanges and development and to 
preserve cultural diversity. In particular, States should take preventive action and/or 
adopt a precautionary approach in situations where the survival of cultural identities is 
at risk of extinction or cultural homogenisation is a real threat. Further, given that 
cultural resources are “living” resources, their preservation is not simply a matter of 
static conservation; they need to be valued and used in order to maintain their ability 
to re-generate and adapt. This is particularly true in the case of traditional knowledge, 
which is considered an expression of  “living” cultures, but it is also relevant in the 
case of cultural goods and creativity, which necessitate the continuous flowering of 
content and ideas. Sustainable use is, then, connected to ensuring sustainable and 
responsible access to cultural goods. Therefore, cultural policies should aim at 
ensuring a balance between the protection and preservation of cultural expressions – 
traditional or otherwise – and the free exchange of cultural experiences. Finally, the 
principle of public participation and a community-based approach to decision-making 
processes seem to be fundamental to empower local cultural communities. If culture 
is something “living” and continuously evolving, local peoples, ethnic and minority 
groups are the best custodians and spokesmen of cultural interests and concerns. Yet, 
empowering peoples through a participatory approach, especially in the case of 
minority groups or indigenous peoples, is always a controversial issue within the 
States’ practice.  
2) The Union and the  “culture and development” debate: a fragmentary 
approach due to endemic features of the EU internal structure 
 
The analysis undertaken in this thesis shows that, in the last decades, the 
integration of culture into the Union’s external relations has grown significantly. The 
EU ratification of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity has contributed 
considerably to give greater visibility to the Union’s engagement in the cultural field; 
it has also helped to create wider and ambitious expectations among third parties. On 
the Union’s side, as a global actor capable of influencing political and legal outcomes 
in international relations, it is certainly contributing to the development of a global 
governance on culture and development. Yet, as this analysis shows, the Union’s 
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action in mainstreaming culture for development is still fragmented and more 
awareness concerning the need to develop an EU strategy for culture in external 
relations is emerging (as confirmed by the Commission in its recent document 
Preparatory Action Culture in EU External Relations).1  
In order to succeed as an external global actor, as well as to contribute 
successfully to the integration of culture in development policies, the EU needs to 
pursue a coherent and consistent approach when dealing with cultural issues. Such an 
approach is firstly based on coherence between the EU external and internal 
dimension, involving coherence and consistency between all the EU policies, the EU 
institutions, and its Member States. In the light of the analysis, pursuing a coherent 
strategy for the mainstreaming of culture and development in the external relations 
seems to be a real challenge because of the interaction between culture and other 
policies and the difficulties of striking the right balance between the different interests 
at stake. Moreover, actions in the cultural sector and in the development sector have – 
so far – mostly developed along different lines, without being based on a joint 
connection between the cultural competence and the development competence. In 
spite of the recognition of the transversal nature of culture since the adoption of a 
cultural competence in 1992, the potential of Article 167(4) TFEU as a clause of 
integration has not been fully exploited.  
Under the new framework established by Lisbon, which strengthens the accent 
on coordination, complementarity, and consistency, such fragmentation could perhaps 
be overcome. Yet, the internal legal constraints, in particular deriving from the 
principle of conferral and the allocation of competences, makes it hard for the Union 
to set up a truly coherent approach in mainstreaming culture as a vector of 
development. In fact, culture is a cross-cutting issue and a complementary 
competence which overlaps with other shared or exclusive competences, as we have 
seen in the three case studies analysed in this thesis. Further, a coherent strategy to 
mainstream culture as a vector of development also means applying principles of 
sustainable development allowing a sustainable use of culture as a resource and 
striking a balance between the need to protect and to promote cultural exchanges. 
The Treaties’ internal rules and constraints affect the external action of the 
Union to varying extents. The Union’s cultural external competence is rather limited, 
                                                
1 “Preparatory Action Culture in EU External Relations”, Report prepared for the European 
Commission, published in June 2014, also mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 4 (n 94).  
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and mainly focuses on initiatives concerning cooperation and the promotion of 
European cultural diversity. When culture interacts with other policies falling under 
the sphere of national competence, such as labour migration, or shared competence, 
such as intellectual property law, further limits bind the external action of the Union. 
The joint participation of Member States in the case of mixed agreements, or the 
requirement for the Council’s unanimity to approve agreements dealing with sensitive 
sectors, both influence the treaty-making power of the Union. Certainly, this analysis 
reveals that the Union is more daring within the frame of its bilateral trade 
relationships. The Union’s emphasis on bilateral relationships with third countries or 
regions is in line with the international mainstream. Indeed, it is increasingly difficult 
to reach agreements in multilateral negotiations, which often seem to reach a 
deadlock, whereas bilateral negotiations represent a viable and more efficient tool to 
develop international relationships and promote sustainable development. 
Nonetheless, Member States also play a relevant role in determining the treatment of 
the cultural sector within bilateral agreements. Further, when cultural considerations 
should be integrated in agreements coping with nationally sensitive areas, the Union’s 
power of initiative is constrained. The following sub-paragraphs are a synthesis of 
these considerations for each of the three specific cases explored in the thesis. 
2.1) The EU and the mobility of cultural goods and services 
The protection and promotion of cultural diversity in the context of trade 
seems to be an eternal dilemma, whose solution can be achieved only at the price of 
one or the other. For the EU Member States, this issue represents a double challenge: 
on the one hand, most States fear that more liberalisation in trade in cultural services, 
especially audiovisual services, would undermine their national cultural industries and 
identities; on the other hand, they are concerned about the increased presence of the 
Commission in the international “trade and culture” arena. In particular, the EU 
ratification of the 2005 UNESCO Convention increased Member States’ scepticism, 
which saw the EU’s growing activity in the field of culture as an attempt to erode 
their national competences. In contrast, EU ratification was warmly welcomed by 
other international actors, stakeholders and associations, which counted on the 
positive influence that the EU as a global actor could exercise in fostering the 
implementation of the Convention. Furthermore, since the adoption of the 
Convention, the Union took a step towards the integration of culture within all its 
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external relations. 
With regard to the Member States’ fears, they do not seem to have been 
warranted: several safeguard mechanisms are available under the EU constitutional 
treaties to guarantee respect for the principle of conferral. In the pre-Lisbon arena, the 
action of the Union dealing with trade in culture in the multilateral frame was very 
much bound by procedural limits fixed under Article 133(6). According to this 
provision, agreements relating to trade in cultural, educational, and audiovisual 
services belonged to the shared competence of the EU and its Member States and the 
negotiation of such agreements required the joint participation of the EU and the 
Member States. We saw that such a mechanism highly influenced the EU approach 
towards agreeing to open the cultural services sector under the GATS: although 
through the cultural exception the EU aimed at preserving its internal acquis, the 
original position was not a full exclusion of cultural services from the GATS. Under 
current Article 207 TFEU, the possibilities for Member States to apply a veto in trade 
negotiations are reduced: indeed, joint participation is no longer a requirement. Yet, 
paragraph (4) of Article 207 TFEU now replaces this safeguard clause by introducing 
the requirement of the unanimity vote for certain Council decisions concerning 
cultural and audiovisual services. Although unanimity is not the rule, and only occurs 
when the agreements at stake risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural and linguistic 
diversity, Member States can still foresee the possibility for mixed agreements which 
allow their participation. This is the case when two or more different objectives are at 
stake and it is not possible to establish which one is predominant, so the agreement 
will be concluded on multiple legal grounds that may touch upon the shared 
competences of the Member States and the Union, such as culture (see for instance 
the FTA with South Korea, which was adopted on the basis of both Article 207 and 
Article 167). Finally, Member States should bear in mind that the protection of 
cultural diversity is a constitutional objective of the Union: therefore a coherent 
external action in the field of culture and trade requires that the external commercial 
competence should be exercised in such a way as to be complementary with the 
cultural objectives under Article 167 TFEU.  
On the bilateral level the Union made a step towards the integration of trade 
and cultural objectives through the adoption of Cultural Protocols within the frame of 
trade agreements. As we saw, this strategy raised strong criticism regarding the way 
new Protocols on Cultural Cooperation were initially negotiated, yet the EU’s attempt 
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offers a practical example of implementation of the principles included in the 
Convention and creates a favourable context for cultural exchanges. The new EU 
strategy seems to be aimed at striking a balance between the two opposite trends: a 
protectionist one, set up in the name of protecting existing cultural diversity, and a 
more liberal one, calling for more cultural exchanges in the name of cultural diversity 
and more development. Additionally, the adoption of co-productions as a framework 
for cooperation is a positive move. Cultural protocols, indeed, mainly focus on co-
productions and co-distributions: this may be a good match between opening markets, 
fostering capacity-building and cultural exchanges, while promoting creative 
industries and diversities in developing countries. 
Through the adoption of cultural protocols the EU integrates culture in its 
trade and development policy, and thus contributes positively to the implementation 
of the principle of cultural integration embedded in Article 167(4) TFEU, and 
promotes the idea of systemic integration as supported by the theory of culture as the 
fourth pillar of development. However, this practice needs to be improved in order to 
allow a sustainable management of culture as a resource: namely, the Sustainability 
Impact Assessment should be extended to the cultural protocol and consultations 
should ensure a greater participation of cultural associations and other stakeholders.  
 
2.2) The EU and the mobility of artists and cultural workers 
 
The mobility of artists and cultural workers needs to be integrated into labour 
migration frameworks. Unfortunately, artists and cultural professionals from 
developing countries are often assimilated to migrant workers, and that assimilation 
may prove to be an obstacle for the mobility of this category. More efforts should be 
made to implement GATS Mode 4 or provisions facilitating the mobility of artists 
under the bilateral framework. Yet, here, the efforts of the Union meet greater 
obstacles deriving from Member States’ national fears and interests. It seems difficult 
to envisage the development of effective EU governance in this specific sector. 
Transnational mobility is an integral aspect of the professional activities of 
artists and cultural workers: this aspect should be taken into account and specific 
regulations tailored to the needs of this category should be adopted. While such 
specific regulatory regimes are missing, rules concerning the cross-borders supply of 
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services under the frame of international economic law may help to support the 
mobility of artists and cultural workers. The UNESCO Convention recognises this 
and requires its Parties to establish preferential treatment schemes to facilitate the 
mobility of artists and cultural workers coming from developing countries so as to 
increase their possibilities for market access (Article 16 of the Convention). Further, 
preferential mobility schemes should also aim at facilitating cultural workers’ 
training, exchange of information and experiences. The European Union strategy to 
foster the transnational mobility of artists and cultural workers in the framework of 
bilateral trade agreements seems to be based on both these aspects: increasing 
possibilities for non-EU cultural professionals to access the EU market through 
provisions improving the temporary presence of cultural services suppliers (in cultural 
sectors other than the audiovisual one); and creating better conditions though the 
Cultural Protocols to simplify and promote the mobility of artists and cultural workers 
within the frame of co-productions, cultural and training exchanges. At this point, two 
distinctions are necessary: the first one relates to the evidence that on the bilateral 
level the Union is able to engage in more ample commitments than in the multilateral 
framework; the second one concerns the differences between the EPA with the 
CARIFORUM and the other trade agreements analysed in relation to the cultural 
services’ market access concessions. As for the first point, once more it is 
unsurprising that the Union is more daring at the bilateral level than the multilateral 
one. Within the multilateral framework the Union’s action is highly influenced by 
internal policy interests and legal constraints, as we saw in the case of GATS Mode 4. 
Yet, Member States also influenced the Union’s final decisions concerning the 
temporary presence of natural persons supplying cultural services within the frame of 
bilateral trade negotiations. This links with our second observation, concerning the 
substantial differences between the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the other 
Agreements. In the EU-Korea agreement Member States strongly opposed the 
allowance of preferential treatment for co-productions and further access to cultural 
sectors because of the level of development of Korean cultural industries, in order to 
defend the European cultural creative sector in the name of cultural diversity. As we 
saw, the criticism towards the Commission’s approach in negotiating the FTA with 
Korea strongly affected the following negotiations for the EU-CA and EU-Colombia 
and Peru agreements. In both these contexts, a wider access for services providers in 
the entertainment services like in the CARIFORUM-EU agreement has not been 
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granted. The unprecedented market access commitments granted for cultural services 
suppliers in the EPA are therefore characterised by a strong development policy 
paradigm. Overall, they seek to facilitate the circulation of CARIFORUM artists and 
other cultural professionals and practitioners in the EU, which might generate 
important capacity-building effects. This approach is coherent with the international 
commitments undertaken by the EU, coping with the promotion of culture as a 
vehicle of development. The different level of commitments undertaken in the other 
Trade Agreements is in line with the case-by-case approach, yet the fact that the EU-
Central America and the EU-Colombia and Peru agreements do not contain the same 
level of access for cultural services suppliers shows that a better prior assessment 
should be made. Indeed, it is also unclear for what reasons artists and cultural workers 
from Central America, Colombia and Peru cannot enjoy the same preferential 
treatment granted to the cultural workers of Caribbean countries. In these two 
contexts development issues are also at stake, but they do not seem to play the same 
significant role as in the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. The mobility of artists and cultural 
workers from Central America, Colombia and Peru is facilitated only on the basis of 
the cultural cooperation provisions contained in the cultural protocol/agreement.  
Besides the need to preserve cultural diversity, the EU’s undertaking of 
commitments to foster the mobility of artists and cultural workers is made more 
complicated by the fact that these initiatives encroach upon sensitive national spheres 
such as visas and migration control. As we saw, visa issues are at the heart of the 
obstacles hindering the mobility of artists and cultural workers from third countries. 
Current EU legislation on migration does not offer any appropriate solutions to this 
problem. For the future, the sectoral approach – which led to the adoption of 
directives such as the one dealing with researchers – could be a good way to promote 
the adoption of a directive concerning artists and cultural workers. Yet, it is difficult 
to imagine that this could take place with the agreement of all Member States. 
Nonetheless, the Commission’s plan to work on proposals to shorten and simplify the 
procedures for visa applications for individuals from third countries, including artists 
and cultural professionals, who wish to make short visits to Schengen area countries, 
re-launched in April 2014, leaves room for better future outcomes.   
The analysis of the Union’s policy documents on migration and development 
shows that very little attention is given to culture within the frame of the legal and 
political initiatives addressing mobility issues that have been adopted. The analysis of 
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mobility and migration carried out in this chapter demonstrates that “culture as a 
vector of development” seems to be relevant mostly when the economic aspects of 
cultural activities are at stake. So far, the integration of culture as a vector of 
development has gained more space in the context of trade policy than in migration 
policy. 
 
2.3) The EU and the safeguard of Traditional Knowledge  
 
As for the protection of traditional knowledge, the action of the Union in the 
bilateral frame is deceptive, especially in terms of raised expectations. Again, the 
internal constraints do not help the Union to pursue higher goals. Nonetheless, the EU 
does not take into proper account the principles of sustainable development in 
approaching this issue. Indeed, the EU Commission’s approach to tackling issues on 
IP law and TK does not seem to be really innovative and is mostly market based. 
Following the major stream, which focuses on the economic damage deriving from 
the current situation, the protection of cultural diversity and traditional lifestyle seems 
less relevant for the EU. In this specific case, preoccupations towards cultural 
diversity play a minor role in contributing to strike a balance among the different 
interests at stake; rather, other interests, underlying the whole issue – such as ensuring 
access to TK and genetic resources to European users – seem to be more relevant. For 
instance, when looking at the solutions proposed under the WTO and WIPO it is clear 
that they could contribute to a better implementation of the Access to Benefit Sharing, 
however they do not tackle the social and cultural dimension of the problem at stake. 
In addition, it is important to be aware of the possibility that such laws and policies 
might conflict with another aspect of this issue: protecting traditional knowledge 
against extinction. The most important measure to protect traditional knowledge from 
extinction is the sharing within their original Communities of such traditional 
knowledge. Laws and policies that make common sharing difficult, for example by 
providing for complicated procedures of prior informed consent, might negatively 
affect the sharing of traditional knowledge among farmers if they hinder conservation 
work. 
The request to modify Article 27.3(b) TRIPS so as to include a ban on 
patenting life would probably be a solution. Being realistic, it is hard to imagine that 
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an agreement on such a ban will ever be reached. In addition, this would open a 
Pandora’s box on a new series of highly debated issues – such as reducing the 
possibility for fostering R&D, technological innovations, health care improvements, 
and so on and so forth. So a balance could be found by reverting to other instruments 
directly addressing the protection of intangible forms of cultural heritage or cultural 
diversity. The economic aspect is certainly important, especially when it can 
contribute to poverty reduction, but in the current debate the preservation of TK as a 
lifestyle is almost being forgotten. Among the EU institutional actors, only the 
Parliament seems to be aware of this. An effort by the Union to protect TK as a 
cultural model of life is required. For instance, the Union could sign up to the 2003 
UNESCO Convention on Intangible Heritage.  
To conclude on this, it should be acknowledged that the Union has done a 
considerable amount of work in developing useful tools protecting traditional 
practices within the single market, in particular in the agro-industry and food sectors. 
I am referring here to the appellations of geographical indications and similar tools, 
which have gained an important place within the Union’s borders and play a relevant 
role on the internal market as both promoters of food quality and local traditions. 
Although these tools may present some shortcomings in terms of a fully effective 
protection of local and indigenous traditional knowledge (as highlighted in Chapter 5 
of this thesis), they can contribute to counterbalance the negative impacts of the 
current IP regime on access to TK and genetic resources, at least by directly granting 
economic benefits and visibility to local and indigenous communities. A greater effort 
by the Union is needed, both at the multilateral and bilateral levels, in promoting a 
wider application of these kinds of tools, perhaps under forms that takes indigenous 
and local communities’ specificities into account.  
 3) Concluding remarks: assessing the Union’s action in the “culture and 
development” debate 
 
3.1) Cultural diversity as a common but differentiated scope 
This synthesis of the major findings of this critical analysis demonstrates that 
the inner features of the European construct limit, to a considerable extent, the 
external action of the Union in the cultural sector. For this reason, it was shown that 
most significant initiatives, such as the adoption of the cultural protocols, take place 
within the bilateral trade agreements’ frame, an area in which the European Union can 
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mostly rely on its exclusive trade competence. Conversely, in areas in which the 
Member States’ competence and interests involved have a strong role to play, such as 
in regulating migration and negotiations concerning IP rules on access to TK and 
genetic resources (although it is worth recalling that the trade aspects of IPRs should 
now entirely fall under the exclusive trade competence of the Union), the Union’s 
initiatives are weaker and often result in a different balancing of the protection and 
promotion of cultural diversity. Indeed, as was demonstrated in this thesis, the 
protection and promotion of cultural diversity emerges as a core issue at the heart of 
the “culture and development” relationship. The EU Treaties grant constitutional 
protection to cultural diversity, which is among the constitutional values of the Union 
(Article 3(3) TEU). The protection of cultural diversity is, therefore, being considered 
among the priorities and in the “common interests” of the Union. Further, such 
cultural diversity ought not to be seen uniquely as European cultural diversity, but as 
the world’s cultural diversity, as suggested by the recent interpretation of the Court of 
Justice and AG Kokott in the UTECA decision (as pointed out in Chapter 2). It is 
worth recalling that, in the context of this decision, the Court made express reference 
to the UNESCO Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions, and endorsed the UNESCO Convention’s definition of cultural 
diversity as “part of the common heritage of humanity”. It can be stated that the 
protection of cultural diversity has gained further strength from the entry into force of 
the UNESCO Convention within the EU. In addition, it also seems that in the 
protection of cultural diversity the EU now pursues a common interest that goes 
beyond the Union’s interests: it rather seems to embrace an overriding reason of 
general interest (identified as the common interest of humankind). 
However, the protection and promotion of cultural diversity carries a different 
weight in determining the outcomes of the Union’s actions when mainstreaming 
culture as a vector of development. Indeed, it is extensively demonstrated that 
preoccupations towards protecting cultural diversity from the likely adverse effects 
that can derive from free trade rules is a central issue in the “culture and trade” policy 
of the Union. It was in the name of cultural diversity that the EU, together with its 
Member States, endorsed the battle for cultural exceptionalism under the WTO. It 
was also in the name of cultural diversity that the cultural protocols and rules 
facilitating cultural exchanges were adopted and integrated in the frame of bilateral 
trade agreements, with a view to both pursue developmental goals and contribute to 
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the free flow of cultural contents and creativity. Although Member States and the 
Commission may have different (or not entirely matching) positions towards the 
integration of culture in trade agreements, cultural diversity comes to the fore as a 
core element in the Union’s “culture and trade” strategy, and is taken into account in 
the search for a balance between free trade and protectionism. Instead, the protection 
and promotion of cultural diversity is not equally taken into account when it comes to 
decisions concerning the mobility of cultural workers and artists or the access to TK 
related to the use of genetic resources. In the case of the interaction between culture 
and migration, the potential negative impacts of restrictive migration policies on the 
circulation of culture are not even discussed at the EU level. Member States still 
prefer to rely on their traditional national initiatives to promote the transnational 
mobility of artists and cultural professionals, such as the promotion of cultural 
exchanges through the granting of scholarships for artists or similar programmes. As 
for the issues underlying the overall question of the access to TK and genetic 
resources, only the European Parliament seems to be aware of the necessity to 
properly assess the possible impacts for cultural diversity of the application of current 
IPRs rules. Different interests, such as those pushed forward by European 
pharmaceutical and cosmetics companies, often supported by the Member States, 
seem to play a more relevant role in determining the final achievements of the 
Union’s negotiations, at least at the multilateral level.  
 
3.2) Is the Union contributing to the emergence of a global governance for 
culture as a vector of sustainable development?  
 
Overall, the strategy of the Union to integrate and mainstream culture as a 
vector of development appears rather fragmentary and is not always coherent. Yet, it 
must be recognised that the EU is becoming more and more involved in the cultural 
arena and its efforts often constitute a positive contribution to the developing of 
global “culture and development” governance. As we saw, limits to the external 
Union’s action derive from the need to respect internal constraints, something that is 
not always so obvious to observers outside the Union and that may appear as 
incoherence between “what the EU says and what the EU does”. Further, the 
integration of culture into other policies seems only to work for certain aspects of 
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culture, mostly related to the economic dimension of culture (as just highlighted). 
This can entail a risk of the commodification of culture and the export of a model of 
development in which culture is reduced to a mere commodity. Although 
commodification is often an endemic risk deriving from the acknowledgment that 
cultural activities can contribute to economic growth and increase national GDP, the 
contributions of culture go beyond the quantitative dimension of development. The 
Union seems to be aware of the multidimensional contributions that culture can bring 
to development, nonetheless the fact that most of its actions are taken within the trade 
framework suggest that its idea of development is still very much grounded on 
economic growth. As we saw, the added value of recognising a central role to culture 
within the development paradigm (or culture as the fourth pillar of development) 
mainly raises further awareness about the promotion of a different model of 
development, more oriented towards sustainable human development criteria than the 
traditional one of economic development. Using the principle of the sustainable 
development discourse can provide useful tools for the European Union to manage 
culture as a sustainable resource and strike a more appropriate balance between 
cultural interests and other kinds of interests, when culture interacts with trade, 
migration, and IP law. 
This is, for instance, the case of the cultural protocols and the provisions 
concerning the treatment of cultural industries in bilateral trade agreements, which 
have been framed in terms of granting greater and more equitable market access to 
cultural goods and services coming from developing countries, so as to promote more 
balanced cultural exchanges and strike a balance between openness and 
protectionism. In this sense, it can be affirmed that the Union is contributing to give 
concrete applications worldwide to the principles embedded in the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention on Cultural Diversity. In other words, it could also be stated that the 2005 
UNESCO Convention is greatly influencing the external action of the Union, at least 
as far as it concerns the efforts in implementing the provisions aiming to foster more 
balanced cultural exchanges. As proposed above, this approach could also be adopted 
in the frame of mobility schemes promoting the mobility of artists and cultural 
workers. Principles of equity and fairness, as well as a cautious approach that takes 
into account the specificity of TK connected to the use of genetic resources should 
also influence the balancing of the different interests at stake in the culture and IP law 
dichotomy.  
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Another broader consideration should be mentioned. In spite of the fact that 
the Union is developing a “cultural approach” in trade and development issues, which 
may not always appear coherent from the outside, it must be acknowledged that the 
Union’s increased engagement in ratifying and implementing relevant Conventions, 
such as the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity or the Protocol of Nagoya to 
the CBD, is attracting greater attention, which is echoed not only in the external 
concrete actions of the Union itself, but also in the Member States’ policies and legal 
initiatives. Further, it is increasingly raising awareness towards the integration of 
culture in development policies and the need to tackle issues and tensions arising from 
this relationship, both at the national, regional and international level. All this 
attention is producing positive outcomes: indeed, although the Commission and the 
Member States may pull in opposite directions, and the action of the Union is often 
restrained by limits imposed by the Member States, it must be acknowledged that this 
is opening the discussion on critical issues concerning the implementation of these 
relevant international conventions. A concrete example of this is given by the recent 
adoption of the EU regulation on Access to Benefit Sharing to promote measures of 
compliance with the Nagoya Protocol at the European level. The adoption of the 
above-mentioned Regulation is, indeed, obliging all Member States to start coping 
with the ratification and implementation of the Nagoya Protocol: it is very likely that 
in the absence of this Regulation most of them, especially those Members who are not 
great users or providers of genetic resources and are not engaged in the dialogue on 
the protection of indigenous or local traditional, would probably not have engaged so 
diligently in the ratification process. Finally, just to reconnect with the considerations 
in Chapter 1 on the positive role that a human-rights approach can bring to the 
“culture and development” debate, it can be added that more efforts in promoting 
cultural rights, which are often the forgotten dimension of development, could 
contribute to counterbalance an approach very much focused on trade. As clarified in 
the Introduction and Chapter 1 of this thesis, there was not enough room here to cover 
the discussion concerning human rights and their relationship with culture and 
development. In the initial part of this thesis, I addressed the human rights discourse 
to give a comprehensive vision of the most commonly discussed instruments that can 
turn into useful tools to strike a balance between culture and trade issues. Indeed, 
cultural rights rescue the human dimension of development. States and international 
actors could then adopt a rights-based approach to culture and respect for cultural and 
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linguistic diversity within national and regional policies and legal frameworks, 
including consideration for minorities, gender balance, and youth and specific 
indigenous peoples’ concerns. The enforcement and the respect of cultural rights are 
perceived as beneficial for democracy, freedom of expression, gender equality, 
reducing discrimination, and other positive values that contribute to the overall 
wellbeing and development of societies.2 This idea has not been further explored here 
in relation to the EU’s external action: a choice was made to focus on practical 
implications of the multilateral and bilateral frame of negotiations in three specific 
sectors, at the expense of a full discussion of human rights. Yet, in reference to this 
point, it could be recalled here that a significant element of the EU’s external human 
rights and democracy policy is represented in human rights conditionality: in order to 
be granted trade preferences, third countries are required to comply with labour and 
environmental standards, or ratify human rights conventions So far, no special clauses 
on cultural rights are contemplated under the range of human rights conditionality 
clauses. Specific cultural conditionality could start to be integrated; however, this 
proposal remains unexplored for the purpose of this thesis. 
I wish to conclude my work with a thought concerning the current crisis that 
the EU is facing. The crisis we are living witnessing in Europe is not only a financial 
and monetary crisis, and nor is it solely not only an increased wave of Euro-
scepticism. Europe is facing a crisis of values, which shows how little consideration 
in truth is given to culture. Jean Monnet said: “Si c’etait à recommencer, je 
recommencerais par la culture”.3 Perhaps, this now is the time to restart, and to do so 
restart by giving placing more value on to culture and the European cultural heritage 
more value within the reshaping of the Union. In July 2014 newspapers reports 
suggesteded that the Greek Government is ready to open negotiations to sell to private 
purchasers pieces stretches of the Greek coastline, small preserved islands, and 
ancient monuments and buildings, to private purchasers, in order to obey the demands 
of austerity imposed by the EU. But is Europe selling its cultural soul? Is Europe 
forgetting to preserve and protect its cultural heritage and the rich diversity of its 
Members in the name of a common interest? If so, which common interest? Should 
fiscal stability be considered a higher priority than preserving Member States’ cultural 
                                                
2 Y Donders, “Do cultural diversity and human rights make a good match?”, in UNESCO 2010 
(Blackwell Publishing Ltd , 2010). 
3 Jean Monnet quoted in Denis de Rougemont tel qu’en lui-même, in Cadmos 33/1986, at 22. 
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heritage? Leaving these questions open, I cannot avoid expressing my personal 
concern about the current situation that Europe is facing. It will be hard to see Europe 
as a credible or a reliable international actor if it does not first solves its inner 
problems of coherence. The approach towards cultural concerns is an example of this. 
Perhaps this is the right time to restart, by rescuing culture and values, to build the 
Europe of solidarity and peace of which Schuman and Europe’s founding fathers had 
already dreamed.  
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